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Abstract 
 
 
The governmental functions of security and intelligence require a number of 
distinct organisations and functions to interact in a symbiotic way. Because 
the external environment is uncertain and complex, these organisations must 
constantly negotiate with each other to establish which of them addresses 
which issue, and with what resources. Coasian principles suggest that if 
there are no transacting costs and property rights are clear, then such 
negotiations should lead to an overall maximisation of the benefits gained (in 
this case better security and intelligence provision), yet this is rarely realised. 
By coupling the transaction cost theory devised by Oliver Williamson in 1975 
with a range of alternate theoretical perspectives that impact on these areas 
of governance, an institutional costs approach is developed. By increasing 
the resolution of the analysis whilst still retaining a comprehensive overview, 
the frictions that hinder negotiated cooperation become apparent.  
The two cases of counterterrorism and defence intelligence in both the 
United Kingdom and the United States are then used to test and refine the 
institutional costs paradigm that results. These demonstrate that orthodox 
views of good cooperation in the former and poor cooperation in the latter are 
overly simplistic, as neither is necessarily more disposed to behave 
cooperatively than the other; rather, the institutional costs environment that 
their respective organisational architectures create incentivises different 
cooperative behaviour in different circumstances. 
The analysis also shows that the impact of the various factors that make up 
the institutional costs paradigm is in fact far more nuanced in these areas 
than is evident in earlier transaction costs scholarship. Their relevance differs 
by type as well as degree. Institutional costs analysis therefore provides the 
beginnings of a political economy for cooperative working in the intelligence 
and security spheres of governance.  
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Chapter 1 - Introduction  
Section 1: Intelligence and Security as Symbiotic Functions 
The intelligence and security spheres are two overlapping and symbiotic 
functions of governance, but institutions and people are at the heart of their 
delivery. The study of intelligence and security therefore requires the same 
breadth of consideration that Peter Jackson observed to be the essence of 
any political economic enquiry; whereby no matter how detailed the focus of 
the enquiry the entire social system on which it is founded needs to be 
considered.1  
Given this interconnectivity, the issue becomes one of governance, of 
managing the disparate objectives and capabilities of those people and 
institutions to best provide the general utility of a secure environment. This 
thesis will develop a theory for cooperation both within and between the 
intelligence and security spheres that is properly cognisant of both internal 
and external factors. It will argue that, whilst there has been a significant 
amount of scholarly attention paid to issues of integration and coordination 
within the intelligence and security spheres, its narrow focus has precluded 
proper weight being given to wider environmental and social conditions. 
Examinations of particular cases have tended to be caricatured by either the 
'failure' or (less commonly) 'success' of the enterprise or community under 
review, whereas the intelligence and security functions can more properly be 
characterised as including an ongoing mix of both.  
This has been detrimental to the more holistic analysis that includes a 
consideration of how internal and external elements and factors interact over 
time.2 The theories that can account for particular successes, or those that 
account for particular failures, whilst useful within the context that they have 
been developed, are inadequate to fully explain all the alternative outcomes 
of cooperative success or failure in a comprehensive way. A wider theory that 
                                                                   
1
Peter McLeod Jackson, The Political Economy of Bureaucracy(Philip Allan Oxford, 1982). 11-12 
2
 Exceptions in the consideration of other areas of governance can be found in the work of, inter alia, 
Martha Derthick, which have demonstrated the importance of including the full gamut of factors. See 
for example Martha Derthick, Policymaking for Social Security(Brookings Institution Washington, 
DC, 1979).  
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can encapsulate their insights without being constrained by them is thus 
required, and it is argued that the institutional cost impact framework 
developed in this thesis offers a suitable architecture for such a theory.   
That is not to suggest that the development of a more appropriate 
explanatory model is commensurate with any kind of fix for the coordination 
problems inherent in security and intelligence provision. The frictions 
exposed within and between the two domains during the investigation into 
the 2009 attempted bombing of Northwest Airlines Flight 253,3 some eight 
years after the Sept 11th Attacks of 2001, are testament to the difficulties 
involved and the unlikelihood of any one organisational solution being 
adequate to the variety of possible threats.  
Before proceeding further it is necessary to discuss what is meant by ideas of 
a ‘security community’ and an ‘intelligence community’: The intelligence 
community is to some extent self defining, and is perhaps more easily 
delineated than intelligence itself.4 In the United States there is a formal 
coalition of seventeen organisations (including the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence) that comprise the  ‘Intelligence Community’.5 In the 
United Kingdom the national intelligence machinery consists of a number of 
collection and analytical organisations that are defined by Cabinet Office.6 
However the position is slightly more complicated than this simple view would 
suggest: Most analysis in the UK for example is performed within 
departments not primarily concerned with intelligence matters. In addition 
there are elements of the security community that are nonetheless 
intelligence organisations in their own right, and who contribute to the 
national piece, albeit often at one remove, that are not included in this 
                                                                   
3
 President Barack Obama, "Remarks by the President on Strengthening Intelligence and Aviation 
Security," Office of the Press Secretary, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-
president-strengthening-intelligence-and-aviation-security. 
4
 The definition of intelligence itself is no easy matter, with opinions ranging across whether it should 
include only secret information, whether it is the raw product as it is recovered from whatever source 
is emerges from, or indeed is the final, analysed and contextualised according to decision-makers 
requirements. It is beyond the purview of this thesis to become embroiled in that debate but see for 
example Philip H.J. Davies, "'Ideas of Intelligence: Divergent National Concepts and Institutions'," 
Harvard International Review 14, no. 3 (2002). 
5
 "Office of the Director of National Intelligence: Leading Intelligence Integration," Deputy Director 
Intelligence Integration ODNI, http://www.dni.gov/index.php/. 
6
 "National Intelligence Machinery," ed. Cabinet Office(2010). 
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national machinery. These include police intelligence units and tactical level 
military7 assets.  
The security community under discussion here refers to those organisations 
that are engaged with protective security functions, including military 
organizations engaged in defence. Wider, and arguably more naturally 
competitive fields, such as aspects of economic security or even energy 
security, where security is a relative position so that achieving more of it for 
oneself means less of it for another, are not considered here from either the 
security or intelligence perspective. Protective security functions are 
nonetheless performed by a wide range of organisations and parts of 
organisations, as well as by individual actors within organisations with 
primarily non-security related purposes and private sector contractors. How 
the protective security community is circumscribed is therefore problematic, 
and given this thesis’ focus on cooperative success and failure between 
elements of each community the issue is non-trivial and not suited to any 
arbitrary delineation.    
Appropriate definitions may also be required to circumscribe the two 
communities differently dependent on how they are inter-relating with each 
other. Definitions may be needed that can incorporate one or other of the 
security and intelligence communities, or on occasion to both of them in 
conjunction. The relationship between them can vary depending on 
circumstances. They may at times be partners in the pursuit of a common 
purpose such as a national security objective, autonomous communities 
pursuing distinct objectives, or one may be a subset of the other as it assists 
it in achieving intelligence or security goals. The nature of the relative 
definition of each community can thus have consequences for the issues of 
property rights, shared goals, and other transaction costs discussed later in 
this thesis.   
The British Security Service for example can be regarded as part of both the 
                                                                   
7
 Throughout this thesis the term ‘military’ will be used in its more American context as a shorthand 
for all armed forces endeavours, rather than the more British understanding of being army related. 
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UK’s intelligence community, of which it is formerly a member,8 and of the 
protective security community with which it is inclined to define itself in its 
public statements.9 The United States FBI, who share many of the same 
functions but who are primarily a law enforcement agency have historically 
preferred to define themselves as such. According to some commentators 
this has undermined their protective security and domestic intelligence 
functions.10 Such self-definition of role is a non-trivial matter that has 
significance for the issues considered throughout this thesis. 
Because of these complications a more inclusive method of defining the two 
communities is required. The problem is similar to that observed by 
Alexander Wendt when trying to apply his social constructivist approach to 
the international system; as he put it “…constructivist sensibilities encourage 
us to look at how actors are socially constructed, but they do not tell us which 
actors to study or where they are constructed…” units, levels of analysis, 
agents, and structures must therefore all be chosen.11  
Peter Winch has argued that in the social sciences “… the concepts and 
criteria according to which the sociologist judges that, in two situations, the 
same thing has happened, or the same action performed…” must be 
understood not only within the rules governing what the sociologist is 
studying but also according to the rules of those engaged in it. Because the 
object of the investigation is a human activity he states that it is these rules 
“…rather than those which govern the sociologist’s investigation, which 
specify what is to count as ‘doing the same kind of thing’ in relation to that 
kind of activity.” In his view even a detailed knowledge of the ‘regularities’ 
that might formally delineate an activity will be inadequate, and a deeper 
understanding of the “considerations which govern the lives of its 
participants”. As he puts it “…A historian of art must have some aesthetic 
sense if he is to understand the problems confronting the artists of his period; 
                                                                   
8
 "National Intelligence Machinery." 
9
 See for example "Mi5 the Security Service," Crown Copyright, https://www.mi5.gov.uk/. 
10
 The relative weight that the FBI give to their various law enforcement, security and intelligence 
roles are much debated. See for example Richard A. Posner, Remaking Domestic 
Intelligence(Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 2005). 
11
 Alexander Wendt, "Social Theory of International Politics,"(Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999).7 
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and without this he will have left out of his account precisely what would have 
made it a history of art, as opposed to a rather puzzling external account of 
certain motions which certain people have been perceived to go through.”12 
Wendt develops this idea. In his view “… the structures of human association 
are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces and …. 
the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these 
shared ideas rather than given by nature.”. As these ideas combine both 
social ‘idealist’ and ‘structuralist’ perspectives13 it follows that the security and 
intelligence communities may be constructed by social practice as much as 
they are formally defined. Both must be defined, at least in part, by whether 
actors feel they are involved in either activity, how they are perceived by 
other members of the community, and the formal position of their 
organization in the constellation of governmental functional entities.  
For example a teacher might be engaged in counter radicalization. He or she 
may be providing some measure of protective security by dissuading 
potential extremism and be providing information about grass roots issues 
that may get incorporated into wider intelligence assessments subsequently. 
However they are unlikely to consider themselves as within either community 
despite the fact they are engaged in activities that could be construed as 
security or intelligence provision. A civil servant whose duties include using 
that information to compile policy advice or trying to implement a counter 
radicalization strategy may feel they are a part of the relevant community on 
some occasions and not others, whilst members of the intelligence agencies 
or counterterrorism police will invariably feel, and be perceived as, within 
each of the two communities.  
Context and perspective are therefore important elements in defining the 
security and intelligence communities. The approach here will reflect this fact 
and both the intelligence and security communities will be defined as 
including those organisations and actors that are outside the formal 
communities but nonetheless are engaged in protective security or any 
                                                                   
12
 Peter Winch, The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy, 2nd ed.(London: 
Routledge, 2008).86-88 
13
 Wendt, "Social Theory of International Politics."1 
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intelligence function that supports it.  
Both intelligence and security concerns are in any event very far from the 
ideal-typical bureaucracies described by Weber as many of the choices 
needing to be made relate to quite individual circumstances:14 In fact 
organisational choices within the intelligence and security spheres are 
framed by the same three general conditions that Cohen et al described as 
representative of an ‘organised anarchy’; it is difficult to impute a single set of 
preferences across the whole, the processes of the organisation are unclear 
or not standardised, and members address different issues with varying 
degrees of participation and energy.15 Under such conditions the institutional 
difficulties involved in seeking out solutions, agreeing them, and then 
monitoring their implementation are of paramount importance. The two 
functions, as well as their many significant sub-functions such as law 
enforcement, are intimately related in some areas and wholly separate in 
others. They each suffer from having to be delivered across what are more 
usually managed as discrete policy areas, which means that conventional 
hierarchical arrangements are inadequate. Furthermore most of these areas 
are themselves complex and require high levels of specific expertise from 
those charged with their delivery at even the lowest levels. This means that 
the sort of tensions noted by Talcott Parsons,16 between the authority imbued 
in each level of a hierarchical construction, and that more informally imbued 
in the expertise of those delivering it, are at their height. There are thus high 
levels of what Diane Vaughan dubbed ‘structural secrecy’ (accentuated in 
many cases by the necessity for actual secrecy), which hinder mutual 
understanding and engagement across the community.17 These structurally 
distinct edifices must also sit within the most complex areas of governmental 
                                                                   
14
See inter alia Max Weber, Guenther Roth, and Claus Wittich, Economy and Society : An Outline of 
Interpretive Sociology, 2 vols.(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978). 
15
Michael D Cohen, James G March, and Johan P Olsen, "A Garbage Can Model of Organizational 
Choice," Administrative science quarterly 17, no. 1 (1972). 
16
 Talcott Parsons in his introduction to Max Weber, "The Theory of Economic and Social 
Organization," Trans. AM Henderson and Talcott Parsons. New York: Oxford University Press 
(1947). 
17
Diane Vaughn, "The Challenger Launch Decision," U. Chicago, Chicago (1996). and see Amy 
Zegart "Implementing Change: Organizational Challenges" in Amy Zegart, "Implementing Change: 
Organizational Challenges," in Intelligence Analysis: Behavioral and Social Scientific Foundations, 
ed. Baruch Fischhoff and Cherie Chauvin(National Academies Press, 2011).309-329 for a discussion 
of how this impacts on the intelligence sphere.  
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business, buffeted by a plethora of influences. This muddies any analysis 
that relies on a single explanatory framework.18 The combination of the these 
factors has lead to a paucity of overarching explanatory propositions.  
Finally the power inherent in the application of some of these functional 
areas, and the possibility of their abuse, means that high institutional costs 
provide constraints and balances. They may therefore be consciously 
tolerated, whether they stem from constitutional, legal or policy instruments.19 
These are often designed to maintain the separation between the areas 
despite their complimentary nature, and can inevitably act counter to 
efficiency and efficacy.  The intelligence and security spheres are thus rife 
with the sort of problems that both political scientists and economists must 
address, and these emanate from the human and organisational contexts in 
which they are delivered, and the complexity and uncertainty inherent in their 
environmental setting. Nonetheless theories that cover both intelligence and 
security as substantive, integrated and symbiotic areas of governance are 
not well developed.  
Practically speaking, the necessity for successfully integrating the different 
strands of security and intelligence provision has been apparent for some 
time. This has been particularly true in the post Cold-War, then post 9/11 
eras; the combination of which saw a shift in the environment away from a 
single over-arching threat to a plethora of problems emanating from 
numerous sources. Cooperative or 'joined-up' working is now regarded as 
essential. The term 'partnership' has become a catch-all euphemism for best 
practise in both spheres, and is ubiquitous on both sides of the Atlantic and in 
                                                                   
18
The classic demonstration of this is Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision : Explaining the Cuban 
Missile Crisis(Boston: Little, Brown, 1971).174. To demonstrate the influence of complexity Allison 
uses as his metaphor the data likely to be required by an uninformed analyst wishing to generate 
propositions around a game of poker. Other authors have discussed the exponential increase in size of 
the decision tree needed to analyse a chess game but the former has the advantage of paralleling 
governmental decision making more closely in that it includes personal preferences (such as for 
winning by bluffing over winning by a stronger hand) and can thus be more closely aligned to 
governmental activity.  
19
 Derthick for example noted that "... the most cherished structural features of American government 
pose obstacles to good administration". Martha Derthick, Agency under Stress: The Social Security 
Administration in American Government(Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1990).4 
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almost every public statement on security related topics by public bodies.20 
However, even so general an acknowledgment of the usefulness of 
collaborative working has to a large extent failed to translate into the sort of 
genuinely joint efforts advocated. There have of course been significant 
exceptions, but these, like the failings, were as identifiable during the Cold 
War years as they were after them, despite the apparent increased push for 
‘joined-up’ public sector functions of all sorts in recent years. The United 
States Congressional Research Service conclude that the partnership 
approach in the USA has not clarified what is to be achieved and how 
resources should therefore be prioritised amongst different partnership 
activities, nor has it assigned adequately specific responsibilities across 
government, or provided any assessment of which partnerships are thus 
successful. The result in the United States is that those involved have 
returned to a default position that simply builds on already achieved 
successes and have continued with “.... existing patterns of engagement” so 
that they “... optimize at the sub-systemic level – focusing on the trees rather 
than on the forest...”.21 Put another way, those involved are still pursuing 
those options that minimise the personal governance costs they experience 
because the property rights regime (the ordering of roles and responsibilities) 
is not sufficiently clear and information is asymmetrically held. Continuing as 
before, except where this has proved seriously deleterious, in thus the 
obvious if not the only choice. How then should this difficulty in introducing 
genuinely cooperative interaction between the various parts of the security 
and intelligence communities, which persists despite the significant 
investment of those in power, be best explained?  
Section 2: Shortfalls and Dichotomies in Existing Intelligence and 
Security Literature 
Recent years have seen an increased interest in research into intelligence 
and security functions by practitioners and academics alike, some advocating 
particular approaches to reform and others looking for explanatory models. In 
                                                                   
20
See for example William Hague, "F.C.O. Programme Spending 2014-15 Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs," ed. Foreign and Commonwealth Office(Hansard, 10th July 2014).  
21
 Catherine Dale, "In Brief: Clarifying the Concept of “Partnership” in National Security," Report for 
Congress Congressional Research Service (2012). 
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both cases however, as this section makes clear, frameworks that explain 
one set of circumstances seem flawed when applied to another, and fixes 
designed for some issues are ill suited to others.   
Nowhere are these problems more eloquently show-cased than in Graham 
Allison's seminal Essence of Decision.  Allison explicitly draws out the 
inconsistencies and shortfalls in three explanatory models, but also 
demonstrates that they have strengths in explaining particular factors even 
as they struggle with others; a divergence most clearly evident when he 
considers either the larger external situation or the internal machinations 
within the United States (US/USA) government. Allison thus begins to 
establish the need for a model that can incorporate both.22 
This need is emphasised by the missing dimension in the work of other 
national security authors, including those who have formerly had to deal with 
these issues as senior practitioners. In many cases either inconsistencies in 
the raison d'être of particular recommended policy fixes, or a limited 
applicability that would seem likely to provoke problems at one or another 
level emerge, often suggesting problems would simply be moved further 
along the line.23 The focus on strong hierarchies by figures like the former 
Director of the National Security Agency (NSA), General William Odom,  is at 
odds with his acknowledgement that even at the highest levels quarrels are 
inevitable; making one wonder what level of authority could ever be 
adequate.  Problems of perfunctory compliance rather than the complete 
engagement needed for functions with this level of specialisation are largely 
ignored in this approach, but are a significant problem within the US 
community about which he writes. There are similar dichotomies in his 
argument for autonomy at some levels, and proximity at others, but Odom 
nonetheless observed the sort of factors that make-up an institutional cost 
architecture and implicitly acknowledges their import, but does not address 
them in an holistic way.24  
                                                                   
22
 Allison, Essence of Decision : Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. 
23
 These issues are developed in Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
24
 See particularly William E. Odom, Fixing Intelligence for a More Secure America(New Haven, 
Conn. ; London: Yale University Press, 2003). 
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Similarly another senior practitioner turned commentator, General Michael 
Hayden, who had served variously as the Director of the National Security 
Agency (1999-2005), the Principal Deputy to the Director of National 
Intelligence (2005-2006) and as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency 
(2006-2009), argues for an authoritative head of the community, but cannot 
balance this with the pre-eminence of the Pentagon, particularly in the post 
9/11 era,25 nor his believe that the authority of the former Director of Central 
Intelligence (DCI) came not from his legislatively enshrined authority, but 
from the resources he brought to the table, resources not available to the 
new Director of National Intelligence (DNI),26 a view shared by many of his 
predecessors at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).27 Such contradictions 
in the work of both former practitioners, neither of who were able to ‘fix’ the 
US intelligence community whilst helping to run it, suggest that simple 
authority (however absolute) is not an adequate answer to the problems they 
observe in meshing aspects of the security and intelligence communities 
together.  
These inconsistencies are not however unique to the problems noted by US 
commentators however. Sir David Omand, who like Odom and Hayden was 
a senior community leader, but in the United Kingdom (UK), writes 
extensively about environmental change in the modern era being causal to 
the collaborative reforms needed, but parallels these with earlier similar 
influences. He too believes in a more commanding presence at the head of 
the US community, but is nonetheless convinced that better coordination 
across the communities will serve the UK best.28 Both arguments are well 
made and empirically supported so explaining the differences between them 
clearly requires an increased resolution of examination, and Omand himself 
acknowledges this when he discusses how ‘trust’ can act to ease interactions 
between different aspects of these functions.29. Other authors who come 
from a more academically orientated position such as Richard Betts and 
                                                                   
25
 Michael V Hayden, "The State of the Craft: Is Intelligence Reform Working?," World Affairs 
3(2010). 
26
 Ibid.37 
27
 Michael Allen, Blinking Red : Crisis and Compromise in American Intelligence after 9/11, First 
edition. ed.(Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, 2013).30-32 
28
 David Omand, Securing the State(London: Hurst, 2010). 
29
 Ibid. 300-2 
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Gregory Treverton have also remarked on the significance of this increasing 
number of horizontal interactions and the unequal holdings of information 
across both functions that need to be managed, and the difficulties inherent 
in the trade-offs these necessitate. However because they acknowledge that 
a solution that is ideal in one circumstance is unlikely to be so in another, no 
holistic approach is developed.30  
Treverton, who is now the National Intelligence Council Chair, makes valid 
observations about the shift in both the information environment from too little 
information to too much,31 and the simultaneous proliferation of end users.32 
He is also aware of the impact of the shift in environmental conditions, which 
include both complexity33 and uncertainty, whose effects he describes as  
cascading in discontinuous ways.34 However he stops short of explaining 
why these should have the impact he gives them credit for. As a result his 
principal organisational recommendation, increased connectivity across what 
he suggests have previously been separate disciplines,35 is counter-intuitive. 
Thus the fluid ‘organisational sense-making’ he advocates36 lacks a 
dimension. It does not yet address how the extant behaviours of actors, 
generated by the existing organisational structure as it reacts with a changing 
environment, could or should be adapted to deal with this dichotomy. 
One European approach to theorising around the problem of increased 
complexity and uncertainty in the environment has been to conceive the 
change in terms of a shift in the threat/risk relationship as the former retracts 
and the latter increases.37 Certainly such a change has been evident since 
the 1990’s and the end of the Cold War. It is less clear that the shift has 
actually introduced any qualitatively unique problems in terms of managing 
governmental responses to either. Rather, there have been a quantitatively 
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larger number of interactions, at evermore levels, across the communities. 
These have actually engendered ‘more of the same’ problems. 
Authors who have adopted a new institutionalist approach such as Amy 
Zegart and Richard Posner have produced a comprehensive picture of why 
inter-agency co-operation and many reforming initiatives break down, but 
their approach falls short in accounting for those occasions when it works 
well. 
Zegart’s use of new institutionalism to develop her 'national security agency 
model' is a certainly a very important part of a “... theory of bureaucracy” but 
as she attests herself, it is not yet comprehensive so that dichotomies can 
become apparent.38 In Flawed by Design for example she makes a 
persuasive case for (inter alia) the importance of the interest group 
environment in pushing through reforms or new ideas, noting that it is weak 
within the national security sphere, so that policy makers are not incentivised 
to see changes through, and reforms are fatally undermined.39 However the 
post 9/11 and WMD era demonstrated a significant shift in interest group 
activity and yet, as Spying Blind demonstrates, very much the same watering 
down and sub-optimum design formats resulted.40 To a degree this is a 
matter of Zegart’s ‘national security agency model’ evolving, but one would 
nonetheless anticipate a reduction in overall collaborative problems, and a 
corresponding increase in the degree to which policy makers would commit 
to a particular course and stay with it. Yet the gradual diminution of the 
proposed DNI’s authority in the run up to the 2004 Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) makes it plain that this is not the case. 
Clearly there is something more going on. How the different factors identified 
by Zegart interact is itself a factor, and the calculation of the likely success of 
the interagency and collaborative endeavours within the community is thus 
not a simple addition, but rather a more complex multiplication, and the 
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problem is not with Zegart’s analysis, but with new institutionalism as an 
explanatory framework.  
Richard Posner has also used a new institutionalist approach to critique 
efforts at reform in the United States intelligence community and inevitably 
comes to very much the same conclusions as Amy Zegart.41 Although he 
also acknowledges the occasional frictionless collaborative endeavour, like 
her, his narrative largely bypasses any explanation for these. Posner has an 
obvious appreciation of the breadth of issues that are relevant to security and 
intelligence delivery. Nor is he naïve regarding potential solutions; at the 
policymaking level Posner appreciates how the ‘probabilistic’ nature of 
counterterrorism intelligence provokes problems for decision makers. He 
notes the impact of external issues such as the complexity of the security and 
intelligence problem, and the uncertainty inherent in any proposed solution, 
acknowledging they make satisfactory negotiations more difficult (and strong 
advocacy more attractive) in the counterterrorism sphere particularly. He 
uses both cultural42 and utilitarian ideas to explain particular observations at 
particular times, yet he does not provide any theoretical underpinning that 
could be regarded as a cohesive whole.  
At the other end of the spectrum authors like Michael Herman, a former Chair 
of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) in the UK, discuss how cooperation 
across security and intelligence endeavours can work, with reference to the 
UK’s intelligence system.43 Herman is the converse of Zegart and Posner in 
that where they explain why collaborative endeavours fail, but cannot explain 
successes, his views of collegiality as what underpins British collaborative 
success cannot really explain why it sometimes breaks down. Like many of 
the American authors considered above, Herman’s explanation is based on 
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sound observations as both senior practitioner and academic,44 yet his 
conclusions are diametrically opposed to those who argue for a strong 
hierarchal architecture to reform communities in response to environmental 
shifts. Instead he promotes bottom up, evolutionary reforms to ever-changing 
circumstances.45 Again, explanation for this difference in policy prescription 
can only be achieved by increasing the granularity of the analysis, but without 
losing the comprehensive nature of the examination. 
Other authors have discerned a symbiosis between not only different parts of 
the communities involved, but also between different explanatory frameworks  
for their behaviour. Philip Davies has evolved his original organisational 
theory approach to allow for a more complex inter-relationship between the 
cause and effect of behavioural factors since it was first developed in 
Machinery of  Spying.46 His Special Edition of Public Administration linking 
(inter alia) Martin Smith's core executive theory to the intelligence community 
has made this clear.47 In his recent work he demonstrates how the cultural 
issues brought out by the likes of Zegart and Posner are themselves shaped 
by structural organisation, which in turn is mutated by cultural pressures that 
can affect both the formal and informal profile of an organisation, as well as 
collaborative success.48 In so doing Davies identifies a circular relationship 
between the two that can be either vicious or virtuous.  The detail of that 
interaction is thus non-trivial and has significant potential repercussions. 
However, Davies stops short of developing a model that can incorporate that 
interaction.  
Certainly his explanation of how intelligence assets that belong variously to 
the MoD and US Department of Defense (DoD) is comprehensive and rooted 
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in organisational problems between different national/civilian and 
tactical/military requirements and priorities, but has some cultural factors 
exacerbating these.49 On the other hand Davies, like many authors, ascribes 
the consistent failure of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to develop 
a genuine intelligence capability, despite significant exogenous shocks 
pushing them in that direction, to a combination of their ‘law enforcement’ 
culture and substantive organisational bars. But in focusing on organisational 
arrangements Davies does little to explain why significant and well 
considered organisational shifts do not translate into genuine shifts in 
practice.50 The mechanics of the interactions between the two are not 
developed, so no reasons for the different impact of each in each case 
emerges. 
Similarly Davies recognition of the ‘information costs’ problem is treated as a 
single issue. He cites different understandings of what intelligence itself is in 
different contexts, identifying variations within and between the US and UK.51 
He also notes how these add to the problem of different holdings of 
information by actors mandated by both specialisation and secrecy to retain 
that advantage, and that these combine to add to tensions and produce an 
apparently insoluble interagency coordination problem.52 Yet these different 
holdings and understandings need not be a problem, and can even be used 
to advantage. Consider for example his persuasive argument that the 
effectiveness of the JIC is realised not by a chair of 'personal authority' but by 
a realisation amongst his or her peers that they are engaged in a collective 
pursuit and to sublimate their own and their departments goals to those of the 
group (the sense of a shared maximand in this work, where the maximand is 
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simply defined as the quantity or thing that actors wish to maximise, whether 
independently or jointly).53 This seems to work well enough in the UK, where 
the culture is inherently collegial, but not in the USA, where the missing 
interagency coordination problem is "... exacerbated by the tendency to work 
competitively...".54 
In sum, Davies comprehensive treatment of so many different factors, left as 
they are as discrete pressures, struggles to account for why apparently 
similar circumstances can lead to such different outcomes. Whilst it can be 
argued that the US is a more competitive culture, and that this is better suited 
to law enforcement type pursuits than those that require a high degree of 
intelligence sharing for example, this does not explain why that same US has 
made such strides in the defence intelligence arena, or why the normally 
collegial UK has not. It is the contention of this thesis that his various points 
can be subsumed into an holistic model for intelligence and security using the 
sort of microeconomic approach developed in chapter two. 
These authors are not of course alone, and others have argued persuasively 
that particular causes are at the root of particular coordination problems. 
Richard Aldrich for example has used the phenomena of globalisation to set 
intelligence and security issues within the context of increased complexity, 
transparency of ethical practises, greater inter-connectedness by terrorists, 
and a lack of equivalent development in global governance so that 
collaboration at every level is both more necessary and more difficult.55 
Others such as Peter Hewitt have focused on particular aspects of the 
problem by relying on key assumptions, in his case the primacy of law 
enforcement in counterterrorism security provision, so that many of the 
coordination issues are simplified.56 In other approaches intelligence and 
security coordination are the bit-players in broader analyses of issues like 
strategic culture, with some authors specifically separating behavioural and 
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environmental factors,57 and others who take a more holistic view. 
Interestingly that debate too turns on the relevance of the interaction of 
disparate factors.58  
All of these authors have advanced a particular theory or world-view which 
has included points that would seem inconsistent. Yet in each case the 
different parts of their argument are cogently argued and empirically 
supported. They are not therefore mutually exclusive, but rather the route by 
which they can be reconciled has not been detailed. It is the contention of 
this thesis that an adapted institutional cost approach can fill that gap and the 
next sections will suggest how this might be achieved.  
Section 3: Why a Political Economy for Security and Intelligence? 
Emile Durkheim opined that the very existence of social sciences is a result 
of economists observing that the world had as much need of social laws as 
physical ones. He argued that these are not a contrivance of man, but rather 
evolved from the centre of a social order as a natural and irrefutable state of 
affairs.59 It therefore seems reasonable that an economic theory of 
organisational inter-action should be able to explain the commonality of 
problems, across functions and time, within a social network such as that 
represented by the intelligence and security communities. 
The link between the social sciences and intelligence or security pursuits is 
well established. Counterinsurgency operations now rely on the totality of 
‘Human Domain Mapping’ within and around the battle-space,60 and the sort 
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of deep ethnographic intelligence regarded as essential by Ambassador 
Henry Crumpton is reliant on a variety of social sciences approaches.61 
Intelligence analysts too have long used social science approaches to 
provide methodological rigour to both their conclusions and the 
organisational framework in which they are delivered.62 Although the use of 
social science disciplines to further intelligence or security operations 
remains contentious in areas like counterinsurgency,63 this is not because of 
any dispute over their efficacy or applicability.  
At the same time scholars using social science approaches have examined 
specific elements and functions of the two communities as described above. 
However as that discussion made clear, an overarching and uniformly 
persuasive model for the intelligence and security function as a whole has 
remained elusive; whilst each explanation deals well with some aspect, it falls 
short at another. Apparently similar actors seem to act differently in 
apparently similar circumstances. An explanation that increases the 
granularity of the examination to expose the causes of these differences is 
required; one which can simultaneously deal with both internal manoeuvring 
of actors and their assessment of and reaction to the external environment in 
which they are operating.    
Such an approach is perhaps best described in Jackson’s The Political 
Economy of Bureaucracy.64 It was of course written to introduce economists 
to the wider sociological literature that he argued impacted on their field. 
However implicit in that observation is the equally true fact that political 
science can benefit from the detailed and rigorous methodology that 
economics permits, provided the analysis remains adequately holistic and 
nuanced.  
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A purist's view of bureaucracy more generally is also too limited in these 
sorts of circumstances. Jackson argues that Weber's analysis is too static, 
and is over focused on the formal roles and structures that are its overt 
representation, to the detriment of many of the informal networks of 
relationships, values and accidental functions.65 Elements which are the life 
blood of complex and adaptive organisations such as those in the intelligence 
and security spheres. By embedding his theoretical reasoning in both 
historical and comparative assessment, Weber concluded that economic 
sociology could act as a conduit between the neo-classical theorist’s ideal 
world and the contextual realities that he observed impacting on institutional 
structure and decision-making.66 A very particular sort of political economy is 
nonetheless required.  
Like any economic model a political economy for intelligence and security is 
reliant on the key assumption that the actors within the system act ‘rationally’. 
One of most oft cited problems with any theory that relies on individual 
rational actors pursuing their own best interest, as any economic explanation 
would appear to wish it, is that the actors must become what Dunleavy has 
described as “… disembodied bearers of preferences whose decision making 
behaviour is strikingly homogenous…”.67 Such a description is hardly 
adequate to represent the myriad of partialities frequently demonstrated 
within the intelligence and security spheres. Indeed there is so very little 
evidence of the automated and pre-programmed responses to given external 
stimuli that would be anticipated by neoclassical economists (equivalent to, 
for example, reactions to price fluctuations in the market) that either the 
model is fundamentally flawed, or there are other non-trivial factors at work.68 
Yet both policy makers and working level personnel in either sphere would 
find some sympathy with the notion that their functions, like those of 
conventional economic man, are “… not about choice, but about acting 
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according to necessity” and simply obeying the “… dictates of reason”69 A 
resolution to this dichotomy is therefore required. 
This thesis will, inter alia, argue that the addition of the political science 
dimension to the economic model allows for a more nuanced interpretation of 
‘rationality’. This will include the complexities and uncertainties that are so 
much a feature of the security and intelligence environment, the limited 
cognitive capabilities of the actors in question, and most importantly how their 
personal perceptions and preferences mean ideas of best outcomes can be 
very individual. Rationality in the security and intelligence context is therefore 
less like neoclassical notions and more like the Weberian understanding of it; 
it is “…a variable, not an assumption”,70 a very human construct, based on 
an only partially informed response to a myriad of cultural, organisational and 
environmental stimuli. Actors are rational, but in an independent, adaptive 
and reactive way that is a far cry from the perfectly informed economic actor 
whose utility is solely based on financial recompense.71 
Once this has been accepted it must be incorporated into a high-resolution 
political-economic model specific to the intelligence and security arena, and 
an extension to the microeconomic methodology used by Oliver Williamson 
can reduce the issues observed to their core features without losing sight of 
the whole. It can thus be used to generate a general theory of the political 
economy of intelligence and security, subsuming and improving other 
sociological approaches: 
Section 4: Progression Towards an Institutional Cost Approach 
The twin pursuits of security and intelligence are functions of government: 
The availability and general accessibility of their benefits, the inseparability of 
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both these and the costs of their provision, and the necessity that their 
provider has the public’s authority, inevitably mean that they are necessarily 
performed by Government, and may thus be defined as ‘sovereign 
transactions’.72 However there are different parts of an administration 
involved, and how the symbiotic relationship between them plays out is 
important to their analysis and their efficacy.  
In 1975 the economist Oliver Williamson explored the decision making 
process of firms as they decided whether to conduct a function within itself or 
by going to the market, and in so doing developed a theory of transaction 
costs.73 There are immediate parallels for the intelligence and security 
community. Why, for example, do the CIA replicate functions also performed 
by the NSA or even Special Forces? Why have New York's police (the 
NYPD) sent what are effectively intelligence liaison officers overseas despite 
the existence of the FBI’s LEGAT program? And why have contractors within 
the intelligence community become so prevalent that the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) are considering whether there are national 
security implications.74 In the UK, why have the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office (F&CO) contracted out security functions to ArmorGroup and others 
despite the availability and relative cheapness of the Royal Military Police 
(RMP) and Protection Command (SO1) units75, both of whom are within 
direct governmental control?  
But the usefulness of transaction cost theory in this context goes far beyond 
these fairly bald questions, just as it did for Williamson in his examination of 
the firm. The theory can also suggest what sort of organisational 
arrangement will work best in what circumstances, and how likely 
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collaborative endeavours like security and intelligence are to succeed under 
different organisational and environmental constraints. 
A useful way to begin is to consider the metaphoric parallel of the indivisibility 
of the owners of beehives and orchards as representative of the relationships 
within an intelligence and security community. The metaphor was first used 
to discuss market interventions by the appropriately named J. Meade in 
1952, who argued in favour of corrective governmental action,76 but it can 
serve more widely. 
Just as the orchard owner needs the bee-keeper to pollinate his trees, and 
the bee-keeper needs the orchard so that his bees are fed, so too do 
different parts of an intelligence community need each other to cue and 
support their own activity: In the UK for example, the Government 
Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) need the Secret Intelligence Service 
(SIS) or the Security Services (SyS) to point them in the right direction or to 
act on the leads they provide. Conversely both the Security Services and SIS 
might receive ‘leads’ from GCHQ, or each other, or might need their support 
once operationally engaged. Their individual efficacy is intimately linked to 
that of the other. Each is heavily reliant on the other to generate ‘leads’ that 
go on to produce product and more leads. The same can be said of the 
relationship of either with, for example, Special Forces or Police units. Both 
need intelligence to direct their security activities but these in turn often 
generate new potential seams of intelligence. 
However each of these agencies is an independent entity with its own budget 
and responsibilities. The result of this close relationship is that the 
organisations involved need to co-operate despite the fact that rendering 
assistance is often ‘unpaid’. If the system is in balance then over time 
payment will probably be received in kind, but it is an interdependency that 
will be impacted on by any change: The bee-keeper’s wish to expand by 10% 
would be dependent on the orchard owner doing the same or there would be 
insufficient food for the extra bees. Similarly an expansion of the orchard 
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would need more bees to fulfil its pollination needs. If on the other hand there 
is sufficient slack in the system, and the orchard owner unilaterally expanded, 
the bee-keeper could receive the benefit of more food availability without 
needing to assist with the investment. In the same way if GCHQ expanded in 
an area particularly advantageous to SIS the latter will reap some of the 
benefit without using up its own resources, and vice versa.  
One can take this symbiosis a little further. Consider for example the situation 
if some of the bees do not fly to the orchard, but instead go to a neighbouring 
garden and pollinate there. The same problem would occur if GCHQ were to 
be tasked to cover an SIS target likely to assist in the production of strategic 
foreign intelligence, but instead come across information of tactical use in 
preventing a domestic terrorist attack. This will be passed to the Security 
Service even though they have committed no resources to getting it. 
Essentially this is the ‘free-rider’ problem identified by Mancur Olson in 1965 
who argued that rational individuals would abstain from joining in collective 
action if they could anyway receive the benefits of it.77  
More obviously problematic would be the use of pesticides by an orchard 
owner. It would impact on bees but it is necessary to keep the trees healthy. 
This is the equivalent to the use of law enforcement or military intervention; 
either may well harm, or certainly risk, the intelligence seam through which it 
was generated. The likely harm is suffered by the intelligence element, 
whereas the gains (at least in the short term) go to the security body.  
In both cases one has to then consider the contractual arrangements in place 
to deal with both benefits and costs. An intelligence lead’s end point will be 
uncertain, so that it may benefit the original organisation with further leads 
and product, a law enforcement body, or even a foreign equivalent agency. 
There will be formal intelligence sharing agreements in place, or 
governmental directives for handing appropriate leads on to police or others, 
but, like the bee/orchard agreements, these will necessarily be incomplete 
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contracts, subject to subjective viewpoints, and needing the support of 
custom and reciprocity to function effectively.  
This argument was originally used by Meade to argue that the 
interdependence is detrimental, so that intervention by an authoritative figure 
is needed to either tax or subsidise. One can view US attempts to imbue first 
the DCI, then the DNI, with genuine authority over the intelligence community 
as this sort of approach and it is probably not accidental that the biggest 
block to its success has come from the Department of Defense, which is a 
significant force in both communities. 
However Steven Cheung has subsequently argued that if the reciprocity of 
the orchard and apiary are reconceived as “.... components of a joint 
product”, and that its elements are therefore taken as either positive or 
negative in any given set of circumstances, then this not only generates a 
clearer analysis but also presents a truer picture of the potentially mutually 
advantageous inter-relationship of the actors involved.78 There exists a 
technical possibility of maximising the benefits to everyone that is rarely 
realised.  
There are two ways one can consider this: The first can be approximated to 
the neorealist view, where security and intelligence at the national level can 
be seen as general, ubiquitous ‘goods’. The State is thus viewed as a rational 
unitary actor dealing with the raft of external problems with which it is 
presented as it tries to maintain a secure environment for its citizens.79 
Security and intelligence are nonetheless complex pursuits and some 
division of labour is therefore necessary, but in keeping with the ideas of 
some US community reformers, the various agencies can be re-conceived as 
tools to deliver the general utility of security:80 In this rather utopian view they 
remain part of a single endeavour and, based on this shared world view, 
actors agree the most beneficial course of action at whichever level they are 
working at.   
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A second and perhaps more realistic view would have the disparate agencies 
and elements as possessed of distinct objectives and priorities that, on 
occasion, come together when their interests coincide. As soon as actors 
start to conceive some elements of what makes up the overall utility as more 
important than others, then the first model becomes too mono-dimensional 
as frictions between the different elements become apparent.81  
However, whichever view one takes, you cannot get away from the fact that 
those involved have to enter into some form of negotiation to decide on what 
the problems are, their priorities within them, and how they are to be 
addressed. As more factors and detail are included, or the level of 
uncertainty increases, more contingencies need to be catered for; the 
number and complexity of those negotiations, and therefore their difficulty, 
increases. The integration of disparate strands of a national security or 
intelligence effort is therefore inevitably going to generate what Williamson 
described as ‘frictions’;82 the transaction or institutional costs discussed in 
subsequent chapters. Whether they are explicit or implicit arrangements, the 
agreements required across different horizontal levels of responsibility, or 
vertically between decision makers and delivery agents, can be reasonably 
conceived as complex contractual issues. It follows therefore that what 
Kenneth Arrow believed to be  the lubricant of any society, trust, will mitigate 
those costs.
83
  The relative levels of frictions and trust engendered between 
rational actors, all interested in their own policy areas, in seeking out 
potential solutions to shared problems, agreeing mutually acceptable course 
of action, and then ensuring that these are adhered to, will naturally define 
how successful collaborative efforts are. Whether a society is using a 
basically collegial and cooperative approach like that used in the United 
Kingdom, or a broadly competitive ethos like that of the United States will 
thus directly impact on their ability to integrate effectively.84  
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Having established that negotiations between interested parties must occur, 
and that the quality and mood of these negotiations is an important element 
in deciding potential outcomes, the constraints on negotiations must be 
considered. Ronald Coase demonstrated that as long as private property 
rights are well defined, and if transaction costs are zero, bargaining will lead 
to the highest valued use of resources.85 Sadly of course transacting costs 
are never zero, and property rights are only very rarely well defined. This is 
true throughout the public sector as well as in the market, and particularly 
true of the security and intelligence domains, and so it is transaction cost 
theory (perhaps more accurately referred to as institutional cost theory in the 
public sector context), and property rights allocation, that are at the core of 
this explanatory model.  
These two influences on the negotiating experience, and the resultant 
limitations on possible outcomes, can encapsulate all the potential frictions 
found in the coordination of security and intelligence provision and, perhaps 
as importantly, they can provide a language that permits an empirical 
consideration across policy spheres and approaches.  
The nature of institutional costs in this context is discussed in more detail in 
subsequent chapters. However they can be broadly summarised as any 
inefficiency or friction that affects the ‘contact’ i.e. the difficulties of looking for 
possible solutions, the ‘contract’, i.e. the negotiating problems in achieving a 
solution, and the ‘control’ of the agreed solution i.e. the subsequent 
monitoring problems the selected option throws up. It was these three areas 
that Oliver Williamson examined in 1975.86  It is therefore these experiences 
which will be examined through the lens of the institutional cost impact 
framework developed in chapter two of this thesis. In this way this thesis will 
argue that the framework can allow not only the assessment and comparison 
of formal organisational forms or culture, but also that it will permit the 
simultaneous evaluation of the more open and flexible agreements that often 
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evolve alongside them in complex environments like those of the security and 
intelligence spheres.  
Section 5: Thesis Overview 
This thesis will be divided into three parts. In the first the theoretical 
underpinning of the 'political economic' approach used will be developed and 
examined: Chapter two will argue that Williamson’s transaction cost theory, 
adapted to cater for the ‘sovereign’ transactions involved in intelligence and 
security provision, can explain the dichotomies identified above. It will 
develop an holistic theory of institutional costs for intelligence and security 
provision. The chapter will thereby demonstrate that the ability of every level 
to access good quality intelligence, whether analysed product or a technical 
capability, and to utilise it effectively to support the security function, will 
depend on the institutional costs involved: Firstly those involved in having it 
collected and processed in the first place, and secondly the costs of securing 
its delivery to the right place, at the right time. It will argue that these costs 
may be generated or alleviated by both internal and external factors, and that 
it is the interaction of both behavioural and environmental factors that decide 
collaborative success. Chapter three will place the intelligence and security 
functions within the wider literature by considering both earlier examinations 
of security and intelligence problems and wider social science theories that 
can usefully be applied to the two functions. Chapter four will then develop 
these ideas by examining how the institutional cost theory developed in 
Chapter two inter-relates with these prominent schools of thought from the 
wider social science disciplines, and can extend understanding of security 
and intelligence provision without violating their central tenets. Its potential 
contribution can thus be further assessed before more detailed cases are 
considered in the remaining chapters. The theoretical discussion in Part 1 is 
arranged around the individual issues that together comprise institutional 
costs so that the contributions of different authors are dealt with in several 
different places.  
Parts two and three of the thesis will then concern themselves with how this 
can be applied to particular intelligence and security problems in the US and 
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UK intelligence and security communities. In order to demonstrate both the 
rigour and wider applicability of the theory cases of both ‘success’ and 
‘failure’ that run with, and counter to, the conventional wisdom of cooperative 
success in the UK and cooperative difficulties in the US will be considered: In 
Part two it will be shown how institutional cost theory can more elegantly 
account for the ‘normal’ case of counterterrorism provision which follows that 
pattern. Part three will then examine the ‘deviant’ case of defence intelligence 
in the recent past, which reverses it in both the UK and US, with poor 
cooperation in the former and good cooperation in the latter.  
Asking why such apparently similar communities experience such different 
cooperative outcomes will test the effectiveness of institutional cost theory. It 
will become apparent that the level of granularity is the key. In certain 
circumstances apparently similar elements within those communities act in 
wholly divergent ways, but in other circumstances they act very similarly even 
when the result is detrimental. Why do the elements of one community act to 
secure greater ‘turf’ in a manner akin to Niskanen’s ‘budget maximisers’,87 
while the other eschews this, preferring to rely on their colleagues to a far 
greater extent in a manner more reminiscent of Dunleavy’s ‘bureau 
shapers’?88 The existence of cross-cases indicates it is not simply a cultural 
pathology. Despite the macro nature of the question it is at the micro level 
that the answer can be found.  
Despite the holistic ambitions of the theory developed space precludes a 
complete examination of every aspect of security and intelligence provision at 
every level. A comprehensive examination of the multiple levels of interaction 
would need to consider those that occur both within and between the various 
agencies and departments involved, the relationships between them and 
external communities, police bodies, the media and others, as well as 
oversight bodies, and to be temporal in nature. Furthermore any specific 
case is likely to boast unique features and no exact replication is likely in any 
subsequent case. The treatment of the subject areas examined in Parts two 
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and three are therefore not an exhaustive account of security and intelligence 
cooperation in the two nations but rather are illustrative of the variety of 
issues in question, so that the key concept of the thesis is more clearly 
outlined.89 The sheer size of the communities and number of their 
interactions would anyway preclude any comprehensive treatment, so 
instead a sampling process has been adopted.90 In the same way because 
the interrelationships that are at the heart of this analysis occur at the 
fracture-lines of the institutions and functional divides that are the traditional 
loci for comparative analysis in these fields91 this thesis has pared back its 
point of departure to the commensurability of the problems faced in the two 
subject areas selected by both the UK and US.92 
Firstly the very different approaches of the two nations to managing their 
counterterrorism effort will be examined. In Chapter 5 the particular 
challenges of terrorism in the modern era will be discussed from an 
institutional cost perspective. It will consider the impact of negotiations 
crossing normally discrete policy areas and the inclusion of an increasing 
number of actors with very different objectives and cultures, the horizontal as 
well as vertical nature of these interactions, and the sequential nature of 
engagement so that relationships and agreements develop according to what 
preceded them. Chapter 6 will then narrow the examination to look more 
specifically at vertical coordination of counterterrorism, the two Countries 
relative ability to counter the threat of terrorism by focusing on how 
institutional costs have been generated or alleviated in each. By situating the 
point of comparability at the problem level the reliance of one nation on a 
strategy delivered through existing institutions can be contrasted with the 
others reliance on new institutions, so that the interaction between different 
institutional actors can be best captured and analysed.  
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Part three will follow a similar pattern when examining the provision of 
defence intelligence in each nation. Defence intelligence provides something 
of a cross-case as the United Kingdom has, unusually, seemed to struggle to 
properly organise in this sphere. In contrast, the normally adversarial United 
States has, since 1988, introduced a regime of low institutional costs and 
impressive efficiency across the range of its objectives. It should be noted 
however that even this division is at least slightly artificial, with both the UK 
and USA labelling their counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan 
as an integral part of their wider policy for countering terrorism at home, and 
with Countries such as the Yemen, Somalia and even Pakistan 
demonstrating a full spectrum of civil and military engagement for much the 
same reasons. Chapter 7 will detail the particular problems of the functional 
area from the institutional cost perspective and start to unpick the reasons for 
the sector developing as a ‘deviant’ or cross case, with poor cooperation 
evident in the UK and good cooperation emerging in the US. Chapter 8 will 
then develop these observations by considering how vertical coordination is 
managed in each nation, and why it is so problematic in the UK and 
apparently so greatly improved in the US. Institutional cost theory will be 
applied in an attempt to describe the different experiences of each more fully 
than ‘national culture’ explanations can manage and will provide an 
explanation for their still divergent, albeit reversed, experiences and for why 
the much more closely commensurate formal organisational forms found in 
both nations in the defence intelligence arena do not translate into similar 
cooperative experiences. 
Chapter 9 will then conclude by summarising the findings and demonstrating 
how the institutional cost impact framework can enhance understanding of 
different levels of cooperation in the intelligence and security spheres. The 
findings of parts two and three will be used to advance the idea that, although 
Oliver Williamson was content to consider transactional costs simply in terms 
of the levels of friction they engendered, the counterterrorism and defence 
intelligence cases indicate that individual transactional costs can be further 
categorised by the way in which they act on overall institutional cost levels. It 
will argue that some act as catalysts, precipitating changes in overall cost 
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levels by their action on other transaction cost issues. A second group will be 
described as pivotal, in that they provide a fulcrum about which other 
transaction costs can shift as they interact. Finally it will be maintained that a 
third category are derivative because they only become problematic when 
acted on by another transactional cost. It will then briefly consider the 
applicability and ramifications of the model as a whole to wider issues of 
governance, as well as suggesting profitable avenues of further research that 
result.  
Experienced intelligence scholars have wisely counselled against what Loch 
Johnson described as “physics envy” and any expectation of a “grand theory 
of intelligence” or formulaic expression of intelligence in the e=mc tradition.93 
However the development of the institution cost impact framework for 
security and intelligence provision is the antithesis of this. Rather, as the 
development of the model in the next chapter will show, it is concerned with 
developing a model that can explain how different elements of each impact 
on the others, how they are integrated, and the effect that the process itself 
has on outcomes over time.  
                                                                   
93
 Johnson L.k. (2009) ‘A Theory of Strategic Intelligence’ p.51 Intelligence Theory: Key Questions 
and Debates pp.33-53 Editors Gill P. Marrin S. Pythian M. Studies in Intelligence Series Editors 
Aldrich R.J. Andrew C. Routeledge. Taylor & Francis Group. London 
 
40 
 
PART 1 
 
The Development of a 
Political Economy for 
Cooperation in Security 
and Intelligence from a 
Theoretical Perspective 
 
 
  
41 
 
Chapter 2 - A Microeconomic Approach to the Analysis of Security and 
Intelligence Provision 
Section 1: Introduction 
The previous chapter put forth the argument for considering intelligence and 
security provision as another core function of government, as has been more 
fully articulated by authors such as Philip Davies and Michael Herman in the 
United Kingdom, and Frederick Hitz and Loch Johnson in the United 
States.94 The use of microeconomic theory to examine what pressures and 
considerations influence both pursuits is therefore a useful way to access not 
only the ‘black-box’ of their internal organisation and decision-making but 
also their interaction with the rest of government. Transaction cost economics 
in particular has proven a useful paradigm for explaining how different 
organisations arrange themselves and decide on preferences because it 
factors in both the internal and external costs and benefits exhibited by each 
potential course of action and organisational mode. Unlike other economic 
models it additionally has the capacity to include the impact of more esoteric 
(but still enormously influential) elements on such decisions, such as 
contextual atmosphere and history, and thus provide a more universal 
assessment.  
Although initially developed as a means to examine whether firms were best 
served in particular instances via the market or by bringing functions in-house 
and establishing an internal hierarchy, the transaction cost concept has 
subsequently proved useful to authors such as Oliver Williamson, Dick Ruiter 
and Lawrence McDonough in the analysis of the public sector.95 In such 
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circumstances however the range of transaction costs may be more logically 
described as ‘institutional costs’ as advocated by Steven Cheung.96 Also 
useful within the public sector is the term ‘governance costs’, which was 
originally used by Williamson to capture costs that occurred once an initial 
contract had been negotiated.97 Certainly costly frictions within the public 
sector can be argued to take place either within an existing ‘contract’; that is 
the contract between the State and its citizens whereby the former provide a 
secure and stable environment for the latter, in exchange for authority over 
them and related rewards, or within the employment relationship between the 
State, its parts, and its staff. Furthermore Ruiter argues that governance 
structures are a key factor in assessing the applicability of transaction cost 
analysis to the public sector more generally. He concludes that for 
transaction cost analysis to be properly relevant to public sector functions in 
this millennium, Williamson’s terminology needs to be adapted to capture the 
different options and constraints within this field,98 so that the use of either 
'governance' or 'institutional' costs would seem more apposite. This thesis 
will therefore use the more general term of ‘institutional costs’ for the security 
and intelligence arena as it clarifies the applicability of what was originally a 
market-based tool to broader issues of government functionality.  
The extension of the original transaction cost theory into a tool for institutional 
cost analysis suited to the public sector has particular resonance for the 
intelligence and security communities. It retains the central economic 
assumption of rational actors, but broadens out their motivations beyond the 
conventional (monetary) understanding of profits or losses to allow individual, 
departmental and national level goals to compete for dominance internally, 
vertically and horizontally. This parallels transaction cost theory’s acceptance 
that sub-goals impact on the decisions and processes within a firm even as it 
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strives for overall profitability. Thus the organisational failures framework 
developed by Oliver Williamson,99 and discussed in detail below, is a useful 
tool in explaining how particular organisational structures evolve to minimise 
the negative impact of institutional costs in one set of circumstances, but can 
then be found to be less than ideal in others.  
As a part of the public sector both the intelligence and security communities 
are embedded in the same complex matrix of peer groups, customers and 
supervisors as their governmental colleagues. Institutional cost 
considerations should therefore be no less relevant to them. In fact however 
an application of the organisational failures framework to the two 
communities makes it clear that they also have special features that make 
the institutional cost paradigm an even more useful explanation: These 
special features vary significantly between the communities of the United 
Kingdom and United States, regardless of the aspect of intelligence or 
security provision being considered. This variation is at odds with the 
standard but often erroneous conception of the two nation’s security and 
intelligence communities being very similar, despite their joint membership of 
bodies such as the ‘Five Eyes’ and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO).100  
There are of course numerous models designed more deliberately with either 
intelligence or security provision, or more general public sector concerns in 
mind. However whilst many are effective as explanatory models when 
addressing the particular question that they were developed for, they become 
less convincing when subsequently applied to other, apparently similar, 
scenarios as the following chapters discuss. This suggests that there must be 
relevant data that has not been factored in, or has not been given sufficient 
import in the new situation. The strength of the model derived in this chapter, 
based on the assumption of rational actors maximising welfare, is that it 
allows the analysis to factor in all available data relevant to the problem 
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under consideration, whether internal or external, and to assess its relative 
import in the specific circumstances of that problem. Where discrepancies 
seem apparent it allows the analyst to increase the resolution used until 
missing data becomes ‘visible’. In reducing the investigation to the micro-
level, institutional cost analysis also provides a common lexicon of terms that 
can be compared across the policy spheres under scrutiny.101 
This chapter will therefore firstly explain how an analysis of security and 
intelligence provision using institutional costs and property rights can be 
derived from the work of early economic theorists despite their primary 
concerns being market based. It will then consider the usefulness of Oliver 
Williamson’s 1975 'organisational failures framework' in this context. Building 
on this it will develop a model specific to the security and intelligence 
functions. Once this is achieved it will consider how the individual elements of 
that model are applicable to the problems and needs of the two communities. 
Finally, supporting arguments around some of the other issues thrown up by 
the use of institutional cost analysis in this sphere of government will be 
discussed, and some concluding remarks offered.  
Section 2: From Different Objectives to Coase:  The Logic of an 
Institutional Cost Approach  
In his 1998 synopsis of the usefulness of transaction cost economics in 
explaining governance methods, Oliver Williamson observed that “Because... 
each generic form of organisation has both strengths and weaknesses, 
organisation needs to be studied as both problem and solution”.102 This is 
particularly true of the security and intelligence domains. As the preceding 
chapter makes clear, the provision of effective security must necessarily 
address legal and law enforcement issues, domestic political agenda, 
national and personal security issues and international political 
complications, as well as touching upon areas like education and social 
policy. This is the case in counterterrorism, counter intelligence and more 
                                                                   
101
 A more detailed examination of how institutional cost theory relate to other theories in the field are 
discussed in the following chapter 
102
 Oliver E. Williamson, "The Institutions of Governance," The American Economic Review 88, no. 
2, Papers and Proceedings of the Hundred and Tenth Annual Meeting of the American Economic 
Association (1998).  
45 
 
general intelligence activity undertaken to provide policy makers with a 
decision advantage in any area of government business. Internally, each 
sphere and undertaking has its own sense of a ‘best outcome’ that is not 
wholly representative of the broader national level ‘general utility’. The 
organisational set-up of the intelligence community needs to function in the 
most complex of environmental settings. This inevitably increases the 
institutional costs of each agreement, decision and action, with individual 
actors regularly required to settle for what are, from their perspectives, sub-
optimal outcomes to accommodate the preferences of others.  
The question then, is how that agreed outcome is arrived at. There are two 
possible visions of an intelligence and security community: The first may be 
described as a utopian ideal wherein all the actors are co-operatively 
engaged in the pursuit of a single Jeremy Bentham-like and uniformly agreed 
general utility. Within this view various intelligence community reformers, 
most notably the former US Deputy Attorney General David Kris,103 have 
conceived the various parts of the community tools through which this utility 
might be maximised. Decision making is thus a matter of principal actors 
agreeing which tool or combination of tools will provide the maximum benefits 
for the minimum cost. It should however be noted that even within this ideal 
scenario there will be occasion when a trade-off is still necessary. For 
example within the counterterrorism sphere an early arrest is likely to reduce 
intelligence gathering possibilities and even viable evidence, but remove at 
least the immediate threat, as was the case with the 2006 plot to bring down 
airliners from the UK over the Atlantic. Bargaining and negotiation will always 
be necessary, however it is managed, and this will naturally provoke frictions 
and incur costs. 
More realistically, within that idea of utility, decision makers and those that 
influence them will have pre-ordained preferences for particular types of 
solution, often as a result of their own background and experience; soldiers 
will opt for a military approach, police officers for a law enforcement based 
solution, and so on. Bentham’s idea of utility therefore starts to degenerate 
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into one more like that conceived by John Stuart Mill whereby different types 
of utility are valued differently.104  As soon as actors start to regard some 
elements of the community as more important than others frictions between 
those elements become more apparent and institutional costs will increase, 
possible options will be constrained and sub-optimal results will not only 
ensue but be more acceptable. The negotiations observed within the utopian 
scenario still need to take place, but will become more susceptible to 
negative influences.  
Most importantly, whether one starts with a conception of the ideal state of a 
single shared goal, or with the reality of diverse preferences, it is impossible 
to avoid the fact that those involved have to enter into some form of 
negotiation to decide on their joint priorities and how they are going to 
proceed. This is summed-up in Figure 2.1 below,105 wherein actors can follow 
a process down either the right or the left hand side, but will inevitably arrive 
at a bargaining situation as depicted in the bottom right hand corner. 
At this point how that process of bargaining is managed becomes central to 
what outcomes are achievable.106 In his seminal work ‘The Problem of Social 
Cost’, Ronald Coase described how the existence of a maximum achievable 
net gain across all the parties involved should encourage a process of 
‘Coasian’ bargaining whereby that maximand is achieved amongst them. The 
division of those spoils amongst the participants is nonetheless still a matter 
of rational self interest, with each attaining their own personal maximum utility 
(given the existence of the other parties).107 Although initially considered as a 
market problem, the pursuit of an overall maximisation makes Coase’s 
theorem every bit as applicable to negotiations within the public sector, and 
significantly more useful than the alternative, compensation based, approach 
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to externalities laid out by Arthur C. Pigou in ‘The Economics of Welfare’.108 
Critically for this argument, Coase also noted that the possibility of successful 
bargaining that could achieve the maximum net gain for the actors involved 
was contingent on two factors; the absence of transaction costs and clearly 
delineated property rights. Disappointingly, in reality transaction (or 
institutional) costs are never zero and property rights are only very 
occasionally well, much less perfectly, defined. This is particularly true in the 
security and intelligence domains. It is therefore institutional cost theory and 
property right allocation that are at the root of the explanatory model 
developed below.  
 
 
Section 3: The Derivation of a Institutional Cost Effects Framework for 
the Security and Intelligence Functions 
The significant impact of transaction costs on organisational decisions was 
first operationalised by Oliver Williamson in 1975. Like Coase before him his 
initial focus was on the private sector, and in particular the factors that 
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influenced a firms decision to conduct an activity in the market or within its 
own hierarchy.109 However the universal applicability of his argument was 
apparent and made explicit in numerous papers that he either authored or 
inspired, including several specific to the public sector.110 As he examined 
the ‘market or hierarchy?’ question in detail Williamson managed to reduce 
the problem to specific elements, divided between behavioural and 
environmental types, which then interacted. From this he went on to design 
his ‘organisational failures framework’ which encapsulated those elements 
and thus indicated what factors and constraints would impact on the decision 
making process.  
 
His diagram is reproduced here (figure 2.2),111 and demonstrates that 
although elements are issues in their own right, it is their interaction that 
aggravates the impact of the frictions that occur. This then increases them 
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exponentially beyond the mere sum of their parts.  This is a significant point 
and has major repercussions as the model is developed so that institutional 
costs in the public sector, particularly intelligence and security provision, are 
able to be assessed.  
At their most broad, transaction costs have been defined by Steven Cheung 
as “.... all the costs which do not exist in a Robinson Crusoe economy”. He 
argues that this is an important expression of how such costs can be 
assessed as they are routinely impossible to separate out as individual costs 
or benefits.112 All security and intelligence could of course be regarded as 
institutional costs experienced by the society that is using them. Some sense 
of this can be attained through contributors such as David Omand in the 
United Kingdom, who perceives the primary duty of governments to be the 
provision of a secure environment so that citizens can go about their 
business with confidence. Thus to Omand the function of a government 
security and intelligence apparatus is to provide this confidence, so that 
market transactions and other aspects of normal society can proceed.113 
However this thesis is concerned with the level and type of institutional costs 
within the intelligence and security spheres, which vary according to the 
institutional context being used. Nonetheless the interconnectedness of 
institutional costs from each such context has a particular resonance within 
these functions of government.  
It is particularly pertinent within the intelligence and security arenas that it is 
usually some sort of information asymmetry through which behavioural and 
environmental factors inter-relate.  This issue can be still further heightened 
by the additional information asymmetry typical of the political field in which 
both tend to play-out. It should also be noted, as the United States 
Constitutional example indicates, that reducing such costs and increasing 
efficiency will not always be the desired goal because of some additional 
dynamic, and a system of high institutional costs may be preferred precisely 
because they are high, as this might be seen as providing stability or 
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protection to parts of the community in question. Overall then the security 
and intelligence spheres can be better represented via the adapted version of 
Williamson’s 1975 diagram, which is outlined below (Figure 2.3).114 
Subsequent chapters will therefore consider functional elements of security 
and intelligence provision, as well as their supporting organisational design, 
using this model.          
 
 
Section 4: The Underlying Assumptions of Institutional Cost Theory  
An assumption of this work, like the microeconomic analysis from which it 
comes, is that actors are rational and self-interested. However Parts two and 
three clearly demonstrate that both assumptions are both far more nuanced 
constructs than simple classical economic analysis allows. In fact it will be 
argued that this is one of the powers of institutional cost approach that 
follows. The detail of both these elements therefore needs to be drawn out 
                                                                   
114
 Source of diagram: Own design developed from Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies : Analysis 
and Antitrust Implications : A Study in the Economics of Internal Organization.40  
51 
 
slightly: Rational behaviour is a contextual creation, not an absolutely pre-
determined response. Rationality in an actor is, as Kenneth Arrow argued, 
less about the ends he or she pursues, and more about the reasonableness 
of the methods used to achieve them.115 The reactions of actors to a 
particular stimulus will vary according to the environmental setting in which 
that stimulus is applied, and the factors that make up that environment can 
be shown to be very broad indeed. However this more realistic interpretation 
of rationality need not be contrary to fundamental economic thinking: Adam 
Smith himself took an open view of what motivated economic actors,116 and 
in linking economics with the wider social sciences Mark Casson argues for a 
similarly broad understanding of rationality.117  
The Weberian understanding of rational behaviour is nonetheless more 
useful in this context than that found in more purist neo-classical economic 
theory; to borrow Richard Swedberg’s phrase; “... rational behavior is a 
variable, not an assumption.”118 The simple predictions of an economists 
supply/demand curve (for example) are not realisable in the more complex 
context of security or intelligence. The reactions of participants, while still 
rational, will be chosen in response to numerous stimuli. These might occur 
simultaneously, be of varying importance, and will not only influence the actor 
in question, but will also act on each other in a complex pattern of feedback 
loops. Rather than being based on perfect knowledge, choices are made by 
individuals and groups suffering bounded rationality in a complex and 
uncertain environment. The merits of any particular reaction may be rational 
to one decision maker and wholly irrational to another depending on personal 
priorities. The personal nature of this rationality is what distinguishes human 
approaches from those of computers and biological processes: As Thomas 
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Schelling succinctly puts it; although a leaf might be observed to turn towards 
the sun to photosynthesize “... words like purpose and seek are wholly 
nonascriptive and nonevaluative.”119 People are different. They engage in 
conscious adaptive and reactive independent thinking. Although this does not 
mean that their reactions to stimuli cannot be predicted, it does mean that 
such predictions are of probable or possible reactions, not certainties, and 
are only broadly based on the “... method of ‘vicarious problem solving’ that 
underlies most of microeconomics.”120 Numerous intelligence analysts have 
discovered this distinction to their cost in areas as diverse as the Russian 
invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the layering of assessments of Saddam 
Hussein’s production of chemical and biological weapons.121        
The nature of self-interest too needs elaboration. Within the context of 
individuals and groups of the intelligence and security spheres self-interest is 
a more complex phenomenon than mere greed. Indeed the multiple levels of 
sometimes conflicting indicators an actor perceives as in their interest is one 
of the central tenets of this work, and is elaborated on, inter alia, in the 
discussion of opportunism in this context. For now it is adequate to note that 
the issues of self-interest and organisational goals are intimately connected, 
and each is adapted by the other, but that this can be in a negative as well as 
a positive way.  
As Talcott Parsons observed in his early considerations of social theory, the 
social norms of an institution will often be designed so that an actor’s self-
interest is canalised into conformity with them, but this is more than a system 
of rewards and sanctions. Rather, the actor will see conformity, and the 
principles embodied by conformity, as a good for their own sake and “.... this 
attitude will prevail in so far as he shares in the system of ultimate common 
value-attitudes of which the institutional system is a manifestation...”122 
However, where the actor sees a value as incompatible with his or her 
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motivations, Parsons suggests a more calculative approach will be taken, 
and even that non-conformity may be the most advantageous course, 
depending on the level and type of sanctions it might provoke.123  
Like the issue of rationality, this issue has major repercussions on 
consideration of the intelligence and security communities. Problems like 
sub-goal pursuit and informational asymmetries will be shown here to be 
much more a by-product of conformity to the goals of the agencies that 
constitute the community than simple self-advancement would suggest. 
Particularly in the United States case, the sanctions referred to by Parsons, 
and available to community level authority figures such as the Director of 
Central Intelligence in the past, or the Director of National Intelligence now, 
are not adequate to prevent non-conformity. This is precisely because the 
authority of the Executive has not been adequate to empower them against 
sub-group opposition from entities like the Department of Defense, whose 
own moral concerns lay with maximising their own capabilities.  
Section 5 – The Institutional Cost Impact Framework for Security & 
Intelligence Provision 
Although necessarily considered separately below, it is important to note that 
property rights and institutional costs are intimately linked at every level. 
Indeed in his 1999 overview of the debate between the neoclassical definition 
of transaction costs, which is exclusively concerned with the cost of trading 
across a market, and the broader understanding subsequently developed by 
scholars such as Williamson, Cheung and Armen Alchian, Douglas Allen 
explicitly names the property rights approach as the alternate viewpoint.124 
Indeed he formulated a definition of transaction costs as the cost of 
establishing and maintaining property rights in his earlier 1991 paper.125 Allen 
also notes that Alchian’s early work on tenure, and subsequent consideration 
with Reuben Kessel of an individual’s utility within a firm, are both dependant 
on the organisations institutional make-up: Non-profit ‘firms’ like public bodies 
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are able to bear significantly higher institutional costs precisely because they 
are not profit making,126 the latter having particular pertinence as an 
explanatory factor in the variance in organisation and delivery of security and 
intelligence. 
Even within this group, security and intelligence provision are undertakings 
that necessarily involve high institutional costs, and as Thrainn Eggertsson 
notes in his 1990 review, such activities require rules to guide resources to 
the uses that return the highest utility. The economics-of-law literature127 
demonstrates that the State, the property rights it allocates and, crucially, 
how they are structured, has the potential to be a force for either good or ill: 
Either they can push the structural production frontier closer to the maximum 
technically possible, or they can be responsible for organisational failure.128 
As discussed below this impact is not restricted to any prevailing legal 
framework, but it is nonetheless central to how efficiently security and 
intelligence can be both performed and interwoven into more general 
governance.    
a. Institutional Costs Overview: 
Just as Alchian had made a conceptual leap with his understanding of 
property rights a few years earlier (discussed in detail below), so did Steven 
Cheung’s work on share tenancy,129 and his subsequent reflections on 
communist Chinese organisations, add definition and breadth to Coase’s 
original (market based) conception of transaction costs. This in turn allowed a 
re-definition of Pareto optimality within the real world wherein all costs, 
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including internal ones, need to be included in the calculus. Individuals might 
work to reduce transaction costs, but behave so as to increase them. Under 
different institutional arrangements or circumstances their ability to do either 
will vary.130 Cooperative efficiency between actors is thus linked to the level 
of institutional costs that impact on their relationship 
Oliver Williamson describes transaction costs as the economic counterpart of 
frictions in a machine: Do the gears mesh efficiently, are moving parts oiled, 
and is there energy-losing slippage anywhere.131 Intelligence and security 
communities need to be considered in the same holistic fashion to determine 
how far the level of institutional costs they are working under undermines 
their joint effectiveness. Friction in the derivative parts, such as the legal 
system, can be as detrimental as friction at its core, and the interaction 
between the parts is both critical and problematic.  
As the provision by the State of a secure environment is a necessity for all 
other social and economic activity, and the State is a near monopoly supplier 
that is not in competition with others, it might seem reasonable to presume 
that those involved in its supply would be uniformly and co-operatively 
committed to reducing these frictions. One would expect all parties to 
routinely demonstrate successful Coasian-style bargaining with each other, 
both horizontally and vertically, in the pursuit of Pareto improvements to the 
overall security situation. At the very least any Kaldor-Hicks type of advance, 
that at least offers the theoretical possibility of overall improvement,132 should 
be readily accepted and introduced. Yet, as the discussion in subsequent 
chapters will demonstrate, this is often not the case.  
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Speaking more generally about the public sector, Joseph Stiglitz opined that 
the failure of governments to deliver Pareto efficient improvements was not a 
matter of Coasian bargaining being suited only to the private sector, but 
rather that it was centred on a misalignment of incentives; an argument he 
extended over four hypotheses demonstrating how this misalignment 
produced (wilfully or otherwise) high institutional costs that obstructed the 
implementation of beneficial policy changes.133 Although primarily focused on 
the policymaking level in the Clinton administration, Stiglitz’s points are as 
relevant to the working level/decision-making nexus, where similar pressures 
necessarily increase levels of institutional costs. They are also more 
generally applicable to security and intelligence provision all the way through 
to the operational level, particularly where information issues are concerned, 
and are discussed further below under the relevant factor heading.   
More broadly however, Stiglitz identifies the temporal nature of public sector 
bargaining,134 which has been shown to apply in the intelligence and security 
worlds and impacts on the development of organisation within them.135 This 
has two effects: Firstly, when coupled with uncertainty as to future 
developments, there is a tendency to impede apparently positive changes for 
fear that they might either undermine a group’s interests later,136 or even 
reduce capability to respond to different, as yet unforeseen, future threats. In 
the latter case both the bounded rationality of actors and their probity itself 
can act as impediments to achieving apparently Pareto efficient 
improvements. Secondly, the dynamic nature of the bargaining process itself 
can encourage informal coalitions within an intelligence community to form 
networks based on longer-term support, rather than the merits of a particular 
issue. In such cases apparently obvious Pareto improvements may seem 
riskier propositions than they should because they might damage longer-term 
alliances. As Stiglitz observes, the results are actually dependant on “... what 
implicit property rights people thought they already had” and how an initiative 
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might affect these. The bounded rationality of actors is displayed via 
inefficient signalling during bargaining and because negotiations are not one-
shot episodes “...each round affects the fall-back position for the next”.137 
Thus the organisation of the institutions tasked with providing security and 
intelligence really does matter as it is here that the level and impact of such 
frictions is decided. A competitive system may encourage innovation and 
effort, but it may also be destructive in circumstances such as those in the 
public sector where perfect competition and information are absent. In such 
cases gains can be achieved by the diminution of one’s competitor as well as 
by self-improvement. Intelligence and security both sit close to the political 
level. However while politics is a zero sum pursuit, policy is not. On occasion 
this distinction is observed, as was the case with cross-party co-operation 
over Northern Ireland during the Major Government in the United Kingdom. 
More often the lines are blurred, as debates over defence spending when 
power passed from Brown’s Labour Government to Cameron’s Conservative 
one, demonstrate. In the case of northern Ireland an inclusive approach 
removed a sense of information asymmetry. Without this it is likely that an 
actor will assume that any proposal from an ‘opponent’ must be made for the 
opponent’s own benefit, and at their expense.138   
Furthermore there is a particular factor with governmental transactions. In all 
other cases government is the primary enforcer of contracts, so where it is 
one of the contracting parties, who is there (in Stiglitz words) to ‘guard the 
guardians’?139 The possibility that government will change its mind always 
exists, particularly in democracies where a new administration with different 
ideas is possible at any time. Credible commitments are difficult, which can 
be problematic in itself, but so too are the possible solutions:140 One of the 
ways a government can reduce the possibility of reversal of their decisions, 
and thus demonstrate their commitment, is by building in significant 
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institutional costs to changes. In the United States for example altering the 
Constitution is theoretically possible, but exceptionally difficult in practise, by 
virtue of the institutional costs that would be incurred by any government 
disposed to attempt change. This can be a positive thing of course, but the 
benefits of the status quo may be a subjective matter, and in the face of 
uncertainty it reduces the flexibility of decision makers to address changes in 
the environment. The same issues pertain through to the operational level, 
where existing and rigid ‘guidelines’ designed for a previous set of 
circumstances constrains Pareto improvements in the present.141  
The applicability of the different parts of the institutional costs effects 
framework outlined above to the governmental functions of both security and 
intelligence provision will therefore now be considered in turn. Starting with 
the central position of information issues and the criticality of the interaction 
of behavioural and environmental factors through them, it will then consider 
specific parts of the model: First, the behavioural factors of opportunism 
(including both moral hazard and hold-up problems), bounded rationality, and 
probity, then the environmental aspects, uncertainty and complexity, asset 
specificity, and frequency. Finally the surrounding circumstances of property 
rights clarity, atmosphere and the participants’ sense of a shared common 
goal will be examined before the argument returns to a more general 
consideration.  
b. Information Impactedness and the Interaction of Human and 
Environmental Factors: 
The complexity of the intelligence and security environments mean that 
information is routinely held on an asymmetric basis. This multiplies the 
impact of the environmental and behavioural factors discussed elsewhere. 
The effects of information impactedness are further exaggerated by two key 
points: Firstly the secrecy inherent in both pursuits increases the perception 
of the problem and secondly, because a large proportion of the information 
involved is also highly idiosyncratic the statistical aggregates used to 
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compensate for a lack of detailed knowledge in more conventional economic 
activity have a limited utility.  
Friedrich Hayek had noted that "... every individual has some advantage over  
all others in that he possesses unique information of which beneficial  use  
might be made, but of which use can be made only if the decisions 
depending on it are left to him or are made with his active cooperation" as 
early as 1945.142 Nonetheless the central placing of information-related costs 
by Williamson was prescient. He constantly emphasises that it is the 
interaction of environmental and behavioural elements that gives rise to 
transaction costs, and that it is information impactedness that is the central 
cog dictating how that interaction will play out, as depicted in his 
organisational failures framework. Because of its overlapping place between 
the behavioural and the environmental factors the effect of information 
impactedness and hidden communication costs is mostly dealt with within 
those sections. However the peculiar import of this factor within intelligence 
and security provision merits particular mention: 
Within the intelligence, and (to a lesser but still significant extent) the security 
domains, the issue of information impactedness has a special significance 
because secrecy is essential in some areas and prevalent in almost all. 
Although David Omand suggests a recent cultural shift from the need to 
know principal towards a duty to share143 the alterations required to make 
this a general reality are substantial, and not yet complete. Secrecy is 
omnipresent and throws up some particular institutional cost problems.  
Perhaps foremost among those is the tendency to aggravate other 
institutional failures or weaknesses. Secrecy increases both the problem of 
asymmetric information and, in a culture where it is nearly universal, the 
perception of its presence. This, as Joseph Stiglitz observes, creates a 
dynamic that leads to biased and unrealistic information being introduced.144 
Furthermore a credible commitment is less likely because those excluded 
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from the process that arrived at the decision are unlikely to feel bound by it, 
but rather that they are fully justified in trying to overturn the conclusion 
reached when possible.  
Secrecy is the most clearly defined technical barrier between different 
elements of the security and intelligence communities. The necessity to 
secure information means that an additional tranche of property rights must 
be allocated and negotiated over. These sit alongside and are largely 
independent of the property rights that deal with the roles and responsibilities 
of actors. Almost uniquely, secrecy can provide near-infinite transactional 
costs between those who are indoctrinated into a secret, and those who are 
not, with very significant penalties often imposed on those that breach that 
divide. 
Some divisions may be basically hierarchical, such as those based on levels 
of vetting. Negotiating access is then a matter of established protocols; a 
developed vetting status gives one routine access to material marked as 
Secret, and occasional access to top-secret, for example.145 Negotiations are 
irregular and relatively friction-less, being based on abstract cases. In these 
cases property rights are allocated according to when individuals acquire the 
necessary status.   
More problematic are the property rights that need to be negotiated over 
when compartmentalisation is based on particular projects or work streams. 
These can operate horizontally as well as vertically and include what in the 
US are known as Special Access Programs (SAP) and, within them Special 
Compartmented Information (SCI) such as Talent-Keyhole (TK) product. 
Even within these, access to individual reports is restricted to those are 
inducted into the relevant operation at that time, or have a demonstrable 
need to know, in the judgement of those in charge of them.146 Negotiating 
access is thus a sequence of complex one-off bargains, where the actor 
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wishing it is substantially disadvantaged. He or she will be suffering from a 
significant asymmetry of information holdings from which to advance their 
argument for access.  
The appropriate set of property rights are thus likely to be defined by the 
holder of information classified in this manner. Even a relatively widely 
disseminated piece of intelligence might remain the property of the 
originating organisation, and they can retain the property rights to it. In 
practise this means that they continue to decide to whom, under what 
circumstances, and with what detail or 'form of words' it is passed.   
There are likely to be a number of different and contradictory pressures on 
the holders of secret information when they are deciding whether, and when, 
to share it. Christopher Grey has, for example, described the way in which 
the being indoctrinated' or 'enwised' into the Ultra secret could provide both 
technical and cultural separation from co-workers at Bletchley Park,147 and 
act as a unifying cultural 'pillar' as actors were linked in their shared 
understanding of the need for secrecy, and of being in a joint effort to achieve 
it, even if they are excluded from individual secrets.148 He notes that the 
same effects have been observed by Michael Herman in more recent times, 
with intelligence officers enjoying a shared 'specialness' into which 
individuals are inducted through specific rituals.149  
Membership of such a group can facilitate negotiations through the sense of 
trust it engenders, and the temporal nature of the relationships within it. Such 
trust is however always fragile, and primary loyalties likely to be to the actors 
own part of an organisation. Even in the best of circumstances secrecy 
means that very real technical barriers will need to be routinely negotiated 
across, and so permits the interaction of other institutional costs described 
below. The various effects of secrecy thus have non-trivial impacts on the 
institutional cost landscape.        
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In addition, because the process must inevitably by-pass normal consensus 
decision making if arrived at in secret, the decision itself is likely to increase 
the divergence between winners and losers. As Stiglitz puts it; “... secrecy 
aggravates the problem of positional goods and destructive competition.” A 
piece of information can thus be a positional good if those holding it can 
derive status from the secrecy surrounding it. In an environment where 
secrecy is common, it is likely that actors will constantly suspect an 
“...interest group is taking advantage of the secrecy to advance their cause 
over yours”. Unfortunately because having information is valuable if others do 
not, secrecy creates rents, which in turn creates a market (however 
informally), and thus provides an incentive to the actors involved to promote 
even an artificial scarcity. Looking at it from the policy making angle, Stiglitz 
has no time for secrecy at all, believing its only merit is in providing a tactical 
advantage in the political bargaining game.150 However in the intelligence 
and security arena, where an active external opposition will seek to do you 
harm on the basis of any information obtained, there is, and will remain a 
need for it despite the institutional costs that it inevitably implies.  
Conversely it could be argued that the introduction of various initiatives on 
open government and transparency that have become policy since the early 
1990’s have established a new, and often significant monitoring cost every bit 
as detrimental to security or intelligence provision as secrecy. Whether 
usefully or not, public debate that takes place in the maelstrom of a diverse 
media (each aspect of which will have its own ideas on maximising utility) 
inevitably leads to criticism. That can induce a risk-averse culture in both 
political and operational levels which can in turn impact on the perceived 
utility of any given option, or the constraints under which options are 
available, for example through new laws or guidelines.151 These constraints 
can have wider policy implications, as the UK/US spat over intelligence 
sharing that followed the Binyam Mohammed Court case demonstrates.152 
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Furthermore as different organisations might suffer different levels of 
criticism, depending on what enters the public domain, new frictions between 
them that impact on collaborative working can develop. The enthusiasm of 
the former Special Branch’s to undertake Security Service taskings suffered 
as a result of the former’s vulnerability to Freedom of Information Act 
requests and more accountable public posture than that of the latter, for 
example.153    
An organisational set-up will thus have to balance these various pressures, 
and it is likely that in so complex an environment that the point of equilibrium 
will be constantly moving. Secrecy, like expertise, is thus one of the drivers 
for using an organisational design that moves what Stiglitz calls ‘critical 
decision making’ (note that ‘critical’ may be at any level, not necessarily the 
highest) some distance from political decision making; an area that will be 
discussed in subsequent chapters.  
In his seminal work ‘Markets and Hierarchies’ Williamson considers the 
transaction cost implications of the “inside contracting system”, wherein a 
firms management provided space, machinery and materials to a second firm 
to whom they delegated a production function in its entirety, paying a 
negotiated piece rate for the finished item.154 Inside contracting presents a 
useful broad-brush metaphor for a government’s use of different agencies to 
jointly provide security and intelligence by each being responsible for the 
productions of elements thereof. The advantages enjoyed by firms using 
inside contracting are those an intelligence and security community would 
desire. Notably that there is no need for the principal firm to have detailed 
technical knowledge of the subsidiary functions to direct them, or to have to 
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negotiate contracts with personnel. There are also economies of 
communication and monopoly powers that might give rise to opportunistic 
‘hold-up’ problems (discussed below) are, theoretically at least, limited. 
Furthermore incentives to each inside contractor can be set to encourage 
efficiency and innovation.155 Information impactedness that might discourage 
investment is minimised. 
Despite these advantages the inside contracting system experienced 
significant frictions and wastage. Williamson divides these into eight broad 
categories (summarised below), including three problems still stemming from 
defective incentives: 
1. A bilateral monopoly, albeit restrained, inevitably develops. 
2. Periodic renegotiations encourage information hoarding and delay 
innovation as actors attempt to improve their position.156 
3. Component flow is hard to regulate. 
4. Work in progress inventories were excessive and later stage work could 
thus prove wasteful of components on which earlier work had been 
completed. This can manifest itself as duplicated efforts, and correlates 
to non-collaborative intelligence or security production. 
5. Disparate relative incomes can de-stabilise desired changes to 
organisational patterns.157 
6. Equipment, being outside a contacting ‘firms’ responsibility, is not 
properly used or maintained. 
7. Innovation tends to favour labour saving, for which the ‘firm’ is 
responsible, over materials, for which it is not.158 
8. Incentives to innovate the product itself were inadequate, as it can be in 
the interests of ‘contracting firms’ to maintain a status quo. They are 
unlikely to see the rewards of innovation above their level of operation. 
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All of the problems that inside contracting experienced have parallels within 
the intelligence and security spheres. All occur because of the interaction of 
behavioural and environmental factors, are immanent to the system itself, 
and have some element of information asymmetry at their root. The bilateral 
monopoly is central to the nature of these sovereign transactions,159 and 
allows the construction of the ‘ring of secrecy’ within which they must exist. 
However it means that a ‘small-numbers’ condition is equally unavoidable, 
and that the equivalent of a ‘first-mover’ advantage will always exist. 
Strategic delay and other gaming-like behaviour will occur in the absence of 
full information, and will be joined with group or individual opportunism to 
improve position and reputation. The regulation of components (or their 
equivalent) could be improved in the absence of bounded rationality, but 
each element is assessing optimal flow on the basis of their own 
requirements and capabilities. Status issues emanating from bounded 
rationality (with asymmetric information) and skewed incentives encourage 
attempts to shift contractual relationships towards subordination relationships 
producing suboptimal outcomes.  
The fact that individuals who do not own assets are unlikely to care for them 
properly, as Williamson suggests, is effectively a ‘free-rider’ problem. The 
possibility that one’s own organisation will not be able to fully appropriate the 
gains from any outlay on those assets is likely to be a deterrent to investment 
and innovation. To quote Williamson in full:  
“Given uncertainty, whence the occasion to make coordinated 
adaptations between successive parts, and bounded rationality, 
whence the limitations on long-term contracts and the infeasibility of a 
flat (single stage) hierarchy, the defects listed are manifestations of 
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small-numbers bargaining relations in which opportunism and 
information impactedness conditions obtain.”160 
Although Williamson was referring to a firm using the inside contracting 
system, the synopsis of the operating conditions quoted above could be 
applied to an intelligence or security community equally well. It is also a 
pointed summation of how the outcome of the interaction between human 
and environmental factors is affected by asymmetric information and the 
costs of communicating across separate parts of any such endeavour.  
c. Behavioural Factors: 
i) Opportunism   
When analysing institutional costs and their impact on an institutions 
organisation and capability, the relevance of opportunistic behaviour as a 
factor that needs to be reckoned with is contentious even in the private sector 
where financial gain is the declared purpose. That it should be relevant to an 
important public service such as the provision of a secure environment is 
naturally even more so. In fact its impact is the larger because of the extent 
of information asymmetry widespread throughout this area. However the 
common-usage definition of ‘self-interest-seeking with guile’,161 whilst 
technically accurate, does not fully capture the range and motivation of what 
is observably ‘opportunistic’ behaviour by actors in this sphere. The ‘self-
interest’ is often actually a conviction of the rightness of one’s perspective, or 
that of one’s agency, over that of others, with at least a conception of the 
greater good still in mind. Self-interest is of course served by superiors 
accepting that point of view and the reputational enhancement that comes 
with success, but not by failure, so the individual or agency will usually have 
a genuinely held conviction that they are correct. Williamson notes that 
internal opportunism takes the form of sub-goal pursuit, whether it be of an 
                                                                   
160
 Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies : Analysis and Antitrust Implications : A Study in the 
Economics of Internal Organization.97-98 
161
 See for example ibid.96  
67 
 
individual or collective nature;162 a seminal problem within the intelligence 
and security spheres as subsequent chapters will demonstrate.  
The ‘guile’ required is a similarly opaque construct. Information impactedness 
between actors is an accepted and unalterable fact of life in both the 
intelligence and security worlds. Secrecy, environmental uncertainty, and 
bounded rationality implicit in varying specialisations and roles mean that 
individuals and agencies must select what information is shared, when, and 
with whom, both vertically and horizontally. Their own sense of what 
constitutes an optimal outcome is an inevitable bias in this. As it is neither 
feasible nor useful to attempt to pass all possible information, all the time, 
any interested party in the chain with a different perspective to the originator 
will probably conclude there was ‘guile’ within the decision-making process, 
even if the original actor believes himself or herself to have been wholly 
righteous.  
That different agencies are aware of their different beliefs is enough to 
increase institutional costs. The suspicion that others may act 
opportunistically is enough to ensure that ex ante negotiations and ex post 
governance become costly as soon as anything less than all the actors have 
anything less than complete knowledge.163 Nonetheless, as Williamson 
observes for the private sector, the fact that actors harbour opportunistic 
inclinations does not imply a flawed system per se. It is the conjunction of 
opportunism with the small-numbers issue that is problematic; an issue that 
is ubiquitous in the intelligence and security spheres as the agencies are 
near-monopolistic suppliers of their own product.164 The exchange is thus 
one between “... bilateral monopolists in stochastic [market] circumstances” 
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and it is in the interests of the parties involved to seek the best terms for 
themselves via “...opportunistic representations and haggling”.165 Whereas 
the system would be best served if they could be co-operatively joined to 
avoid the bargaining and, more seriously, the mal-adaption costs generated, 
as subsequent case studies demonstrate. 
The term ‘moral hazard’ should not therefore necessarily mean that agents 
are acting dishonestly despite the pejorative nature of the term. Alchian and 
Woodward’s contention that the 'moralistic overtones' are justified because 
“... if everyone would simply agree to undertake a given standard of effort 
and abide by the promise, a more efficient outcome would result”166 may be 
adequate to straightforward contracting but does not deal adequately with 
issues of varying interpretations and shifting circumstances. Clearly the very 
fact that hostile governments and bodies are deliberately countering one’s 
efforts or suborning one’s personnel are a particular problem within the 
intelligence or security arenas and costs are therefore certainly incurred in 
policing them. But there are also well-intentioned and wholly internal 
deviations that need to be considered, and these can be every bit as 
significant to the institutional costs incurred, and to the organisational design 
that results.    
In their review of Williamson’s ‘Institutions of Capitalism’, Alchian and 
Woodward argue persuasively that the relevance of opportunistic behaviour 
can be better assessed if it is divided into conduct concerned with moral 
hazard and that concerned with the problem of hold-up.167 This separation is 
also useful to the analysis of the security and intelligence functions and is 
therefore utilised here. 
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ii) Moral hazard 
The susceptibility of organisations to moral hazard is dependent on their 
plasticity; the degree of discretion or legitimate options open to decision 
makers.168 The nature of both intelligence and security provision, with their 
dynamic nature, their distinctive policy, strategic, tactical and operational 
levels, and their variable tools and objectives make them very plastic indeed. 
The impact of this on property rights is discussed later, but here the issue is 
that the necessary freedom of action enjoyed by agents will inevitably allow 
them to bias their decisions away from the primary wishes of their principals 
towards their own agenda. On occasion this may be an advantageous state 
of affairs, but it will also allow re-interpretation of policy to best suit one’s own 
beliefs and world view. Consider for example a recent statement by the then 
head of the United Kingdom’s Secret Intelligence Service to the Intelligence 
and Security Committee, wherein he stated that did not feel bound by the 
requirements and priorities laid out by the Joint Intelligence Organisation 
(JIO) in Cabinet Office.169 The passage of time between requirements edicts 
whilst new threats emerge, and the run-in time for any successful 
recruitments of human sources mean that some flexibility at this level is 
beneficial. However for the most part it is likely that new threats and 
opportunities,170 as well as their tie-in to forthcoming government policy, will 
be best understood within Cabinet Office machinery that has access to pan-
governmental analysis and needs. Diversions from their established 
‘requirements and priorities’ process may therefore not be helpful.171 The 
number of vertical and horizontal levels within an intelligence community 
means that monitoring compliance with these is always going to be a 
significant institutional cost, and unlikely to ever be comprehensive, even 
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where there is no malicious intent but only a marginally different view of the 
overall ‘good’.172 
Joseph Stiglitz, discussing insurance provision, defines moral hazard as 
arising “...when neither the state of nature nor individuals actions are 
observable to the insurer”, and goes on to say that this form of moral hazard 
is pervasive in the economy including when insurance is provided by 
governments via social institutions.173 Investment in (defensive) intelligence 
provision and target hardening measures are themselves a form of insurance 
against a possible, rather than certain, event although the ‘insurer’ and the 
‘insured’ are both contained within government. This makes actions more 
observable, but not completely so, due to the disparate functions and the 
distinct levels that comprise them.  
On the other hand, the extent and complexity of the ‘state of nature’ that 
needs to be observed is far larger than any that conventional insurance might 
need to consider. Even when discoverable it will be imperfectly observable 
due to surrounding noise. The principal-agent relationship is thus 
characterised by limited or asymmetric information and monitoring difficulties. 
These allow the latter to use their discretionary latitude to deviate from the 
formers implicit wishes, and the fact of the ‘insurance’ existing will itself 
produce an incentive for agents to take risks they might not otherwise 
contemplate when deciding how to allocate scarce resources.174 Knowing 
that the Security Service had primary responsibility for intelligence on 
terrorism has, for example, allowed the Metropolitan Police to cease 
intelligence coverage of possible terrorists and their support groups unless it 
was directly linked to an active investigation. This had been a role performed 
by their Special Branch until its dissolution in 2006.175  
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Additional or unexpected funds can also produce the sort of moral hazard 
that raises institutional costs; they may thus be every bit as detrimental. 
Subsequent chapters will discuss the United States intelligence community 
as a whole, but even in the usually frugal United Kingdom’s security 
environment the shift of resources to a newly created and centrally allocated 
Counter-Terrorism fund allowed opportunistic behaviour by agents. Here 
various projects that would normally have been funded from conventional 
policing budgets, and in many cases had struggled to realise resources on 
that basis, were slightly re-written so that community based elements 
acquired a counter-terror angle.176 The apparently critical nature of the time 
constraints made proper monitoring expensive and limited, so that the costs 
of genuine delivery were heightened by these more opportunistic projects.177 
The situation here is akin to that observed by Williamson (and then later 
Frederic Scherer, in relation to defence contracts). Unless intrusive 
monitoring can establish and therefore disallow unwarranted expenditure, it is 
actually in the interest of firms (or in this case agencies or parts thereof) to 
incur excessive costs.178 This is due to the misaligned incentives that the 
equivalent of cost-plus contracts and difficult to penetrate ‘cost sharing’ 
contracts promotes.179   
Stiglitz' (with Rothschild) subsequent analysis shows how an individual’s 
marginal private benefit, achieved through expending a given level of effort 
on accident prevention, falls as more insurance is provided, until preventative 
effort will theoretically reach zero.180 There is thus a substitution effect, and 
the trade off between incentives and risk bearing needs to be considered 
alongside any anticipated trade-off needed to allocate scarce resources.  
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An insurance provider may be reasonably paralleled with government 
provision of defensive intelligence and security. The effort towards accident 
prevention by individuals is then a parallel of agency activities that they 
perceive as marginal to their core functions. Thus a government, having 
invested heavily in physical security measures to counter a known threat, is 
likely to feel more protected from attack (or at least to the type of attack most 
recently suffered) and invest less heavily in intelligence gathering, leaving 
itself vulnerable to new threats. This was the position in the 1990’s, on both 
sides of the Atlantic, when a peace dividend was anticipated from the 
investment made against the Soviet threat.181 Conversely, but perhaps more 
reasonably, as observable criteria and thus the level of certainty increases, 
the augmented intelligence picture should allow a reduction in physical 
security measures.  
Misaligned incentives, or a lack of clarity around them, can therefore be 
critical to the effectiveness and efficiency of security or intelligence delivery. If 
a principal could perfectly align the incentivisation of his agents with his or 
her wishes then the rational self interest of each agent, whether inclined to 
use guile or not, would perfectly accord with them. The plasticity of the two 
spheres under examination, their dynamic nature and complexity all make 
incentive schemes much more general than this ideal however; a type of 
incomplete contracting in itself. Significant ex post monitoring costs should 
therefore be expected if the moral hazard that results is to be alleviated.182 
This has been the case even in a relatively well regarded controlling 
organisation, the UK Home Office's 'Office for Security and Counter 
Terrorism' (OSCT), which is required to monitor and direct police and 
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Security Service counter terrorism activity even though both are, nominally at 
least, under the Home Office.183  
iii) Hold Up 
The second type of opportunistic conduct identified by Alchian and 
Woodward is that associated with ‘hold-up’, a behaviour intimately associated 
with the environmental condition of asset specificity discussed elsewhere. 
Using Alfred Marshall’s idea of a composite quasi-rent that is dependent on 
continued association with a separate, but currently associated resource,184 
Alchian and Woodward describe hold-up as the amount that those providing 
those currently associated resources “.... could attempt to expropriate by 
refusing to pay or serve”. Either an agency or policy-maker might be 
vulnerable to hold-up, as each are reliant on the services of others to 
maintain their particular type of production. Furthermore the appearance of 
hold-up type behaviour, and even its possibility, can be as detrimental as its 
actual occurrence.185 Taking an holistic view of an intelligence and security 
community one would anticipate the problem to be minor; all parts are after 
all ‘owned’ through some mechanism or other by the executive branch of 
government. However many such functions are very asset specific, 
particularly in respect of their personnel. Asymmetric information (including 
this functional expertise), set within a complex and uncertain environment, 
have caused individual agencies to behave as distinct entities that are co-
reliant in much the same way as Alchian and Woodward’s private firms.        
The possibility of hold-up has two consequences within the security and 
intelligence spheres: Firstly institutional costs are raised as ex ante 
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negotiations and contracting (whether formal or informal), then ex post 
monitoring, are increased to mitigate this hazard. Secondly, and perhaps 
more seriously, it can affect major structural decision-making. As Alchian and 
Woodward note, having to buy in services exposes the purchaser to a hold 
up risk, making outright ownership or even rental for self-use more attractive. 
This decision will be informed by the monitorability, in this case linked to the 
perceived reliability of the supplier agency, and degree of dependency 
involved.186 Thus the overall nature of the community and its participants 
becomes important again. A collegial, co-operative venture such as that 
found in the United Kingdom will concern itself far less with hold-up (but, as 
subsequent chapters make clear, will still do so when property rights are 
blurred) than will a more competitive, adversarial system such as that found 
in the United States. Consider respectively for example the Central 
Intelligence Agency’s ownership of an internal SIGINT capability;187 arguably 
a response to a vulnerability to hold-up by the Department of Defense, and 
the development of individual counterterrorism capabilities by local Police 
Departments in US cities as a response to a perceived vulnerability to hold-
up by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.188 In both cases the supplier 
agency have also been seen as competitors, making the threat of 
opportunistic behaviour by them enough of a concern to influence preferred 
institutional organisation at significant cost.  
The indivisibility of large-scale units also permits opportunistic behaviour by 
some actors. The example cited by Williamson is applicable in the 
intelligence or security cases, where information specialisation is a 
permanent feature of the organisational landscape, and large, usually 
monopolistic suppliers are the norm. In his footnote he describes a situation 
where a reliable information specialist deviates from optimal behaviour by 
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erroneously informing most recipients that the state of things is y, and only 
truly informing his preferred recipient that it is in fact x, and then capitalises 
with him/her using the advantage that pertains. In the intelligence context this 
might be through improving the standing of, for example,  the US Department 
of Defense elements over civilian agencies in the eyes of the Executive by 
the judicious use of some details or by using slightly different phrasing 
concerning product from its satellites. This need only be a matter of very 
slight differentiation on how intelligence is reported. Williamson makes the 
point that whilst in most circumstances, equivalent behaviour is regulated 
against, the initial state of information asymmetry and inevitable element of 
assumption as to future developments make the likelihood of successful 
sanction minimal.189  
In the intelligence sphere the situation is thus still less clear cut in that the 
opportunistic behaviour need not be of the deliberate or malicious type 
envisaged by Williamson in his analysis. Rather it is a natural result of 
circumstances: The information as final product is likely to contain a higher 
percentage of analysis over irrefutable fact than would be the norm in more 
conventional circumstances, so that where it is produced will matter. This is 
particularly the case where possible future events are being predicted. The 
host agency of the information specialist will certainly be more fully sighted 
on the detail and how particular conclusions were reached, as well as their 
strength against other possible interpretations, and are thus already 
advantaged. This will matter less if the collection and analytic parts of the 
process are housed within separate agencies (as for example is the case 
between the United Kingdom’s Secret Intelligence Service and Foreign & 
Commonwealth Office) than when a part of the same undertaking (as is the 
case with the Central Intelligence Agency in the United States). 
Organisational form will thus affect the level of institutional costs from the 
outset. More importantly however the information specialist will almost 
certainly suffer from a pre-formed bias fashioned during any career within a 
parent agency or department. At the extreme these parent bodies have been 
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described by Paul Flynn as “... a series of fiefdoms that are not particularly 
focused on any set of national aims and objectives”190 so these residual 
loyalties will have impact. As Abraham Maslow’s maxim would have it; “it is 
tempting, if the only tool you have is a hammer, to treat every problem as if it 
were a nail”.191 The synopsis then produced by the information specialist will 
inexorably be drawn to viewing the problem through the prism of their 
personal and organisational perspective. A soldier is more likely to see a 
military issue, a police officer a law enforcement one, and so forth.  
Thereafter more demonstrably opportunistic behaviour is likely. Most ‘central 
service’ type postings, where a lot of information specialisation takes place, 
are of a temporary nature (on both sides of the Atlantic), with personnel being 
drawn from, and returned to, their original units. For reasons closely linked to 
the pursuit of their own rational self-interest, there is an innate tendency on 
the part of any information specialist to favour their parent body over the 
central service one.192  
To return to Williamson’s analogy, it is hard for all users of the specialist 
information to discern, ex ante, whether x or y is the true case – indeed if 
they could they would have little need of the information specialist’s services 
– especially when the observable information in either case is similar and 
minimal. Even in the event of clearly (post event) false reporting it is likely to 
be impossible, as Williamson suggests, to establish what was produced 
through opportunistic behaviour and what was a genuine mistake. In the 
intelligence sphere this difficulty is magnified across several levels, as 
subsequent consideration of the Iraqi threat in 2003 on both sides of the 
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Atlantic makes clear.193 In fact the term opportunism may be something of a 
misnomer as an individual may well have a genuinely held belief that their 
interpretation and resultant policy preference is best for all. Their world view 
will have been informed by a nontrivial 'learning by doing' experience (to 
which Williamson refers) within their own organisation which will be an 
integral part of this. The lack of mischievous intent however does nothing to 
lessen the potential damage that such behaviour might cause, or the higher 
institutional costs that its possibility must engender. Organisational design 
can however reduce this problem significantly, as the success of the United 
Kingdom’s Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) demonstrates.194    
iv) Bounded Rationality 
In his 1945 study, Friedrich Hayek concluded that if organisational issues are 
to be properly addressed in an operational way, it was essential that the 
bounded rationality of human actors be centrally featured.195 Williams went 
further by dividing his examination of the problem into two distinct spheres: 
The limits imposed by neurophysiological/computational capacity, and the 
limits that language creates, where the term language is used 
idiosyncratically to include the range of communication devices used, such 
as shared social norms and concepts, which are inevitably developed within 
a group as its members pursue economies of communication.196 This can 
have very real implications for institutional costs between communities with 
different  understandings of a particular term. The term intelligence itself for 
example is a particular type of information in the UK, whilst in the US 
information is a 'component of intelligence', yet the two nations work together 
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constantly in the intelligence sphere.197 Although he does not explicitly 
describe them as such, for Williamson language costs are an issue of social 
constructivism, and it is in this sense that the term is used throughout this 
thesis. Both the computational and language aspects of bounded rationality 
have substantial relevance to the intelligence and security spheres. 
Computational limitations will pertain in any circumstance where complexity 
exists. Williamson quotes Herbert Simon’s summation that “The capacity of 
the human mind for formulating and solving complex problems is very small 
compared to the size of the problems whose solution is required for 
objectively rational behaviour in the real world”.198 The problems experienced 
due to this neurophysiological constraint will be magnified exponentially in 
the face of uncertainty, where numerous factors will interact, so that in both 
the security and intelligence areas bargaining will never achieve anything like 
a complete contract. Bounded rationality in these cases thus ensures that 
appropriate adaptations cannot be feasibly included in contracts.199 Fully 
clear property rights will therefore be similarly elusive, and actors vulnerable 
to not only ex ante, but also ex post opportunistic behaviour.  
The effect of the language form of bounded rationality is a factor of the level and 
type of information impactedness, a condition prevalent within both the 
intelligence and security fields. This can involve an inability for the various 
elements to a negotiation to communicate successfully in a mutually understood 
language due to differing codes or norms, or even a requirement for more 
technical jargon. Further to this it can also mean that the parties understand 
something different without realising the discrepancy, for example where 
different agencies are pursuing slightly different optimal outcomes but assume 
their colleagues are of the same mind. Ironically two of the primary purposes of 
an organisational hierarchy are to extend the bounds of rationality through 
specialisation of decision making without needing complete information, and to 
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economise on communication related expenses,200 but language issues will 
inevitably undermine this pursuit. Although the contract to provide a particular 
aspect of security is not re-negotiated in the same way a contractor bids to fulfil 
a contract, issues such as primacy for a particular operation may be regarded 
as parallel, and the same small-numbers problem is observable.201 Thus the fact 
that the United Kingdom’s Senior National Coordinator for Counter Terrorism 
operations is a police officer offers the possibility that police bids for primacy will 
be better understood and more sympathetically considered because they are 
couched in language he or she understands.202        
One of the organisational problems involved in overcoming bounded 
rationality is ironically that it is a combination of information asymmetry and 
bounded rationality that makes it impossible for leaders to distinguish 
necessary fundamental structural change proposals from opportunistic ones. 
An inability or very high cost attached to communicating and assessing such 
change mean that there is a tendency to water-down proposals and then see 
how the consequences manifest themselves via performance. However, as 
Williamson warns, performance is a function of many factors, not all within 
one’s organisational domain, so that sorting out what is attributable to 
structure is difficult.203 Nor are the obvious solutions any sort of perfect 
response; Williamson demonstrates that leaving gaps in agreements, and 
adopting a process of adaptive sequential decision making, prevents new 
hazards,204 re-emphasising his contention that there is no perfect 
organisational form.    
v) Probity 
Probity, or trust between actors, has institutional cost implications for the 
intelligence and security fields because although the particular circumstances 
of any one issue might be unique, the relationship of those involved in 
addressing it will not be. The impact of temporality to the range of possible 
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paths and forms an organisation might take (including those dedicated to 
intelligence or security provision) has been described in detail by Grey in his 
examination of the disputes, agreements and eventual evolution of the 
Bletchley Park decoding organisation.205  It that case as in others, there 
exists an ongoing, sequential set of negotiations and actions that beget 
further bargains and actions. In each of these negotiations not only does 
information have to be shared, it must also be believed to be true.206 This, 
coupled with the vulnerabilities the subject matter engenders, means that 
trust between participants is a prerequisite. Whilst this can produce negative 
effects if individual actors or agencies go unchecked, without it cooperative 
success would be impossible. Indeed Casson argues that trust is the 
fundamental basis of cooperation and how managers engender such trust 
can define them as leaders.207  
The probity of actors that will create conditions of mutual trust then has a 
particular value within an intelligence community beyond that originally 
described by Williamson,208 and in his subsequent work on the public sector 
and foreign affairs in particular the importance of probity is more directly 
acknowledged.209 It impacts at the inter and intra-agency level, and between 
the intelligence communities and their consumers. These then are 
Williamson’s three parts of public sector probity: The vertical, horizontal and 
internal,
210
 and his diagram is adapted below with an intelligence agency 
made central, security agencies as his ‘counterpart agencies’, and to include 
the distinct bodies charged with oversight as an additional vertical 
responsibility (Figure 2.4):211 
As can be seen the inter-relationships are two-way. It is of course important 
that the policy maker or the governmental machinery that represents him has 
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confidence that the agencies goals are congruent with their own, that 
compliance is timely and efficient, that the quality of the information and 
where applicable, and its analysis is adequate (or, at the minimum, shortfalls 
in knowledge are clearly indicated as such).212 However it is also important 
that the agency maintains a trust in their political or working level masters, 
and believes that it will handle the intelligence provided appropriately and use 
it for proper purposes.  
 
Like any large-scale complex task, a Nation’s intelligence and security effort 
is necessarily a co-operative affair between a number of agencies divided 
into discrete functions that must then be re-integrated into what Davies 
describes as “...a single, coherent unified effort”. Re-integration is crucial if 
security is to be maintained or proper policy decisions made, so that “The 
effectiveness of each individual agency rests on the effectiveness of 
interagency management in intelligence more acutely than in many, and 
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probably most, areas of national government.”213 Trust between them is 
therefore essential and obvious. Less obvious is that different sub-goals from 
agency to agency may establish differing ideas of probity within each, which 
can undermine that trust if appropriate inter agency organisation is absent.      
This difficulty is extenuated because of the need for a commonly understood 
sense of probity at an intra-agency level. Philip Selznick observes that the 
“The chief virtue of integrity is fidelity to self-defining principles” and that 
“each type of institution ... has a distinctive set”.214 Thus there is an inherent 
tension between effective intra-agency and inter-agency cooperation that is 
based in both social conditioning and procedural constraints. It follows 
therefore that hazards arising through the interaction of asset specificity and 
probity will, as Williamson states, be best mitigated within a governance 
structure that “supports a presumption of, or predisposition toward, 
cooperativeness...”.215  
There is, then, a symbiotic relationship between the level of trust between 
individuals and organisations, and the institutional costs that are incurred 
during their interactions. Williamson observes that “Co-operation is jointly 
determined by social factors and incentive alignment” so that “... efficiency 
depends in part on the distributive process in the co-operative system.”216 
The clarity of property rights and boundaries will matter much less if all 
parties have faith in the others sense of probity. In spheres where complete 
contracting is impossible as future situations cannot be fully known but only 
hypothesised (as is currently the case with the growing cyber security field for 
example) a belief that others will deliver what is required of them, and not act 
to exclude other actors from subsequent negotiations, will reduce costs in ex 
ante policy implementation and post event monitoring.  
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Nonetheless there is a dichotomy within the transactions cost literature 
between a relationship reliant on probity, and a more calculative approach 
whereby possible outcomes are assessed and met with a range of cost-
effective actions based on mitigating threats while maximising benefits.217 
Any such deterministic approach to trust will be unsuitable in the highly 
uncertain environment inhabited by security and intelligence actors, where 
calculations of reciprocity are anyway rarely based on any kind of like-for-like 
exchange. Where transaction costs would suggest a hierarchical form of 
organisation for exchanges that are essentially idiosyncratic, trust in the 
probity of other actors allows for both less formal control systems and the 
formation of deeper cooperative inter-organisational relationships that can 
provide the necessary temporal dimension, although the nature of each type 
of trust is subtlety different.218 Thus while transaction costs analysis does 
allow that trust can improve the resilience and adaptability of contracts,219 
this facet of probity is of greater significance when issues of governance like 
security and intelligence are considered. 
Williamson states that the general rubric for transaction cost analysis is that 
of risk mitigation through ex-post governance, necessary because as all 
complex contracts are incomplete and thus “... the contracting fiction of ex 
ante incentive alignment is untenable.”220 However his conclusions on 
incentive alignment for sovereign transactions, which include security or 
intelligence activity, are that the necessity for probity (in conjunction with the 
asset specificity of the human assets involved) dictates a Weberian type 
bureaucracy with very low powered incentives. In this view, the now 
superseded ideals of a well recognised hierarchical authority, fixed 
administrative methods and an absolute distinction between private and 
business assets221 are favoured over the high powered incentives where 
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personnel can “.... appropriate streams of net receipts”, as these are likely to 
“... place the fidelity of the system at risk”.222 In such circumstance ex post 
governance structures will necessarily need to be very high to compensate.  
The reliance on ex post governance structures promote innovation and 
improved efficiency. When coupled with the trust based, co-operative 
requirements described above, cultural factors can thus be seen to have 
economic implications. The competitive nature of American business life is 
reflected in their public bodies, including providers of security, law 
enforcement, and intelligence whereas in the United Kingdom the more co-
operative approaches found in most working environments filters into these 
spheres too.223 Clearly faith in the probity of one’s fellows will reduce 
institutional costs, and it will be much easier to achieve with someone seen 
as part of the same undertaking than with someone with whom one has to 
compete. Competition may encourage innovation, but it will also discourage 
sharing and trust. As subsequent chapters will demonstrate there are thus 
significant differences between the level of United States and United 
Kingdom institutional costs because of this probity problem. Even within the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation for example, managers regard it as 
advantageous to have different agents compete with each other for 
recognition and advancement to keep them focused.224 This may have some 
advantages where individual instances of crime are being investigated, but it 
has pushed the institutional costs generated during activities such as 
intelligence, which requires information sharing and co-operation, beyond a 
proportionate level. As Barnard concluded as early as 1938, informal 
organisation matters every bit as much as formal organisation,225 and the 
frictions which are institutional costs can be introduced via either.   
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d. Environmental Variables and Factors: 
i) Uncertainty and Complexity 
As subsequent chapters will make clear, the issues of complexity and 
uncertainty pervade the intelligence and security domains. The problems that 
decision makers need to address are frequently based on ‘possible futures’ 
that are hard to predict given the complexity of possible interactions that 
could affect the scenario in question,226 and the organisational apparatus 
needed to deal with them effectively is necessarily little simpler. 
For Williamson uncertainty is inextricably associated with bounded rationality. 
The co-relation between them may be likened to that between the ‘mysteries’ 
and ‘secrets’ (respectively) of the intelligence world, and the same problems 
of predicting outcome, whether at policy or operational level, pertains.227  
In his 1950 paper considering the evolutionary aspects of firms in the face of 
uncertainty, Armen Alchian advances the model offered by Gerhard Tintner 
who also considered the effect of subjective uncertainty on decision-
making.228 Tintner demonstrates that, critically, under conditions of 
uncertainty any possible action (in our case on the part of security or 
intelligence personnel) has not one, but a range of potential outcomes. 
Although only one actual outcome will occur, decision makers cannot know 
which that will be. Under such circumstances there is a spectrum of potential 
outcomes. Within these there will be, for example, an action offering a higher 
mean but greater spread of the possible utility to be achieved, and another 
with a smaller mean but smaller spread. In such circumstances there is no 
useful maximum utility guaranteed as a result of the action selected (except 
in unusual cases where the actions in question could generate wholly 
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distinct, non-overlapping possible outcomes), but rather a choice between 
different distributions of possible results; a very different calculation.229 
Even within the relatively straightforward arena of profit and loss this is a 
complex problem, but at least the distribution of utilities potentially achievable 
can be compared like for like. In the security sphere the issue is further 
affected by the distinction of type, as well as scale, between potential 
outcomes. At the extremes decision-making may be simplified by an 
overwhelming ‘distaste’ for some outcomes. In the counterterrorism sphere 
this may, for instance, be a significant loss of life. Or, in the counter 
intelligence world the possible loss of a nuclear secret or serious harm to the 
State. The avoidance of even their possible occurrence will limit the actions 
available. Bounded rationality may however make even these circumstances 
difficult to recognise. More routine situations will offer a combination of 
uncertainty as to both the exact circumstances faced and the possible 
outcomes, and bounded rationality, which will prevent proper computation of 
them and the utility to be achieved. The degrees of distaste for outcomes to 
be avoided cannot of course be given an accurate ordinal value, but they can 
at least be rank ordered. An examination of the United Kingdom’s protective 
marking system, and how items are ascribed a classification of, for example, 
secret rather than top secret, indicates the seriousness that the State places 
on each type of harm that loss might provoke.
230
 So to can other levels of 
protection such as limiting circulation to favoured or trusted allies. Similarly 
‘Standard Operating Procedures’ can be indicative of the value individual 
agencies place on particular benefits and harms. This is synonymous with 
Alchian’s ‘preference function’ and may be based on both negative outcomes 
preferably avoided and positive outcomes sought, but as he observes, this 
does not in itself provide a “criterion of rationality or choice” in the face of 
uncertainty.231  
The implementation of any such preference function necessitates the 
introduction of standardised rules for given sets of circumstances. Whether 
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they are framed as ‘Standard Operating Procedures’ (SOP’s) or ‘doctrine’ 
these are intended to ensure that the actions of junior levels reflect the 
preferences of more senior ones. However they are rarely duplicated across 
different organisations unless based in law,232 even where different 
organisations will find themselves working alongside one another.  Put into 
institutional cost terms, in the general case categorisation of problems 
reduces costs by treating issues within designated criteria as the same, so 
that new solutions need not be sought (and in more individualistic cases the 
costs of searching outside normal procedures has the additionally desirable 
effect of restraining any ill considered “... passage of “impulse into action”).233  
However the very precision and reliability of bureaucratic responses 
discussed as a positive by Weber, that is as a method of reducing frictions, 
thus increasing efficiency, can in only slightly more uncertain circumstances 
have the polar opposite effect as a result of “trained incapacity” and 
“occupational psychosis”.234 Both of these can corrupt Weber’s efficiency 
effect and increase costs. At the extreme the original goals of an organisation 
could even be displaced by the increasing rigidity of the regulatory framework 
intended to support them; “... an instrumental value becomes a terminal 
value”. This in turn means the bureaucracy can no longer adjust readily, and 
indeed may exhibit a defensive tendency when required to do so. Entrenched 
interests and internal loyalties to the status quo can outweigh broader 
organisational goals.235 These rigidities are of course synonymous with the 
institutional costs associated with asset specificity (as discussed below). 
Thus an attempt to lower the institutional costs caused by one environmental 
condition can increase those associated with another.  
The opaqueness around best outcomes in the face of uncertainty impacts on 
decision making across all levels of security or intelligence delivery. In the 
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private sector of course a firm need only be better than its rivals to survive, 
rather than some imaginary perfect competitor. Although public sector bodies 
do not ‘perish’ in the way firms can, and do not therefore evolve via selection 
in quite the same way, successful strategies and elements of agencies will be 
favoured over those that fail, which will naturally atrophy;236 Alchian 
reasonably suggests that “The economic counterparts of genetic heredity, 
mutations, and natural selection are imitation, innovation and positive profits” 
(the last of which is arguably akin to success in public sector bodies237). 
However uncertainty ensures that this need not be related to positive 
adaption or decision. Chance becomes an element of success, but as 
Alchian notes the strategy that brought success is likely to be adopted as 
good no matter how randomly selected.238 Thus under uncertainty the 
tendency to imitate rather than innovate increases exponentially.  
Alchian identifies six factors that motivate the imitation of past successes in 
preference to freshly informed decision making; and all are present in both 
the security and intelligence environments where uncertainty is conjoined 
with bounded rationality. These factors are: An absence of clear criterion for 
decisions, a shifting environment, too numerous a variety of factors relevant 
to decisions, uncertainty within each of them, the absolute imperative of 
superiority over the ‘competition’, and no trial and error option. Imitation thus 
allows under-pressure officials or policy makers to avoid real decision making 
in favour of creating conventions, social norms, or ‘standard operating 
procedures’ based on previously observed success.  
Certainly a successful genuine innovation would reap dividends, but these 
would be limited under the low-powered incentives usually found in the public 
sector pursuant to the needs of probity discussed elsewhere. The risks of a 
failed innovative approach are significant, and often more personally felt, so 
the bar defining ‘success’ is likely to be far higher. Identifying when, and 
when not, to break with these conventions is difficult as in complex and 
dynamic environments such as these no two instances will ever actually be 
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the same. However deciding whether the degree and type of difference 
observed is such as to require a wholly innovative responses is nigh on 
impossible. Convergence to an optimum is not a possibility due this lack of 
repetition as well as the seriousness of failure (equating to the death of a 
firm), so that the maximand needed to allow Coasian bargaining is obscured 
and an ability to determine the “..... goodness of actions in anything except a 
tolerable-intolerable sense is lost”.239 Where a threat is of an immediate and 
serious nature, such as during an active terrorist operation, this may be 
adequate but for longer term and more mundane issues uncertainty over 
outcome will alter the tenor of debate and the possibilities considered.  
Interwoven with this uncertainty is the complexity of most security or 
intelligence scenarios, which generally involve multiple actors and need to be 
considered over various time-frames. Again, the bounded rationality of actors 
is the principal behavioural issue magnifying complexity problems, but the 
risk of opportunistic behaviour is also significant. Damon Coletta has argued 
for example that the increasing complexity of the military sphere has 
increased levels of 'principal-agent' frictions between governments and their 
armed forces, as well as with actors in their wider operating environment.240 It 
is also pertinent to note that complexity and uncertainty create their own 
dynamic at an organisational as well as operational level.  
The systems that provide intelligence or security at a national level are 
necessarily complex and exhibit the characteristics of complex systems 
discussed below, as summarised by Calvin Andrus in his exhortation to the 
United States intelligence community to be more adaptive.241 All have 
institutional cost implications, whether positive or negative: 
1. Self-Organisation – Individual actors in proximity to each other act in the 
same way without necessarily increasing efficiency (in keeping with 
earlier notions of the isomorphic tendencies observed by Walter Powell 
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and Paul Di Maggio).242 At an organisational level this creates costs. 
Senior executives must try to manage the costs and benefits of 
maintaining a broad repertoire of intelligence or security options, whilst 
still attempting to keep the agencies involved engaged with a single 
strategy. At an operational level isomorphism causes problems in terms 
of analytic product, with costs incurred to prevent groupthink.243 
2. Emergence – The successful creation of a genuinely inter-operable 
intelligence or security community will allow it to produce benefits beyond 
those anticipated by the simple sum of its parts. Conversely the 
introduction of a discordant element can have disproportionate costs, as 
was the case after the introduction of the Department of Homeland 
Security to the United States intelligence community. The same positive 
and negative trends can be observed at every level; even for example in 
the efficiency of a single surveillance team or during equivalent 
operational level activity. 
3. Relationships – Relationships matter in the security and intelligence 
fields, but can be costly to maintain in a complex environment. Most 
obviously the productivity of an agent will be determined by the quality of 
his or her relationship with their handler or case-officer, but the case-
officers loyalty is to his or her employer and their multi-faceted goals. 
Similarly the type of relationship experienced between departments or 
agencies (whether collegial or competitive for example) will also affect 
costs and outcomes. These costs will be increased exponentially as 
actors are required to trade-off advantage now for goodwill later within an 
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increasingly complex community. The subsequent tendency to assess 
situations based on the existing assessment of those with whom one is 
allied can have either cost-saving benefits or negative outcomes as the 
2003 Iraq assessments made clear.244  
4. Feedback and Adaptability – With information being so central to the 
efficient operation of both security and intelligence activity the manner in 
which it is adjusted as it works its way around the system and back to the 
originator is critical. In a successful system the original data will be 
enhanced with additional information that benefits the final product and 
thus the resultant decision making in excess of the costs of circulation. 
However in both spheres information is invariably incomplete and 
unproven, and both are open to new information from the external 
environment. Divergent opinions and tangential issues can all play both 
positively or negatively as information moves through the system. White 
noise can obscure and even corrupt the original message so that either 
the wrong degree or direction of damping or amplifying occurs within the 
feedback loop. The more complex the system through which information 
needs to pass is, the more likely this becomes. It results in both the data 
and the system itself adapting, but always to the last situation, so that 
inefficiency costs accrue due to its imperfection for the next situation. For 
example, considered within the context of the internationalisation of 
counterterrorism intelligence, such complexity and the costs associated 
with it are obviously on the increase. However the more routine 
phenomena of circular reporting has always been a problem, whether in 
counterterrorism or counter-intelligence operations.245   
5. Non-linearity – The complexity and the quantity of influences constantly 
acting on any issue within either the intelligence or security sphere mean 
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that consequences are likely to be out of proportion to the original 
environmental change, and unpredictable in their nature. Both increase 
institutional costs and make pre-emptive adaption to minimise them 
difficult.  
ii) Asset specificity  
As has already been discussed asset specificity has been associated with 
the hazard of hold-up by Alchian and Woodward, but Williamson has also 
associated it with the probity needed within sovereign transactions such as 
intelligence and security provision. 
Although Terry Moe regards asset specificity as less relevant to the public 
sector,246 Williamson successfully counters that this is to miss the specificity 
of human assets, where sunk costs include significant non-transferable 
training and social conditioning. Sovereign transactions are particularly 
susceptible to this sort of asset specificity. Williamson discusses Foreign 
Service officers, but those involved in either intelligence gathering or security 
provision are likely to be no less particular. So too will the “..... requisite deep 
knowledge of protocols and procedures” be imbued into personnel, especially 
where secrecy is involved.247 The asset specificity of personnel has two 
distinct transaction cost effects: First, that these are incurred in mitigating it 
as a hazard through security of employment (which may include continuing 
payment to ineffective personnel), maintaining internal dispute resolution 
machinery, and related conventional incentives. Second that the asset 
specificity of staff will significantly increase the consequence of the 
behavioural hazard of probity (discussed previously).   
The problems resulting from asset specificity extend beyond the immediate 
resources being used on a particular intelligence pursuit or security risk. They 
can also be seen permeating through the formal and cultural institutional 
configurations of agencies and communities, affecting their ability to function 
within their current environment, and to adapt to changes in it. Because 
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culture is "...related to the total organization (and is) not regarded as 
phenomena solely vested in the hands of management"248 it is not 
necessarily amenable to direction from management. As the property rights 
discussion below concludes, the impossibility of fully predicting and 
contracting for all potential circumstances in spheres as uncertain and 
complex as these results in a significant proportion of what might be required 
of individuals and agencies being embedded in social norms and an 
organisations “culture”.249 These less formal and implicit requirements are 
nonetheless binding on all parties. For the most part this is an advantageous 
arrangement that allows not only management of minor changes in the 
environment but also more efficient communication within groups using the 
“.... codes and other shared human capital” referred to by Richard Posner 
and Luis Garicano250 (building on the work of Jacques Crémer251 ). However 
Kenneth Arrow has shown how agents may be rationally disinclined to 
change these norms and codes even when faced with changes in their 
environment.252   
The use of such informal arrangements reduces the contracting costs 
between policy makers and agencies, and between agencies and their staff, 
to realistic levels and provide an efficient means of communication at both 
the inter and intra agency level using these shared values and 
understandings. They are nonetheless, as Posner/Garicano observe, a 
substantial sunk investment.253 A sunk investment, furthermore that, unlike its 
contractual equivalent, does not have a pre-designated method of being re-
negotiated (however expensive an option that might be in the case of legal 
contracting). Although they allow minor shifts and flexibility by setting such 
modifications in a larger cultural understanding around purpose. When more 
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major re-alignment is required that necessitates a re-evaluation of the culture 
itself, the extent of the sunk investment in these social norms and codes 
becomes aligned with the degree of difficulty in altering them in the manner 
described below (Figure 2.5):254  
    
The fact that an organisation’s supporting culture and codes are optimal to an 
existing external operating environment at a given point in time, but may not 
be at another, make them an asset that is specific to that environment. This 
in turn means that cultural factors, and the investment an organisation puts 
into them whether consciously or not, are hostage to the same vulnerabilities 
as their other sunken investments. Within the intelligence and security 
functions, the unusually large degree of risk of change that the complexity 
and uncertainty of the environment create mean that this problem is 
exacerbated. Just as an investment in a particular human or technical source 
may be rendered less valuable than anticipated when events move on; so too 
will an agencies cultural condition. However in the latter case money alone is 
unlikely to alleviate the problem as the United States intelligence community 
has repeatedly found. The most cited case of this problem is the post Cold 
War adaption from a single, overarching and absolute threat to the plethora 
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that subsequently emerged.255 However more minor instances abound on 
both sides of the Atlantic; examples include the United Kingdom’s Special 
Branch reaction to the Security Service being put on a statutory footing,256 or 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s failure to integrate its own intelligence 
apparatus.257  
The informal contracting methods embodied in these cultural understandings 
and organisational codes thus have a dual nature that can be either 
beneficial or deleterious. Certainly, effective organisation is made easier if, as 
Luther Gulick argued, there is an 'homogeneity of function' amongst those 
involved.258 This is particularly clear when one considers how the asset 
specific nature of such traditions impacts on another behavioural element of 
institutional costs; that of probity. As Williamson makes clear in his 
consideration of the United States Department of State, it is essential to good 
governance that what he terms ‘sovereign transactions’ are completed by 
staff committed not only to the policies of the current Executive, but also the 
longer term good of the Nation. This requires not only a low-powered 
incentive scheme to discourage adventurous behaviour, but also a positive 
investment in human capital.259 In coming to this conclusion, Williamson is 
building upon the work of Donald Warwick, who states that the United States 
foreign service is comprised of an elite that “.... places great emphasis on the 
intellectual and social superiority” of its staff, recruits them from the bottom 
rather than laterally, thus ensuring that standing values are fully inculcated 
into them before they become decision makers, and is content that they 
boast “little in the way of marketable skills”.260 The asset specificity of the 
resultant workforce is clear. So too is the trade-off that must be made. The 
often-laudable certainties that this specificity brings are inevitably contrasted 
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with a consequential lack of responsiveness. Williamson suggests that the 
frustrations with an apparent inefficiency are actually no more than “...a 
predictable consequence of the syndrome of attributes that define the 
sovereign bureau (hence should be interpreted as part of the design trade-
off).”261; an idea with important ramifications for the organisation of an 
intelligence or security capability.  
When the assets inherent in an organisation’s personnel become too specific 
for their, often more immediate, requirements, policy makers are likely to 
attempt to adapt into a different organisation less weighed down with cultural 
and formal regulations, or to simply create a different organisation with 
different assets. Williamson's (somewhat flawed) implication that the creation 
of the Office of Strategic Services (subsequently the Central Intelligence 
Agency) was because the State Department proved unwilling to take on 
tasks that might compromise its core responsibilities for diplomatic  missions, 
and to adapt to the new environment of hostilities, is an example of this.262 
The merits of such moves are of course subject to the individual 
circumstances of each case, and often subjective: Consider for example the 
US use of different organisations to achieve very similar policy objectives in 
Chile in the 1970's. While 'Track 1'   was an expansive, whole of government 
strategy, the more secret 'Track 2' of the Whitehouse and CIA specifically 
excluded both the State Department and Department of Defence (and 
thereby both the Ambassador and Defence Attaché).263 Yet cooperation 
between these organisations was entirely possible, as the meeting in late 
1972 to decide on their joint approach to any potential coup demonstrates.264  
Different organisational cultures can therefore provide decision makers with a 
greater range of policy options in the face of asset specificity in any one of 
them, even as it presents property rights problems. This is demonstrated by 
                                                                   
261
 "Public and Private Bureaucracies: A Transaction Cost Economics Perspective."330 
262
 "Public and Private Bureaucracies: A Transaction Cost Economics Perspectives."330 However, 
although State Department limitations may have been a factor, Williamsons implication is at odds 
with the accepted history of the formation of the OSS. See for example Bradley F Smith, The Shadow 
Warriors: O.S.S. And the Origins of the C.I.A.(New York: Basic Books, 1983). 
263
 Kristian Gustafson, "C.I.A. Machinations in Chile in 1970," Studies in Intelligence 47, no. 3 
(2007).5 
264
 Hostile Intent: U.S. Covert Operations in Chile, 1964-1974(Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, 
Inc., 2007).216 
97 
 
the way different Presidents have utilised the National Security Council as an 
alternative, shorter term version of the State Department,265 or as an organ to 
avoid Congressional oversight as in the Iran-Contra debacle.266 On that 
occasion formal rules deliberately increased the asset specificity of the 
governments ‘factors of production’ for security, in that case by prohibiting 
both the Central Intelligence Agency and Department of Defense from 
funding combatants in Central America. This was in fact done to prevent 
exactly the sort of unwanted consequences that were eventually 
experienced. The result was that an alternative, less suitable organisation – 
The National Security Council – that was very much an animal of the (then 
current) administration, and had a much smaller sunken investment in the 
broader United States system of governance that included the legislature, 
was used instead.267 Even more gentle evolutionary changes within an 
intelligence system can be baulked by the specificity of the culture or 
intelligence “theology” as Marrin and Davies consideration of the 
intelligence/policy interface embodied within the national intelligence 
estimates system makes clear.268 
Curiously, even between bodies engaged solely with ‘sovereign’ transactions, 
altering an asset so that it becomes more specific to a particular task, and is 
thus a hostage to the endeavour, can be used to signal to others involved in 
a joint undertaking that one is genuinely committed to a course of action. In 
this respect the asset specificity of resources is linked to the probity of those 
using them, and it can be advantageous despite the additional institutional 
costs likely to accrue.269 Asset specificity can therefore mean that 
organisations are locked into a particular role. This may mean that property 
rights are clarified, even if flexibility is reduced.    
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The multifaceted nature of what Posner and Garicano refer to as the “lock-in” 
issue is further exemplified by their conclusion that the United States 
intelligence community at large actually benefits from the disparity of such 
norms from agency to agency, so that at least one agency might be well 
structured to deal with any new threat.270 The reality of that will be discussed 
in subsequent chapters; at present it is enough to say that such an 
arrangement incurs institutional costs through other imperfections. These 
have included overlapping property rights leading to a lack of clarity of role, 
notwithstanding the point made at the end of the paragraph above. Indeed a 
difference in culture both within and between agencies has more often been 
cited as a key problem271 and, ironically, is one of the drivers behind Posner’s 
own advocacy for a new domestic intelligence agency outside the Bureau.272 
Even at the operational level within the intelligence sphere the product itself 
can become something of a sunk-investment to those that have advocated a 
particular interpretation of even very limited core data. The science of 
analysis,273 and the particular pathologies that can afflict it and its effective 
usage, have been examined by academics and practitioners alike,274 and will 
inevitably form part of the argument in the following chapters. Suffice it to say 
here that analysed product is asset specific in that it is particular to the 
available data and environmental conditions at the time it is produced, 
including relationships with policymakers, and these are varying constantly. 
Nonetheless an analyst is inevitably going to be associated with his or her 
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published thoughts on any particular issue. This in turn can either encourage 
equivocation and overly timid assessments, or alternatively a reluctance to 
abandon previously articulated views. Both have institutional costs 
implications as additional tiers of review, each potentially subject to the same 
conditions (although not necessarily at the same time) are required, and 
bring further issues of blurred responsibilities and more complex information 
exchange. 
Overall then the importance of asset specificity to the provision of security 
and intelligence may be summarised in the words of Oliver Williamson who 
stated; ” The organization of economic activity is massively influenced by the 
degree to which the transactions under examination are supported by assets 
that are specific to the parties.” So that “.... governance structures need to be 
matched to the underlying attributes of transactions in a discriminating way if 
the efficiency purposes of economic organisation are to be realised.”275 
iii) Frequency 
The frequency with which identifiably similar issues occur in the intelligence 
and security spheres impact on institutional costs when conjoined with 
opportunistic behaviour to an even greater degree than in the private sector 
areas discussed by Williamson. He discusses the impact of small numbers 
bargaining, and how some circumstances within larger number bargains can 
act as small number bargains to increase institutional costs. In the same way 
the limited number of potential providers of a security ‘good’, or of a type of 
intelligence, and the unique facets of most security problems can allow a 
public sector manifestation of the same problems. This can be exacerbated 
by the mixture of stochastic circumstances and monopolistic relationships 
prevalent in the intelligence and security spheres.276  
The unique nature of any security or intelligence issue, whether at the 
strategic, tactical or operational level, mean that what may at first appear as 
large number transactions within the day-to-day provision of intelligence 
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could well be anything but. The homogeneity required for large number 
circumstances to pertain, and thus neuter opportunistic behaviour, is illusory 
in this context. Similarly the ‘learning by doing’ and information impactedness 
advantages realised by incumbents will provide substantial advantages over 
alternate providers or strategies in dealing with a problem at the equivalent of 
contract renewal stage: In both cases institutional costs rise in terms of both 
bargaining costs and mal-adaption. The problem is as Williamson described 
it in the private sector, but magnified; the interests of the actors encourage 
opportunistic haggling and misrepresentation, whereas the interests of the 
system require bargaining to be based on an overarching maximisation of 
utility.277    
Both the intelligence and the security functions are made up of numerous 
non-standard transactions. In his synopsis on transaction cost economics in 
1985 Oliver Williamson noted that a specialised governance structure would 
be “...more sensitively attuned” to such atypical transactions; but that such a 
structure would come at great cost. The frequency problem with respect to 
governance structures in these spheres is thus whether these costs can be 
justified, which will vary depending on both their benefits and utilisation. 
Costs will be more easily recovered from large, recurrent transactions of 
course, but are more likely to be incurred during infrequent and even unique 
situations. As Williamson continues, where nuanced governance is required, 
some type of aggregation of similar cases or other factor is likely.278 
Perfection is unlikely to be achieved but the resultant organisation may be 
more appropriate than any other realisable option, and further informal 
adaption of specific elements can minimise the underperformance. For 
example intelligence elements of larger concerns, such as the United 
Kingdom’s military’s Intelligence Corps or police’s Special Branch, both 
developed flatter and less hierarchal governance structures informally whilst 
nominally still maintaining the formal rank structure of their parent body.279 
The frequency issue can thus impact on both operational and organisational 
capability.   
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e. Surrounding Variables 
i) Property Rights 
Coase was thinking primarily of market-based transactions when he first 
developed his theorem on transaction costs, property rights and the 
possibility of a mutually beneficial bargaining process. Central to this theorem 
is that “.... the delimitation of rights is an essential prelude to market 
transactions.”280 However the usefulness of the theory as a paradigm for 
security and intelligence organisation developed here is as dependent on the 
subsequent conceptual leaps of other scholars: With respect to the 
understanding of property rights that point of departure came when Armen 
Alchian re-conceived them not solely as legal rights, but also as economic 
rights so that they can be viewed as the right to the use of a resource;281 a 
much broader idea and one that more readily allows degrees of ownership, 
and for some uses to be permitted whilst others are not. An inevitable 
extension to this concept is that property rights are not therefore restricted to 
formal laws but must include social norms and ideology or, as Eggertsson 
describes it; peoples taste for a good society.282  
This reinforces Coase’s point of the importance of private ordering as against 
legal centralism,283 and importantly for this argument when the United 
Kingdom and United States are compared, allows the conclusion that a strict 
legal framework can in fact be inimical to clear property right allocation 
because, as Galanter observes; “.... participants can devise more satisfactory 
solutions to their disputes than can professionals constrained to apply 
general rules on the basis of limited knowledge...”.284 In other words, in 
complex areas the necessary flexibility can be better achieved if property 
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rights are situated in informal norms, rather than in cumbersome regulatory 
frameworks. 
Alchian’s conclusion was that property rights are not reliant solely on the 
State for delineation and enforcement, and he concurs with Williamson that a 
plethora of other governance structures are involved, with varying degrees of 
formality and explicitness. Different transactions will have different 
governance needs and these needs will be recognised and adapted to in an 
efficient system.285 The extent that an actor can demonstrate their property 
rights is thus bound up with issues of reciprocity. These might affect their 
freedom to use the resources exactly as they would wish, their ability to make 
credible commitments, and what additional costs might need to be incurred in 
order for them to do  so (such as the equivalent of providing economic 
hostages, as discussed by Williamson).  
Informal systems of governance can thus supplant legal or other formal 
solutions, and in reality often do. More frequently still, particularly in 
sovereign transactions such as intelligence and security delivery, the two 
systems sit side-by-side. The relative importance of legal constraints to 
customs, social norms, and the way a society or group is informally ordered 
in deciding how property rights are allocated and disputes resolved has a 
significant impact on the resultant institutional costs, as grey areas are 
protected and contested. As the subsequent comparative chapters will 
demonstrate, this is particularly pertinent in examining the relative 
responsiveness to both external and internal stimuli of the respective 
intelligence communities of the United Kingdom and United States.  
In order to prove the real world importance of informal norms in dispute 
resolution, and challenge Coase’s assumption that the legal framework would 
be the starting point for dispute resolution in his seminal rancher/farmer 
parable, Robert Ellickson conducted a field study in exactly that environment. 
He demonstrates how the particularities of a given groups social norms 
dictated their preference for a non-legal resolution. Legal redress was seen 
as “costly and politicised”. It was regarded as producing higher institutional 
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costs by using “sovereign authority” in the pursuit of property rights clarity 
when compared to a “good neighbours” approach. Interestingly however in 
other circumstances a legal resolution might be preferred, despite the higher 
costs, simply because of the environment in which the ‘dispute’ was set; in 
Ellickson’s work the case of a cow being hit by a vehicle rather than straying 
into a field is cited.286 Thus how property rights are decided is dependent on 
context as well as the minimisation of institutional costs, although this is itself 
a factor in defining the context. This has implications for the management of 
security and intelligence provision at every level. In fact Ellickson develops a 
model of five “controllers” employed in the pursuit of social-order.287 Using 
these he demonstrates how the twin human factors of potentially 
opportunistic behaviour and bounded rationality (whereby an overall utility 
cannot be clearly grasped by all the relevant actors) both need to be 
managed by a combination set within the five ‘controllers’. These controllers 
include, but are not a sub-set of, regulatory frameworks.   
The security and intelligence facets of governance, like any economic 
undertaking, have both a technical and structural production frontier, and the 
latter will be determined (as in the case of the Eggertsson’s larger economy) 
by the “... country’s prevailing structure of property rights, which determines 
the set of feasible organizations”. Furthermore the structural production 
frontier will always be inside the technical one because, although rational 
participants are assumed to want to maximise wealth, (and therefore ensure 
a property rights allocation that allows this) they are unable to do so as the 
bargaining costs are sufficiently high as to prevent the evolution of perfect 
property rights arrangements.288 Eggertsson further notes that “For any 
branch of production, and given the set of known production technologies, 
alternative forms of contracts among the owners of the inputs (alternative 
ownership structures) are associated with different types of incentives, 
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leading to different costs of production.”289 How each branch is situated 
within the whole is thus of importance.  
The property rights alluded to by Eggertsson can define incentives within a 
narrower band of activity more completely than any appreciation of a national 
level of utility could hope to do. This in turn can be inimical to greater 
collusion between branches within an intelligence community. At the other 
end of the spectrum, too broad a set of incentives can lead to an 
inappropriate structure and leadership remaining in existence. For example 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation has historically been organised with its 
incentives supporting law enforcement activity. At the community level these 
incentives have been too narrow and unsuited to the larger focus of those 
with intelligence responsibilities as a whole. This has lead to a cultural wall 
between the FBI and (inter alia) the Central Intelligence Agency.290 At the 
same time within the organisation the same incentives are too broad for all its 
functions. This has resulted in an inability for its increasingly large domestic 
intelligence unit to assimilate itself into its parent body.291 Vague property 
rights can therefore cause increases in institutional costs not only horizontally 
but also vertically. In the FBI case, imperfect ‘contracting’ at an individual 
level leads to imperfect allocations of property rights and incentives, which in 
turn have shaped not only the status of analysts within the FBI, but also its 
place within the United States Intelligence Community, and indeed the 
community's resultant capability to perform.292  
Just as property rights shape the incentive schemes and resultant costs of 
production, so too can different institutional arrangements affect the way they 
do so. The particular vulnerability of the security and intelligence spheres to 
‘moral hazard’ is discussed with other opportunistic behaviours above. 
However from the property rights perspective it should be noted that both 
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endeavours are based on resources that are, as Alchian and Woodward 
describe it, subject to a wide range of “.... discretionary, legitimate decisions 
within which the user may choose”. They therefore exhibit a high degree of 
‘plasticity’ with the attendant monitoring costs. This plasticity is unavoidable 
in pursuits where there is a high requirement for discretionary behaviour but 
inevitably leads to a blurring of property rights. Alchian and Woodward 
describe how even within a simple firm this can allow different operational 
levels to bias their actions towards their own stage of production, which can 
be “.... to some degree inconsistent with the interests of the principal”,293 a 
tendency that can be exaggerated over a complex and multi-tiered institution 
like an intelligence community.  
Preferences for different property right allocations will also affect the level of 
institutional costs as different institutional arrangements are selected 
horizontally. At the national level a comparison can be made between those 
observed in the United Kingdom and the United States; where the former’s 
collegial approach is contrasted by an intentionally adversarial one in the 
latter. At this level the democratic nature of the systems in which both 
Nations intelligence and security apparatus must operate impacts on the 
property rights framework that is preferred. This will not necessarily be the 
one that brings the structural production frontier closest to the technical 
production frontier, and thus maximises the overall utility that can be realised. 
Rather it is that which is acceptable to the majority of participants and 
observers within their own cultural context.294 
As the subsequent consideration of the United States intelligence community 
makes especially clear, there are instances when the property rights around 
a particular issue are deliberately blurred, notwithstanding the increase in 
institutional costs that this must incur. This is precisely to avoid any 
concentration of power in any particular hands. For example although the 
President is invariably perceived as the top of the decision making pyramid 
for security and intelligence affairs the Constitution ensures he is in fact 
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merely the top of one of the pyramids. Congressional budgetary control, 
State level responsibilities, and Judicial challenges ensure that authority is in 
fact diluted. Furthermore changing technology, threats and priorities ensure 
that no clear demarcation between each body’s responsibilities and authority 
is tenable for any great period of time. This apparently deliberate lack of 
clarity around property rights, despite the resultant inefficiencies and costs it 
imposes, is then reflected down through the rest of the community. While not 
entirely unique to the public sector this deliberate pursuit of high costs is rare 
outside it, ensuring that the use of transaction cost economic analysis of the 
public sector is of particular value. 
Even outside of these constraints the efficient allocation of property rights 
and concomitant reduction in institutional costs is not a matter of inexorable 
improvements being made over time. The structural production frontier does 
not simply move closer to the technical one as advances are made. As 
Williamson and others have noted, there is no one perfect organisational 
arrangement which will be ideal in all circumstances, even if it is likely to be 
faced with only a modest range of problems. Complex contracting is 
necessarily incomplete and less than one hundred percent specific so the 
resultant organisational structure it produces cannot be ideal in all situations. 
Instead it needs to be flexible enough to deal with most of them 
adequately.
295
 The temporally wide and infinitely complex requirements on an 
intelligence or security infrastructure at any level will therefore always be 
particularly problematic. 
 Even Richard Posner, an unabashed advocate of organisational reform in 
the United States intelligence community,296 when examining it from an 
economic perspective (as he has successfully done with U.S. law), 
acknowledges that while the US community has systemic obstacles, the 
costs of radical reform would outweigh the benefits. In particular he notes 
that increased centralisation (in other words strengthening property rights) 
will improve information sharing and minimise ‘turf wars’ but would reduce 
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the quality of the intelligence produced through ‘herding’ and related 
pathologies becoming more prevalent297 so that only ‘modest’ prescriptions 
can realistically be offered. Even within a single agency, the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation, Posner concludes that there cannot be a single 
organisational structure suited to both law enforcement and domestic 
intelligence. The property rights embedded in social norms are distinctly 
different between the two functions and the de-centralised (field office) 
system that proved so calamitous in the run-up to the 9/11 attacks is 
nonetheless well suited to crime fighting.298  
There is therefore a link between property rights allocation and what type of 
an institution actors believe an organisation is. A shift in organisational type 
at Bletchley Park, as previously diverse skill sets were merged, and 
functional capability shifted towards those of a full-blown intelligence 
organisation, lead to exactly the same sort of frictions over contested 
property rights observable in the US intelligence community this century.299 
When one then also considers the added complexities inherent in strategic 
level intelligence and security activities the inexorable increase and 
significant scale of costs that result in lack of property rights clarity the 
importance of the issue becomes clear. 
Another risk of weak property rights is that it allows actors to potentially 
threaten ‘hold-up’ (see above). However the property rights dimension is 
important. Security and intelligence communities are like firms in that, as 
Alchian notes, they; ”... involve ownership in common of the coalition specific 
resources” But the use of those resources also remains within the control of 
specific agencies or even individuals. Property rights are thus divided and 
unclear. In ideal conditions the utility to be achieved by ‘joint action’ will 
exceed that achievable by the sum of separate results that specific parts of 
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the community could achieve. Reward will then, as Alchian continues, be a 
portion of the whole.300  
It is however unlikely that members of the coalition will know in advance with 
any certainty what, if any, utility is to be gained by a particular action. The 
mutually held property rights, in conjunction with a high degree of inter-
specificity, allow for actors to easily and convincingly threaten hold-up if they 
are unhappy with a proposed course of action. They can thus extract what 
Marshall called “composite quasi rent”301 either explicitly, or more likely within 
the public sector context, implicitly. The protective measures required to limit 
these problems, such as increased vertical integration, longer term 
agreements that reduce flexibility, regulation and even legislation,302 all 
increase the institutional costs involved in the joint effort and thus reduce the 
overall utility gained by not only all the actors, but also the policy makers and 
public. 
A linked problem with multiple interested parties having an interest in the 
resources of a security or intelligence endeavour is how the inevitable 
variations in that resources’ value are managed. The merits of a particular 
resource in any given circumstance will of course vary from one type of 
operation or pursuit to another. This need not be particularly problematic if, 
over time, all are used adequately enough to secure their relevance while not 
being overburdened relative to the others. Indeed, in such conditions the fact 
that “all components of property rights to a resource need not be held in 
common”303 can be a positive advantage, with joint owners working co-
operatively to spread the load, and maximise the gains from specialisation. 
Rather, a problem arises where one input is superseded by another, and one 
of the group has a greater interest in it than his/her peers. As Alchian states, 
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variation in value is inevitable, even where the intrinsic worth of an input is 
unchanged, and someone has to bear this.304  
New technologies might mean that a particular type of intelligence input, 
while still theoretically usable, is less cost effective than a more recently 
developed one which becomes the equivalent of a new joiner in a market 
environment. Alternatively, one agency recruiting a new human intelligence 
source with improved access against a particular target may mean the 
agency with the existing source being relegated in importance. In either case 
there will be a tendency for those with a heavy investment in the original 
‘factor of production’ to provide perfunctory rather than consummate co-
operation305 in supporting the shift (in what are very idiosyncratic roles). They 
will be incentivised to use their inter-specific rights to conduct hold-up tactics 
as described above, and to question the validity and value of the newer input. 
Unfortunately within these two spheres of security and intelligence it may 
even be that, whatever their motives, they are right to do so. In any event it is 
likely to be a long time before the veracity of their position can be properly 
assessed.        
The property rights issue is then central to the level and type of institutional 
costs intelligence or security endeavours will be faced with, and will define 
the realistic options available to it. The relationship between the two is 
symbiotic, so that the right institutional framework will allow a re-allocation of 
rights and reduced institutional costs. For example the United Kingdom’s 
Armed Forces ‘Joint Doctrine of Intelligence and Understanding’ describes 
how intelligence activity has two possible approaches:306 The first it terms the 
conventional approach, which has “.... fixed lines and boundaries between 
departments which include rules for inter-agency co-operation” – a system 
with clear but inflexible property rights firmly established and well suited to 
some, but not all, defence related problems. Traditionally the use of a military 
solutions has boasted the most unequivocal objectives, but this is no longer 
the case in the Twenty-First Century.  
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The alternate approach is one where property rights are based in a more 
flexible and open system. This allows actors to pursue easier and more 
adaptive inter-agency co-operation, which is more an improvisation on a 
theme (the overarching strategy of commanders) in the same way that jazz 
musicians might interpret a piece.307 As the Joint Doctrine publication itself 
suggests, clarity around property rights (the rules between agencies) will 
remain an essential part of the mix. A system that incorporates both this 
clarity and the “flexible and creative” rules the doctrine advocates, with 
authority for sharing at the lowest possible level,308 will not be an easy one to 
develop.        
In all these cases property rights include not only legal, but also economic 
rights to the use of particular resources. These can be delineated not only by 
sovereign authority, but also by social norms, patterns of reciprocity and 
informal contracting, but are no less valid for this. Subsequent chapters will 
demonstrate how the intelligence communities of both the United Kingdom 
and United States are thus influenced by the same 'controllers' of society 
observed by Ellickson, and that they also operate at the tactical and 
operational levels of the intelligence and security functions. They affect the 
allocation of property rights in different ways in different circumstances, but 
always impact on the resultant level and type of institutional costs 
experienced.  
As later examination of attempts to reform the intelligence and  security 
communities will show, it is not simply a matter of tightening up the property 
right ownership patterns. Different allocations have both different strengths 
and different weaknesses in the intelligence and security context. There is no 
perfect organisational form to cover all eventualities in any but the simplest 
repetitive spot transactions,309 and these spheres are situated in an infinitely 
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complex and uncertain world. Clarity must sit alongside flexibility, centrality 
with localised independence of action. A property rights system that can 
deliver all of these will be hard to design and harder still to define in such a 
way as to be clear to all the relevant actors. The inevitable imperfections, 
when coupled with the other behavioural and environmental factors, are likely 
to be taken advantage of by individual (or sub-group) level actors, in pursuit 
of their own utility over that of the whole. This will be a particular problem 
where actors have a different conception of what the maximand actually is. 
The conscious ‘taste’ for the higher institutional costs that a disperse 
allocation of property rights brings is a particular public sector problem. Firms 
(under the added evolutionary pressure of being likely to ‘die’, a fate only 
very rarely suffered by public bodies) almost invariably prefer an efficient 
concentration of decision making capability over the wilful neutering of its 
authority figures. Public bodies, on the other hand, need not give this much 
consideration.   
For efficient bargaining to occur, geared towards maximising overall utility, 
Coase offered that property rights must be clear. Despite the difficult 
circumstances of the security and intelligence sphere, that general principle 
holds. Decision makers will be more efficient when able to bargain with clarity 
amongst themselves, towards a maximisation of their joint utility. Expenditure 
on securing and protecting property rights due to imperfections in initial 
allocation and overlap within the communities should ordinarily be minimised. 
More utility from the security and intelligence communities will be preferred to 
less, ceteris paribus, and this can be best achieved when all institutional 
costs are as low as possible.  
ii) Atmosphere 
Williamson’s original conception of the organisational failures framework 
reproduced above incorporates what he refers to as ‘atmosphere’. This 
concept allows that the nature of an interaction itself may have value to the 
participants in it, and thus broadens the understanding of net benefits that is 
required. The low powered incentives required for actors working at 
‘sovereign transactions’ (see the discussion of probity) mean that intelligence 
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and security interactions are particularly affected by considerations of 
atmosphere. Within each sphere there are various types of exchange 
relations operating vertically and, equally importantly for the actors, 
horizontally. As Williamson observes “... these relations themselves are 
valued” so that they must be included in any calculus of efficiency.310 
Furthermore these atmospheric factors may be non-separable, even where a 
technological separation is discernible. Attitudinal factors such as job 
satisfaction will be intrinsically linked to productive efficiency. In many areas 
of the public service sector atmospheric benefits replace the type and level of 
those achievable in the private sector, and are seen as an inherent (albeit 
implicit) part of the remuneration package. Changes to them can thus have 
far reaching effects. Atmospheric considerations then provide the backdrop 
to the interactions between behavioural and environmental factors whereby 
institutional costs are generated or reduced. They are of particular relevance 
in fields such as intelligence and security that are heavily reliant on the 
personnel involved, rather than whatever technology may support them. 
Although difficult to measure or predict they can have far reaching and 
unintended consequences as Williamson’s example of blood donors being 
dissuaded from attending when a fee is introduced amply demonstrates.311  
Subsequent chapters will demonstrate how the effectiveness of very similar 
organisational forms was variable when situated in different situations. 
Contrast for example, the 1990’s, when a peace dividend was expected and 
intelligence and security requirements seemed to be on wane, and the post 
9/11 period, when budgets increased substantially but the reputation of many 
agencies was at a very low ebb. This was not only because of the degree of 
technical frictions experienced against newly prioritised targets, but also 
because of the effect of atmosphere on encouraging what Williamson calls 
consummate (over perfunctory) completion of tasks.312 Similarly there can be 
a reciprocal effect on the effectiveness of agencies and individuals 
depending on their self-perceived relevance to policy making or other 
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functions. In the United States context for example the same institutional set-
up can be used or by-passed by particular Presidents depending on their 
personal preferences, as demonstrated by President G. W. Bush’s transfer of 
primacy in the fight against terrorism from the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
to the Central Intelligence Agency (and thence, arguably, to the Department 
of Defense).313 The same sort of demoralisation occurred in the Metropolitan 
Police’s Special Branch when the Security Service were made lead agency in 
countering the Irish Republican threat on the mainland in 1991.314  
Atmospheric effects operate at all levels, from the individual to the national, 
and include the general health of agencies and communities. The usefulness 
of incorporating ‘atmosphere’ effects into the calculation, despite the risk of 
criticism from pure-rationalists, is that it ensures the focus remains holistic.315    
iii) The Degree of a Shared Sense of a Single Maximand 
Closely related to the concept of atmosphere and its effects on institutional 
costs is the extent to which the various actors and their agencies share a 
sense of what the optimal outcome actually should be, and can therefore be 
expected to act co-operatively in trying to achieve it. However such a 
maximand is not a simple construct and cannot realistically be created 
through managerial constructs like 'mission statements' or announcements of 
'shared values'. Rather it is a complex mix of cultural values,316 aligned 
incentives and actors understandings of their roles and responsibilities. It is 
therefore also closely associated with both property rights and the asset 
specificity of those involved.  
The sense of shared purpose (across whatever organisational form is used) 
will determine the degree disparate elements are motivated to collaborate. 
Conversely the type of organisational form adopted, the and the resultant 
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levels of other institutional costs, can make a shared maximand more or less 
likely. The United States, which organises its intelligence community sub-
units predominantly according to their individual objectives, has a long history 
of trying to implement community wide reforms with only very limited 
success. The combination of different views as to what represented the 
national good, within its increasingly diverse elements, coupled with different 
ideas on how it might be achieved, has undermined suggested reforms 
throughout its history. Different bodies and agencies have had different 
objectives, which they each conceived as the true expression of the national 
good, and have then pursued to the detriment of their partner agencies and 
even their own managers. Despite Director Robert Mueller's advocacy for an 
emphasis on intelligence and more collaborative working317 the FBI has 
consistently struggled to extend their sense of a positive outcome beyond the 
conviction of offenders.   318 The rational behaviour of actors has been 
bounded by their limited sense of overall utility. This has then been coupled 
with the inescapable uncertainty of the environment. Institutional costs have 
thus escalated whilst reform has failed to clarify the property rights situation.  
The United Kingdom on the other hand, which primarily organised its 
community by collection discipline, leaving assessment to others,319 has 
historically demonstrated a greater cohesion around the objectives espoused 
through its central machinery and a more pronounced adaptability to these. It 
is of course smaller and therefore more wieldy, but the principle of a joint 
objective handed down from on high has certainly meant that agencies have 
not had to interpret where utility was to be found, but merely to maximise it. 
The existence or lack of a shared maximand is not a nation-centric 
phenomenon however: It is pertinent to note that even during World War II 
different understandings of organisational purpose created significant 
frictions even in the success story of Bletchley Park,320 and very recent 
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changes in central government machinery, which have lead to the increased 
direct exposure of the United Kingdom’s community to political and other 
exogenous factors have significantly reduced the sense of shared purpose 
previously felt as a result of more opaque property rights, in a manner more 
reminiscent of the United States’ experience.321  
The degree to which disparate actors subscribe to a mutually understood and 
genuinely shared sense of a best outcome at a level appropriate to their role 
is thus part of a circle with other elements of the institutional costs impact 
framework that can be either vicious or virtuous, and can substantially effect 
cooperative efficiency.       
Section 6: Supporting argument for a Micro-economic Approach 
a. The Reality of a Single Shared Maximand in Intelligence and Security 
Provision:  
For Coasian bargaining to be feasible there must be a maximand made up of 
the same constituent parts for each actor involved. In his original, market 
based, example Coase could use a dollar based system to make clear the 
reciprocal nature of the issue and how it must be considered both “... in total 
and at the margin” (emphasis from original).322 Like other public sector and 
governance issues however the provision of intelligence to decision makers 
and a secure environment are not reducible to simple pounds or dollars. 
They are both, like their subset defence, public or collective goods,323 so that 
their usage by one actor need not reduce the amount available to others. Nor 
would it be to true to say that simply because monies have been spent on 
their provision, that the actual amount of each that is available has been 
increased. Simple quantitative analysis is therefore problematic. 
Furthermore, both the United Kingdom and the United States have adopted 
very broad conceptions of their national security.324 These cover not only 
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traditional conceptions of security from foreign invasion (perhaps regarded as 
the oldest duty of any governing body)325 and physical attack, but also ideas 
of economic well being, environmental and virtual threats, and even each 
Nation’s sense of itself as it is integrated into the wider world. The tentacles 
of each Country’s national security are thus intricately involved with almost 
every sphere of governmental activity, exponentially increasing the 
interactions and trade-offs likely to be required from decision makers. Indeed 
the agenda outlined in each Nation’s ‘National Security’ planning could more 
easily be described as an attempt to capture the authors’ view of the 
‘National good’.326 This inherent complexity makes any attempt to reduce the 
maximand to a specific value for the purposes of quantitative analysis 
fraught.   
Nonetheless security and intelligence provision are, in general, ideally suited 
to examination using Pareto’s famous simplification of the economic problem 
into the division between “tastes” and “obstacles”, and the resultant shifts 
around equilibrium between the two.327 In both spheres the obstacles to 
increasing overall utility are both internal and external: Technical obstacles 
such as finite resources limit the total possible productivity, as in conventional 
cases. However so too will the fact that, as Hicks observes; “… so much of 
total production is at the disposal of persons other than himself” and that this 
truism will hold good for any group that is less than “… the totality of a closed 
community”.328 This then includes the activities of either the foreign 
intelligence service or terrorist cell, whose utility is obviously at odds with 
one’s own. But more importantly for this argument, it also includes the 
alternate sub-units on one’ own side, situated within (variously) opposing 
political factions, other parts of the intelligence community, or even the 
narrow managerial parts of one’s own unit, where different opinions will 
always exist.  
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The aggregation of such disparate “tastes” is not therefore a simple matter, 
as Pareto himself found. However within the context of a broad national level 
defence against external hostility and the pursuit of national welfare 
(including disparate strands such as economic and energy security) it can at 
least be understood in a qualitative sense. In both the United Kingdom and 
United States there is without question a shared sense of national security 
and public safety as a universal ‘good’. A vague conception perhaps, which 
inevitably frays at the edges when examined in detail from any one 
perspective, although the United Kingdom’s and the United States national 
security Strategies may be regarded as attempts to encapsulate exactly 
this.329  
Just as when Nicholas Kaldor concluded in 1939 that “... the economist 
should not be concerned with “prescriptions” at all, but with the relative 
advantages of carrying out certain political ends” because “it is quite 
impossible to decide on economic grounds what particular pattern of income-
distribution maxims social welfare”,330 so too is it more useful to consider this 
particular problem at the macro level despite the use of micro-economic 
theory as the paradigm. A broad conception of national security means that it 
can be envisaged as a national level general utility, in the same way as the 
profits earned by a firm is regarded as its utility. Indeed the former is a much 
nearer approximation of utility as originally outlined by Jeremy Bentham in 
1780.331  
In formulating a doctrine whereby individual endeavour within a social group 
should be directed towards maximising “.... the greatest happiness for the 
greatest number of people” and advocating authoritarian intervention to 
achieve this, Bentham encapsulated the real purpose of each element of a 
social network such as an intelligence community. Of course, in the case of a 
firm, utility is maximised when those within it are most broadly and fully 
rewarded, whereas in an intelligence or security community the benefits are 
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to be bestowed on both those within and those outside. This only 
emphasises the necessity for such bodies, their sub-units, and the individuals 
within them, to adopt an expansive vision of their purpose. The inevitable 
problems in achieving this utopian ideal are a central tenet of this thesis, but 
the beauty of Bentham’s starting point is its very simplicity; the reduction of 
options to a two-dimensional continuum between pleasure and pain.332   
It follows therefore that the admittedly almost infinitely complex and nuanced 
concept of utility offered by an expansive vision of national security 
(notwithstanding that it must allow different timescales and aspects of itself to 
take precedence in any given circumstance) can nonetheless be collated into 
a single conception of the national good. The success or otherwise of this 
collation must then impact on the level of institutional costs and clarity of 
property rights experienced within the intelligence or security sphere under 
consideration, and thus its ability to efficiently adapt itself and deliver the 
required product. 
Inevitably then, anything less than a perfectly uniform conception of an ideal 
solution to whatever issues are addressed generates some amount of 
institutional cost. Opinions do not need to be diametrically opposed; only 
imperfectly aligned. The position is similar to that discussed by John Stuart 
Mill as he built on Bentham’s work, in that some tastes deserve preference 
over others.333 However in deciding which ‘taste’ deserves preference 
decision makers need to bargain and trade-off the different merits of, for 
example, law enforcement over intelligence collection and contract amongst 
themselves. They will then need to monitor the outcome for both internal non-
compliance and for external shifts in the situation being addressed. All of 
which involve incurring institutional costs. 
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b. Intelligence and Security – Distinct Pursuits Conjoined:  
Whilst each is a wholly different pursuit, the costs and benefits of intelligence 
or security are inseparable from those of the other. Intelligence agencies 
creates a product, whilst security organisations deliver a service so that both 
are delivery agencies within the Dunleavy definition.334 They are however 
controlled by different regulatory bodies. This dichotomy has consequences 
for their ability to agree, or their enthusiasm for, any negotiated agreement 
despite their inseparability.335 Acquiring a particular piece of information may 
have usefulness in decision-making around potential physical threats and in 
the pursuit of economic advantage. The institutional costs involved in 
obtaining the information cannot be separated into those paid out for each, in 
the same way that the costs of Cheung’s toll collector provides both a 
policing and revenue service.336 The ensuing benefits, though they cross 
disparate spheres, are universal and mutually dependant so that they may be 
regarded in the same way as the ‘indivisibilities’ discussed by Williamson 
despite the organisational difficulties in aligning the agencies delivering them. 
The economic benefits will only accrue in a secure environment, and security 
is dependent on economic well-being. Any mathematical division of the 
resulting benefits, like those of the initial costs, is therefore likely to be 
subjective and misleading. Information is unusual as a ‘good’ in that once 
acquired its use does not diminish it in quantity or (necessarily) value, and 
neither is the set-up cost or resources required for its acquisition dependent 
on the “... scale of the production process in which the information is 
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used”.337 The formation of a community, in either the formal or informal 
sense, to manage the provision of intelligence and security has its foundation 
here, and the institutional design of that community will be dependent on the 
institutional cost context of the environment in which it will need to operate.  
The different evolutionary paths and current forms of the United Kingdom’s 
and United States intelligence and security apparatus’ can be divined within 
this paradigm. As Williamson observes; “....there is no technological bar that 
prevents one individual from assuming the information gathering and 
dissemination function.... all parties, suppliers and users,... could be 
independent ..... yet scale economies of both types could be fully realized”.338 
In the case of the United Kingdom, which boasts not only a collegial attitude 
to such matters but significant treasury constraints, this style of monopolistic 
provider is evident. Levels of substitutability between intelligence providers 
are, for example, much lower than in the US case. The primary division 
amongst agencies in the UK is by collection discipline, with the use of their 
product or service being disseminated to ‘customers’ as needed. This 
approach is demonstrated by the division and directing of the Government 
Communications Head Quarters (GCHQ’s) capability, and, for example, the 
increased percentage of its work undertaken at the request of the Security 
Service.339 However the more adversarial position of the United States and 
their fundamental belief in the separation of power
340
 (linked to their ability to 
resource a more expensive organisational framework) has resulted in a 
division based on function, and mutually beneficial pursuits have been 
artificially cleaved. The transactional difficulties in re-amalgamating these, as 
discussed in later chapters, are such that much of the United States 
intelligence community’s evolutionary history has been concerned with 
overcoming them so that the natural advantages of these indivisibilities can 
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be captured. To return to Williamson “....the incentive to collectivize activities 
for which indivisibilities are large.... are transactional in origin.”341    
When institutional structure supports this natural state of indivisibility between 
different elements of the security and intelligence, it need not be a 
problematic issue, and may even be a positive force for good. However it is 
worth reiterating that indivisibility can present problems when actors indulge 
in opportunistic behaviour in the presence of sometimes substantial elements 
of information specialisation, as can often be the case in these spheres.  
c. The Reciprocal Nature of the Security and Intelligence Bargains: 
Reciprocity has been described as “...the vital principle of society”342 and may 
be regarded as central to analyses of stability and instability within a  society. 
Functionalists make reciprocity central to the interpretation of data by 
establishing its consequences for the larger structures within which it sits.343 
This is no less the case within the security and intelligence communities. As 
such degrees of reciprocity are closely linked with both coalition forming 
behaviour, and the effect of information impactedness across and within 
agencies. The relevance of reciprocity for institutional costs is affected by 
several factors that must therefore become part of the calculus.  
Despite the ubiquitous nature of the phenomenon Gouldner counsels against 
an assumption of its presence, or that the receipt of a benefit will necessarily 
mean a return, and argues that the existence of such a relationship needs to 
be empirically demonstrated.344 A collegial type intelligence community such 
as the United Kingdom’s is more likely to demonstrate reciprocal behaviour 
than one based on a power relation, and therefore exhibit lower institutional 
costs generally. Attempts have been made by the United States to ‘force’ 
reciprocal behaviour on the various parts of a diverse community through, 
variously, a Director of Central Intelligence, a Director for Homeland Security 
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and most recently a Director of National Intelligence (whose real authority is 
open to question and in any case varies by type and degree from agency to 
agency). but these attempts have only tended to increase institutional costs, 
whereas bottom-up reciprocity has tended to lower them, as subsequent 
chapters will demonstrate.      
Where reciprocal behaviour is being assessed between parties to 
transactions, it should be understood that it need not be either ‘wholly absent’ 
or ‘wholly present’ but is quantitatively as well as qualitatively variable, with 
extremes from ‘equal benefits returned’ to ‘no benefits returned’. In fact 
Gouldner suggests that the case where one party gives more or less than the 
other is probably the most common case. In any event what reciprocity does 
entail is a mutual dependence between the actors that is “...the complement 
to and fulfilment of the division of labor”,345 where the mutual gratification is in 
the long-run as well as part of the immediate exchange.   
It follows then that institutional design will be affected by the degree and type 
of reciprocity common in the society in which it is set, and that the 
institutional cost position will vary accordingly. Gouldner’s observations that 
reciprocity is not part of the American dominant cultural profile, but rather 
inhabits a latent or substitute cultural structure within institutional sectors,346 
suggests that the United States was always destined to promote a very 
different looking intelligence community to that emanating from the United 
Kingdom.347 Indeed in the UK, reciprocity amongst intelligence actors leading 
to patterns of probity between them, and the eventual development of a 
shared maximand can be traced back to 1924 and the establishment of 
Cryptography and Interception Committee (and its standing Y Sub-
Committee). This was composed of the Single Services, the Government 
Code and Cypher School (GC&CS, which provided code-breaking functions), 
and later the Service Intelligence Directorates. Because, for example, The 
Army could more easily intercept communications useful to the Air Force, 
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and the Navy could do the same for the Army the Y Sub Committee was 
needed to coordinate the role of each as an 'honest broker', and to link them 
to GC&CS and even the Post Office (GPO). Their mutual reliance was thus 
clear, and bound them to collective goals.348 This initiative pre-dates even the 
Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), which is often cited as a long-standing 
example of integration in an intelligence community, and demonstrates the 
enduring nature of collegiality in the British intelligence system.          
It must however be kept in mind that whether the presence of reciprocity is a 
force for good or ill will depend on the particular circumstances pertaining. 
Unofficial reciprocity can undermine a bureaucracy, as Gouldner suggests 
occurs in the Philippines where it pervades all spheres of life and is an 
integral part of their corruption problem. But it can also enhance information 
sharing and co-operative behaviour. Gouldner therefore argues persuasively 
that a distinction needs to be made between ‘complementarity’; which 
denotes that one’s rights are another’s obligations and ‘reciprocity’; wherein 
each party has both rights and duties, so that the latter has an impact at a 
systemic level.349  
The act of reciprocation is itself a part of a transaction. Gouldner discusses 
the case where groups whose needs are met by the political machine 
reciprocate by paying the machine for the services received and notes that 
there are two necessary assumptions: That the reciprocation actually occurs, 
and that the performance of positive functions by the one are contingent 
upon the performance of positive functions by the other.350 Whether the 
machine is negatively corrupted, or not realistic in its ambitions will depend 
on the detail of this inter-play, but in any event the degree and manner of 
reciprocity will have institutional cost consequences. 
Section 7: Concluding Remarks 
As the discussion above makes clear, the conflicting pressures within the 
government functions of both intelligence and security, sitting as they do in 
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the most complex and uncertain of environments, means that no single 
organisational design will be ideal in all circumstances or to all agencies and 
departments. As the new institutional economists of the last few decades 
have concluded in other spheres, there will inevitably need to be a trade off 
between the different sorts of institutional costs that might be incurred. This 
will be influenced by the different sorts of utility that decision makers will wish 
to attain, and the parallel tradeoffs between these.   
Nonetheless the level of these institutional costs will be affected by the 
capacity for the organisational system in place to conduct Coasian style 
bargaining efficiently. A shared idea of what constitutes a maximum possible 
utility to be achieved in any given circumstance needs to be shared by those 
involved within and across agencies. This must be by both type and quantity, 
and should be clearly delineated and understood within a shared sense of 
national security, so that the products of the various departments and 
agencies are visualised as factors of production or tools to that end, rather 
than ends in themselves. In reality however the type and amount of benefits 
that actors can achieve are limited by the frictions inherent in delivering the 
possible options. These will in turn be resultant on the institutional costs 
incurred in selecting and delivering each possibility. 
Additionally, the work of Alchian and Demsetz demonstrates how, for such 
bargaining to work well, the participants also need to all have a clear (and 
shared) sense of the property rights involved. Within the security or 
intelligence spheres this means clarity around responsibilities as well as 
ownership of resources. In most cases boundaries between different areas of 
responsibility will be crossed, and most security or intelligence issues will 
likely have some element of uniqueness about them, so that this is not an 
easy undertaking. The institutional design is therefore of paramount 
importance to how such problems are handled (as subsequent chapters will 
demonstrate) because this is how the property rights and responsibilities of 
participants are made clear. 
The institutional costs described are not unique to any particular aspect of 
intelligence or security delivery, but rather will occur internally, horizontally 
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and vertically in each so that the institutional cost impact framework must 
address issues of organisation, decision-making and even international 
relations at large. It is therefore argued that the institutional costs based 
approach developed above can significantly add to understanding of 
variations of cooperative success in the security and intelligence spheres.  
The next two chapters will examine existing approaches, and how 
institutional cost analysis sits within them. Because the institutional cost 
methodology developed in this chapter is an holistic model that includes a 
wider variety of behavioural and environmental concerns a number of 
different theoretical perspectives must be considered. These have each been 
concerned with one or more of the elements of cooperation identified above, 
whether or not the scholars in question have applied their thinking to either 
the intelligence or security functions. To make the discussion manageable it 
is divided across two chapters. Chapter 3 will consider how issues of 
cooperation within the security and intelligence functions can be located 
within existing scholarship on different aspects of cooperation and 
collaboration. Chapter 4 will build on these insights to properly examine how 
the institutional costs approach developed here inter-relates with the 
prominent schools of thought in these disciplines. 
Between them, the two chapters will thus assist in further detailing the 
potential contribution an institutional cost approach can make to the analysis 
of cooperation in the intelligence and security spheres, before the specific 
cases of counterterrorism and defence intelligence provision are considered 
in Parts' two and three.  
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Chapter 3 - Intelligence & Security, Existing Theories and Scholarship 
Section 1: Introduction 
Having derived an institutional cost impact framework for cooperation across 
the security and intelligence functions in Chapter 2, this Chapter will now 
examine the relationship between those same functional areas and existing 
scholarship that either has been or could be usefully applied to them, before 
Chapter 4 places them in the institutional cost context. Chapter 2 described 
how an institutional cost paradigm could be usefully employed to further 
explain the intelligence and security spheres; how they function as a part of 
more general governance, and how some specific features can be accounted 
for. The setting may be distinct, and the resultant issues therefore apparently 
more significant or, on occasion, critical, none of the issues described are 
unique to the intelligence or security domains. They have in fact been 
observed in other areas by social scientists for some years; only the mix and 
points of emphasis varies to any great degree. 
Security and intelligence communities have, since their inception, existed in a 
complex and interconnected environment, although (as Part 3 will 
demonstrate) the shift towards greater threats from non-State actors, and the 
ensuing rise in multi-faceted alliances, has certainly lead to an increase in 
what Emile Durkheim described as the moral or dynamic density of a society: 
Intra-social relations have “... become more numerous, since they extend, on 
all sides, beyond their original limits.”351  There are inevitable side effects to 
this increase in the number of “... individuals sufficiently in contact to be able 
to act and react upon one another.” and the development of the division of 
labour that results, both vertically and horizontally.352 This chapter will 
therefore consider the extent to which existing theoretical approaches have 
successfully addressed this inter-connectivity in a manner that can explain 
the particular experiences observed in the intelligence and security spheres 
as the requirements made of them have fluctuated. 
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Any tranche of theories considering societal action, interaction or 
development must necessarily be selective. Ever since the rationality of 
earlier  ‘enlightenment’ thinkers, such as Descartes and Newton, has been 
tempered by notions of complexity and then feedback in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries, some idea of contemporaneous action and 
being acted upon has been acknowledged. This is the case even where 
particular issues, such as culture or agency, have been the principle point of 
focus. A huge body of work therefore exists in these areas.353 In order for this 
to be manageable, some selectivity must occur. As the intelligence and 
security communities are embedded in wider governance, and it is how those 
interactions play-out that is at the heart of this thesis, then the scholarship 
that has most closely addressed these issues, but that nonetheless 
represents a broad swath of perspectives, will be prioritised. It is however 
worth noting at the outset that any theoretical distinction used to sub-divide 
an analysis of the organisational make-up of the intelligence and security 
function, or the way the two communities are organised is slightly arbitrary. 
There are significant cross-over’s between the observations and thoughts of 
scholars working in the various schools, as well as notable disagreements 
within each tradition, as Richard Scott discovered when trying to develop an 
analytic framework across the whole body of institutional and organisational 
study using  a division based on sociological, political and economic 
paradigms.354    
Firstly Section 2 will examine the conclusions of academics and practitioners 
that have framed their work not on any particular theoretical approach but on 
the cooperation needed for intelligence and security reform. Section 3 will 
then pick up on how new institutionalist thinkers have viewed reform in the 
United States, contrasting their ideas with the more collegial views of British 
adaption. Next Sections 4 and 5 will examine how behavioural then 
bureaucratic understandings of collaboration can be usefully applied to the 
security and intelligence functions, and what it is that limits each approach. 
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Section 6 will then consider the relationship between cooperation and 
decision making, whilst Section 7 will utilise theories of complexity to further 
unpack the difficulties inherent in the two spheres. Finally Section 8 will 
examine the extent to which more standard theories of international relations 
and the uncertainty of that level of analysis can explain cooperative 
difficulties in intelligence and security delivery. The whole will then be 
concluded in Section 9 before Chapter 4 examines each in turn to see how 
they interrelate with the institutional cost approach developed in this thesis.   
Section 2: Intelligence and Security Scholarship, Reform and 
Collaborative Working  
Security and intelligence scholarship has included both academics and 
senior practitioners. Many of these have identified that any holistic picture 
needs to be generated by an examination with a much higher degree of 
resolution. The resultant reforms they so often advocate are intimately bound 
up with cooperative working between actors and the necessary 
organisational shifts to deliver it.  
Even senior figures like the late William Odom, whose long career included 
senior posts in the military, in intelligence and in policy making,355 focuses 
not on simple fixes or increased cooperation, but rather on providing an in 
depth study of the entire bureaucracy, including both organisational and 
behavioural factors like the commitment of any government to see reforms 
through. However, in trying to operationalise this approach the difficulties in 
generating a single methodology applicable to the whole of so complex and 
integrated an undertaking become apparent and inconsistencies appear. 
General Odom was, for example, a keen advocate of a clear line of 
command.356 Subsequently though, in his discussion of the National Security 
Agency (NSA) and their unique technical ability, he also promotes 
stovepipes, so that different commands have to ‘come to the same well’ to 
obtain intelligence. He argues that the NSA is a national resource by default, 
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and also that it is 'a combat support agency' and should be the only provider 
of tactical level signals intelligence (SIGINT), despite acknowledging the 
problems this has caused in the past.357 To Odom, the NSA is both a unified 
command in the DoD, and a military service in its own right.358 Given these 
contradictions a clear line of command seems improbable.  
The same thinking can be seen in his approach to the intelligence-
policymaker interface. Odom argues that autonomy for an intelligence 
agency is usually a detrimental organisational form. Proximity between the 
consumers and their requirements and priorities are what direct a collection 
program most effectively, and ensure the real needs of the consumer are 
met. He suggests that the contrary argument is based on the problem of 
biases towards existing policy choices or decisions, but that autonomy does 
not really address this problem.359 However he also argues that in some 
discrete areas a central provider is best, and that autonomous 'stovepipes' 
are of benefit. Odom links this to specialised knowledge, and even argues 
that it may be the way to address the existing problems between national and 
tactical level within the military360 (an issue discussed at length in Chapter 5 
of this thesis). In particular Odom cites the admittedly very specialist skills of 
cryptanalysts361 and the work of both the NSA and the then National Imagery 
and Mapping Agency (NIMA),362 arguing quite reasonably that such skill sets 
cannot and should not be replicated at lower levels, but that lower levels 
should be able to access the intelligence they need from central providers. In 
this respect he seems to reflect Luther Gulick’s preference for uniformity of 
function within an organisational unit.363 Yet there is a similar specific skill-set 
and technical requirement in the comprehensive analysis of a particular 
functional or even geographic area that can include everything from 
contextual cultural factors to detailed knowledge about access to weapons 
and their capabilities. It is therefore somewhat disingenuous to suggest this is 
a lower type of specialism and can be handled at a tactical level.  
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At the strategic level, Odom argues that net assessments should be a wholly 
military function, yet allows that the single services and joint chiefs have 
never (and probably will never) agree on them because of vested interests in 
particular programs. However his solution is effectively a re-working of the 
idea of an external body taking on this function, albeit based in the office of 
the Secretary of Defense because they would have access to information. 
His rationale is that while the service chiefs "might quarrel..." they "..could 
hardly object".364 However the same might be said for having a Presidential 
directive ordering co-operation with the CIA: It is the difference between 
perfunctory and full compliance that matters.365 Odom's reliance on the 
authority of command, an inevitable predisposition in a former senior military 
officer, does not answer this. Indeed Zegart has argued persuasively that the 
authoritarian approach suited to the military function is contraindicated in the 
intelligence arena.366 In each case therefore, there must be other factors at 
work.         
The General’s examination of budget management is similarly instructive: 
Odom notes the discontinuity between the (then) Director of Central 
Intelligence’s (DCI’s) role of preparing and submitting the National Foreign 
Intelligence Program (NFIP) for congressional approval and his lack of 
relevance to the resultant appropriations being spent. Despite his intuitive 
liking for an imposed top-down solution it is, he admits impractical in this 
case for both behavioural ("turf disputes") and environmental ("complexity") 
reasons.367 He discusses the separation of the NFIP and various tactical 
level budget streams (Tactical Intelligence Related Activities (TIARA), the 
Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP), and the Defense Airborne 
Reconnaissance Office (DARO)), and suggests they will only be integrated 
'by chance'.368 He makes the point that for the effective use of budget inputs 
they must be linked to outputs; the 'collection of usable intelligence'. Odom 
does however acknowledge that in the military sphere it is difficult to separate 
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operational and intelligence activity, so the problem is actually only being 
moved along the line. He only truly begins to get to the root of the problem 
when he elaborates on how budgets are broken down into the three 
categories of 'operation and maintenance', 'procurement' and 'research, 
development, testing and evaluation'. The problem is that intelligence outputs 
depend on all three, with different agencies and departments involved with 
any or all streams. Odom observes that the fixed total approved at the outset, 
and resultant zero sum game, cause bureaucratic pathologies, including 
budget maximising behaviour, as observed in the National Reconnaissance 
Office (NRO), but he is unable to fully account for it. Instead he reverts to his 
preference for single management across the three budget streams as far as 
is possible, despite it being at odds with his alternative view that some 
agencies should be stove-piped.369  
General Odom is obviously keenly aware of the issues of both complexity 
and uncertainty. Indeed part of his rationale for SIGINT functions being 
managed at the national level alone, and removed from single services, is the 
complex and interactive nature of the technology, the targets, and varying 
priorities at different levels of command, and in that context his argument is 
convincing. At the same time he is clear that in his view reform should be 
directed from the top.370 This is contrary to orthodox thinking on the nature of 
a complex adaptive systems, which are generally held to adapt from the 
bottom up.371 Ironically, the development of 'Intellipedia', precisely the sort of 
shared 'well' of intelligence advocated by Odom in his discussion of the NSA, 
relied on precisely this sort of 'bottom-up' evolutionary pressure.372  
Like William Odom, General Michael Hayden uses his own experience as a 
senior member of the US intelligence community to inform his observations 
on how it should function and deliver national security objectives.373 Despite 
much of Hayden’s senior tenure being in the very different strategic 
environment of the post 9/11 era the two find many of the same difficulties. 
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Hayden, like Odom, is disposed towards an authoritarian solution, although in 
this case based on comprehensive legislative authority to support the 
Director of National Intelligence as a genuine head of the intelligence 
element of the community. Yet he is also cognisant of the pre-eminence of 
the Pentagon because the Country is effectively at war, and their resultant 
claim on many of the national level resources. This dominance can be to the 
detriment of not only civilian needs but also tactical military requests as 
resources are tasked to acquire militarily useful ‘communications externals’ 
such as links and geo-locators, rather than the more tactically useful 
intelligence often found within the communication itself.374 More profoundly at 
odds with his general conviction in the utility of a hierarchy, Hayden believes 
that the authority of DCI George Tenet, prior to the 'Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004, stemmed not from his legislatively 
enshrined position as head of the community or the 200 strong coordinating 
staff that came with it, but rather because he was head of the Central 
Intelligence Agency itself. As such he brought a distinct function that was 
needed and useful, which in turn granted him a strong voice (a voice that the 
new DNI post has probably lost),375 a view shared by a number of earlier 
DCI's.376 More recently it has been argued that the CIA's control over covert 
operations, under the direct supervision of the White House rather than its 
Directors line manager, the DNI, has effectively left the latter 'impotent'.377 
Bargaining power rather than formal authority is the more important element 
here. 
Hayden is also aware of the tension between integrated and autonomous 
operating in any complex undertaking; either of which can be virtues in 
particular circumstances, but vices in others. Too much central control leads 
to inflexibility and lost opportunities, too little means that individual excellence 
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cannot be ‘leveraged’ or ‘harmonized’.378 However to Hayden it is simply a 
matter of  striking the right balance.379 This may be adequate in considering 
strategic shifts such as the end of the Cold War, but can hardly 
accommodate the different but simultaneous needs of tactical war-fighters 
and national level strategists that he himself identifies, so that a more 
complete model of cooperative working is required.   
Similar inconsistencies arise with strategic thinkers on this side of the 
Atlantic. Throughout his book 'Securing the State'380 Sir David Omand381 
discusses the changes needed to the intelligence and security regimes of the 
United States and United Kingdom as a result of the increased complexity 
and uncertainty of the wider environment. Yet each lesson is referenced by 
an earlier historical context, suggesting the situation, or at least particular 
elements of it, are not as unique as one might think. 
Like his American colleagues, Omand argues for stronger leadership of the 
intelligence community, citing the US case. He notes the previous difficulties 
of the formerly double-hatted DCI. Then, with apparent approval, the creation 
of the DNI as a single head of the intelligence community charged with 
creating a "... unified, collaborative and coordinated enterprise", and that 
extensive coordinating machinery has been established to support that 
aim.382 However he also notes that the lack of a clear and unambiguous 
authority will make the task most difficult.383 In his parallel discussion of the 
UK agencies, he instead seems to invest his hopes in an improvement in 
coordination, with the agencies best left as independent entities aware of the 
needs of the others, and engaged with them in a joint enterprise. His concern 
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for the UK is for the loss of the Permanent Secretary level coordinator.384 
Although he equates the role to that of the DNI because both have 
responsibility for community health and product quality, the organisational 
and cultural networks in which each sat were very different. This, as well as 
the relative performance of each, needs to be accounted for in any 
theoretical model used to compare the two.  
Omand’s enthusiasm for strong leadership is supported by his take on the 
early history of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), and in particular its 
Chair. Though it is at least debatable whether the post boasted the 'visible 
authority' Omand credits them with. Indeed Omand himself cites Dick White 
as having brought the strong community leadership he suggests385 through 
his appointment as ‘a very senior Coordinator’.386 It seems likely that his 
authority stemmed from his unique position as a former chief of both SIS and 
SyS, just at DCI Tenet's was rooted in his role as head of the functional 
Central Intelligence Agency, not his community management role. 387 
Certainly the JIC, as the executive of the Permanent Secretaries’ Committee 
on the 
Intelligence Services (PSIS), was an important element in setting the 
requirements and priorities (particularly at the strategic level) for the 
agencies, and this vested some authority within them, but it ran concurrently 
with other points of authority, such as the relevant Secretary of State. Yet the 
system worked, which cannot be fully explained by any reliance on a simple 
hierarchical architecture.  
It seems clear therefore that efforts at reforming as well as understanding the 
intelligence and security communities on either side of the Atlantic are 
plagued by apparently contradictory evidence, even when undertaken by 
those with such a wealth of practical experience.  
Other reformist authors, such as Betts and Treverton are more focused on 
the practicalities of the coordination issue. They have a clear view of the 
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difficulties, and what they would like a reformed intelligence community to 
look like, but struggle to account for why it has not been ‘fixed’.  
Gregory Treverton’s work focuses on the problems of increasing complexity 
as a result of environmental shifts that include the post Cold War impact of 
globalisation388 and the increased interaction between different types of 
security and intelligence provider with the advent of the ‘war on terror’.389 He 
is keenly aware of the need for horizontal as well as vertical integration and 
bemoans the existence of stovepipes as an ‘institutional legacy’.390 Amongst 
his prescribed solutions however is that organisation shifts from being by 
agency, to being by ‘issue’. Seeing the problem solely from an organisational 
perspective, Treverton does not address in any depth why he feels these 
issue based divisions would not simply inspire new stovepipes, albeit based 
on different divisions, and a repetition of the same sub-goal behaviours he 
implicitly observes as making the current ones into what he describes as 
‘baronies’. 
Treverton, centres his reforming argument on the disparities between cold 
war and post cold war intelligence in its societal setting. He argues that the 
FBI and CIA failed to co-operate effectively "... because we, the American 
people, didn't want them to". He notes the dichotomy between the desire for 
personal freedom and for security that resulted in the 'raggedy' cooperation 
between the two whilst each sat on either side of 'intelligence and law-
enforcement' and 'home and abroad' divisions.391 In Europe, on the other 
hand, some scholars saw the same increased complexity as an 
environmental shift in 'risk'. The shift away from globally dominant centres of 
power, and the threat that they presented, towards the cauldron of multiple 
State and sub-State (or more accurately perhaps trans-State) level hazards 
that now need to be addressed.  In part this is because although less serious 
than the potential nuclear holocaust of the Cold War years, the threat had 
become more amorphous. Ulrich Beck went further and argued that the world 
had changed from one “dominated by threat” to one “permeated by risk” so 
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that the “... fixed norms of calculability, connecting means and ends or 
causes and effects....(were) rendered invalid. ”392 He went so far as to 
connect this admittedly dystopian view with both the administrative and 
technical decision-making process, but crucially saw them now couched in a 
more complex environment so that uncertainty of outcome was suddenly 
omnipresent.  
While both Treverton and Beck have certainly observed significant 
environmental shifts it is less clear that these have introduced any genuinely 
new, qualitatively distinct problems. There have always been trade-offs 
required between different options, and some level of discord between 
agencies has existed since the environment became complex enough to 
need them. Rather, recent decades have seen a quantitative increase in the 
need for integration of different national security and intelligence tools, and 
for this to occur at ever increasing levels of decision making. Frictions in 
organisational ordering, which could previously be dealt with on a case-by-
case basis, are now daily issues. If the shift in risk was a principal 
explanatory factor in cooperative success one would expect to see good 
cooperation on both sides of the Atlantic, worsening through the 1990’s and 
into the modern era, as opposed to poor integration of US community parts 
(in most cases) and better cooperation in the UK. Thus environmental 
changes can not alone account for the interactions observed, and can be no 
more than part of the answer. 
In his seminal work ‘Enemies of Intelligence’,393 Richard Betts acknowledges  
the substantial amount of empirical work into intelligence and security issues, 
but notes that that they mostly deal with intelligence failures, and that there is 
no overarching normative theory that encapsulates them. He goes on to 
describe three distinct but overlapping issues that impact on efforts to 
coordinate the community: 
The first are failures of perspective, and he suggests here that the record of 
failure is not as bad as it is often regarded. This view is linked to the problem 
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advanced by Mark Lowenthal of not being able to empirically show what one 
gets for each pound or dollar spent on intelligence or security; unlike in the 
military sphere where there is a demonstrable ‘bang for one’s buck’. 
Comparisons can be made between competing items of equipment, in 
intelligence the utility of any particular intelligence stream is hard to define, 
and harder still to predict at the outset.394 If nothing surprising happens, then 
the decision maker can never be sure if it did not happen because the risk 
was known and steps to avoid it happening were successful, or because it 
was never actually going to happen anyway, and the investment was 
unnecessary.395 Betts links this to the related problem for intelligence that 
while successes may be opaque, failures are clear and often serious. The 
point is certainly a fair one. It fails however to disaggregate unavoidable 
failures and failures that could have been prevented, given the status of 
relevant intelligence capability across the board. For example the non-
prediction of the Arab Spring, where the tensions in each of the four Arab 
states involved were well reported, as was the increasing influence of social 
media, but that the self immolation of a Tunisian fruit seller would or could act 
as the catalyst was not and could never have been predicated. This is clearly 
an unavoidable failure, and can be compared with such failures as not linking 
information separately held by the CIA and FBI prior to the 9/11 attacks, or 
the misinterpretation of information before the Argentinean invasion of the 
Falklands. The difference between ‘secrets and mysteries’396, in other words. 
The net result however is that reforming impetus is often misdirected, a 
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practical problem based upon repeated failures to comprehend the issue as a 
whole. 
Betts second area of concern is around the processing and communication of 
information in a timely and manageable way, an information cost of the sort 
discussed in Chapter 2 and throughout the case studies to this thesis, 
particularly Chapter 5. Finally and perhaps most tellingly he suggests the “... 
roots of failure lie in unresolvable trade-offs and dilemmas” so that “... curing 
some pathologies with organisational reforms often creates new pathologies 
or resurrects old ones”;397 very much the pattern empirically observed and 
the root of the new institutionalist approach discussed immediately below. 
Although he laments the lack of any normative theory of intelligence, Betts 
does not however attempt to link these three issues in a single cohesive 
framework.  
Intelligence and security scholarship that examines cooperation in the fields 
can therefore be seen to be limited in its explanatory power, often to the 
particular issue or instance under consideration. The review of the same 
authors in Section 2 of Chapter 4 will argue that institutional cost analysis can 
provide a more comprehensive explanation.  
Section 3: The Dichotomy of Collegiality and New Institutionalism in 
Intelligence and Security Cooperation 
New institutionalist authors have also found inconsistencies emerging when 
examining the problem from a more theoretically grounded position. This 
approach, which is utilised explicitly by US reformers such as Amy Zegart 
and implicitly by the likes of Richard Posner, can explain how collaboration 
can break down, but struggles to account for the many occasions when it 
works well (despite being at least partially rooted in transaction cost 
economics,398 an issue explored in Section 3 of Chapter 4 when new 
intuitionalism and institutional cost analysis are examined together). Although 
it is concerned with the behaviour of actors, new institutionalism is rooted in 
microeconomic theories. It therefore seeks to explain apparently irrational 
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macro level outcomes from a rationalist starting point by focusing on micro 
level issues (such as the very personal preferences and bounded rationality 
of individual actors). These are set within a strong cultural framework. Any 
such notion must be tempered by an acknowledgment that culture itself is a 
mosaic of what in Grey's conception are 'pillars' or overarching and widely 
shared values and norms, and 'splinters' associated with different groupings 
to the one under analysis but that are no less strong for that.399 The impact of 
culture on the personal utility of key actors is thus a product of different 
cultural memberships, and which is prevalent in any particular set of 
circumstances is not necessarily easy to deduce. The cultural affiliations of 
being a member of a small operational team, such as the one working under 
the US Ambassador in Sarajevo in the 1990's that saw State, CIA and DoD 
officials create the Diplomatic Intelligence Support Center (DISC), may 
trounce those associated with membership of one of the parent organisations 
under one set of circumstances, but the latter might  re-emerge as dominant 
as these diminish.400 The assumptions of a dominant culture informing new 
institutionalist approaches thus provide a useful means of making cultural 
impact manageable (and have been used for that same purpose within this 
thesis), but viewed in isolation from other factors they can skew analysis.  
In Zegart’s view the rationality of the institutions of national security and 
intelligence is nonetheless socially constructed. The behaviour of actors is in 
the context of the values, norms and traditions of their own organisations. 
These thus both constrain the behaviour of their members, and are 
reinforced by it. In an extensive examination Zegart thus argues persuasively 
that the failure of the US intelligence and security community, and the 
elements within it, to adapt successfully401 to the new circumstances of the 
                                                                   
399
 Grey, Decoding Organization: Bletchley Park, Codebreaking and Organization Studies.107-172 
400
 See Jennifer E Sims, "Understanding Ourselves," in Transforming Us Intelligence, ed. Jennifer E 
Sims and Burton L Gerber(Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2005). 51-53. Future 'DISC's 
were obstructed by the CIA once the Balkan crisis receded.   
401
 Between 1991 and 2001 no less than twelve influential reports around US governance generated 
340 (out of 514) recommendations that focused on improving the national intelligence capability. Of 
these, despite a declared intention dating back to 1947, 94 were focused on the need to improve 
coordination in some way. Clearly the issue was not mired in complacency, nor was there a lack of 
will to address acknowledged problems. Yet, the influential make-up of the report’s authors 
notwithstanding, of the 340 recommendations a mere 35 were fully implemented, and some 268 were 
not implemented to any degree. Despite exogenous pressure, and an acknowledgement of the 
140 
 
post Cold War world was because of the frictions and difficulties such issues 
imposed to counter evolutionary pressure. Zegart argues that it is the 
difficulties in cooperative behaviour between actors who are operating within 
the parameters of their individual organisational environments that are the 
causal factors in poor adaption.402 Intelligence and security agencies exhibit 
similar characteristics to, and are subject to the same budgetary pressures 
as, other organisations,403 the fact that they exist in a largely monopsonistic 
relationship with their paymasters means that the governance more generally 
must be included in their analysis. Zegart's view is thus one of a very 
interdependent set of organisations.   
Where domestic policy issues are normally the province of a discrete 
department, foreign policy can be affected by a variety of disparate voices. 
These can include State Department, the military, or the intelligence 
community, with overlapping interests. Yet Zegart (writing prior to the 
September 2001 attacks) found that organisational structure was not an 
issue to those foreign policy interest groups that did exist, despite it being 
relevant to their opposite numbers in the domestic arena, so that evolutionary 
pressure for adaption was restricted to internal actors with particular and 
overly parochial interests.404In fact She found that foreign policy in general, 
and the intelligence and securities spheres in particular, demonstrate an 
asymmetry of information between those within the policy process and those 
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outside it. Information is more likely to be classified as well as being hard to 
obtain. This is at variance to domestic policy areas where the situation can 
even be reversed, so that external interest groups ‘brief’ policy makers in 
Congress. Bureaucrats thus have an ‘insider’s’ information advantage over 
‘outsiders’ in interest groups or other public bodies, who would incur 
substantial costs in generating their own sources of information.  
Congress is in any event incentivised to concentrate on the domestic policy 
arena which provides a more demonstrable (electoral) benefit. Secrecy 
combines with the high level of uncertainty in the intelligence and security 
spheres to dis-incentivise members of the legislature, who have little to gain 
by success and a lot to lose by failures in the security or intelligence fields. 
As Zegart notes, even after the Iran-Contra scandal, the 'Tower Report'  
emphasised that foreign policy was, and should be, in the Executive domain 
and thus minimised the negative impact that the relative uncertainty of the 
foreign policy arena might have on congress.405 The ambivalent position of 
Congress was further demonstrated by their muted acquiescence of the fact 
that the administration refused to share the results of its review of the US 
nuclear posture, Presidential Policy Directive 11 (PPD 11), with the Congress 
despite their being the organisation required to perform "due diligence" 
around implementation of the 2010 'Start Treaty'.406 Despite Senator Lugar's 
longstanding interest in nuclear deterrence his only censure was a polite 
observation that "... I simply would say that our country is strongest and our 
diplomacy is most effective when nuclear policy is made by deliberate 
decisions in which both the legislative and executive branches fully 
participate." and even then reaffirmed that "... This process should begin with 
the President of the United States.” even adding that the President should be 
more involved in funding decisions despite funding being one of the principle 
tools of Congress exercises any authority over the Executive.407 
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Zegart thus argues that the fundamental problems in the intelligence and 
security communities are likely to be ‘sticky’ because of micro level factors 
like the incentives of different actors. She could draw on a number of 
empirical reviews that have come to a similar conclusion. The Silberman 
Robb Commission’s overview for example stated; “..... Indeed, Commission 
after Commission has identified some of the same fundamental failings we 
see in the Intelligence Community, usually to little effect. The Intelligence 
Community is a closed world, and many insiders admitted to us that it has an 
almost perfect record of resisting external recommendations.”408 Even more 
routine reviews, such as those undertaken by congressionally constituted 
bodies such as the Aspin-Brown Commission,409 or independent bodies such 
as the Council on Foreign Relations,410 (both of which considered the US 
intelligence community at large in the post Cold-War period), do, while 
varying in the specifics of their recommendations, tend to recommend similar 
broad changes. This is echoed by congressional reviews of progress made 
following criticism and recommendations, such as those considering the 
FBI’s development towards an intelligence based domestic national security 
capability.411 Yet, as the new institutionalist model predicts, these 
recommendations consistently fail to be enacted in any meaningful way. A 
purist new institutionalist model would suggest that the bureaucracies of 
private firms should be similarly ‘sticky’ but, unlike government agencies, 
private firms adapt at a population level.412 As soon as they fail to modify 
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after exogenous shocks they perish and are replaced by new firms, whereas 
most government agencies have been around for some fifty years.413  
Zegart therefore demonstrates that “organizations are never neutral”, so that 
the nature of government organisation seriously impacts on its policy 
output.414 She also establishes that there is no one perfect structure to 
address the problem because of the complexity of the inter-relationships and 
the uncertainty of the environment in which they must work. Her work very 
successfully accounts for failures in collaboration that in turn undermine 
reforms and overall efficacy. However Zegart, whose emphasis is on reform, 
does not does not account for instances where different actors have 
cooperated successfully.  
New institutionalisms inability to deal with cooperative success is not 
however rooted in Zegart’s analysis but in new institutionalism itself when it is 
applied to cooperation right across the intelligence and security regimes. Its 
emphasis on behaviours being acted out in rigid organisational pathways 
cannot account for why the same agencies sometimes successfully 
cooperate, and sometimes do not. As a CIA officer attached to the FBI Henry 
Crumpton found good informal and tactical level cooperation, but poor 
collaboration above that, a fairly common experience.415 At the same time the 
UK’s community faces qualitatively similar external problems to that of the 
USA, but manages to cooperate fairly efficiently in most (but not all) areas as 
Part 2 and 3 to this thesis make clear.416 If collaboration works at a tactical 
level but breaks down at a policy or strategic level, or works in one area but 
not another, then there must be something more going on than simple 
national or cultural approaches can explain. 
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Richard Posner has also used a new institutionalist approach to critique 
efforts at reform in the United States intelligence community and inevitably 
comes to very much the same conclusions as Amy Zegart.417 Although he 
also acknowledges the occasional successful collaborative endeavour, like 
her, his narrative offers little explanation for these. Posner notes the impact 
of external issues such as the complexity of the security and intelligence 
problem and the uncertainty inherent in any proposed solution, 
acknowledging that they make satisfactory negotiations more difficult and 
strong advocacy more attractive, particularly in the counterterrorism sphere. 
He adds both cultural418 and utilitarian ideas to make sense of the difficulties 
he observes across the intelligence and security endeavour.419 Despite this 
implicit use  of what is essentially a new institutionalist paradigm, Posner is 
largely concerned with advocating change. He has therefore limited his 
explicit attempts in  providing a theoretical architecture to providing (with 
Garicano) an 'organisational economics' perspective for some aspects of 
intelligence provision. This perspective nonetheless included some of the 
facets of the model developed in Chapter 2. They note for example that while 
an examination of a specific case might indicate that a particular piece of 
information should have been passed internally or from agency to agency, 
the organisational realities in delivering this involve a more complex trade-off. 
A more centralised, hierarchical organisation is likely to improve appropriate 
information sharing both within and between agencies. It will foster the 
adoption of common codes, data networks and even cultural practises. 
However it will also encourage group-think and ‘herding’.420 The suitability of 
each structure, and the optimum point of balance between centralised and 
decentralised arrangements, will thus vary according to the problem faced. 
The net result is that in using an organisational economics paradigm more 
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directly, Posner is lead to question the likely effectiveness of the sort of 
radical reforms he argues for elsewhere.421  
Posner's understanding of the breadth of the security and intelligence 
function is nonetheless comprehensive, and includes broader intra-agency 
organisational issues such as the incongruence of having a (pe-2004) 
Director of Central Intelligence positioned as head of an agency specifically 
barred from domestic matters or, as is still the case, having national level 
assets that would also have domestic counterterrorism functionality situated 
in the Department of Defense. Posner considers that Law enforcement is one 
tool, intelligence another, and ‘target hardening’ a third and sees integration 
of these as critical. He highlights the linkage between flawed organisational 
forms, inappropriate incentives, sub-goal pursuits, territorial behaviours and, 
ultimately, sub-optimal performance. He is not therefore naïve in assessing 
possible solutions. Posner also appreciates how the ‘probabilistic’ nature of 
counterterrorism intelligence provokes problems for decision makers at the 
policy level, so that some work up to a certainty, others down to a ‘zero 
chance’ because both are easier to deal with.422 Yet Posner also realises that 
the real probability of an attack is a factor of capabilities, intentions, 
personalities and a myriad of other circumstances. Developing future policies 
when so much is unknown or even unknowable is thus no simple task, 
provoking behaviour where decision makers indulge in ‘satisficing’, or 
produce policy based on lines of least resistance.  
Within both Zegart and Posner the seeds of a fuller explanation that could 
explain the full range of outcomes are apparent but are not fully developed, 
as the discussion that contrasts their approaches to the use of institutional 
cost analysis in Section 3 Chapter 4 will discuss. In his work with Garicano 
Posner has recognised the importance of both environmental and 
behavioural factors and has even used microeconomic tools to compare the 
utility of different organisational forms for teams doing intelligence 
analysis.423 However because the relevance and even type of impact that 
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different issues provoke varies in different circumstances Posner stops short 
of offering a more far-reaching theory, and concentrates on particular 
reforming ‘fixes’ like the creation of a domestic security agency for the US 
akin to the UK’s Security Service. 
Conversely authors like Michael Herman discuss how cooperation across 
security and intelligence endeavours can work, with reference to the UK’s 
intelligence system.424 Where Zegart and Posner explain why cooperative 
workings fails, but cannot explain the occasions on which it succeeds, his 
argument that the collegiality endemic to the British system is at the root of its 
collaborative success cannot really explain why it sometimes breaks down.   
Herman’s explanation is based on sound observations as both senior 
practitioner and academic,425 yet his conclusions are diametrically opposed 
to those who argue for a strong hierarchal architecture to reform communities 
in response to environmental shifts. Rather, Herman has observed a 
deliberately induced tension in the UK between a centralising tendency and a 
strong enthusiasm for the benefits of independence.426 Furthermore he states 
that reform in the UK has been more successful than in the US precisely 
because it is gentle and evolutionary rather than ‘root and branch’ (with the 
exception of the Trend Reforms and the move of the Joint Intelligence 
Committee (JIC) into Cabinet Office). It is, for the most part, internally 
generated from the bottom up as need arises.427  
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Yet Herman is neither insular nor conservative in his outlook.428 His views are 
not because of any limited view on the role of intelligence or of the complexity 
of the environment in which it needs to operate,429 nor even its need to adapt 
to changing circumstances. For example in a prescient piece in 2002 Herman 
argued that the refocusing of resources on non-State and rogue State entities 
post 9/11 should be linked to a diminution in the targeting of ‘friendly’ States if 
the diplomatic consensus it required was to be maintained.430 Herman’s 
views on oversight seem equally at odds with the US authors: He notes with 
approval that in the UK self censorship is the norm and supervisory bodies 
rather weak. This requires a collegial rather than adversarial relationship that 
supports mutually agreed and better considered change to occur; a view 
strongly at variance with both Amy Zegart and Jennifer Kibbe. Zegart argues 
empirically that a lack of proper incentives creates a weakness in oversight 
architecture that in turn makes it ineffective,431 whilst Kibbe,432 focuses 
instead on the information disadvantages of the oversight bodies and their 
partisan nature to account for their failings. Both positions are empirically 
based, but no theoretical template that account for their divergence is 
offered. 
Philip Davies has used a more internal point of focus to examine coordination 
and efficacy in the intelligence sphere. His use of organisational theory has 
incorporated both bureaucratic and behavioural issues, and allows that in 
different circumstances different factors will carry different weight.433 
Although Davies explanations remain rooted in cultural factors (exacerbated 
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by different understandings), and the social norms that result,434 like General 
Odom he suggests that these cultural issues are themselves the product of 
organisational factors. In this account organisational changes are in part the 
result of cultural perceptions as the two journeys of the UK and USA 
intelligence communities as detailed in his two volumes of 'Intelligence and 
Government in Britain and the United States' make clear.435 For Davies there 
is therefore a circular relationship between the two that can be either vicious 
or virtuous. It is not therefore simply an issue of national character leaving 
US actors predisposed against cooperative working, as the success of US 
operations like Courtship (between the FBI and CIA) and the 'Special 
Collection Service' (SCS) (between the CIA and NSA) make clear.436 The 
mechanics of how behaviour and bureaucracy  interrelate are thus non-trivial, 
with substantive potential repercussions, as Davies rather depressing 
summation of the 'National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United 
States' (the 9/11 Commission) stated views of the potential formation of a 
Security Service equivalent for the USA indicate.437 Yet they are still not fully 
accounted for.  
In Davies account, it is the quality of accepted interagency coordination that 
makes the difference, and by extension its effective operation that will allow 
appropriate adaption or reform as required,438 and he produces significant 
evidence to attest to that fact. However, he also argues persuasively that this 
is realised not by a chair of 'personal authority' but by a realisation amongst 
his or her peers that they are engaged in a collective pursuit so that they 
sublimate their own and their departments goals to those of the group.439 
These goals thus become a shared maximand. This seems to work well 
enough in the UK, where the culture is inherently collegial, but not in the 
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USA, where the missing interagency coordination problem is "... exacerbated 
by the tendency to work competitively..."440 so we return once again to 
cultural factors influencing outcomes. Cultural competitiveness can however 
be rooted in organisational minutiae, such as how budgets are decided and 
spent441 as his examination of the UK’s imagery intelligence demonstrated.442 
So the wheel turns full circle; the two factors of culture and organisation are 
clearly intimately interrelated.  
As a result as soon as a community divides its component parts into 
specialisations that can more efficiently and accurately handle policy areas or 
threats, they will inevitably overlap and as they or the environment alters will 
cease to exhibit the same clearly defined borders that the division of the 
community had originally anticipated. Divergence, as Davies continues, is 
thus inevitable and the question becomes one of managing both the 
regularisation of cooperation and the resulting distinctive departmental 
objectives.443 However, in concluding that the effectiveness of collegiality 
over competitive approaches to community management can be ascribed to 
the cultural circumstances in which each is applied, Davies account stops 
short of deriving a ‘general model’ that incorporates the various micro factors 
he has unearthed during his detailed observations. It therefore remains 
unclear why, for example, General Soyster could leverage horizontal control 
across the stovepipes inherent in the Department of Defense intelligence 
enterprise, whereas no DCI ever could achieve the same in even the civilian 
arena that they nominally controlled, or indeed why, in the UK context, the 
Chief of Defence Intelligence struggles to manage this sort of control whilst 
the civilian JIC can. 
Other authors have also argued persuasively that specific causes are at the 
heart of given problems of cooperation.444 Yet in each case whilst the 
particular instances under discussion can empirically validate the arguments 
advanced, a more complete selection of cases shows that they are either 
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inconsistent or incomplete. Examples of collegiality clash with new 
institutionalist perspectives, and vice versa, but both can be evidenced. 
Section 3 of Chapter 4 will develop the argument that this dichotomy can be 
addressed by the use of institutional cost analysis. The next sections of this 
chapter will instead consider how more general theories might explain the 
different phenomena observed in security and intelligence cooperation.     
Section 4: Security and Intelligence Cooperation and the Relevance of 
the Behaviouralist Perspective 
Uncertainty is a key element of both the security and intelligence functions. It 
is also a central platform of the predominant international relations school of 
structural realism or neo-realism. This has lead one of its scholars to 
observe, albeit anonymously, that intelligence is irrelevant because it deals 
with intentions which are unknowable.445 The leading proponent of neorealist 
thought, Kenneth Waltz has gone even further and argued that the 
complexity of international relations (which is intimately linked with the 
uncertainty of the international environment) means that they cannot be 
reduced to "autonomous realms" and are thus beyond theoretical 
explanation;446 a very unsatisfactory state of affairs. The importance of an 
approach that can address environmental complexity and uncertainty with the 
myriad of other factors at a useful level is therefore clear.  
Despite this apparent divergence between structural realism and intelligence, 
a behaviouralist approach can allow the two to mesh: Using a definition of 
intelligence as “the collection, analysis, and dissemination of information for 
decision-makers engaged in a competitive enterprise” Jennifer Sims puts the 
behaviour of actors relative to each other onto the agenda as they negotiate 
and manoeuvre for advantage.447 The degree and method by which these 
activities are conducted as a competitive game within the intelligence and 
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security communities is elaborated on in the following paragraphs, and when 
discussing other models, so for now it is enough to note that although Sims 
developed her definition and subsequent theory for the international arena, it 
has application at every level. Advantage is sought via information 
asymmetry both externally and internally. 
There are four key elements to Sims approach; collection, transmission, 
anticipation and leveraged manipulation. The latter being a euphemism for 
the counter intelligence function that emphasises the relevance of achieving 
a relative advantage rather than any absolute acquisition of knowledge or 
power. She argues that a principle feature of successful transmission and 
anticipation, which represent a significant proportion of the internal element 
of intelligence provision, are bound up with ‘trust’. As has been noted in 
Chapter 2 this has been referred to as the lubricant of a social system, and 
the antonym of the frictions captured within institutional costs.448 In the case 
of transmission Sims states that the more intelligence functions must be 
delegated to enhance collection the more important trust becomes. In this 
she is supported by Lawrence and Lorsch’s definition of an organisation as 
“... a system of interrelated behaviors of people who are performing a task 
that has been differentiated into several distinct sub-systems, each sub-
system performing a portion of the task, and the efforts of each being 
integrated to achieve effective performance of the system”.449 Thus capturing 
the fundamental features of a security and intelligence community in the 
complex modern environment. Because both the break-down of different sub-
functions and their re-integration are encapsulated the importance of probity 
amongst actors is highlighted. However increased distance between 
intelligence providers and intelligence users makes trust more difficult as 
institutional blocks increase. Conversely too great a proximity can hinder 
anticipation as collectors merely react to current policy favourites.450 This 
contradiction is at the heart of not only the merits of ‘push or pull’ 
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organisational architecture,451 but also the root of the current debates on both 
sides of the Atlantic about how close intelligence providers and political 
classes should be in the wake of the 2003 invasion of Iraq.452 Chapter 4 will 
argue that the discussion of probity in the institutional costs context can 
provide increased clarity around this dichotomy. 
There are strong parallels between a large commercial organisation and an 
intelligence and security community. It follows that when Cyert and March 
introduce their seminal ‘A Behavioral Theory of the Firm’ by describing the “... 
modern representative firm” as a “large complex organization...” with its 
major functions “...performed by different divisions more or less coordinated 
by a set of control procedures,” 453 they could as easily be describing the 
modern security and intelligence community. An intelligence body generates 
a product, the intelligence, in exchange for resources, its funding. Whilst the 
price mechanism is not immediately apparent it is nonetheless the case that 
the customer, in this case a government department involved in the provision 
of security, needs the information to assist in its decision making on a 
particular issue. It will only continue to agree to a particular level of resources 
(which are then no longer available to itself) being passed to the intelligence 
community if it feels it gets the right level of value in return. This necessitates 
the product being accurate, relevant and timely to the issue at hand.454 In the 
United Kingdom the process can be clearly paralleled through the process of 
agreeing the Single Intelligence Account, wherein it is the customers who 
decide on the appropriate level of future funding for the agencies.455 In the 
United States the linkage is a little less clear because of their predilection for 
a separation of power: 456 It is Congress who agree funding, as they do for 
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most governmental functions, and then provide at least some degree of 
oversight, but the intelligence community is very much a tool of the 
Executive. There are thus similarities between this arrangement and that of a 
firm that might have to answer to a board of directors and to their 
shareholders. 
It follows that Cyert and March's observations are then equally apposite: Like 
a firm, a nation’s intelligence and security community produces diverse and 
numerous products, ‘buying and selling’ in many different ‘markets’, it 
generates and processes a significant amount of information, then makes 
decisions and adapts as a result. Perhaps most telling in their analysis is the 
observation that if the external market was the sole determinant of a firms 
behaviour little of the above would be particularly relevant, but in fact the 
market is “..neither so pervasive nor so straightforward. The modern firm has 
some control over the market; it has discretion within the market; it sees the 
market through an organization filter.”457 The modern firm then exists within 
the same sort of complex environment already observed by Davies to apply 
to an intelligence agency (The United Kingdom’s Secret Intelligence Service) 
which has adapted to pressures from two distinct environments: One extra-
governmental and shaped by the operational situation, akin to a firms 
production issues, the other intra-governmental and shaped by the political 
and administrative circumstances of its consumers and its relationship with 
them; similar to the need for a firm to inter-relate and service a changing 
market and group of consumers.458 
Cyert and March observed that firms pro-actively examine their environment 
to decide which issues are deserving of organisational attention. They have 
to examine options with a much broader perspective than classic economic 
modelling allowed, and subsequently assess the potential consequences of 
each. As Williamson later noted, each part of the process has non-trivial 
costs associated with it.459 As importantly for this parallel, comparison of the 
utility each option might provide is rarely even a matter of pitting like against 
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like, but tends to include tangential issues and intangible but important 
factors, often measured in wholly distinct ways.460 One of the results was that 
profit maximisation, a central tenet of classic economic theory, was not 
necessarily actually pursued. Instead the decision maker tended to opt for a 
satisfactory alternative that seemed to “... satisfy a number of auxiliary 
conditions”.461 Their behaviouralist approach can therefore be seen to 
advance understanding of the difficulties inherent in security and intelligence 
provision and their pursuit of a shared maximand.  
Their conclusions on the subject of the organisational goals of firms are 
equally instructive in the examination of intelligence and security, and may 
also be further explained by a consideration of the institutional costs in each 
situation.462 A firm’s goals are described as “... a series of more or less 
independent constraints imposed on the organisation through a process of 
bargaining among potential coalition members and elaborated over time in 
response to short-run pressures.”463 This analysis can be seen to be very 
similar to that discovered by Derthick in her descriptions of intergovernmental 
bargaining as an ongoing business of shifting perceptions of utility by some 
leading actors who react to external pressures,464 but whose options are 
nonetheless circumscribed by others who set their agenda ex ante, and 
direct implementation post ante as the internal and external environment 
evolve.
465
  
One would anticipate the goals of a firm to be much simpler than those of 
most governmental functions, with profit a clearly dominant factor to the near 
exclusion of all others. Cyert and March instead see the same sort of 
interaction of environment and behavioural factors as one would expect in 
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the more complex spheres of  intelligence or security (discussed in 
institutional cost terms in Section 4 Chapter 4), and their view of both the 
process and the resultant potential outcomes is more reminiscent of a 
governmental bureaucracy operating rather like that described by Martin 
Smith as a ‘core executive’; with bargaining amongst key players more 
relevant than an application of neoclassical economic modelling would 
predict for a firm apparently wholly dedicated to profit maximising. 466 Their 
conclusion that goals develop in this way precisely because even a firm is a 
“... coalition of participants with disparate demands, changing foci of 
attention, and limited ability to attend to all organizational problems 
simultaneously”467 increase the strength of the parallel with an intelligence or 
security community. Indeed one of Cyert and March’s primary questions in 
‘The Behavioural Theory of the Firm’; “what is the effect of departmental 
structure on the goals actually pursued in an organization?” and the resultant 
“differentiation of subunit goals and the identification of individuals with the 
goals of the subunits, independently of the contribution of that goal to the 
organisation as a whole.”468 could be regarded as the critical question for 
community integration in the security and intelligence spheres.  
Two further points arise from their conclusions on firms’ organisational goals: 
Firstly the distinction between their long-run and short-run goals.469 The 
former may be paralleled with strategic level goals and the latter with tactical 
or operational goals. Thus, because long-run goals are constantly altered 
through shifts in coalition structure and the bargaining positions of its 
members, institutional costs are likely to be higher and prediction more 
difficult. Secondly, the success of a particular organisational make-up of a 
firm is peculiar to the specific circumstances in which it finds itself at a given 
point in time. There is no ideal in the firm’s case anymore than in that of a 
governmental function. Therefore what would seem to be weaknesses can 
paradoxically be advantageous if the environment shifts appropriately. Cyert 
and March note that “... the decentralization of decision making (and goal 
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attention), the sequential attention to goals, and the adjustment in 
organisational slack permit the business firm to make decisions with 
inconsistent goals under many (and perhaps most) conditions.”470   
The uncertainty prevalent in the intelligence, the security, and the commercial 
environments also has effects on both types of organisation that impacts on 
how decision-making is managed and what organisational architecture is 
used to support it. Intuitively one might expect that a higher level of 
uncertainty would lead to actors maximising both their predictive capability 
and their flexibility; ensuring that any choices were as rooted in the specific 
circumstances of a case as was possible, and that pre-commitment should 
be minimised as far as possible to guarantee that flexibility. In fact, in their 
consideration of a firm’s organisational choices in the face of uncertainty 
Cyert and March concluded that this was achieved by becoming more 
reactive and less predictive.471 Such a shift may be tenable within a security 
providers organisational structure it has critical importance for an intelligence 
agency, whose primary purpose is providing information, the usefulness of 
which may hang on its predictive qualities.472 
Cyert and March identify four key characteristic of organisational choice and 
control:473 
1. Multiple and varying goals where the "... criterion of choice is that the 
alternative selected meet all of the demands (goals) of the coalition". 
(parenthesis in original). 
2. Only a vague and sequential examination of alternatives that is 
concluded when the first viable solution is found. 
3. Uncertainty is avoided rather than incorporated into the process by the 
use of set procedures and reaction to resultant feedback over attempts at 
prediction.      
4. Standardised procedures and standards are used to make and apply 
decisions. 
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These are the result of both long term adaption and are the response to short 
term control and decision making needs, and can be found within the case 
studies which follow this chapter, so that although identified through the 
prism of the firm they may be regarded as applicable to the public sector in 
general and intelligence and security bodies in particular. 474 It might 
reasonably be expected that security providers might act in the manner 
predicted by Cyert and March, as security is intrinsically a reactive function to 
the combination of threat and risk,475 but an important part of intelligence 
provision is predictive, so that the type of solutions summarised in the four 
elements above should be an anathema to them, and certainly the national 
security strategies of both the UK and US emphasise the extent to which they 
rely on predictive intelligence.476 However recent assessment of the United 
Kingdom’s longer term 'horizon scanning' capability by Kristian Gustafson, 
and earlier work on the analytic function in the United States suggest that this 
need not be the case and in fact there are organisational pressures for even 
intelligence providers to adhere to Cyert and March’s dictum, particularly in 
the ‘Requirements’ field. 477  
Yet the inclination to apply a standard operating procedure, which can be 
precisely why a large organisation is usually efficient in performing a core or 
routine function can paradoxically be why an institution acting in an area of 
high uncertainty fails to adapt.
478
  This dilemma lead Weber to re-think the 
concept of rationality as a simple linear condition and develop the idea of 
formal and substantive rationality (of economic action) to capture the 
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distinction between the application of an accepted and existing logic, and 
more ambiguous and open approaches based on ultimate ends. 479 It has 
long been recognised as a factor in the effective management of intelligence 
in both the United Kingdom and United States. Within the intelligence and 
security spheres one can note informal solutions being overlaid on to 
particularly rigid institutions, such as the flexible and loose approaches 
adopted by both Special Branches' within the Police and the Intelligence 
Corps in the British Army.480 A successful integration of the two approaches 
can mean lower institutional costs, so that the advantages of each might be 
realised. 
Cyert and March thus develop three core ideas that have significance for 
cooperative working across the intelligence and security domains; the 
bounded rationality of those involved, imperfect environmental matching, and 
the dynamic character of processes within them, each of which can be 
recognised as an aspect of the model developed in Chapter 2. 
Thomas Schelling on the other hand, like his fellow economist Williamson, 
focused on the micro level, considering overall outcomes as an almost 
inadvertent result of the sub-level pursuit of actors’ rational self-interest. To 
him economics is based on transactions in which "everyone affected is a 
voluntary participant",481 and again a parallel can be drawn with the 
intelligence and security function in a democracy. Like most government 
functions those affected are voluntary participants, albeit to a greater or 
lesser degree. They are funded via taxes and are responsive in the short 
term/operational area via the wishes of a politically appointed decision 
maker, in the medium term via their budget, and in the longer term through 
the electoral vulnerability of that decision maker. So, like the examples 
quoted by Schelling, an examination of the impact of externalities and 
'market failure' is likely to be instructive. 
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In including the complexities and more nuanced aspects of behaviour in his 
modelling, Schelling captures other key features of the intelligence and 
security spheres that must form part of any holistic examination. Firstly, it 
allows for the dynamic and ongoing nature of the spheres. Decisions do not 
simply exist in a moment of time but are informed by the past, the actual and 
anticipated behaviour of others, and then continue impacting into the future. 
This paves the way for the feed-back loops and unintended consequences 
discussed under 'complexity' below. Behaviour is purposive, but over a 
period of time that might exceed the issue under analysis. Secondly, 
although equilibrium is a useful theoretical tool it is less relevant in the 
shifting and complex environment that is reality. It is not necessarily a 
desirable state, nor routinely part of a participants’ calculation. Thirdly, the 
rational pursuit of goals is not predicated in the way neo-classical models 
would have it: They may be misguided or not fully articulated and humans 
can deceive themselves as to the goals they are actually pursuing, or the 
benefits they will in reality bestow. They may be motivated by emotional 'self-
interest' rather than more obvious gain, and actors are often content to enjoy 
a reasonable success and do not then fully pursue maximum utility.482 These 
factors, taken together, fundamentally alter the dynamic of microeconomic 
considerations of individuals pursuing their own self-interest, with an invisible 
hand arranging an aggregate common good, without in any way contradicting 
it.  
Based on the factors above, Schelling allowed that rational actors, whilst 
intentionally pursuing their own interests, were capable of forming coalitions 
with others who were pursuing different interests; even where this meant that 
they achieved a sub-optimal outcome, on the particular occasion in question. 
This is a clear point of similarity with actors in the intelligence and security 
communities. It permitted him to alter the probable outcomes of game theory 
to more closely reflect observable outcomes in reality.483 Rather than being 
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doomed to an undesirable aggregate outcome through the pursuit of their 
own micro-motives, actors could be seen to cooperate to improve the result 
for all, even where this was not the best outcome for them as individual 
agents. Game theory thus becomes a part-bargaining model. This has 
implications for its explanatory power concerning cooperation in the 
intelligence and security spheres, as discussed in this chapter, and thus for 
the importance of the negotiating costs detailed in the next. 
Schelling's argument may be summarised thus:  Where n people have a 
binary choice with the same preferred option and pay-off, and are better off 
whichever choice they make as more amongst the 'others' choose the less 
desirable option, then there is some number (k), which is greater than 1, such 
that if all individuals numbering k or more choose their un-preferred option 
and the rest do not, then those that do are actually better off than if they had 
all chosen their preferred choice (see the hypothetical case represented in 
Figure 3.1).484  
This is still the case despite the fact that free riders (choosing their own 
personal preferences) still benefit to a greater extent. Schelling is therefore 
implicitly linking Coase's ideas485 with Cyert and March's consideration of 
coalitions.486 k is thus the minimum size of a viable coalition (the red line 
represents the total or average values corresponding to the numbers 
choosing the preferred or less desirable option). However its relationship to n 
is not uniform or easily predictable. It will vary from situation to situation and 
is a second important factor in probable outcomes.487 Schelling's work 
therefore suggests that the viability of cooperative working in the security and 
intelligence spheres will be subject to the same strictures. 
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Paralleling an intelligence community with a large firm and the behaviour of 
actors within it can thus be instructive, provided that the parallel is used to 
examine the community at the right level of resolution. The simplicity of 
neoclassical economic theory is both inadequate and misleading as it too 
closely links cause with effect. Like Allison's consideration of complex 
problems from the perspective of a unitary rational actor (discussed later) the 
very process of pairing back to fundamental elements risks ignoring 
apparently minor factors that actually combine to great effect and, as the 
conclusion in Chapter 9 makes clear, in very different ways.  
Section 5: Security and Intelligence Cooperation and the Bureaucratic 
Perspective 
Having examined the applicability of behavioural theories to the security and 
intelligence spheres, this section will consider how far bureaucratic theory 
can usefully add to that understanding, so that the equivalent section in 
Chapter 4 can then demonstrate the usefulness of applying institutional cost 
analysis to bureaucratic explanations of cooperation in them. Max Weber's 
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view of bureaucracy was as a technically superior means of organising the 
division of labour, boasting a "... "rational" character, with rules, means-ends 
calculus, and matter-of-factness predominating", supported by a system of 
the sort of low-powered incentives still recognisable in first Robert Merton 
and then Oliver Williamson's later work. 488 In this view the importance of 
individual behaviour is diminished: The bureaucrat is "...a small cog in a 
ceaselessly moving mechanism..." and above all "... forged to the common 
interest of all the functionaries in the perpetuation of the apparatus and the 
persistence of its rationally organised domination." so that "increasingly the 
material fate of the masses depends upon the continuous and correct 
functioning..." of the bureaucracies that support the capitalist system.489 The 
development of fixed forms and responses to prevent their collapse and the 
chaos that would result is thus inevitable. However the rigidity of the structure 
that naturally results introduces costs when a more flexible approach is 
needed, particularly in a notoriously uncertain area like security. The question 
then is under what circumstances are those costs worth paying, and what 
organisational forms will minimise the trade off required. This is the dilemma 
with all organisational ‘standard operating procedures’, but its relevance 
increases exponentially with increasing uncertainty, and uncertainty is the 
prominent characteristic of both intelligence and security provision. 
One of the most constant criticisms of the United States intelligence and 
security communities, although they are not alone in this, is that they 
routinely fail to adapt to either implicit need or explicit instruction. 
Bureaucracy simply does not manage the unexpected or unique well, yet 
these are the pre-eminent circumstances of both the security and intelligence 
worlds.490 This is an issue that will be discussed further in subsequent 
chapters, but it is worth noting that this stickiness is typical of any institution 
that becomes sufficiently complex to become a bureaucracy. Indeed so 
fundamental is this process that the very title of institution is derived from the 
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process whereby actors fix or “institute” previously fluid or ad hoc 
arrangements, as noted by Emile Durkheim.491 Durkheim identified that the 
shared belief systems, social mores and norms of a group engaged in some 
shared endeavour, although subjectively formed around a particular 
objective, become “crystallized”.492 For example the same constraining 
frameworks that ensured the Central Intelligence Agency could not pass 
funds to the contras in El Salvador (much to the chagrin of some very senior 
actors) and therefore kept them from too active an involvement in what would 
become the National Security Council's ‘arms for hostages’ debacle also 
prevented quick adaption to the post-Cold War environment and the 
emergence of the asymmetric non-state terrorist threat. 493    
The ideas of Weber and Durkheim were developed by Talcott Parsons, who 
linked the entwined arenas of social and cultural frameworks with the 
personality traits of the actor to add an additional dimension to any analysis. 
He saw social action as a largely voluntaristic result of norms and values, 
which allowed the introduction of ideas of sub-goal pursuit and opportunistic 
behaviour. Parsons thus argued that the function of an institution was to 
regulate action “...in conformity with... common values”. This has important 
consequences for efficiency as far as the original purpose of an organisation 
is concerned,494 and even more important consequences for sort of 
integration of disparate agencies required to make a modern day intelligence 
or security apparatus function properly.  
Parsons regarded systems as either functional or normative; the former 
consisting of “... a plurality of interdependent variables” but the latter is 
something more, an interrelationship “... of entities which, once the basic 
principles or assumptions on which it rests are given, constitutes a 
“harmonious whole...” with a relationship of “mutual requiredness” evident 
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throughout. 495 A distinction that, according to conventional wisdom, also 
seems to summarise the US and UK communities respectively. 
Normative rules lead to structural integration by virtue of their “... regulatory 
relation to action” established by the basic assumptions alluded to by 
Parsons, and the use of sanctions indicates a weakening of integration.496 As 
well as this internal constraint, a set of organisations will be similarly 
constrained in the means they might use by the ultimate ‘common-ends’ they 
seek or even the “... ultimate common value-system” in use, so that the most 
efficient means-ends calculus will not necessarily be adopted.497 A common 
phenomenon in communities of organisations such as those found across an 
intelligence and security function. In a legally bound democratic entity like the 
United States for example the Executive incurred significant institutional 
costs throughout 2002/3 by having the future invasion of Iraq established as 
both legally and morally justified through the concept of a ‘war on terror’ and 
the apparent existence of weapons of mass destruction.    
Merton went further and argued that, over time, the very purpose of an 
organisation can be displaced by the lower level objectives that emerge from 
the regulatory framework that is supposed to support it. The impact of this on 
their capacity to share a maximand or single goal will be expanded on in 
Chapter 4 in the course of the institutional cost discussion there. Here it is 
enough to note that as a result the bureaucracy itself becomes less flexible 
and more defensive when adaption is required, with internal loyalties 
predominant over those focused on the wider good.498 The same issue can 
occur when specific professionalism encourages actors to develop “ ...special 
preferences, antipathies, discriminations and emphases”; a condition of  
‘occupational psychosis’ that can lead to what Merton called a pride of craft 
that leads to a resistance to change.499  
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Given the condition of structural secrecy that pervades the sectors under 
discussion, such inflexibility can lead to principal-agent problems,500  and a 
lack of adaptability, so that they will exhibit a punctuated equilibrium, 
permitting only minor evolutionary change that acts as a release of pressure, 
until some major external occurrence forces sudden adaption. Even then the 
degree of adaption will be constrained by how high the institutional barriers 
had become when compared to the force for change.501 This condition is not 
specific to intelligence and security provision, as an examination of social 
security in the United States has made  clear,502 and the rigidities that are at 
the root of the phenomena are prevalent in both functions of government. If it 
were possible to provide a meaningful empirical measurement of 
organisational change occurring within the intelligence and security 
communities one would therefore expect a severely leptokurtic distribution for 
the United States, similar to that found by Jones et al in the social security 
case.  
At the extreme, events such as the Pearl Harbor or 9/11 attacks certainly 
generated a massive desire for significant adaption within the United States 
intelligence apparatus and a great deal did indeed change. However after the 
initial pressure slackened, and the more immediate crisis was passed 
institutional blockages and the sub-goal pursuits of elements like the 
Department of Defence and Federal Bureau of Investigation began to once 
again provide frictions to the efficacy of (in the latter case) the new Director of 
National Intelligence.503  
In the British case, as the case studies that follow indicate, one would expect 
a more normal distribution as institutional friction is generally lower so 
gradual adaption more deliverable. It is however still a factor: The controlling 
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nexus for intelligence (prior to 2010), the Joint Intelligence Committee, has 
for example adapted in only very minor ways throughout its long history, 
except for two significant changes that occurred in the wake of crises. In the 
first case chairmanship shifted from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in 
the light of the Franks Report into the Argentinean invasion of the 
Falklands.504 In the other case the fall-out from the Review of Intelligence on 
Weapons of Mass Destruction by Lord Butler also ensured that a tipping 
point was reached.505 On that occasion the crisis of confidence that resulted 
permitted the Brown government to introduce a more confused raft of 
changes whose usefulness is still debateable.506       
Merton also considers outcomes, and the degree of 'causal imputation' 
between action and outcome. He starts by dividing those that are actually 
intended from those that are not, noting that those that are intended are at 
least 'relatively' desirable to the actor, even if they seem not to be; even 
when negative they will at least be "the lesser of two evils"507 This is the 
means-ends of the rational actor. More often however the anticipated 
consequences of the purposive action considered by Merton are conjectural; 
there is some stochastic element to the outcome.  This too has particular 
implications for the intelligence and security functions. For example as 
uncertainty increases the further away the time horizon is, the more an actor 
will concern themselves with the "...imperious immediacy of interest"
508
 to the 
exclusion of both the more distant consequences of action and indeed less 
apparent threats or opportunities. This is a pathology particularly prevalent in 
defensive security operations, but can also be observed in longer term 
intelligence functions. 509 Uncertainty can thus also impact on the 'variability' 
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of rationality as discussed earlier. Rational pursuit of immediate interests can 
be irrational in terms of longer term or more nebulous issues like values.510 
There are on-going discussions on both sides of the Atlantic as to whether 
the (largely successful) prosecution of the 'war on terror' has undermined 
democratic values but even more modest issues, like the United Kingdoms' 
'Freedom of Information Act' can have the opposite of its intended outcome, 
with some operators committing less of their activity to permanent record on 
the assumption that it may subsequently be released, even at the risk of 
compromising terrorism prosecutions.511  
In bureaucratic terms, the Intelligence and security interface can either be 
managed by a 'pull' architecture, whereby consumers task agencies with 
discovering what information they feel they need, or by a 'push' architecture 
in which the producing agencies collect that they feel is appropriate or 
possible then push it on the consumer (or some mix of the two). The former 
is of course intuitively more appealing but actually both present both costs 
and benefits.512  
The centrally set 'requirements and priorities' of the United Kingdom's 
national intelligence machinery make it essentially a 'pull' orientated system. 
This emphasis persists down through the operational and tactical levels, with 
the security end seeking an assessment from, for example, the 'joint 
Terrorism Analysis Centre' or a military J2 cell on a given functional or 
geographical area when the need presents itself. 513 Consumers may be 
unaware that they need intelligence on a given issue, or even that it is an 
issue at all until it is too late; re-targeting intelligence collection, particularly 
human intelligence (HUMINT), can require a very long lead-in time before it is 
useful, and the dangers of relying on untried sources have been recently re-
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emphasised by the 'Curveball' debacle prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq.514 
There is a dichotomy between the bounded rationality of department heads, 
their short term requirements, and the needs of the rest of their department, 
much less the wider governmental community in which they sit.515 In a 'pull' 
system it is difficult to limit what and how much intelligence is requested by 
the security consumer (amongst others) for whom more will always be 
preferable.  Even then collection may not be feasible at all.516  
On the other hand, an over reliance on the suppliers pushing intelligence 
upwards has its own glut of potential pitfalls to contend with. The rational self 
interest of the producers will encourage them to perform well from their home 
agencies perspective, which may not be entirely in tune with the preferences 
of the consumer. Technical collection agencies particularly can thus flood a 
consumer with tangential or irrelevant information leading to information 
overload, and are rationally inclined to continue producing at the very limit of 
their resources.517 The same can occur in human intelligence collection at the 
operational level, as the Security Service's short lived experiments with 
performance related pay tied to numerical factors (number of reports for 
example) in the 1990's, or the Metropolitan Police Special Branch's attempt 
at devolved budgets at the same time, which denied managers the flexibility 
to move resources to particular areas of operation as they peaked in interest, 
demonstrated. In both cases frenetic activity continued in areas of marginal 
interest, to the detriment of others in which the consumers had a far greater 
interest.518  
Ideas of how bureaucrats demonstrate their rationality, the type of utility they 
are motivated to pursue, and how they pursue it, are central to both 
cooperation in the intelligence and security spheres and bureaucratic 
explanations of organisation more generally. This is not least because of the 
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expectation that rational actors will behave similarly in similar circumstances. 
The apparent contradictions between the budget maximising model 
developed by William Niskanen (who as considering bureaucratic behaviour 
in the United States)519 and the bureau shaping model of Patrick Dunleavy 
(who was focused on the UK)520 are therefore especially useful in defining 
the missing link in bureaucratic analysis.  
Dunleavy observed British senior staffs trying to narrow down their 
responsibilities to a core function, contracting other responsibilities and parts 
of their budget out to sub-contractors to reduce their vulnerability to criticism. 
Niskanen on the other hand found their American equivalents inclined to 
maximise their responsibilities and budgetary authority as this maximised 
their powerbase. Amy Zegart subsequently found exactly this sort of 
behaviour as one of the root causes of turf wars in the US intelligence and 
security apparatus. 521 Both Dunleavy in the United Kingdom and Niskanen in 
the United States supported their theories with a substantial amount of 
empirical research. However the disparity is not nation specific; Zegart also 
noticed the United States congress were disinclined to maximise 
responsibilities in connection with the intelligence community as there are 
poor incentives for extending involvement.522 The question then is how such 
diverse conclusions could be reached when considering government 
functions in at least broadly similar environments? If one accepts the 
assumption of rationality, then one needs a way to explain the distinct 
outcomes observed by each of them. 
Niskanen’s enormously influential ‘Bureaucracy and Representative 
Government’ was published in 1971 following years of observation of the 
American bureaucracy as an insider in Robert McNamara’s Defense 
Department. In it he argued persuasively that bureaucrats are rationally 
motivated to maximise their budgets as this is how success is defined, with 
larger areas of budgetary control both a survival technique and a proxy for 
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greater utility from “... salary, perquisites of office, public reputation, power, 
patronage, output of the bureau, ease of making changes and ease of 
managing the bureau.” 523   
The theory rests on two fundamental premises: That bureaucrats are 
rationally motivated to seek larger (discretionary) budgets, and that their 
relationship with their sponsor is one of bilateral monopoly. The bureau are 
the sole suppliers of a service to a sponsor (the government), which in turn is 
their sole source of revenue, normally managed as a one off payment rather 
than per unit of output. Niskanen therefore argues that the issue is one of 
asymmetric information, as the bureau can control information on both “costs 
and capabilities”524 and can either oversupply the service or supply it at an 
inefficient rate. In the United Kingdom the ‘Single Intelligence Account’ is 
precisely this sort of one-off payment. In the United States the issue is more 
complicated, but as Amy Zegart has demonstrated, the likelihood of genuine 
line by line funding through Congress is limited by their own misaligned 
incentives.525 As a fully informed sponsor would be likely to insist on the 
maximum output at minimum cost, then the bargaining power of the bureau 
chief depends on his or her ability to “... distort or conceal information from 
the sponsor”. But like any other manager dealing with a potential issue of 
sub-goal pursuit by a junior, the sponsor has several options to control this 
tendency; monitoring, competition and the securing of detailed information 
from alternate sources for example. The important point for the analysis is 
that all these measures come at a cost.526 
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Patrick Dunleavy challenged Niskanen’s view by looking at British central 
government and re-conceiving how it should be examined by distinguishing 
both different types of budget and different types of links with the centre. 
Writing in the mid 1980’s he saw a prospective “hiving-off of three quarters of 
the existing Whitehall personnel to separate agencies” as incompatible with 
Niskanen’s conclusions from the United States.527 In his view the problem 
was that “... these new right views make none of the distinctions between 
types of budget and types of agency..” that he included.528 Although 
comprehensive in his overview of British central governance at the time, 
Dunleavy was writing before the secret intelligence agencies were officially 
acknowledged as even existing, and when both the Metropolitan Police and 
Royal Ulster Constabulary were controlled in a very different way to how they 
are today. So it is worth looking at his categorisations of both budget and 
agency type and thus the extent to which the intelligence and security 
functions might be incorporated, so that their likely level of institutional costs 
in given circumstances might be more easily paralleled.  
Firstly, Dunleavy differentiates between the type of budget an agency head 
will be dealing with. He uses four broad categories: 
a) The core budget, used for its own running costs and operations. 
b) The bureau budget, which is the core budget plus monies paid out to the 
private sector through contracts etc. 
c) The program budget which includes a. and b. plus monies an agency 
passes to other public sector bodies for them to spend but over which it 
maintains some supervision or control. 
d) Finally the super-programme budget which consists of all those above, 
plus spending by other bureaus over which the agency nonetheless has 
some supervision.529  
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Dunleavy also believed that the organisational choices of leading bureaucrats 
would be affected by their relationship with the centre. As the adapted 
version of his 1989 diagram (Figure 3.2)530 demonstrates, these can be 
divided them into five categories (A to E) on this basis. Although not 
discussed by Dunleavy,531 the secret intelligence agencies (Secret 
Intelligence Service, Security Service and Government Communications 
Headquarters) would fit into category C, as agencies staffed by civil servants 
but not directly controlled by Ministers (that control being once removed 
through the Foreign and Home Office’s to their Secretaries of State). Defence 
Intelligence on the other hand is directly under the Secretary of State for 
Defence, but staffed by both civil servants and military personnel (plus some 
private contractors) but as an integral part of the Ministry of Defence can be 
located in A, lowering internal institutional costs but making its external 
relationships more difficult.
532
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Whitehall that include counterterrorist functions. More complicated still, the 
Metropolitan Police is now under the Mayor’s office, but with some elements 
still funded by and responsive to the Home Office, and in particular the Office 
of Security and Counter Terrorism within it, depending on how the function in 
question is related to the Home Office’s CONTEST strategy. This has led to a 
position where even individual post holders can be (for example) one third 
the responsibility of the Mayor's Office, and two thirds under the Home Office 
(albeit both via Police managers), leaving them partly in D and partly outside 
central control altogether, and introducing a whole new level of institutional 
costs to be inculcated by managers beyond those observed by Dunleavy 
when he categorised them in 1989.533  
The juxtaposition of the theories of Dunleavy and Niskanen is the classic 
demonstration of the difference between the United Kingdom and United 
States outlook, and is perhaps best exemplified by is the progress of the 
UK’s Joint Intelligence Committee from a military co-ordination body to a 
civilian one, as opposed to the USA’s attempt to create a civilian intelligence 
supremacy that was mutated (on several occasions) by an engorged and 
recalcitrant Department of Defense.534 However the relatively recent 
development (both qualitatively and quantitatively) of the threat to various 
sorts of electronic communications has also led to the same very different 
organisational reactions in the two Countries. In the United States the same 
cultural rigidities that were suited to the Cold War environment have proven 
ill-suited to the additional complexities (not least the fact that both the 
offensive and defensive aspects are co-located) and heightened levels of 
white-noise in the cyber world.535   
In the United Kingdom, on the other hand, the reaction of the Security 
Service, despite their mandate to protect such infrastructure, is to seek a co-
operative arrangement with the Communications-Electronics Security Group 
(CESG), a sub unit of Government Communications Head-Quarters (GCHQ). 
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Furthermore, like the wider security and intelligence communities, 
coordination and funding is managed via the Cabinet Office through the 
National Cyber Security Program (NCSP) to ensure the same holistic 
approach.536 As Davies has described, the United Kingdom’s intelligence 
community members are inclined to seek expertise in their co-members 
rather than seek to duplicate it in-house (the trait observable throughout the 
United States community). He suggests reasonably that this is due in part to 
the limited Treasury funds available to each, so that having the task done 
elsewhere is the cost effective and obvious choice, with all intelligence 
activity coming out of the same pot anyway. In the United States funding has 
historically been easier, and individual community members appear before 
Congress to secure their own program budgets, so that such projects would 
only increase their chances of a large settlement.537  
The conflicting findings of Niskanen and Dunleavy are thus reflected in the 
security and intelligence spheres of the US and UK respectively. Section 5 of 
Chapter 4 will therefore use the institutional cost framework developed in 
Chapter 2 to articulate why this is the case despite the similarity of the 
environments each must work in using. This explanation will then be 
extrapolated into the counterterrorism and defence intelligence provision 
case studies that follow in Parts' two and three.  
Section 6: Security, Intelligence and the Usefulness of Theories of 
Cooperative Decision-Making 
A recurring theme in many examinations of intelligence or security is the link 
between intelligence and the provision of a decision making advantage of 
some sort. Some authors from the structural realist tradition emphasise the 
competitive nature of decision making in the international arena: When 
looking at the intelligence function specifically, Jennifer Sims constructed her 
theory of adaptive realism based on how intelligence informs decision making 
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as a competitive function of government.538 The process by which 
governments make decisions, and how intelligence can be capitalised on, is 
therefore a key driver of not only how intelligence but also security is, or 
should be, organised. The degree to which the two systems are integrated at 
the point of decision making will therefore have significant impact on 
outcome. 
The same form of organisation will be more or less effective depending on 
how decision makers go about their business. Nowhere has this been better 
demonstrated than through the mismatch of the British intelligence's formal 
committee based structure that had evolved over decades, and the informal 
style of governance known colloquially a sofa-government539 utilised during 
Tony Bair's Government during the run up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, and 
the consideration of Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction.540 How 
decision makers include or dismiss information and then act and react 
amongst themselves as a result, is therefore a necessary consideration.  
The need for breadth in conceptual thinking on decision making around 
intelligence and security issues was most eloquently highlighted by Graham 
Allison, one of the preeminent authors on national security during the Cold 
War. In the seminal Essence of Decision Allison specifically drew out not only 
the strengths but also the inconsistencies of three explanatory models as 
applied to the Cuban missile crisis;541 His unitary actor model uses the neo-
realist approach to simplify decision-making, but requires a comprehensive 
and single rationality and set of preferences by all the actors concerned, as 
well as a full knowledge of all alternatives and consequences. Although a 
useful macro level tool for some tasks, it cannot offer a realistic analysis of 
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the whole situation in reality. On the other hand his organisational process 
model provides an embryonic description of the sort of frictions that are at the 
heart of the explanation developed in this thesis, and his political bargaining 
model captures some of the sub-goal pursuit issues and behavioural factors 
that result. However neither theory can capture the whole picture in isolation 
so that something more holistic is needed. 
In his rational unitary actor model Allison uses version of the configurational 
ideal developed by Weber. 542  It relies on a Hobbesian idea of "... consistent, 
value-maximizing reckoning or adaption within specified constraints".543 The 
strength of this model is that it allows analysis of specific problems at a 
manageable level, as it reduces even entities like the United States and the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to single actors competing only with each 
other. But in doing so, as Allison demonstrated, it obscures more 
comprehensive understanding. Not only can it hide internal divisions and 
processes, but in assuming a unified and rational actor progressing as best 
as it may in a linear fashion towards a desired objective, it can be deceptive 
as to the complexity of that objective as well as the environment in which it is 
pursued.544  
More particularly in this context, it tends to assume an enemy will also act 
rationally by the same standards as one's own, which has often lead to the 
analysis breakdown known as mirror imaging, and has caused predictive 
failures in circumstances like Yom Kippur and the Russian invasion of 
Afghanistan.545 The model also fails to cope with diverse pursuits within an 
apparently unified government; Allison cites Chinese simultaneously wanting 
national superiority and Marxist-Leninist goals.546 As Allison himself notes, 
the model relies on 'comprehensive rationality', which incorporates full 
knowledge of all alternatives and all consequences, which is simply not 
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realistic in situations of any complexity.547 The procedural ruts that Allison 
considers as part of his organisational process model548 are precisely the 
'rigidities' conceptualised by Merton above, but also demonstrate how the 
behavioural ideas developed by Simon impact on outcomes.549 In the Cuban 
missile case the established organisational processes' and cultural norms 
detailed by Allison preclude some possible policy responses and encourage 
others, and are therefore significant. 
In his third model Allison, like Williamson, argues that outcomes are not so 
much a result of governmental decision making, but rather a 'resultant' of 
numerous bargaining games involving national, organisational and personal 
goals, all interconnected and affecting each other over time. He aligns the 
model with earlier work by Charles Lindblom arguing that consideration of 
what outcomes are desired cannot be separated from what means are to be 
used, they are considered simultaneously and as one, so means-ends 
analysis is very limited, and alternative options and even other possible 
consequences are often overlooked. Rather decision makers proceed 
incrementally according to their last output.550  
The public choice theorist Martin Smith has developed these ideas to 
generate an explanation of the UK's Westminster governance he calls 'core 
executive theory', and he has applied this to the interface between 
intelligence and government particularly.551 In this view governance and 
decision making are a process wherein key but mutually dependant actors 
exchange resources. Power is thus based on dependency rather than 
command. However access to intelligence can shift the balance of power 
relations through what former Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd described as 
the "...cache of the double envelope".552  
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Smith argues convincingly that it was the shift of general policy organisation 
closer into Downing Street, in pursuit of the generally laudable goal of ‘joined 
up government’ across departmental boundaries, the apparently inoffensive 
use of ‘task forces’, and even the use of (often derided) issue specific ‘Czars’ 
that all combined to allow the Blair government to bring intelligence further 
into his fiefdom. The information advantage this generated in turn allowed a 
small clique to manage the intelligence on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction 
so that more general and critical discussion was limited (incredibly, there was 
no Defence and Overseas Policy Committee meeting during the twelve 
months that preceded the invasion of Iraq)553 so that the Prime Minister 
achieved substantial autonomy over national security issues.554  
However, this does not mean that he achieved, or ever could achieve, 
unalloyed domination. A Prime Minister or a President is still only the most 
powerful actor within a group of slightly less powerful actors and is thus 
vulnerable to coalitions. The very different constitutional positions of each 
affect how and when authority will wax or wane, and how dramatically, but 
not the fact that it will. Authority will vary from issue to issue.555 In different 
circumstances for example Treasury officials may use their particular 
knowledge as a power resource simply by their ability to generate statistical 
information over massive data sets, and that too can provide a significant 
bargaining advantage; as the Brown Chancellorship under Prime Minister 
Blair indicated. In such a case (economic) intelligence on rival nations may 
be requested by, and supplied to, the Treasury by the agencies horizontally, 
and need not go via Downing Street. Even if it does it may lack the context 
that drove the original tasking. Conversely, as Smith argues, the core 
executive can widen the understanding of ‘national security’ so that normally 
discrete policy areas such as immigration or anti-social behaviour are 
incorporated into it, moving the intelligence advantage back again, and 
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legitimising decisions that would otherwise be intolerable, as has occurred on 
both sides of the Atlantic in the post 9/11 era.556  
Both Allison and Smith therefore demonstrate how important the 
relationships and motivations between different actors in the security and 
intelligence spheres can be, so that Section 6 in Chapter 4 can next examine 
the increased resolution that institutional costs analysis can offer of these. 
However the external environment is also significant so that theories that 
address it specifically must also be addressed. 
Section 7: Complexity and Cooperation in Security and Intelligence 
Globalisation and the accelerating rise of a post-traditional social order have 
increased complexity exponentially. The deliberate intrusion by societies into 
their own environments has, according to Anthony Giddens, made internal 
what had previously been the external issues of risk and uncertainty.557 This 
has meant that rather than a linear cause-effect relationship between 
intelligence or security goals and outcomes a reflexive relationship 
prevails.558 The difficulties this entails can be most clearly seen in attempts at 
strategic warning following the move from State-centric threats to those that 
are globally networked.559 However complexity theory by its very nature 
resists methods of analysis that require some elements to be abstracted 
away from others; its interconnectedness and feedback loops are central to 
how it operates. Simple reductionist approaches to analysis are likely to be 
inadequate because multiple levels of analysis are the only way to account 
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for emergent properties.560 Too expansive a view on the other hand renders 
the analysis useless.  
There are two aspects to complexity that must be considered; those that are 
internal and those that are external to (in this case) the intelligence and 
security communities in question. The former can be assessed along three 
axes where vertical complexity is represented by the number of hierarchical 
levels, horizontal complexity by the number of different departments, 
agencies, 'job titles' and the like, and spatial complexity by the number of 
different geographical locations involved. The latter can be summarised as 
the number of different exogenous issues that impact on or must be dealt 
with by the organisation in question.561 Each aspect is a force multiplier on 
the others, and internal complexity will be designed to adequately address 
the complexity of the external environment with which it must deal. The 
provision of intelligence and security to any nation state engaged with the 
wider World will necessarily be extraordinarily complex. 
According to complexity theory complex adaptive systems such as 
intelligence and security communities boast four aspects that are relevant 
here: Firstly they are made up of agents with schemata. Where system level 
outcomes are the aggregate of many such schemata, each of which is 
delineated by the perception and limits of the agent in question. Sub-level 
actors have flexibility and some limited degree of autonomy, so that their 
strategies and tactics both compete and reinforce each other. Secondly they 
are self-organising networks sustained by importing energy (information). For 
a complex system to function well its individual parts need to be partially, but 
not fully connected, and there is an upper and lower number of 'connections' 
that each unit can usefully have. The energy that needs to be imported into 
the system will, for any particular part of the system, come from the same few 
near neighbours. As Herbert Simon argued, too great an inter-connectedness 
means that either the system decays as change is constantly dampened out, 
or it becomes utterly chaotic as every alteration is magnified as it continues 
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to bounce around the system.562 The evolutionary aspects of complex 
adaptive systems are to be found here, so that thirdly they display co-
evolution to the edge of chaos. Finally the fourth aspect is that they 
recombine and evolve during and after each cycle. Parts of the outcomes 
from one round of activity become the input to the next round.  
As a consequence patterns emerge without the input of a central controller. 
Indeed attempts at hierarchical ordering, which must be made on the basis of 
limited situational awareness and high uncertainty as to the future, are likely 
to be problematic if they run counter to these more evolutionary forms of 
order.563 That is not to say such interventionism is always wrong, merely 
difficult to successfully achieve.  
Ironically in the United Kingdom it was the acceptance of Anthony Giddens 
view of the complexity of the international environment that lead to the Blair 
then Brown governments adopting the Third-Way approach to policy: An 
outlook which was in turn applied to the organisation of central governance564 
and proved so significant to the effective functioning of the Joint Intelligence 
Committee. The sort of partial intervention described above had a very 
different result to the more informal evolution exhibited by the Committee 
throughout most of its history.565  Robert Geyer argues persuasively that the 
difficulties exhibited across the Third-Way project were precisely because 
there was not just a third way, but a fourth, fifth and probably many more 
beyond that; the full extent of the complexity had not been fully factored in.566            
One of the distinguishing strengths of complexity theory is that it includes 
temporal as well as spatial breadth. Despite the problems engendered by 
complexity described above, there is a more positive longer term outcome 
from the tendency to self- organise; agents and sub-systems within the whole 
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will co-evolve. Changes by any one of these need to be reacted upon by its 
near neighbours, and in turn this will be reacted on by theirs. This adaptation 
will eventually be fed back to the originator of the change so that they can 
then refine what they are doing in the light of the new information on the 
activities of its fellows, and so the component parts of a complex system are 
in a constant state of co-evolution. A mix of small and large changes are 
inevitable during this co-evolution of interacting systems, even if the process 
is essentially stochastic. If an increasingly 'long-run’ of change was plotted, it 
would show an increasingly clean line.567 This in turn means a lack of 
concern with points of equilibrium. The history and future of a complex 
system are more than mere fluctuations around a fixed point of balance, so 
that high fitness peaks cannot be sustained in an uncertain and shifting 
environment. Nonetheless a balance between flexibility and stability must be 
achieved for any organisation to survive at the macro level.568 
Despite complexity theory's position that the least fit sub-system or agent will 
be replaced, assumptions of natural selection within intelligence or security 
communities must be approached with some caution. Public bodies of any 
sort rarely 'die', so that Darwinesque notions of evolution via natural selection 
would seem flawed.569 Yet evolution per se has certainly occurred, and the 
very roots of intelligence evolution are biological: “... every animal, even a 
protozoan, must have a mechanism to perceive stimuli...”570 to organise its 
survival. The application of an organic explanatory paradigm to the 
complexities of intelligence and security concerns therefore retains an 
intuitive appeal. Recent years, and the advent of qualitatively different threats 
have for example necessitated that both the US and UK develop new 
bureaucratic entities that cross conventional departmental responsibilities. To 
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return to the organic metaphor, a successful complex system will have 
“influence over the great sympathetic, but it permits the latter great 
autonomy”. 571 
Complexity also has impacts on the allocation of resources. Most levels of 
decision maker naturally prefer to deal with things that can be understood. 
This not only means that managers are inclined to let the urgent drown out 
the important and that short term issues are dealt with at the expense of the 
more uncertain long term problems,572 but also that budgets are harder to 
secure for items where the return is hard to visualise. This includes 
intelligence generally, but also affects how resources are allocated between 
disciplines or agencies. Initiating human intelligence operations, which are 
always very uncertain of success, is harder to fund than a geospatial imagery 
operation where a hard-copy photograph can be handed to the customer. 
This has most recently been found to apply to the new cyber threat, where 
politicians have found it harder to allocate resources in austere times to 
projects that are expensive, but do not have an easily and publicly 
demonstrable benefit. A senior minister has paralleled the situation to that 
observed in the Sacha Baren Cohen film 'The Dictator' where funds are more 
easily won for defence procurement that involves "pointy hurty shiny things" 
than for computer based, more nebulous projects.573     
The CIA's Calvin Andrus has argued persuasively that in order to have any 
hope of 'keeping-up' with the unpredictable environmental changes faced by 
intelligence practitioners in a complex and uncertain world they would need 
to be similarly adaptive and unpredictable.574 Andrus rationalised this 
conclusion by paralleling the intelligence community with successful adaption 
in an even more traditionally hierarchical body; the United States military. In 
that case information technology has allowed ever lower levels of command 
to assume increasingly greater autonomy in their decision making, but this 
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could only be countenanced because junior officers were fully aware of 
strategic as well as tactical objectives, then supplied with real-time 
information of the battle space near them. Feedback loops of information 
became as important horizontally as vertically (whether up or down) as the 
situation changed.  
He thus advocated the use of self-organising technologies such as 'wikis' to 
spread and share intelligence and information, and 'blogs' to add points of 
view and promulgate more effective feedback loops. Environmental 
complexity and the internal complexity needed to meet it clearly have 
ramifications for cooperative working across the intelligence and security 
spheres, and for their interface with policy makers. However the temporal 
nature of complexity means that any comprehensive assessment of its 
impact must also include the effects of the behavioural traits of the relevant 
actors. To accommodate this Section 7 of Chapter 4 will therefore consider 
the complexity issue from the new institutionalist perspective. Before that 
however the next section will consider how the features described above can 
be factored into perceptions of national security and intelligence functions in 
the international sphere.    
Section 8: Security and Intelligence Cooperation and Theories of The 
International Environment 
The international arena in which intelligence and security issues are 
increasingly predominantly situated are inevitably complex. This is as a result 
of both historical/future complications and the sheer number of interested 
actors both within and external to the body addressing them. The problems in 
operationalising complexity theory have been touched on above but it is 
pertinent to note that as a result even such auspicious neorealist thinkers as 
Kenneth Waltz have concluded that although a theory of international politics 
"...can describe the likely outcomes of the actions and interactions of states... 
" in general theories of international politics bear on "... the foreign policies of 
nations while claiming to explain only certain aspects of them."575 In arguing 
that international theory must deal with “autonomous realms” he concludes 
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that it cannot deal with both internal and external factors simultaneously. One 
is left, according to Waltz, with analysis of events.576 This means that any 
such theory will fall well short of providing a complete explanation.  
Various attempts have been made to bridge this gap. Some, like ‘Innenpolitik’ 
theories, stress the domestic angle over the external issues, others, such as 
‘aggressive realist’ theory, regards the environmental pressures as most 
significant. Alternatively defensive realism allows for some flexibility between 
the two.577 They are nonetheless still variations on a theme, dependant on 
the preferred point of emphasis. Most theories "take as their dependent 
variable not the pattern of outcomes of State interactions, but rather the 
behavior of individual states"578 so that a full understanding of the impact of 
both complexity in outcome and uncertainty in decision making is difficult to 
achieve. What seems to work effectively in one case is less so in another. As 
Allison so convincingly demonstrated states cannot be understood simply as 
rational and unitary entities,579 but on the other hand domestic centred 
explanations cannot account for why, as Gideon Rose puts it; "... states with 
similar domestic systems often act differently in the foreign policy sphere and 
why dissimilar states in similar situations often act alike".580 
More intuitively appealing in a complex security environment is the 
neoclassical approach to realism, which addresses both internal and external 
factors: Foreign policy, to this way of thinking, is a product of a nation’s 
power relations within the international system (the realism), but that that 
policy is not delivered by anything resembling Allison’s unitary actor. Rather it 
is adapted and ‘translated’ as it passes through various levels of governance 
(the neoclassical element).581 Neoclassical realism is a theory of foreign 
policy rather than of intelligence and security per se but the two are closely 
aligned. Although it regards the various tiers involved in a foreign policy 
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decision as differentiated, and can increase or reduce the granularity to 
include any level that can impact on the final decision (including the level of 
the general population, which has become increasingly relevant),582 the 
systemic pressures are what remain paramount. It is on these that the 
explanation focuses. Unlike structural (neo)realism discussed above, which is 
more concerned with foreign policy outcomes and considers the State itself 
to be a black box, neoclassical realism reverts to classical realism's concern 
with the policies that produce these outcomes, and is thus additionally 
concerned with the internal power relations. 583 It can therefore include some 
of the issues incorporated into the approaches discussed above, from simple 
behavioural considerations to the machinations of a core executive. 
When addressing a security concern more directly, Dyson finds a disparity 
between successful tactical and operational level adaption and failed 
strategic level adjustment to a changing military threat environment. This is 
despite the neorealist assumption of an 'invisible hand' in national security 
that replicates that found in the markets.584 He uses this disparity to 
demonstrate how neorealist theory's assumption of high executive level 
autonomy within this sphere fails to explain the persistence of strategic drift in 
the United Kingdom's defence posture, and the apparent inability of the core 
executive to deliver strategic improvement, despite its dynamism at lower 
levels. This failure is despite the fact that the same three potential responses 
frame all three policy levels; inertia (the failure to adapt), emulation (the 
adoption of recognised best practise) and innovation (a potentially riskier 
approach offering the possibility of higher pay-offs), so that a government's 
pursuit of one should translate across the different policy levels.585 
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Taliaferro on the other hand argues that a State’s power is found in their 
relative ability to “... extract or mobilize societal resources as determined by 
the  institutions of the state, as well as by nationalism and ideology” and that 
it is these that shape the policy options available.586 Any democratic system 
will have constraints imposed on decision makers of course, but how they 
organise will dictate both their degree and type. The United Kingdom’s core 
executive will for example need to engage in the sort of horse trading 
described by Martin Smith,587 with costs and results varying depending on a 
multiplicity of factors that will include the level of initial consensus and the 
historical position of ‘favours owed’. In the United States on the other hand, 
the executive’s capability to mobilise resources is more explicitly linked, 
through the Constitution, to its ability to bargain. In both cases however 
democracy itself tempers the states autonomy and introduces further actors 
into the bargaining process.588Although described by Taliaferro at the 
national level, the same pattern is observable at other levels. An agency or 
department would naturally prefer to retain its resources for its own 
designated purposes. Yet, as the subsequent case studies show, whilst the 
United States intelligence and security communities exhibits this trend 
regularly, the United Kingdom's do so only occasionally. An explanation that 
can transcend this dichotomy is therefore required, and the more nuanced 
explanation of these preferences that the more holistic institutional costs 
impact framework can provide will therefore be described in Section 8 of the 
following chapter.  
Section 9: Conclusion   
Intelligence and security organisations are no more and no less than 
institutions of governance, and like any other governmental institution they 
adapt according to a range of stimuli.589 This means that, like any other 
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organisation, a wide variety of approaches can usefully explain various 
aspects of cooperative success and failure amongst the actors and agencies 
engaged in their delivery. Each approach has acknowledged however, 
(whether explicitly or implicitly) that whatever its particular point of emphasis 
or focus, any analysis of collaborative working in those communities must 
have regard to a wide range of factors that can be internal or external to 
them. Furthermore these are often only apparent when the granularity of the 
analysis is at the micro level because they are a product of how disparate 
elements interact. Different situations and perspectives appear to lend weight 
to one point of view or another, only for it to then appear flawed in 
subsequent circumstances. A range of apparently shared goals and interests 
become distinct as the examination increases in resolution. Existing general 
theories are peppered with ideas that are applicable to some parts of the 
intelligence and security cooperation issue, but are never comprehensively 
explanatory: 
The analysis of US reformists and new institutionalist scholars discussed in 
Sections 2 and 3 for example could provide a very persuasive account of 
collaborative failure and its detrimental impact on both reform and efficacy. 
But despite their inclusion of both process and behavioural driven frictions 
they could not address those occasions when cooperation between different 
actors with distinct preferences was successful. When separated out, both 
behavioural and bureaucratic accounts provided convincing explanations for 
specific actions but were less engaged with the environmental conditions that 
necessitated them. Accounts that credibly described the nature and impact of 
cooperation amongst actors that influenced decision making demonstrated 
the same limitation. Conversely approaches that focused external issues 
such as complexity or international relations seemed limited in their 
cognisance of how internal negotiating and positioning impacted on those 
processes.      
Having developed what this thesis argues is a more comprehensive 
explanatory architecture for collaborative success or failure across the 
security and intelligence spheres in Chapter 2, and then examined how far 
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existing approaches explain different aspects of that collaboration in this 
chapter, Chapter 4 will next investigate the relationship between institutional 
costs analysis and the various approaches to cooperation that have been 
considered here. In this way they will be used both as a critique to the theory, 
and to assess the degree to which the various alternative approaches may 
be utilised to add depth to the institutional costs approach. 
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Chapter 4 - The Interrelationship of Existing Theories and Institutional 
Cost Analysis, and the Methodological Approach Used 
Section 1: Introduction: 
This chapter will examine how institutional cost analysis 'talks' to the existing 
theories of social interaction that were applied to the security and intelligence 
sphere in Chapter 3, and by also describing some of the issues that the 
approaches described in the previous chapter into institutional cost language, 
demonstrate how its particular strengths better explain cooperative success 
and failure in those functional areas. In particular the Chapter will show that 
although the institutional cost paradigm develops many of the key points of 
emphasis in other approaches, it is not simply a synthesis of existing 
theories. It is instead a method of considering the myriad of relevant factors 
as a set of interacting 'lowest common denominators' without having to treat 
them as autonomous, so that their inter-relationship can be examined.  
In this respect institutional cost theory relies on the same sort of duality 
identified by Anthony Giddens and his ideas of structuration; the interaction 
of agency and structure.590 At the heart of the institutional cost impact 
framework is the interaction of environmental and behavioural factors. Indeed 
there are obvious parallels between that work, the organisational failures 
framework of Williamson,
591
 and the model derived to examine collaboration 
in the intelligence and security spheres in Chapter 2 The impact of actors 
equates to Williamson’s behavioural elements, and the relevance of structure 
to his environmental and surrounding concerns, including the clarity of 
property rights.  
In the same way the broad bodies of theories discussed in Chapter 3 will now 
be examined to assess the extent to which analysis of the institutional costs 
involved can usefully add to their ability to explain the sort of complex 
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interactions that define intelligence and security provision. It will argue that 
institutional costs rise, and will probably continue to do so exponentially, as 
increases in intra-community communications and bargaining interact with 
increased complexity. In the same way shifts leading to new uncertainties 
around the property rights of the actors are bound to arise. It will also engage 
with the extent to which the intelligence and security spheres are enmeshed 
in the wider world, and the impact of this on their ability to co-ordinate 
internally. Nonetheless it will suggest that recent shifts are problems of 
degree, not of a wholly new typology. This chapter will instead argue that by 
increasing the resolution at which these issues are considered, institutional 
cost analysis can add depth to the approaches discussed in Chapter 3, and 
explain why they appear to fail in some circumstances while being strong in 
very similar ones, so that a more comprehensive and inclusive explanation is 
possible.   
The first half of the Chapter will proceed in a manner that parallels that of 
Chapter 3. Sections 2 and 3 will consider how institutional cost analysis can 
inform ideas of intelligence and security scholarship generally, and the new 
institutionalist approach more specifically. Next the behaviouralist and 
bureaucratic approaches will be contrasted with institutional cost theory. 
Cooperative decision making, complexity and then theories of the 
international environment itself are the examined through the same 
institutional cost prism.     
The second half of the chapter will then be given over to a discussion of the 
methodology and case study selection used in Parts 2 and 3 to engender the 
widest possible trial of institutional cost analysis as an explanation for 
cooperative success and failure in the security and intelligence spheres given 
the limited space available. The whole will then be concluded in Section 11 
before Parts 2 and 3 move on to examine the specific cases. 
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Section 2: Intelligence and Security Scholarship and Institutional Cost 
Analysis 
In many of the reforms advocated by the intelligence and security scholars 
and practitioners that were discussed in Chapter 3, the identification of 
cooperative working was an essential element of many of the reforms 
advocated. When coupled with the subsequent divergence in their various 
policy prescriptions, this suggested that a theoretical framework that can 
account for interactive success and failure between actors, such as that of 
institutional cost analysis, could have wider application.  
The apparently contradictory policy fixes advocated by Odom and dilemmas 
examined by Betts that were discussed in Chapter 3 for example can be 
explained by considering the institutional costs experienced by those 
involved. Odom has in fact observed many of the sort of factors that make-up 
an institutional cost architecture, but as a senior practitioner, has not 
extended his narrative to provide an overarching framework. He is however 
implicitly clear that property rights matter, and that frictions in negotiation 
count. For example he argues that the DIA should cease its collection 
activities and pass them on to the appropriate 'expert' collection agency,592 
and that the CIA should become the HUMINT lead, with defence HUMINT 
under the operational control of the DCI. He even goes so far as to suggest 
that overt collection through Defense Attaches, debriefing programs and 
even interrogation should be managed by the DCI, because this would clarify 
HUMINT ownership at large. Yet he does not address the negotiating 
problems this would cause in terms of the property rights around tasking and 
product ownership.593  The lack of a more holistic framework that can deal 
with these issues thus leads to inconsistencies in his approach.  
More generally his dual advocacy of both clear lines of command and 
stovepipes of technical expertise make practical sense individually but are 
contradictory. Whilst it is inconceivable for example that each tactical level 
command could have the resources or expertise to manage the collection, 
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decryption and analysis necessary to have their own SIGINT capability,594 
without clarifying the property rights of those tactical level units to a national 
level resource difficulties and friction will necessarily ensue.595 This clarity 
need not be vested in ownership or direct control however, so long as rights 
of access are agreed and understood. This is shown by the arrangements of 
property rights to the intelligence product of the UK’s Government Security 
Head-Quarters’ (GCHQ) by the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS or MI6) and 
the Security Service (SyS or MI5) and even more conventional areas of 
government.596 Hayden's contention that the DCI’s authority emanates not 
from his formal position as the head of the intelligence community, but rather 
from his position as head of an individual part of it can also be explained by a 
consideration of the property rights involved: The DCI had clear and 
unequivocal rights to the CIA's own directorates, but only a vague authority 
over the rest of the community that overlapped that of other actors.597 As long 
as property rights are clear, they do not need to be mono-linear or 
formalised. The tension between integrated and autonomous operating 
identified by Hayden can then be considered not simply as a shifting point of 
balance, but in a more nuanced way as actors with a clear sense of the 
property rights of other participants at each functional level will be able to 
vary between the two as circumstances demand without further complex 
negotiations.   
There is a paradox between the two intelligence communities on each side of 
the Atlantic: The United States has had a legally enshrined 'intelligence 
community' since its inception in 1947, but has resisted the reality with 
individual agencies co-operating with others only fitfully, whereas the United 
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Kingdom has resisted the term, emphasised the individual independence of 
each element (even when legal recognition finally arrived during the late 
1980's and 1990's), yet has managed enviable levels of collaborative working 
over the same period.598 This has been noted by Sir David Omand and leads 
him to conclude that that there can be no ‘right’ organisational model and is 
content to note instead some ‘general characteristics’ that they might share. 
He highlights the necessity for trust, not hierarchy, as a lubricant to ease the 
inevitable increase in interactions required as he lays out a model of four 
concentric circles of functionaries.599 Despite its centrality however, the way 
trust might offset the negotiating frictions involved in linking different aspects 
of the intelligence and security function is still not an idea that is developed. 
In a similar fashion Treverton acknowledges the importance of sub-goal 
pursuits by actors within agencies, implicitly suggesting this is important to 
how different organisational forms play-out.600 Although unstated it is 
nonetheless clear that in both their views the property rights of actors and 
how they behave together is as important as how they are organised.  
Both Treverton and Betts are also concerned by the increased levels of 
horizontal engagement between intelligence providers and security delivery, 
as well as the need for public and political support.601 Information costs are 
thus key to them both. There is a shift from too little information to an excess 
of it,
602
 a quantitative increase in the number of communications, a qualitative 
difficulty of having them understood across the varied 'languages' used by 
different actors.603 There is also an inbuilt asymmetry of information holdings 
between intelligence providers and consumers, as well as between both of 
them and the 'end-consumers' of security, the public, that can hinder 
agreements. Bett’s discussion of unwelcome strategic estimates, and the 
different analysis that is likely from either military or civilian intelligence 
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professionals can evidence this disparity.604 Information costs must therefore 
be treated not only as a matter of efficiency, but also as part of the 
negotiating problem, as it is in the institutional costs impact framework. 
Treverton, like Odom, implicitly seeks a low institutional route to managing 
the dramatic increases in information and consumers by avoiding stovepipes, 
and putting consumers, analysts and sources all together.605 However this 
leads to an unresolved tension with the increased complexity that results.     
Treverton is nonetheless concerned with the environmental conditions of 
both complexity606 and uncertainty (his discontinuous cascades of 
effects).607A principle advantage of his approach is that it (implicitly) lowers 
institutional costs by removing vested interest in a pre-decided judgment, and 
of frictions at the intelligence and policy interface. Yet the "... unified, 
explanatory, consensual understanding about the world..." that 
"organizational sense-making" theory demands608 is at odds with the sub-
goal pursuit of most agencies and actors, just as his solution to the 
information problem is at odds with his views on complexity. In each case 
although Treverton et al identify the same issues that constitute the 
institutional they do not address their interaction, so that contradictions 
emerge.  
Davies also recognises the problem of information costs in a complex 
environment, citing different understandings of what intelligence itself is 
within the United States community context. This adds to the problem of 
different holdings of information by actors, mandated by both specialisation 
and secrecy, that result in an apparently insoluble interagency coordination 
problem that is too complex to be properly addressed.609 He also shares the 
concern with 'language' costs observed in US scholars. In their open letter to 
the UK's 'Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre' (DCDC), Davies and 
Gustafson cite the mismatch between civil and military understandings of 
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such critical areas as the nature of the 'strategic' realm, and whether it is 
geographically or temporally delineated.610 In their view, different 
understandings as well as different information holdings impact on how 
successfully different elements of a community can interrelate, complicating 
negotiations between them.  
Despite such complications Davies is clear that such negotiations must occur 
for any intelligence and security system to be coordinated. In the UK (which 
is generally better at holistic collaboration) the unfortunate history of imagery 
intelligence is used by Davies to show how hard it is for an agency such as 
JARIC611 to serve two masters, in this case the national community and its 
military paymasters.612 In the United States he demonstrates that the 
problem is more prevalent, with similar problems over DoD assets that are 
part of the national system, as well as organisations like the FBI, whose 
loyalties are strained across their dual requirement to be both law enforcers 
and intelligence gatherers.613 Although unstated Davies is clear that in both 
cases the use of resources must be negotiated whatever organisational form 
is actually used, and property rights clarity will be central to its efficacy. 
Nonetheless Davies is unambiguous in his view that national intelligence 
resources on both sides of the Atlantic must be handled by national entities, 
not sublimated into lower level or parallel pursuits, implicitly arguing that this 
produces a sub-goal orientation by actors suffering a toxic combination of 
bounded rationality and self-serving bias in an uncertain environment, which 
is deleterious to the national role. Yet he also argues persuasively that the 
CIA could usefully be broken up into an SIS style National Clandestine 
Service, with its analytic functions passing to, for example, the State 
Department in the same way the UK's F&CO fulfil the bulk of the analytic 
function for SIS.614 At the same time he is aware that no reform initiative 
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based on direction from a 'monocratic hierarchy' can achieve more than 
perfunctory compliance.615 Like the scholars discussed above, Davies has 
identified many of the constituent parts of the institutional costs impact 
framework as impacting on particular aspects or instances of coordination 
and cooperation in the intelligence and security communities of each nation 
but has not gone so far as to develop an overarching theoretical framework 
to contain them. 
Section 3: Institutional Costs, Intelligence and Security Cooperation, 
and the Problem of Collegiality and New Institutionalism 
The new institutionalist approach also incorporates many of the individual 
elements developed as Williamson's original transaction cost organisational 
failures model so there is significant overlap between new Institutionalist and 
microeconomic conclusions.616 Indeed, as Chapter 3 observed, Zegart sees 
transaction cost economics and classic new institutional theory as almost 
synonymous, although her treatment of this is only superficial.617 For Zegart, 
it is nonetheless these same factors that are the root cause of poor 
community design and adaption in the United States.618  
However, just as Williamson’s organisational failures framework needs to be 
adapted to the institutional cost impact framework for the use in the 
intelligence and security sphere, Zegart has found that conventional new 
institutionalist theory was inadequate to the foreign policy realm in which 
most intelligence or security questions lie, being better suited to the domestic 
policy sphere.619 This shortfall can be addressed by the analysis developed 
here because it links the internal issues on which she concentrates with 
wider environmental aspects.  
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It is external uncertainties that ensure there can be no one perfect structure 
to address all circumstances. The different transaction costs inherent in each 
mean that the contracting issues which are the heart of institutional costs are 
significantly different for those trying to influence foreign, rather than 
domestic, policy. Zegart is concerned by the one-sided nature of information 
holdings of the President over Congress, for example, but is also aware they 
give the Executive much more freedom to act unilaterally.620 Institutional 
costs from negotiating and implementing policies are therefore much lower 
and action potentially much quicker, which is often of great advantage as the 
pace of decision making required during the Cuban missile crisis amply 
demonstrates.621  Conversely the resultant lack of effective oversight can 
lead to foreign policy disasters like the Iran-Contra affair where, arguably, 
external scrutiny would have moderated Executive branch activity.622 
However she also observes that it is the incentive schemes for members of 
Congress that make intrusive oversight a costly pursuit with little obvious 
return (aside from in exceptional cases623). Property rights around foreign 
policy responsibilities are also more opaque than even Zegart demonstrates. 
A 1992 report by the General Accounting Office for the House of 
Representatives concluded that National Security Directives contain foreign 
or military policy making guidance not specific instructions but "... do not 
appear to be issued under statutory authority" so that even the legal positions 
are unclear.624 This combines with the inherent secrecy in intelligence and 
security activity and impacts on the institutional cost in the more immediate 
external environment. The imbalance of information ensures foreign policy 
interest groups are few and relatively recent. Even within the operational 
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agencies charged with providing intelligence and security information costs 
are a perennial problem: almost every major review, particularly those 
initiated to examine the causes of an intelligence failures, 625 have concluded 
that information sharing has been an issue and needed addressing in some 
way or other. Given the cachet that comes with having secret information 
when others do not, this seems unlikely to change.626 Even the FBI’s own 
strategic review, in typically understated fashion noted that “...historically, the 
challenge has been to share this information effectively within and outside 
the FBI”.627 In the intelligence and security spheres information costs are thus 
not isolated as a friction in their own right, but rather are fulcrum about which 
other issues play as the diagrammatic model developed in Chapter 2 
demonstrated.   
In Zegart's view, national security and intelligence bodies must exist with 
other departments, agencies and bodies in a more ‘tightly knit’ way than their 
domestic counterparts. Asset specificity produces institutional costs through 
the degree of “asset cospecialization” so that the utility of one agencies work 
depends on that of another, which can produce hold-up problems.628 One 
agency may be hostage to the machinations or inefficiencies of another. 
These costs have to be assessed against those introduced by overlapping 
capabilities and the resultant duplication of effort and loss of property rights 
clarity if an agency chooses to become less asset specific and bring a 
function in-house.  
It is here that Zegart departs from Williamson's transaction costs model. She 
argues that the avoidance strategies suited to the private sector that offset 
the hold-up problem, such as vertical integration, more complete contracts 
and signalling commitment, are not applicable to the security and intelligence 
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spheres.629 The State Department cannot, for example, buy-out the Central 
Intelligence Agency if unhappy with its product, and certainly most attempts 
at this sort of vertical integration within the community have been 
problematic.630 Nonetheless agencies and departments do bring functions in 
house when they feel the need. This has been demonstrated by the New 
York Police's (NYPD's) paralleling of FBI's programs post 9/11.631 
Furthermore contracting is often as complete as the uncertainties of the 
environment allow, indeed overly rigid contracting is as often the problem in 
the US case. The establishing of probity, and signalling commitment to a 
course of action once it has been agreed, are also very much part of the UK's 
strategy for security and intelligence cooperative working (as Part 2 to this 
thesis discusses) even if it is less evident in the US case examined by 
Zegart. Despite the domestic/foreign division that Zegart notes, the model 
does still have general applicability to those spheres if applied holistically. 
That vertical integration has failed does not, for example, detract from the 
fact that it has been attempted, or explain the motivations of those 
introducing it.  
The rigour of this aspect of the new institutionalist model and its relationship 
with transaction cost approaches has been established in the private sector. 
Jane Lu contrasted the usefulness of Walter Powell and Paul DiMaggio’s 
theory against the Transaction Cost model in predicting the entry mode 
choices of over one thousand Japanese companies as they sought to invest 
into Western Countries. It concluded that the two models complimented each 
other and that the empirical data supported the hypothesis that both intra and 
inter mimetic isomorphism were strong factors in entry mode choice.632 This 
study is useful not only for the extent of its quantitative data but also because 
the Japanese companies were, like their security sector equivalent the 
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Department for Homeland Security which is examined in Chapter 6, cultural 
and institutional outsiders at the outset so that parallels can be drawn.633 
Where property rights overlap there is an ‘opportunity cost’ to the tasks 
undertaken so that any function ascribed to one agency will reduce the 
functionality of its ‘competitor’ agencies. This was the case in the creation of 
the Department for homeland Security which was conceived to be “revenue-
neutral”, so that financing became a ‘zero sum’ competition.634 In such 
circumstances it is no surprise that established organisations behave as 
Zegart’s model predicts. Despite being staffed by talented people, they did 
not manage, as the Silberman Robb Commission put it “..... to escape the 
iron laws of bureaucratic behaviour” but instead have developed “... self-
reinforcing, risk averse cultures that take outside advice badly”. 635 This is the 
'iron cage' of isomorphic behaviour described by Powell and DiMaggio that 
develops in the face of "... resource centralisation, goal ambiguity and 
technical uncertainty".636 Despite the twin exogenous shocks of 9/11 and the 
invasion of Iraq based on flawed intelligence assessments, the Silberman 
Robb Commission found bureaucratic adaption hard to implement, and the 
high institutional costs involved in that adaption can be seen to be a root 
cause of that difficulty.  
Although Zegart is concentrating on the United States community, the factors 
She identifies also have relevance in the United Kingdom. It is how the 
factors play-out that can be distinct. Most importantly she demonstrates how 
the new Institutionalist theory can address the problem of intelligence and 
security issues falling in the gap between previous theories of either foreign 
or domestic policy analysis. Indeed She notes that although transaction cost 
analysis has been usefully employed in the domestic arena it has not been 
used in areas that fall under foreign policy.637  Just as neoclassical realism 
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incorporates both the internal and external factors whose interactions are at 
the centre of institutional cost theory, but emphasises the external 
environment, so new institutional does the same but emphasises the internal 
dynamics. Yet different factors will rise or fall in importance in specific 
circumstances and this needs to be accounted for. 
Section 4: The Behaviouralist Perspective and Institutional Cost 
Analysis 
The behaviouralist tradition examined in the previous chapter, and its 
identification of the limitations in neoclassical economics was, in many ways 
the forerunner to Williamson's transactional cost theory, and thus the 
institutional costs impact framework for security and intelligence. In particular 
Cyert, Simon and Trow questioned the ability of classical economics to 
properly describe decision making in a large organisation in a complex 
environment; arguing that the assumption of a given problem that boasts a 
given set of alternate reactive courses of action, each with a particular set of 
consequences, is too simplistic. Nor did they accept that the decision maker 
could then choose amongst them based on a simple process of utility 
maximisation, even in a firm where monetary profit would generally be 
regarded as the purpose of all activity.638 It is Williamson's transaction cost 
analysis that can provide the linkage between the methodological divergence 
between the 'maximisers' of economists and the 'satisficers' of the 
behaviouralist tradition.639   
It was Williamson's use of microeconomic theory, and his inclusion of factors 
such as complexity uncertainty and atmosphere, that not only explained why 
the behaviour they observed occurred, but also allowed the factors to be 
simultaneously modelled to the extent that some degree of predictive power 
around such interactions resulted. Indeed the distinction that Cyert et al make 
between programmed (that is repetitive and pre-defined) and non-
programmed (strategic, future based and ill-defined) decision making 
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requirements, and the resultant applicability or otherwise of conventional 
economic modelling to each, is implicitly based on the transactional costs 
involved in each case, although they refer to the degree of 'search' a 
particular decision will require.640 Where Cyert, Simon et al finished by 
highlighting the question, transaction cost economics provided the answer; 
an answer well suited to the decision making and organisational make-up of 
intelligence and security provision in a complex environment of asymmetric 
information.641 These are the non-programmed areas that boast high and 
thus very relevant institutional costs.         
The rationality that drives these non-programmed decisions, where further 
negotiating will be required, is a central assumption of the economic model, 
and an intimate element of any behavioural explanation, but it can vary 
across different levels and around different conceptions of ‘self-interest’. 
Police officers like to make arrests, soldiers to win battles, and diplomats to 
reach an understanding. Yet a collective goal or maximand, to which each 
are rationally inclined, is usually taken as understood, and as importantly in 
the intelligence and security spheres, as shared. This perception, and how it 
is managed, is in fact a non-trivial variable.642  
There are implications too from behaviouralist conclusions on firms’ 
organisational goals. Cyert and March differentiate between their long-run 
and short-run findings.643 There are therefore different maximands 
associated with each. Long-run goals are constantly altered through shifts in 
coalition structure and the bargaining positions of its members, institutional 
costs are likely to be higher and prediction more difficult. On the other hand, 
the short-run or operational level has more clearly identifiable goals available 
to participants so that their pursuit is easier because institutional costs are 
lower. There are clear parallels with the different cooperative experiences 
across the same agencies but at different levels, and one can find examples 
of good cooperation in the short-run (or operational tactical levels) even 
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between elements of the United States intelligence community that are 
apparently renowned rivals: The eventual success of the operation that lead 
to the killing of Osama Bin Laden and a significant haul of intelligence was as 
a result of successful co-operation between the National Security Agency 
monitoring communications, Central Intelligence Agency assets collecting 
and developing intelligence, Federal Bureau of Investigation officers passing 
on intelligence retrieval techniques to the marines on the ground, and the 
Department of Defense's Navy Seals team that actually conducted the raid 
and seized the intelligence.644 Each element performed a specific and clear 
role according to their actual expertise. This allowed a lower level of 
institutional frictions thanks to clear goals and distinctive property right 
allocations amongst the actors involved, leading to a successful joint-
working. 
Recent analysis of defence reform in the United Kingdom supports this 
contention; tactical and operational reform has been dynamic and guided by 
observed need rather than path dependency, but strategic level reform has 
"... reached a state of organisational, bureaucratic and intellectual decay".645 
In the former institutional costs are relatively low but in the latter both 
negotiating costs and uncertainty ensure they are significantly higher. Even 
the major shift in requirements from the defence sector has been inadequate 
to make incurring the costs worthwhile. At the same time the success of a 
particular organisational make-up of a firm in achieving any institutional goal 
is peculiar to the specific circumstances in which it finds itself at a given point 
in time. The crucial factor is therefore the level of friction interfering with any 
adjustments required. High levels of friction may prevent flawed decisions 
just as easily as low ones might permit good ones.  
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This is evidenced by Cyert and March's own key characteristics of 
organisational choice and control.646 The first is essentially an 
acknowledgement of the central relevance of bargaining and all four implicitly 
involve the frictions and difficulties within the process itself. One can 
recognise in them Williamsons' concern with 'contact' costs, the cost of 
negotiating new 'contracts' and how these encourage the use of near-fit 
existing solutions, particularly around the machinery for 'control'.647 It follows 
that these frictions could be further unpacked for security or intelligence 
organisations by reference to the institutional cost impact framework 
developed here. 
This increased explanatory power may be made clear by a cursory 
examination of the three ideas that Cyert and March concluded were at the 
core of a behavioural theory of a firm. The first, the bounded rationality of 
actors, is central to both Williamson's organisational failures framework and 
the institutional cost impact framework developed here.  It arguably 
represents the greatest flaw of neoclassical economics, with its assumptions 
of perfect information and calculation, in explaining real behaviour. However 
by considering bounded rationality not only as an issue in its own right, but 
also in conjunction with environmental factors such as uncertainty, 
complexity, or the specificity or frequency attending a particular problem. 
Viewing these combinations through the prism of not only a dearth of 
information, but also an inequality of its distribution, this sort of 
microeconomic consideration can take behavioural considerations much 
further.  
Their second core feature is imperfect environmental matching. Like bounded 
rationality, this admits the imperfections excluded by neoclassical theory, 
wherein form follows requirement perfectly and near instantaneously, with 
less well evolved approaches dying out through competitive pressure. It 
acknowledges that the form chosen will in fact be shaped by history as much 
as efficiency, and subject to numerous internal and external influences. 
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Institutional cost analysis can not only include all these factors holistically, but 
will allow their interaction to be regarded with finer granularity. Finally, Cyert 
and March note the importance of the dynamic nature of the processes 
involved: These include unresolved conflict between multiple actors with 
conflicting interests, within firms as well as between them, that cannot be fully 
settled through 'complete' contracting (an unachievable ambition in the face 
of either uncertainty or complexity). Furthermore these conflicts do not exist 
in a moment of time, or ever achieve a state of equilibrium. Rather the 
negotiated settlement of one issue will have repercussions (in terms of 
favours owed or 'precedent') for future negotiations. 648 Property rights clarity, 
atmosphere, and the degree to which the actors involved share a sense of 
the same maximand will all inform outcomes in this area.  
The focus by Thomas Schelling on micro level behaviour as a determinant in 
economic and social action outcomes that were discussed in the previous 
chapter means that there is a significant cross-over between his and 
Williamson's approaches. Both use a high level of resolution to explain 
complex phenomena, although Schelling focuses on numerical aggregation 
whereas Williamson is more concerned with the different type of factors that 
conjoin to form macro level outcomes.  
Schelling identifies the same sorts of problems as Williamson; the bounded 
rationality of some actors, the asymmetry of information holdings, and the 
mis-incentivisation of actors. He also concludes that any solution would need 
to be based at an organisational level, in formal and informal structure and 
constraints.649 Ironically he thus provides a strong argument for the use of 
microeconomic theory to deconstruct the sort of social phenomenon 
observed in a governments aggregate production of a good, apparently 
contradicting his own believe that economics is "... a large and important 
special case rather than a model for all social phenomena ”.650 In 
demonstrating that individual motives could be subsumed into cooperative 
approaches that improved utility overall, even when actors were simply 
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rational as in game theory, Schelling also implied that the factors affecting 
the efficacy of that cooperation, the institutional costs, will be critical. The 
ease and reliability through which individual actors can form coalitions will 
have a direct bearing on whether decisions emanating from a collective body 
like an intelligence and security community act to maximise their overall 
utility, or that instead they are incentivised to act by disparate elements 
pursuing individual goal maximisation to the detriment of the whole. 
As Section 4 of Chapter 3 explained, implicit in this is the idea that the merits 
of forming coalitions should be the same for both the United States and 
United Kingdom's intelligence and security communities. Schelling's theory 
stops short of predicting in what circumstances a viable coalition is 
achievable (k in Figure 3.1), although he does suggest some issues that will 
effect it anecdotally. This is the point of entry for institutional cost analysis. 
The ease of the actors’ ability to contact, contract with, and control each 
other will decide whether a coalition is viable. In the United Kingdom the 
clarity of property rights and the low institutional costs that result from the use 
of a system of committees provide an environment where trust, the lubricant 
of coalitions and agreement, can thrive. 651 In the United States however, 
overlapping property rights and difficulties with community level orchestration 
generate frictions that create the competitive culture observed by Davies,652 
making coalitions significantly harder to create or sustain. Furthermore, just 
as the successful history of coalition assists British officials negotiate the 
next; every failed attempt to form one in the United States will bequeath 
higher institutional costs for the next attempt. This creates a vicious circle 
that negatively affects attempts at re-organisation within the community. 
Institutional cost analysis can therefore provide an explanation for the factors 
observed by Schelling.       
The behaviouralist approach thus provides a useful insight into some of the 
elements  that inform cooperative success and failure, and indicate that 
although intelligence communities work at the national level it is not macro 
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but micro economics, and a consideration of the detail of exchanges, which 
provide the most insight. However the introduction of the additional factors 
that inform transaction cost modelling, and in particular the effects of their 
interaction as described by the institutional costs impact framework 
developed for application to an intelligence community, is required if a 
complete explanation is to be achieved.  
Section 5: The Bureaucratic Perspective and Institutional Cost Analysis 
Section 5 of Chapter 3 examined how the rigidity of bureaucratic structures 
interacts with a notoriously uncertain function like the security and 
intelligence provision. This section will go on to consider how institutional 
cost analysis can add depth to a bureaucratic analysis of collaboration within 
those functions. 
John Marini noted that “In a constitutional system, the powers of the state are 
thought to be limited; in the administrative state only resources are limited. In 
a constitutional regime, the most important political questions are those of 
principle or public right; in the administrative state they revolve around money 
and finance.”653 The interactions within that 'administrative state' will 
therefore define the extent to which the bureaucracy adapts (or not) to the 
will of its political masters, and thus define its organisational fitness. Indeed it 
was the gradual but inevitable decrease in adaptability that lead to Durkheim 
shifting his focus from the sort of individualistic activity described in the 
section above to a preoccupation with “the noncontractual elements of 
contract”;654 another constituent part of institutional cost analysis. 
This progression towards more fixed routines and a regulatory framework is 
the same process that establishes the institutional costs that are often first a 
safeguard, but later become a problem as circumstances change during 
subsequent transactions. As has been demonstrated in the previous two 
chapters, in the face of uncertainty and complexity the point of balance 
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between the two is neither fixed nor mono-dimensional. In fixing an objective 
at one point in time, the crystallisation of the bureaucracy can ensure that 
opportunistic and self-interested actors within it are unable to manipulate its 
purpose to their own advantage. Unfortunately these same costs can also 
prevent necessary adaption to new threats in the external environment, and 
often the difference is entirely subjective.  
In the previous chapter Robert Merton's argument that the very efficiency of 
the bureaucracy could be counter-productive. Put into institutional cost terms, 
in the general case categorisation of problems reduces costs by treating 
issues within designated criteria as the same so that new solutions need not 
be sought. In more individualistic cases the costs of searching outside normal 
procedures has the additionally desirable effect of restraining an ill-
considered “... passage of “impulse into action”.655 However the very 
precision and reliability of bureaucratic response discussed as a positive by 
Weber as a method of reducing frictions and costs, thus increasing efficiency, 
can in only slightly different circumstances have the polar opposite effect. 
This is a result of both “trained incapacity” and “occupational psychosis”, both 
of which corrupt Weber’s efficiency effect and increase costs. 
The rigidities of Merton are of course synonymous with the institutional costs 
associated with asset specificity.  This has long been one of the problems in 
integrating the United States agencies into a genuine community, with 
elements exhibiting exactly the sort of informal defensive activity predicted by 
Merton.656 However rapid environmental changes in the United Kingdom 
have been known to have the same affect. For example through the Cabinet 
Office requirement for Special Branch (later Specialist Protection) officer’s to 
conduct an increasing number of ‘high risk low infrastructure’ (HiRLI) security 
operations overseas, to support the government's national security strategy 
in the post 9/11 era. These operations could not be properly accommodated 
within existing police guidelines. Left without any clear recourse, self-
interested elements of the bureaucracy turned to internal discipline 
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mechanisms so that the entire strategic leadership and much of the 
operational element were neutered for some three years while the issue was 
examined. No discipline cases resulted but, in the manner described as 
“trained incapacity” by Merton, the ability to deliver on the original (core) 
goals of the organisation was substantially damaged.657 The 'vested interests' 
on each side were not however based in the 'differential advantage' of each 
that change might force, but were rooted in the different cultural identities 
with which they were associated, as Merton had predicted.658  
Perhaps the most important aspect of Merton's work with respect to 
cooperation in intelligence and security is that he linked the environmental 
issues of complexity and uncertainty with the behavioural element of 
bounded rationality. Unintended consequences were caused "...by the 
interplay of forces and circumstances which are so complex and numerous 
that prediction of them is quite beyond our reach" which has further 
repercussions for intelligence or security delivery: Firstly, that the realities of 
life require confident action despite incomplete information, so that not all 
consequences can be predicted.659 The classic example of this phenomena 
is the Central Intelligence Agency's arming of the Afghanistan Mujahedeen 
(via the Pakistani intelligence service) in the 1980's to subvert Russian 
expansion, but it is no less prevalent in simpler tactical scenarios. Moreover, 
because costs rise in a complex and uncertain environment, the pursuit of 
ever-more information has a diminishing return.  
This can be represented diagrammatically (Figure 4.1)660 for even a simple 
'either/or' choice. In the worst case the pursuit of certainty, which in a 
complex and uncertain world can never be achieved, precludes any action at 
all. More usually a bureaucracy will become 'risk-averse' in the face of actual 
or potential criticism to some degree, as was experienced within the Central 
                                                                   
657
 P3.(Regarding ‘Operation Shobusa’). 
658
 Merton, "Bureaucratic Structure and Personality."565 
659
 "The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action." 900.   
660
 Source of diagram: Own design. 
211 
 
Intelligence Agency in the post 'Church Committee' era.661 Behaviour and 
environment are therefore inter-related and should be considered as such.   
Uncertainty can also reinforce the problem of rigidity of habit previously 
discussed. A good outcome on the first time a stratagem is used does not 
mean that this will be the case on subsequent occasions, in similar (but never 
identical) situations. Uncertainty makes it very hard for an actor to recognise 
when this might be the case. 
 
Despite what amounts to an extensive list of issues that impact on outcomes 
neither Parsons nor Merton address these interactions as a holistic problem 
in any operable way. Merton himself states "... that a frequent source of 
misunderstanding will be eliminated at the outset if it is realised that the 
factors involved in unanticipated consequences are no more than that, so 
that "... none... serves by itself to explain any concrete case."662 He thus 
makes it clear that uncertainty, with all its many facets, does not alone 
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explain the outcomes observed, so that other 'factors' must be included. This 
gauntlet is subsequently picked up by Williamson and the transaction cost 
school. The rigidity, formalism and ritualism referred to by Merton, whether 
designed to offset uncertainty or not, are all realised in higher institutional 
costs. They will be lowest where the circumstances are closest to 'routine' in 
that they most closely replicate those that first informed the organisational 
design, and become higher as the disparity from that 'routine' increases. It is 
for this reason that changes to the bureaucracy, or to its modus operandi, 
only occur when the need to do so is so great that it outweighs these 
obstructive tendencies, and a tipping point is reached.  
Institutional costs analysis predicts that the nature of information holdings will 
be decisive in establishing the nature and efficacy of the organisational form 
used. There is a tension between the merits and problems of both 'push' and 
'pull' systems. In a push system the operational side is encouraged to use its 
better knowledge of what intelligence is actually available, and what security 
problems are emerging, to act in an entrepreneurial fashion and 'push' 
aspects of its services on policy makers (who may be ill-informed about 
both).663 Conversely policy  and decision makers may prefer a pull 
architecture which allows them to use their better knowledge of what is 
actually required for the agenda on which they are working.664  
There are costs associated with both. In the former case an intelligence or 
security supplier may be motivated to use their relatively high information 
holdings and the bounded rationality of their consumer to both oversupply 
product and over emphasise the need for it in the same way as the bureau 
maximiser discussed below.665 They may as a result be incentivised to 
supply greater quantities of less useful information.666 However there are 
costs engendered by a 'pull' system too. It may lead to types and levels of 
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demand that cannot be properly met; the "British intelligence cacophony" 
referred to by Davies, with different departments also pursuing sub-goals as 
they try to get their own issues prioritised.667 The problem of opportunistic 
actors using an information advantage is therefore not avoided, but only 
moved, and because of the number of potential consumers this can 
potentially lead to a 'tragedy of the commons' scenario where no consumer is 
properly serviced.668 Furthermore requirements imposed from above on 
collection operations have a tendency to lead to much higher institutional 
costs as a "... 'bureaucratic nightmare' of additional and redundant 
administrative steps.." are introduced.669 The institutional costs inherent in 
each approach have lead the UK to adopt a pragmatic compromise that tries 
to maximise the information holdings of each group. For example there exists 
a formal requirements system for intelligence providers, laid down by the JIC 
and approved by ministers which provides strategic direction670 and 
legitimacy.671 In addition however an informal process of 'interpretation' exists 
within the agencies themselves intended to allow utilisation of their superior 
information holdings in the operational sphere. Interpretation may however 
be very broad indeed. In the case of SIS Davies has suggested that this can 
extend beyond the simple use of subject matter expertise, so that 
'Requirements Officers' have acted on behalf of consumers in areas they (the 
consumers) "... cannot go".672 The comments of the then head of SIS to the 
ISC that he did not feel bound by the requirements issued by the JIC may be 
regarded as symptomatic of that freedom.673 In this way the UK has 
attempted to maximise specialisation whilst minimising the risk of actors 
using their asymmetric information holdings to their own advantage by 
lowering other negotiating costs, but at the risk of diminishing their control.      
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Elements of the debate between 'push' and 'pull' organisational forms are 
apparent in the dichotomy (observed in Section 5 of Chapter 3) between the 
budget maximising model developed by William Niskanen in the US and the 
bureau shaping model of Patrick Dunleavy in the UK:  Like institutional costs 
analysis, Niskanen's argument regards asymmetric information as central. 
Because the bureau is in a bilateral monopoly situation it can control 
knowledge on “costs and capabilities”674 from its governmental sponsor. 
However, although the bureau may indeed be in a strong monopolist's 
position, the same need not necessarily be true of the bureaucrat who leads 
it. He or she is vulnerable to replacement in the event of unsatisfactory 
performance. The macro approach of Niskanen therefore needs to be 
tempered by the sort of micro-level considerations of individual utility 
discussed by behaviouralists, but because they impact on each other they 
must be assessed in conjunction with each other.   
Consider again the oversupply problem of a 'push' architecture: Breton and 
Wintrobe show that although it is theoretically possible for the bureau to 
oversupply if it is a genuine monopoly, the disequilibrium that results would 
ensure political consequences. These would make the position untenable so 
that oversupply is not a realistic strategy. They argue that it is not the 
monopoly of supply, but the loss of control due to asymmetry of information 
between the two parties that actually effects outcomes.
675
 However the 
counter strategies available to a consumer to offset this problem all come at 
a cost. It is the cost of those control measures (the institutional costs) relative 
to the costs of the inefficiencies of the bureau that will therefore be crucial.676  
In the hypothetical case depicted in Figure 4.2,677 the marginal benefit an 
agency's governmental sponsor or consumer will achieve by operating 
control mechanisms at different levels (so that resources are either deployed 
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exclusively in their best interest, or do not need to be passed onto the agency 
at all) is represented by the line CD. AB represents the costs of employing 
those controls, so a governing body will have an interest in controlling their 
bureaucrats only up until the costs and benefits are equal, at point Y. The 
institutional costs around deploying the control measures mean that there is 
an area XYD (shown here in green) that it is in the interests of the bureau to 
maximise their budget within, whilst it is not in the interests of the governing 
body to control them.  
 
How those institutional costs are arrived at is thus the missing dimension to 
Niskanen’s model. Breton and Wintrobe conclude that, as the government 
body can know the bureaus actual costs but not how efficient it is, then the 
best strategy for the bureau would be to not operate efficiently but rather to 
shift their actual cost curve upwards until it is identical to the sponsors 
marginal valuation curve. 678  
Breton and Wintrobe draw two further conclusions from their analysis that are 
particularly pertinent to the intelligence and security spheres: Firstly that 
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complexity is an issue that affects the sponsor’s enthusiasm for control 
measures. Complex, non-routine, tasks like intelligence and security 
provision will attract higher levels of control than routine ones, because the 
sponsors needs from such an organisation would be greater.679 This does not 
however undermine the argument above, it merely shifts the curves. 
Secondly that a bureaucrats opportunistic behaviour in pursuing budget 
maximisation is more likely to be a factor in areas where the substitutability of 
leading bureaucrats is limited; those perceived by sponsors as unresponsive 
cannot be easily moved on. They cite military organisations but of course the 
same would apply in any of the specialised and rarefied areas of intelligence, 
where very particular knowledge and security clearances limit a bureaucrat’s 
vulnerability to being easily replaced.680 Both are thus issues that are based 
on the relative levels of institutional costs sponsors and bureaucrats are likely 
to experience.       
It is worth noting that one of Niskanen’s resulting policy prescriptions, that 
more competition should be introduced into public sector delivery, is of 
course at odds with the institutional cost argument because such competition 
is likely to obscure the clarity of property rights. Experience has shown that 
where competition has been introduced within the security and intelligence 
domains it has either failed, as in the case of the Department of Homeland 
Security’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis, which now exists as a mere 
conduit of information rather than as the central pillar of domestic security 
envisaged in President George W. Bush’s Executive Order 13228, or has 
resulted in constant ‘turf-wars’ as each side try to enforce their supremacy, 
as has been the case with the competition between Department of Defence’s 
Human intelligence collection and the Central Intelligence Agencies 
Clandestine Service. Competition in the in provision of analysed intelligence, 
according to General Odom, generates "... more heat than light".681   The 
former for example extended the definition of ‘”preparation of the battlefield” 
to “preparation of the environment” to massively increase the breadth of their 
‘legitimate’ operations far outside what are conventionally regarded as war 
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zones.682 Competition can thus motivate bureaucrats to try and enlarge their 
relative authority, so that additional institutional costs are incurred in 
negotiating new settlements. Whether this actually occurs will be decided by 
whether this is worth their while when the benefits are compared with the 
institutional costs.  
In his response to the Breton and Wintrobe critique Niskanen also used what 
can be regarded as a  derivative of the institutional cost argument, extending 
their analysis to include the fact that legislators (in the United States case) 
could not be relied upon to reflect the majority of voters simple preference for 
the optimum output and the lowest cost, but would be influenced by their own 
sub-goal pursuits. As legislators are inclined to sit on committees that reflect 
their constituency interests (and are normally successful in achieving their 
preferred option), it need not necessarily follow that their own goals would be 
for control measures at the level of efficiency represented by point Y above, 
but could be to the right or left of that depending on how they perceive their 
own rational self-interest is best served.683 In the United States case 
numerous distinct budget lines within the security and intelligence areas have 
to be approved independently of each other by different committees, 
depending on the subject matter. This introduces an extra tier of transactions, 
and therefore transaction costs, which exacerbates the potential for 
opportunistic behaviour.
684
 Institutional costs of various sorts are thus a 
central tenet of how Niskanen’s budget maximising model actually functions, 
and can add insight into why the model can be less successful in some 
circumstances than others. 
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Implicit in Dunleavy’s rejection of the bureau maximising model in the United 
Kingdom is an understanding of how the head of a bureau’s utility 
maximisation is inextricably linked to the level of institutional costs he or she 
faces. In turn these are linked to the organisational make-up of his or her 
sphere of responsibility; in particular the clarity of the property rights that 
variously impact on how effectively they can administer those responsibilities.  
 
To demonstrate how this might work in practise, a diagrammatic 
representation (Figure 4.3) of a bureaucrats marginal costs and benefits in 
two different organisational set-ups that is a development of Dunleavy's may 
be used.685 In the first example, given as a delivery agency configuration 
(depicted by the red line), the marginal benefits to the bureaucrat slope 
gradually away as the agency budget increases, in the second, the curve for 
a control or contracts agency (and depicted by the green line), the slope is 
steeper as the benefits the bureaucrat accrues fall-away more sharply under 
this organisational configuration. For the purposes of this argument it is the 
fact of the distinction that matters, rather than its detail, which is developed 
further in the case studies. Meanwhile, the marginal costs (represented by 
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the black line) to the bureaucrat rise steadily as his or her programme budget 
increases (up to the point where no further increase is feasible, at which point 
the costs rise vertically). 686  
The net result is that there are different points of equilibrium for each 
configuration, at X and Y respectively. In this case the senior executive will 
be incentivised to try and increase the budgetary size of his or her agency if it 
currently lies to the left, but not if it is to the right of these points. However as 
Parts 2 and 3 will show, the same logic can be applied to other choices, 
including the degree to which they are motivated to implement organisational 
reforms.   
In his counter to the Niskanen approach, Dunleavy picked up on this point 
and extended it. In differentiating between types of agency in the manner 
discussed in Chapter 3 he recognised that the leading bureaucrats of each 
were faced with different ways in which their personal utility would be 
maximised, and (implicitly) that this distinction would be a function of the 
institutional costs each faced in pursuing the various strategies open to them, 
assuming that “... these costs (in terms of the time and effort taken justifying 
a budgetary increment to sponsors, and the political and administrative risks 
attached) rise as the agency’s existing budget gets larger..”.687 His 
distinguishing between different budget types and the resultant shifts in the 
utility that senior bureaucrats experience as costs change has a particular 
resonance for modern security and intelligence cooperation: The need for 
program and super-programme budgets688 are endemic as resources move 
between different agencies during joint operations. In the UK therefore the 
issue of primacy has an impact on a senior bureaucrat's expected utility 
relative to the resources they must expend. Yet domestic security operations 
often mean they must work on one side of the divide or the other. Mutual 
                                                                   
686
This may be the point where institutional costs are so high that further expansion under the sort of 
organisational configuration then in use is counter-productive, so that a new and radically different 
approach needs to be adopted. This phenomenon is discussed further using leptokurtic curves above.  
687
 Dunleavy, "The Architecture of the British Central State, Part I: Framework for Analysis." 268 
688
 Program budgets include an agencies core and bureau budgets, together with any monies they pass 
to other agencies, whereas a super program budgets include all these and in addition any funding 
raised by other agencies over which they have control.  Discussed in Democracy, Bureaucracy and 
Public Choice: Economic Explanations in Political Science.182-200 
220 
 
tasking by all of the agencies has long been an essential part of both 
intelligence and security operations by virtue of how the communities are 
organised by discipline rather than any end product.689 Efforts to ensure that 
credit for successful operations is spread amongst them is thus an attempt to 
ensure the utility they receive is even. Because working relationships are 
temporally spread, and today's winner might be tomorrow's loser, both 
sponsors and senior bureaucrats are incentivised to ensure this is the 
case.690      
Chapter 3 described how Dunleavy demonstrates that a rational bureau 
leader will be motivated by the ease with which he or she can deliver 
whatever function their bureau is charged with. Minimising issues of contact, 
contract and control through clear roles and responsibilities and 
straightforward negotiations with others who are mutually interested in their 
success (lowering other institutional costs) will be the preferred option in 
every case. However Dunleavy adds that the welfare implications for senior 
officials cannot be known a priori.691  This is in fact only partly true as a 
detailed analysis of the institutional costs likely to be experienced by the 
bureaucrat under any particular organisational framework would provide 
some degree of predictive capability. 
The importance of property rights' clarity in deciding these relative levels of 
net utility will be demonstrated through the use of cross-cases in subsequent 
chapters, but an example from the United Kingdom can briefly make the point 
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here. This is because where institutional costs rise in the United Kingdom the 
same frictions that are observable in the US appear. Consider the confused 
property rights around the provision of imagery intelligence in the United 
Kingdom, where an unusually proprietary approach by the Ministry of 
Defence, which acts more like its trans-Atlantic counterpart in this case, has 
consistently ensured that the discipline is junior to civilian signals and human 
intelligence collection, and have declined 'single intelligence account' funding 
to ensure it remained within their bailiwick. Nonetheless imagery intelligence 
is required to inform not just defence, but also national assessments as well 
as national future requirements and priorities so that, unlike most other 
aspects of the intelligence community in Britain, poor definition of property 
rights have caused high institutional costs.692  
The use of a micro-level examination through institutional cost analysis can 
therefore demonstrate that the Niskanen/Dunleavy dichotomy detailed in 
Chapter 3 is not a matter of separate and competing theories, but rather of 
separate situations. The use of this micro-level consideration over a 
comprehensive range of internal and external factors allow institutional cost 
analysis to add depth to bureaucratic approaches by examining the factors 
that would influence a rational economic actor to react to environmental 
stimuli in any particular way. This examination can now be extended to 
consider cooperative decision making. 
Section 6: Theories of Cooperative Decision-Making and Institutional 
Cost Analysis 
Chapter 3 described how cooperation and the difficulties of negotiating the 
equivalent of a contract between two superpowers is at the root of Graham 
Allison's Essence of Decision,693 so it is unsurprising that elements of the 
institutional costs framework for security and intelligence provision are central 
to many of his arguments. Even Allison's simplest model, the conception of 
the state as a 'rational unitary actor', implicitly introduces 'costs' as a factor as 
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it discusses the usefulness of a current crisis group. In this case what was to 
become the Executive Committee of the National Security Council, (ExCom) 
was formed to reduce information costs so that the pace of the crisis could be 
managed: Incorporating the notion that an increase in 'costs' of an alternative 
will make it less likely to be chosen.694 However it is his subsequent models, 
that between them represent nascent versions of different parts of the 
institutional cost paradigm. They introduce the idea that the monoliths 
responsible for major national security decisions are actually made of 
numerous internal and differentiated ‘gears and levers’ so that large acts are 
the result of innumerable smaller actions conducted at various levels “… in 
the service of a variety of only partially compatible conceptions of national 
goals...”.695 They can thereby be seen as introducing Williamson’s conception 
of economic outcomes to international relations. 
The procedural ruts of Allison's organisational process model696 can be 
readily re-conceived as the sort of asset specific sunk costs incorporated into 
the transaction cost framework developed by Williamson. Allison's foremost 
example was the United States Air Force belief that a ‘surgical strike was 
impossible because it was outside normal procedure.697 In this case the 
asset specificity of their existing plans, coupled with an asymmetry of 
information between the air force and ExCom, can be interpreted from an 
institutional cost perspective. In this view, the inherently high costs 
incorporated in doing anything different to that which they had always done, 
and everything they had modeled their plans and enemy reaction on, meant 
that they did not even seriously contemplate the possibility of a new  type of 
action until left with no choice by their political leaders. 
Essentially Allison is arguing that the complexity of the issue, coupled with 
the bounded rationality of actors, leads to it being divided so that different 
aspects can be attended to in sequence. However this and the high search 
costs involved in seeking out solutions (linked to time constraints), means 
that any satisfactory option is accepted, rather than the best resolution being 
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sought out. Uncertainties are side-stepped by an emphasis on both short-run 
feedback and repertoires of actions. He therefore concludes that although 
organisations adapt, the costs of doing so ensure it occurs only over an 
extended period of time.698 As the former Director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency has observed when reviewing the much-later War on Terror this 
leads to a tendency to "... let the urgent drown out the important".699  Property 
rights difficulties also impact on organisational process in Allison's account: 
Deciding who was to control the U2 flight over Cuba caused a ten day delay 
in operations as both the Central Intelligence Agency and Air Force both had 
processes in place for doing so which appeared to apply to the 
circumstances in question, and both advanced their legitimate claims to the 
exclusion of the others.700 In the same way the time taken for information to 
arrive at ExCom, and for decisions to be made, was a result of the processes 
in place for less time sensitive problems, but had very real impacts during the 
crisis. The rigidity of each organisations processes impacted on time frames, 
but it also minimised other costs by ensuring the safety of "... sub-agents, 
agents and communications networks", and that analysis of data was done to 
an appropriately high standard.701   
Allison's third model, 'political bargaining', is very much centred on how 
contracts are negotiated, agreed and enforced at the level of the actors 
involved: It therefore also boasts key points of similarity with transaction 
costs analysis.702 However like institutional costs framework for security and 
intelligence, Allison feels the need to reconsider the nature of an actor's 'self-
seeking interest with guile' so that it  incudes; "... responsible men (are) 
obliged to fight for what they are convinced is right".703 The view may be less 
bleak than that espoused by both classical economists and neo-
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institutionalist observers of the intelligence and security world's (like Amy 
Zegart), but the result is just the same.704 In fact Allison notes that tensions 
can exist even within a single actor: The position of an individual on any 
given issue is itself a result of their bounded rationality coupled with the 
complexity of their own position. They have a multitude of roles; as a member 
of a collective body such as ExCom, as leader of a particular department 
(which is why he sits in the body), as a private citizen and so forth. All are 
held simultaneously so that which is dominant in addressing a particular 
issue will depend on the actor's perception of the relative importance of each 
on any particular occasion.  
The issue has implication for downward negotiation as well as upward. A 
senior bureaucrat may well believe that the wellbeing of their own 
organisation is synonymous with the national good, but the interests that 
support him or her will vary.705 If sub-levels are not convinced their leader 
acted with the correct role dominant in his or her approach then constant re-
contracting and ongoing governance costs may result. Not only will domestic 
political opposition following an announcement change the cost of a decision; 
but as decisions are in fact only way-stations to action, there are also 
significant opportunities for slippage or even reversal by sub-level actors. The 
costs of constant intrusive monitoring have to be weighed against other 
newer business, and sub-level actors can use asymmetric information 
holdings to set the costs around particular policy options in which they may 
have personal investment.706 Curiously, because perfect knowledge is not 
possible, the misperception of actors can actually lower some costs. They 
might for example erroneously perceive themselves as having agreed a 
policy that they think will do quite different things to those subsequently 
achieved. Indeed Allison suggests that many compromises are based on 
these misperceptions and that they can (like trust) act as a lubricant against 
the frictions that provoke high costs.707  
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Finally there are the costs of transmitting the information during bargaining. 
These apply internally and externally of course, but in both cases the 
problem of white noise obscuring the key message is significant. This is 
particularly the case in security cases such as the Cuban missile crisis, 
where different messages were put-out intended for different audiences (the 
American public as against the Politburo for example) but received by all. 
Each side had to not only interpret or create them with this in mind, but also 
predict what repercussions the opposition would suffer as a result of the 
wider audience. The necessity of reducing these sorts of costs resulted in the 
establishment of the 'hotline' between Chairman and President.708   
The net result is that Presidential power, or that of any other authority figure 
by extension, is viewed on a 'primus inter pares' basis. It is merely the power 
to persuade, whilst other actors "... are bound to judge his preferences in the 
light of their own responsibilities, not his".709 Complexity creates differences 
of opinion, and consensus building is therefore required. The factors involved 
in establishing such a consensus are also where core executive theory and 
institutional costs analysis overlap. For core executive theory an asymmetric 
holding of information becomes a power resource. Because of this rather 
than intelligence being a flow of information to be quickly transmitted to those 
who need, it is a bargaining tool to be eked out in exchange for some other 
advantage.
710
 The plasticity of intelligence information is therefore a factor in 
how bargaining and power relations play out, and secret information is more 
vulnerable to flexible interpretation than that which is openly available.711 
Core executive theory, as applied to the provision of intelligence and security, 
can thus be seen as an implicit version of institutional cost theory. Like the 
impact framework developed in Chapter 2 it sees uneven information 
holdings as a critical tool in the bargaining process on which outcomes are 
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based. The different experience when trying to integrate the United States’ 
intelligence community and that of the United Kingdom is rooted not in the 
fact of its diversity, as they are both diverse and share a similar range of 
potential sub-goals, but in the way interdependency and coordination is 
pursued. The ‘adversarial nature’ of United States intelligence management 
has thus best been summarised through a neo-institutionalist lens, whereas 
for the most part a more successful version of core executive activity can be 
used to represent the United Kingdom’s community.712 It is the lack of clarity 
around overlapping roles and the difficulty of negotiating a way around that 
which makes the difference.  
Martin Smith focuses on internal processes so that the behavioural elements 
of the institutional cost model are writ large, and the inter-temporal aspect of 
negotiations are captured. This is however to the detriment of uncertainty and 
external complex factors. The next two sections will therefore continue to 
parallel those of Chapter 3 by focusing on the institutional cost issues 
surrounding approaches that concentrate on external complexity and 
uncertainty.  
Section 7: Complexity, Complex Adaptive Systems, and Institutional 
Cost Analysis 
The management and minimisation of institutional costs is critical to 
outcomes where integration of different elements of any community is 
required, and the complexity involved is thus a key aspect of the 
environmental considerations used in the impact framework developed in 
Chapter 2. Indeed the disparity in size between the United Kingdom and 
United States intelligence and security communities, and how this effects 
their usefulness in any comparative analyses,713 can be re-conceived as an 
issue not of relative size but of relative complexity. Complexity theory does 
not try and explain outcomes by investigating the level at which they are 
observed, but rather assumes they will be the result of activity at multiple and 
                                                                   
712
 Philip H. J Davies, "Intelligence and the Machinery of Government Conceptualizing the 
Intelligence Community," Public Policy and Administration 25, no. 1 (2010).38-39. 
713
 See Davies, Intelligence and Government in Britain and the United States : A Comparative 
Perspective.Vol.1.4-10 
227 
 
often lower levels. Just as institutional cost analysis accepts that its different 
individual elements have to be combined to produce a meaningful analysis, 
so complexity theory regards these sub-levels of activity as reacting to 
changes in their more local environment. Overall 'order' is therefore an 
almost accidental, at best no more than partly planned, outcome.  
Complexity and uncertainty mean that standardised responses or the simple 
application of a blueprint plan will be inadequate, so that the lower level 
agents develop their own schemata which determine their actions based on 
their personal perception of a situation at any given point.714 These may be 
constrained by rules that can be more or less defined, but are nonetheless 
the product of the cognition of the agent in question. Because actors have 
autonomy "... roles and rules are negotiations and gambits...".715 With so 
much about which to negotiate, the costs of bargaining and the property 
rights of actors become critical factors in deciding how the aggregation of 
their various plans will actually play-out.        
It follows that the bounded rationality by managers mean that adjustments 
aimed at a small part of any given problem in a system will inevitably have 
unforeseen consequences for other parts of the system or over time. To 
paraphrase Augustus Comte the increasing specialisation of functionaries, or 
their specificity to use transaction cost terminology, will inevitably be 
negatively affected by the bounded rationality of those involved, when set 
within an increasingly complex undertaking, so that they lose touch with the 
primary goals.716 If managerial intervention is always based on rational but 
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bounded predictions focused on those managers own position or agency, the 
assets it already has available, and its relationship to a few near neighbours 
at best, then it is inevitable that short-term localised advantage will be sought 
and more opportunistic behaviour observed. That a system may self-organise 
more effectively than managers can decree is in any event an unpalatable 
possibility to them. The futility of attempting to predict outcomes when 
engaging with the wider environment is likely to encourage middle level 
managers to instead focus on easier and more personal or localised gains, 
using the information asymmetries between them, to indulge in internal 
political gaming. They can therefore self-impose higher institutional costs on 
the larger pursuit.717 However the bottom-up pressures that a complex 
system engenders mean that over time a system should achieve very high 
levels of fitness, and institutional costs should be constantly being minimised 
for every state of the environment with which the system has to deal.718  
In this view the system will be constantly adapting at the edge of chaos and 
this is the point at which it is most fit for the circumstances in which it is 
functioning. This is adaption is not random and is generated by variations in 
the degree different elements attract or repel each other; the level of costs 
experienced during inter-operation. However this is an unstable position and 
shifts can leave the system ill-suited to a new reality. Many organisations, 
including some of those in the intelligence and security domain, therefore 
remain some distance from any such high level of fitness. Complexity theory 
cannot however convincingly indicate whether that is because, as Anderson 
suggests, the “adaptive landscape metaphor... must not be pushed too far”719 
or because of ill-conceived interventionist actions of boundedly rational 
managers.  
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Economists' ideas of a fixed point of equilibrium is replaced by a shifting self-
organised criticality, referred to as dynamic equilibrium. This captures the 
notion that this point is not simply on the route to a stable position, but is both 
a result in itself and the platform for the next move. This is very much the 
case in the security and intelligence world.720 This leads to an apparent 
dichotomy. Where complexity theory suggests constant, albeit stochastic, 
evolution some of the explanatory power of institutional cost analysis is 
derived from its ability to explain uneven patterns of some facets of 
governmental activity, and the leptokurtic distribution that results. High 
institutional costs encourage an inertia that is only surpassed when other 
costs are so significant, and the misfit between requirement and capability so 
marked, that action must be taken. The first seems representative of the UK's 
security and intelligence effort, the second more representative of the US. In 
fact rather than being problematic it is a further example of how the higher 
resolution of institutional cost analysis can add a further tier of explanation.  
Complexity theory does not invalidate the relevance of inertia,721 but nor does 
it concern itself with why shifts occur because of its assumption of selective 
pressure driving evolution.722  By examining how inertia and evolutionary 
pressure interact and are operationalised, an institutional costs approach can 
explain the more complex patterns of cooperative adaption that are 
observable. For the smooth and gradual adaption predicted by complexity 
theory to occur in any society complicated enough to have a division of 
labour, relationships would need to be managed through contractual 
undertakings that are spontaneously agreed, infinitely flexible and open, 
short lived, and based wholly on self-interested consent. The inevitable 
institutional costs make such a situation wholly unrealistic even in 
employment contracting using low powered incentives. However it follows 
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that the lower institutional costs are, the more adaptive a network of actors 
can be, and the closer to that ideal they can get.723  
This facet of institutional costs may account in part for the different 
experiences of newly created intelligence or security bodies in the United 
Kingdom and the United States: As demonstrated in later chapters, the most 
cooperatively successful of these, such as the United Kingdom's 'Joint 
Terrorism Analysis Centre' and the United States 'Diplomatic Intelligence 
Support Centre' in the Balkans, have evolved at an operational level where 
low institutional costs have allowed interaction with the environment to direct 
co-evolution with it. The autonomy allowed both to adapt its products to meet 
the needs of the situation, and gradually clarify their ‘property rights’ to the 
general satisfaction of all, so that they are seen as a government-wide 
resource.724 Conversely in the United States a Presidential Executive 
Order,725 attempting to enforce the status of the Department for Homeland 
Security within the intelligence and security sphere was met with antipathy 
and resistance, even from those placed within it. Indeed even some of its 
component organisations simply did not engage with the new parent body in 
any meaningful way, instead emphasising the property rights of the 
redundant organisational form that had gone before.726  
The relevance of the interaction between complexity and institutional costs to 
cooperative working in the intelligence and security communities can be 
demonstrated by the impact of the work of the CIA's Calvin Andrus. He 
explicitly discounted reorganisation per se in favour of significant changes in 
management style that amounted to the implementation of a wholly new 
culture across the intelligence community; arguably a far more ambitious 
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undertaking.727 His work lead to the introduction of the 'Intellipedia' 
intelligence sharing platform across the US community,728 but different levels 
of acceptance have meant that its usage varies.729 In Andrus's opinion 
information holdings are an integral part of both the problem and the solution, 
just as it is in the institutional costs paradigm. His argument is that by 
minimising information asymmetry across the community both vertically and 
horizontally, and within and between agencies, the costs associated with 
uncertainty and complexity (an inherent aspect of both intelligence and 
security work) can be mitigated. Ironically of course it is the behavioural side 
of the institutional cost impact framework that is likely to hinder 
implementation of any such approach. The probity, bounded rationality and 
opportunistic tendencies of rationally self-interested tiers of management are 
likely to baulk at the apparent loss of control that complex adaptive solutions 
imply.730 
Tellingly complexity in the new international environment after World War 2 
was a primary driver in leading the United States to form the National 
Security Council and its staff, concluding that the existing regime of creative 
chaos and ad hoc management was no longer adequate. However other 
drivers included co-ordination problems between the (then) departments of 
the Army, Navy and State, and the increasing inter-departmental 
resentments from those excluded from any particular discussion, as well as a 
personal difference in style between President’s Roosevelt and Truman.731 
Clearly complexity alone does not explain every aspect of such 
developments, and the more internal considerations additionally permitted by 
institutional cost analysis are also needed. However the interaction of 
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institutional costs and more top-down views of the international environment 
must also be examined for their impact on collaboration and these will be 
engaged with in the next section.  
Section 8: Institutional Costs, Security and Intelligence Cooperation 
and Theories of The International Environment 
Chapter 3 to this thesis established how neoclassical realism opened the 
black-box of structural realism and gave it a wider utility for questions of 
security and intelligence by also considering internal actions and motivations. 
The issues of uncertainty and bounded rationality that are also used for 
institutional costs analysis have particular impact. There are however clear 
limitations: Lobell et al. consider four combinations of possible 'worlds'; clear 
or unclear information on the external threat, combined in turn with clear or 
unclear information on potential policy responses. Where both are clear 
neoclassical realism is only useful to explain 'dysfunctional behaviour'. Where 
information on the external threats is unclear, they conclude that it is not 
particularly useful, and if policy response information is also poor, then 
innenpolitik explanations will be more productive in any event. It is only when 
there is clear information on the external threat environment, and poor 
information on the policy responses that neoclassical explanations come into 
their own.732 Clearly something more is required.      
Institutional cost theory can be regarded as having a mutually complimentary 
relationship with neoclassical realism in this regard; the former provides the 
insights into the drivers on policy from an anarchic international environment 
with which a state must deal, and the latter the insights into how those drivers 
are translated into a particular policy response. The different responses to 
apparently similar external stimuli noted by Gideon Rose are due to different 
cooperative experiences between influential actors that lead him to conclude 
internal factors were affecting policy responses.733  
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Institutional costs analysis can clarify the dynamics of the processes 
involved. An examination by Tom Dyson of one aspect of protective security 
provision, defence reform in a changing threat environment, from a 
neoclassical realist perspective has demonstrated how different effects 
operate at different levels, to provoke different outcomes.734 He notes that 
strategy is increasingly civil servant heavy to insulate it from single service 
agendas; with the military increasingly focused on specialist areas such as 
‘troops to task’ decision making. The increasing use of military/civilian 
partnership approaches during the Effects Based Approach to Operations 
(EBAO) that comprise the majority of current security initiatives in which the 
military are involved have added an additional dimension to the property 
rights tapestry. It is interesting to note that thus far the British army at least 
have functioned in a Dunleavy-esque way, preferring to have ‘Foreign Office’ 
or ‘Department for International Development’ personnel solely responsible 
for infrastructure projects and the like, and concentrate on simply providing 
adequate environmental security to permit them to operate. Nonetheless 
where overlap occurs and property rights become opaque, such as over 
issues like civilian governance in geographical areas that are enduring armed 
conflict, relationships are more strained and policy making more confused.735   
Although focused on the significant impact of one source of institutional costs 
(the British electoral cycle)
736
 Dyson's article makes it clear that other 
frictions added to the difficulties experienced in trying to emulate the United 
States 'Revolution in Military Affairs' (RMA) initiative, and not all were related 
to a declining executive autonomy. Throughout the late 1990's the 
implications of the RMA and the new unipolar world with which the United 
Kingdom now had to deal produced a pervasive environmental uncertainty. 
By 2006/7 the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts had helped to answer these 
questions but produced new ones. Dyson suggests that it was the 
conjunction of these external environmental problems with those in the 
                                                                   
734
 Dyson, "Defence Policy under the Labour Government: Operational Dynamism and Strategic 
Inertia." 
735
 Mid Senior Level British Army Officer M1, interview by Author2012, Afghanistan.  
736
 Dyson quotes one senior MoD official thus "... no government would be in a position to implement 
a resource-driven SDR process at any point other than the first two years of a new parliament" Dyson, 
"Defence Policy under the Labour Government: Operational Dynamism and Strategic Inertia."222. 
234 
 
internal environment; the forthcoming election,737 that undermined the 
production of a 'Strategic Defence Review' which could have provided the 
necessary strategic direction.738 This is however only part of the story. Why 
and how the existence of an electoral cycle might shift a government's 
response from emulation to inertia are rooted in the behavioural factors 
identified in the institutional cost impact framework such as opportunism, 
bounded rationality and probity. Its relevance is decided by the costs of 
establishing 'contracts' with those that can smooth a policy through. 
Conversely at the operational end Dyson notes that deliberate strategies to 
reduce institutional costs in the face of different adaptive necessities have 
been regularly introduced. In the post Cold War era the 'Directorate of 
Operational Capability' was established to "...sift out organisational 
politics...”739 as the United Kingdom sought to match military planning 
assumptions and capabilities.  
More recently, and as a direct result of being engaged in an on-going 
'shooting war', the Ministry of Defence and Treasury have agreed the 'Urgent 
Operational Requirements' scheme specifically to reduce the institutional 
costs involved in procurement. These often manifest themselves in the form 
of temporal, as well as financial costs. Interestingly the incentives within the 
scheme are themselves arranged to minimise institutional costs around 
auditing, with a self-policing approach supported by the risk of a loss of a 
fast-time revenue stream and a joint service balance being ensured via the 
Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) who manage the scheme with the 
help of treasury officials.740 Political level approval remains at the strategic 
level, supported by a 'dip-sampling' (often post-spend) approach that 
provides some level of institutional cover without introducing new levels of 
potential bottleneck or friction.741 At the tactical end, traditional hierarchical 
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control (and therefore ownership of an operation) was replaced by an 
increased autonomy for more junior, but better networked and briefed, 
officers on the ground, constantly updated by their own intelligence feed.742  
Such major cultural shifts were supported by organisational learning that was 
managed with careful attention to the property rights of those involved: Initial 
collation of potential lessons is firmly located in the relevant ‘Single Service 
Warfare Centres’ so that their objectivity was not compromised by the 
acknowledged problem of inter-service rivalry. This is then assessed by the 
joint training (J7) division of PJHQ, who act as both a ‘service agnostic node’ 
and referee. Anything with implications for all the services is amalgamated by 
the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre and the United Kingdom 
Defence Academy into the military equivalent of an all-source assessed 
product and implemented as appropriate. Those lessons deemed single 
service issue only remain the property of the originating service and are 
inculcated into tactical level doctrine by them. 743  
Two further aspects of neoclassic realism theory that were alluded to in the 
previous chapter deserve consideration with regard to its utility with 
institutional cost analysis in the security and intelligence sphere. Neoclassical 
realism argues that the first filter through which an international policy 
decision must pass is that of perception on the part of the decision maker. 
Where structural realism regards rational calculation as being based on good 
information delivered on a smoothly functioning transmission belt, 744 
neoclassical realism argues that information is imperfect and delivery 
involves obstacles. However despite implicitly acknowledging the importance 
of language costs and information asymmetry, neoclassical realism is silent 
on the influence of information channels generally, and intelligence feeds in 
particular. Yet how intelligence is managed and presented, and the 
institutional costs incurred in so doing, can fundamentally shift that 
perception. This is made clear in Marrin’s analysis of how intelligence 
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professionals and policy makers interacted on the Al Qaeda threat during the 
1990’s.745 
Although threats and opportunities present themselves to policy makers at 
the international, regional, or domestic level, each is addressed in 
conjunction with the potential effects on the other.746 All of this complexity is 
filtered through the perception of a few key decision makers; To revert to 
Dyson’s discussion above, if a decision maker views an internal domestic 
election as more urgent than a strategic defence review (even when the latter 
is acknowledged as more important) it will determine when the  strategic 
review is addressed.747 However a lack of appropriate policy options can also 
shift situational perception to better reflect actual the capability to respond, as 
the British response to indications of Argentinean aggression in the South 
Atlantic in the early 1980’s demonstrated.748 The bounded rationality of 
actors in a complex and uncertain environment was allowed to produce 
friction in the information transmission belt.   
This problem can be further unpacked by considering the second issue: The 
dynamic between external vulnerabilities and possible adaptive strategies 
requires the state to extract resources with which to counter threats. To do so 
requires bargaining or coercion,749 although the latter is not practicable over 
time in a democracy. This means that the institutional costs of bargaining are 
central to implementing any solution.  
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In both cases however there is a tension between the State wanting to 
extract resources, whether by taxation, requisition or expropriation, and 
society wishing to retain them; something must be offered in return and 
institutional costs are incurred. Similarly mobilisation incurs costs whether 
direct, through the need for an administrative tier, or indirect, through 
inducements to, and negotiations with, external actors.750  Indeed it has been 
argued that different States have different organisational forms precisely 
because of this tension and their attempts at negotiating an efficient solution 
while maximising their own utility.751  
Overall then neoclassical realism and institutional cost analysis can be seen 
as mutually complimentary, but while the former prioritises the foreign policy 
environment, but allows that how response capabilities are managed 
produces significant constraints, the latter regards the internal and 
environmental aspects as of potentially equal importance, with their actual 
dynamic varying from circumstance to circumstance. This dynamic will be 
drawn out in the case studies that follow in parts 2 and 3 to this thesis. First 
however, there follows a brief discussion about their usage and selection, 
before this chapter concludes. 
Section 9: Methodology, Data and Case Study Selection 
Having developed the theory of institutional costs for cooperation within and 
across the security and intelligence spheres in Chapter 2, and then examined 
the relationship between alternative theoretical constructs and scholarship 
that might usefully be applied to this area in Chapter 3, this Chapter has so 
far considered how those existing theories and institutional cost analysis 
interrelate. Parts 2 and 3 to this thesis will next apply the institutional cost 
paradigm to particular case studies of collaborative working within the 
security and intelligence domain, testing the rigor and applicability of the 
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model. This next section will therefore describe the methodology used and 
the rationale behind it and discuss the selection of the particular cases used.    
This thesis is an empirical inquiry that investigates the contemporary 
phenomenon of collaborative working within the intelligence and security 
function within a real-life context, where the boundaries between the two are 
less then obvious. It has therefore been designed to deal with technically 
distinctive situations where there are more variables of interest than fixed 
data points. The methodology used is thus designed to overcome the 
problems of what might initially seem to be inconsistent and overly complex 
results amongst the cases selected.752 The complexity of the theory being 
tested, the communities of interest, and the policy problems they are required 
to deal with, means that they would not be responsive to either a quantitative 
or survey based approach (which would also be overly limited by the secrecy 
issue that would restrict the numbers of returns), or to any kind of 
experimental reproduction. A multiple qualitative case study approach has 
therefore been selected, and the theory developed in Chapter 2 is then 
examined to assess the extent to which it can provide a causal pathway that 
accounts for all the different collaborative experiences observed across the 
cases selected, even where other theoretical accounts have failed or proven 
inadequate to describe the whole range of outcomes. 
Essentially, the process used is one of a pattern matching analysis using a 
process tracing methodology. The outcomes actually observed across the 
cases are compared to those that would be predicted if the model is sound. 
Each case is managed as an analytical narrative within the context of the 
theory developed in the earlier chapters. Where apparent anomalies occur 
they are further investigated to see if an increased granularity of examination 
tends to prove or disprove the theory. Each case will thus be used to 
demonstrate that alternative patterns either do not arise, or can be explained 
by reference back to the model with improved data, so that a causal 
mechanism can be inferred. 
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The communities of the US and UK have been selected because of their 
overall similarity in terms of the societies in which they operate and the 
problems with which they are faced (discussed further below). However the 
high degree of resolution required for this style of process tracing research to 
be useful nonetheless means that the more detailed analysis must allow for 
the non-comparability of various pieces of evidence. As John Gerring has 
noted, "... the observational world does not usually provide cases with both 
temporal variation (making possible 'pre' and 'post' tests) and spatial variation 
('treatment' and 'control' cases) across variables of theoretical interest, while 
holding all else constant." so that contextual evidence and deductive logic 
must be relied upon. Multiple types of evidence must therefore be used to 
combat this.753 The cases and evidence selected are not therefore random 
but rather selected to be relevant to the central argument (the process of 
case study selection, and the mitigation of any bias affects, is discussed 
further below) and each piece of evidence must to some extent be seen as 
"...a series of N=1 (one-shot) observations." However, the inferences that 
can be drawn from such a series of non-comparable observations can be 
demonstrated to boast the same scientific rigor as those that are sample 
based,754 so that the difference in commensurability between the 
counterterrorism and defence intelligence cases can be turned to advantage.  
In each case the dependent variable is the levels of success in cooperation 
that can be observed between key actors. Such successful cooperation may 
or may not then be translated into operational success, but the important 
point for the purposes of this study is the level of cooperation itself.  
The independent variables are then the various elements of the institutional 
cost impact framework for security and intelligence provision developed in 
Chapter 2. Their application however is complicated by the importance of 
their interaction with each other, so that they cannot usefully be isolated and 
examined sequentially, but rather have to be individually identified as a factor 
in each case, but then have their impact analysed as factors of the whole.   
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The other variables that would, in a simple experiment, be 'controlled' are 
held constant as far as possible by the similarities across the cases selected 
in these areas. They must however be acknowledged to be a broad collection 
of potentially impactful issues, and are continuous rather than discrete or 
dichotomous (across the two nations of interest), so that the dependent and 
independent variables cannot be entirely isolated. However the use of the 
cross case technique adopted, considering 'typical' cases that seem to 
demonstrate a strong and relatively direct linkage between the level of 
collaborative behaviour amongst actors, so that a causal mechanism 
between the former and the latter may be reasonably inferred.755        
The vast number of potentially relevant communities and cases that could be 
utilised to test the causal links between the institutional cost theory 
developed herein and collaborative success or failure mandate that some 
form of selection must take place. Randomly selected cases would be 
unlikely to provide the leverage into the research question, however 
representative they might be, and small sample sizes so chosen are more 
likely to generate a problem of precision in that they might produce too much 
variation in results to be useful, or be wholly unrepresentative anyway.756 
Instead, cases have been selected as being 'typical' within their major group 
(Counterterrorism or defence in the UK or in the US) but 'diverse' across 
them (as further described below) to most fully test the hypothesis. 
Nonetheless the cases selected for study at each level have been selected 
from a much larger population, of which they are representative in their 
fundamental features, so that findings can most reasonably be extrapolated 
out to a wider universe of cases that exhibit similar features.   
In order to make sense of that selection procedure this section will next 
discuss the usefulness of analysing the security and intelligence communities 
of the UK and US. Then it will explain use of their respective counterterrorism 
and defence organisations as the next tier of analysis, arguing that their utility 
in this regard is because together they provide the cross cases that challenge 
the accepted wisdom of good cooperation being the norm in the UK, and bad 
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the norm in the US. Thereafter the rationale for the selection of particular 
instances of collaborative success and failure will be outlined. This will be 
followed by a brief discussion of the sources of information available, their 
triangulation and usage, and how potential biases were addressed. Finally 
there is a short note on the ethical considerations involved.    
The security and intelligence communities of the United Kingdom and the 
United States have been selected for a combination of logistical and purely 
academic reasons. Despite some degree of secrecy being inherent in the 
subject being studies, both belong in relatively open social settings that are 
inclined towards self-examination and largely tolerant of external 
assessment. There is therefore a significant amount of data and analysis 
from variety of perspectives available in each case that can inform this work. 
On a less pragmatic note, the two security and intelligence communities of 
the US and UK are embedded in broadly similar societal settings. Whilst any 
comprehensive comparison is beyond the purview of this thesis, it is worthy 
of note that both are required to function in liberal democracies, wedded to a 
rule of law that acts as a curb on executive authority (albeit to varying 
degrees over time), that are internally open and externally engaged with the 
rest of the world. It may be further assumed within the context of this thesis 
that both communities are required to produce broadly similar ‘outputs’ that 
include (but are not limited to) the maintenance of a largely secure 
environment that permits that sort of society, and the capitalist style of 
economy that underpins it, to flourish.  
Figure 4.4: 
US/UK Societal Setting US/UK Community 
Organisation 
US/UK Preferred 
Outcomes at Macro Level 
Mostly Similar Mostly Different Mostly Similar 
Despite these environmental and goal similarities however, the way in which 
each nation sets about achieving these goals from an organisational 
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standpoint are very different, as depicted in Figure 4.4 below.757 It is this 
divergence that provides the point of departure for this investigation into 
collaborative working within each. 
It should however be stated at the outset that the use of both the UK and US 
communities does not amount to a comparison.758 It is rather that relevant 
facets of each are examined to based upon the divergence of their relative 
experiences despite their similar starting positions and overall goals. 
However the usefulness of the juxtaposition of the two communities must be 
briefly considered. In his far more wide-reaching comparison of the 
evolutionary trajectories of the intelligence communities of the United 
Kingdom and United States, Davies divides the potential criticisms of the 
comparison into four strands: That the difference in their respective sizes 
make any joint evaluation of their coordination unrealistic, that their 
respective budgets are too divergent to then contrast different behaviours 
around them, that Prime Ministerial and Presidential levels of authority (and 
the existence of a professional rather than political administration to support 
each respectively), and finally that the existence of the ‘Whitehall Village’ 
from which governance in the UK is largely managed means that probity 
between actors is significantly easier to develop than in more widely 
dispersed US community.759 Each is however dismissed in turn.  
To begin with the latter, the notion that geographic proximity is enough to 
provoke the sort of probity discussed in Chapter 2 is discounted by noting the 
actual similarities in traveling time between the different agencies in each 
case, particularly as more of the UK’s community have been displaced from 
London to home county bases such as RAF Wyton.760 
To deal with the most oft-cited argument against parity, Davies counters 
persuasively that once those aspects of the UK’s community that are 
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ostensibly part of wider governance, such as the analytic elements of the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, or Defence Intelligence are included in 
the calculation (functions that are automatically a part of the US intelligence 
community) then something like proportionality exists when one considers 
the size of the intelligence community relative to the two countries 
populations. More directly significant when one is considering issues of 
coordination, he notes that in the key executive level areas where 
synchronisation should occur the numerical levels of actors are very similar. 
Each nation boasts a similar number of agencies so that although the US 
might deploy a larger number of junior staff, at the executive level there are 
clear parallels, with both general coordination and the production of 
collaborative assessments being managed by similar numbers of people in 
both cases. In the UK for example the 2004 Joint Intelligence Committee had 
twelve members, while the US’s National Foreign Intelligence Board had 
thirteen. The UK’s  ‘Assessments staff’ and the US’s National Intelligence 
Council (NIC) both comprised some thirty staff. Yet is at this level, rather than 
the more sharply differentiated (by size) operational and tactical levels that 
most of the frictions between agencies are to be found.761      
In the same way he rejects the idea that the relative size of the US 
community budget is reason enough for actors to contend their share of it 
more intensely by demonstrating that its National Intelligence Program (NIP) 
budget and the UK’s Single Intelligence Account (SIA) are not commensurate 
as types. The broad function of the former, to produce all-source fully 
analyzed intelligence product, and the narrow function  of the latter; to 
produce predominantly raw intelligence to be analysed and incorporated into 
wider policy documents elsewhere, are too divergent for budgetary size to be 
a relevant comparator.762    
Davies also successfully counters the idea that the difference between Prime 
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Ministerial and Presidential authority is adequate to distinguish their relative 
experiences of coordination, demonstrating that both must necessarily 
engage in coalition building and negotiation to achieve their goals.763 When 
comparing the structures that support each he notes both the similarities of 
two heavily departmentalised structures, but also the distinction between an 
apolitical civil service and a politically appointed one,764 contenting himself 
with outlining the organisational politics arguments that define the 
experiences of both.765 It is however the contention of this thesis that it is how 
these sorts of negotiations and agreements play-out distinctly in different 
cases that defines cooperative success or failure. The very broad similarities 
between the two systems thus provide a useful shared base-plate from which 
the more specific differences can be best observed. The US and UK provide 
good exemplars because they exhibit fundamental distinctions in the way 
they are organised, despite the similarities described.  
Moving on to the selection of appropriate areas for examination within each 
nation, two principal areas of the security and intelligence spheres have been 
selected; those of counterterrorism and defence intelligence. Both require 
significant levels of inter and intra agency collaboration to function effectively, 
and thus provide rich seams of examples that can be examined. Because the 
subject matter of interest is the success or failure of cooperation rather than 
any wider assessment of the overall success or failure of the communities 
under discussion the causal hypothesis is sufficiently specific for a set of 
relevant cases to be identifiable.766 As space precluded an examination of 
the institutional costs approach to every aspect of intelligence and security 
provision these two had to be chosen over other possible areas of analysis. 
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In addition the institutional costs environments for counterterrorism and 
defence intelligence have also progressed very differently. Institutional 
frictions in counterterrorism have remained constantly high or low (in the US 
and UK respectively) despite major organisational reforms whilst in the 
defence intelligence sphere very specific threshold moments and shifts are 
observable, offering the possibility that this divergence would also produce 
further lines of enquiry.  
Defence intelligence and counterterrorism both boast high degrees of 
technical separation between the different functional areas that comprise 
their delivery. These exceed those of other areas of national security 
provision: The provision of national estimates or assessments of threats to 
the nation for example can involve several agencies who produce individual 
versions that are subsequently compared (as in the US case), or high 
degrees of collaborative working between actors engaged in the same 
activity and to an established shared purpose (as in the UK case). Traffic 
however tends to be in one direction so that the tensions and frictions 
exposed in the defence intelligence and counterterrorism cases are less 
observable.  Counterintelligence on the other hand demonstrates some of the 
same overlaps found in counterterrorism provision, for example between law 
enforcement and intelligence gathering. However it has not been subject to 
the same conflicting policy pressures that the upsurge in international 
terrorism has engendered in recent years,767 nor is it played out under the 
public gaze to the same extent, so that data less prevalent and conflicts are 
likely to be less pronounced.768 For these reasons the two very different 
subject areas of counterterrorism and defence intelligence provision were 
selected as the best approach to testing the validity of the theory, whilst also 
suggesting its possible range of applications.        
There are however very distinct differences in the commensurability of the 
UK and US approaches to the two functional areas selected. There is a high 
degree of comparability in the defence sphere juxtaposed by much lower 
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comparability in that of counterterrorism. In the latter case the similarity of the 
terrorism problem and of overall objective is not replicated by a similarity in 
how the issue is dealt with. Although certain roles and responsibilities appear 
to be comparable they do not exist within similar networks. Given that it is the 
interactions between actors within these networks, and how they manage 
cooperation across the fracture lines between them, that this thesis focuses 
on. It therefore follows that a traditional like-for-like comparison of units or 
actors will be inadequate. Although any such comparison might appear to 
allow the cancelling out of apparently similar variables from each country, it 
would actually skew the findings based upon a flawed assumption of system 
wide commensurability that cannot be supported; a cognitive bias would thus 
be encouraged based on that assumption. In the counterterrorism case a 
like-for-like comparative case study approach is not the most manageable 
solution to examine cooperative working.  
This thesis will therefore break with prior precedent and instead move the 
point of departure between the two nations back to how the terrorism 
problem is primarily addressed. This is in fact only an extension of the 
methodology used by Davies, who addressed the commensurability problem 
by moving the point of comparison one step back by examining areas of 
functional equivalence rather than particular posts or institutions.769 This was 
adequate in that case, as Davies interest was specifically in the intelligence 
function. This thesis however needs to go further because it is concerned 
with the use of intelligence in the wider policy arena; and in particular how it 
is enmeshed with the security function. It therefore utilises a non-standard 
derivation of a standard model of comparison. In moving the loci of the 
comparison back to how the terrorism problem is primarily perceived by each 
nation one finds that they put their faith in very different organisational 
frameworks. The contrast is therefore not between how a single US or UK 
institution pursues intelligence and security cooperation. Rather it is between 
what is essentially a government 'program' on the United Kingdom's side (the 
CONTEST strategy) and the more clearly defined hierarchal structures that 
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have been created in the United States (the Department for Homeland 
Security and the Director of National Intelligence). Nonetheless if there is to 
be any comparability of how collaborative working across the whole of the 
counterterrorism piece is managed in each nation then it is at this level that 
the analysis must thus proceed. The use of apparently similar entities more 
usual in traditional comparative studies of these areas is inadequate for 
capturing the very different multiplicity of interactions found in each 
Countries' counterterrorism response.770 They diverge too completely 
between comparable problems at one end, and similar broad objectives at 
the other, so that an overly narrow focus on points of apparent 
commensurability must be sacrificed in favour of a more holistic 
consideration of how each nation approaches the terrorism problem.  
In the defence intelligence part of this thesis the two nations are far more 
easily compared like for like. Both have defence departments that 'own' 
intelligence assets with both national and military responsibilities. Both have 
had to deal with very similar issues, are members of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO), and have worked together regularly with 
interoperability between them a key goal.771 Yet as Part 3 demonstrates they 
have had very different experiences with cooperative working in recent years 
so that in the defence intelligence case the usefulness of the comparison is in 
explaining that divergence even within wider structures that are far more 
similar than in the counterterrorism case.  
The efficacy of the cross-case approach is thus further enhanced by the 
difference in commensurability in the counterterrorism and defence 
intelligence spheres, and the usefulness of the institutional costs framework 
can be more widely tested than if they were equally comparable between the 
US and UK. The use of the two areas in conjunction with each other allows 
an analysis that counters the conventional wisdom that the United Kingdom 
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manages cooperative working well, while the United States does not. Whilst 
the counterterrorism function does broadly exhibit these traits, the defence 
intelligence function transposes them; it demonstrates a history of poor 
cooperation in the UK contrasted with increasingly effective collaboration in 
the US since the re-establishment of the Military Intelligence Board (MIB) by 
General Soyster and the first Gulf War on the early 1990's. The inclusion of 
both spheres thus provide a response to notions that the different 
cooperative experiences found on each side of the Atlantic are rooted in 
national cultural factors. They therefore suggest the hypothesis depicted 
figuratively (Figure 4.5) below.772 This in turn permits a cross case analysis of 
examples that are both diverse and atypical across the sectors and 
Countries, but that nonetheless uses typical cases within the functional area 
they are found. In this way a covariational typology that demonstrates spatial 
as well as temporal variation is developed, and a higher degree of reliability 
can be inferred:  
Figure 4.5: 
Collaborative 
Working in: 
Counterterrorism Defence Intelligence & 
Security 
United Kingdom Mostly Successful Mostly Poor 
United States Mostly Poor Mostly Successful 
 
Beyond this each also exhibit very specific institutional costs problems that 
are different in each case773 so that they present very different issues against 
which the institutional cost impact framework may be tested. As a result 
when an increased granularity of examination is conducted on particular 
aspects of each quadrant, atypical results can still be observed. For example, 
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with instances of poor cooperation occurring even within an area where the 
whole is successful, and vice versa: The rigor of the model can thus be 
further tested at different levels of functionality and with increasingly detailed 
data being used until an explanation emerges.  
The very complexity of both functional areas in itself precludes a genuinely 
holistic examination of each and every collaborative aspect they offer, so 
some degree of considered selection must necessarily occur (the 
unsuitability of using a genuinely random selection process has been 
addressed above). The possibility of selection bias and related threats to 
validity must therefore be addressed.774  
Internal validity is retained through the use of established criteria in each 
case. Most importantly cases have been selected for their degree of 
relevance to the research question rather than for any particular outcome. 
They must therefore demonstrate the need for significant degrees of 
cooperative working at the level being examined, be it inter or intra 
organisation. Outcomes are assessed solely on the success of failure of the 
cooperative element, rather than on any particular operational outcome. For 
example although the July 7th bombings of 2005 were a significant breach of 
London's security regime the fact that the attacks were undertaken by 
terrorists that were colloquially known as clean-skins, meaning they had not 
come to the notice of the security or intelligence agencies in any substantive 
way. This meant that no liaison between the intelligence and security 
elements of the UK counterterrorism architecture could have occurred.775 
This example therefore has little utility within the context of this thesis. The 
importance of the cooperative element to this work means that a more direct 
comparison between specific parts of the US and UK communities is forgone 
in favour of a consideration of how coordination and collaboration are 
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managed. In Chapter 6 for example the use of the CONTEST strategy in the 
UK is contrasted with efforts to achieve the same goal through particular 
agencies and posts in the US. It is the success or failure of the cooperative 
endeavour that is the test of the theory, not the similarities of the methods 
being examined. In this respect this thesis is not a comparative study per se, 
but rather uses the two nations differing experiences to draw out the ways in 
which the discrete elements of the model interact and thus impact on 
collaborative success, and to demonstrate the reliability of its application.  
Because the institutional cost impact framework is an holistic theory of 
organisational cooperation examples are chosen to most widely assess that 
universality in each functional area, which also improves the external validity 
of the results observed. The fact that much of what is done in intelligence and 
security spheres remains secret means that ensuring constructional validity is 
of particular importance. The cases used have therefore been selected 
because they can be examined using multiple sources of data, and thus 
follow the normal process tracing methodology.776 Each offers a variety of 
primary and secondary source material, often from several distinct and 
distinctly opinionated resources, that can be triangulated. 
The issues and cases analysed have all been considered by various parts of 
the two governments themselves, either to inform future policy or as post 
event reviews. This has lead to a substantial amount of government 
documentation, reports and speeches and even legal proceedings from both 
sides of the Atlantic, and in most cases this is openly available. Whilst for the 
most part such documents are essentially reliable two caveats should be 
recorded: First the often secret nature of the subject matter largely precludes 
the existence of an 'opposition' point of view. Although such documents are 
published as the wholly objective report or findings of government it must be 
accepted that any government has some vested interests in what they say, or 
at the very least how it is said. Where possible such publications have been 
analysed in parallel with the reporting of oversight bodies like the Intelligence 
and Security Committee to provide some balance. For example the UK's 
                                                                   
776
 Gerring, "Case Study Research."173 
251 
 
National Security Strategy was criticised by the parliamentary Joint 
Committee on the National Security Strategy for being "almost unrelentingly 
positive" and providing no details of problem areas even where the 
government had already published them.777  
Secondly in a few cases official reporting can become partisan, particularly 
where things have gone wrong. The post event investigations into the 
September 11th 2012 attacks on the US Special Mission compound in 
Benghazi lead to a series of spats that variously involved Congress, the State 
Department, the CIA and Department of Defense as different actors briefed 
against each other, so that it became increasingly difficult to ascertain 
precisely what had actually occurred when.778 To some extent of course such 
inter agency disagreements are an integral part of the analysis because of 
their impact on future cooperative behaviour, so that they cannot be ignored. 
Particular pronouncements therefore have to be situated within that wider 
context as far as possible.  
The widest possible use of sources and the narrow nature of the enquiry into 
cooperative success or failure also offsets the third often experienced 
problem; that it is usually only failures in the intelligence and security spheres 
that enter the public domain so that available data tends to support a perhaps 
overly bleak view.779 Case study selection in this thesis is therefore geared 
towards instances of collaboration within the functional areas used, rather 
than particular operations, so that potential bias due to operational outcomes 
that were actually in part forced by issues that are extraneous to this 
examination are avoided.   
Usefully given these caveats both nations also boast an extensive body of 
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peer reviewed work on issues that are directly applicable to the areas under 
discussion, or that can provide useful parallels that can lend predictive 
support to particular arguments and offer further points of triangulation. In 
addition although considering very specific areas of governance (those of 
intelligence and security), as this thesis considers issues of cooperation and 
is developed from a wide breadth of theoretical perspectives, research into 
other areas that considers similar themes can also provide some degree of 
reassurance.   
These documentary sources were then further examined through a number 
of qualitative interviews with actors from different levels in the organisations 
being examined with two intentions. Firstly to provide points of triangulation 
or challenge of key features so that any biases in, for example, governmental 
documentation, could be tested and secondly to permit a deeper level of 
analysis. Interviews were semi-structured, with the framework adapted 
slightly to suit the particular experience or role of the interviewee. Although it 
should be noted that an organic approach to this was taken, as in most 
instances interviewees had additional experiences of which the author was 
not cognisant until the interview began. It was decided to separate the 
interview structure from the 'impact framework' and only return the focus 
back to that during the subsequent analysis of the interviews so that the 
interviewers bias did not lead interviewees. Interviews were thus divided into 
different sections.  
Firstly specific experiences of positive and negative cooperative working 
either within the interviewees own organisation or between it and others were 
discussed in a factual way to establish chronology and the interviewees role 
and access. Then more personal observations were solicited including, 
where relevant, how the interviewee believed cooperation was either 
achieved or harmed in the instances cited.  
Next more general perceptions and impressions on cooperation within and 
between the interviewee's own organisation and others were sought. A cross 
examination was conducted in an attempt to expose any inherent 
assumptions (by either side) and to draw the interviewee into explicitly 
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describing anything relevant that had been left implicit.780 Finally the whole 
was re-capped to verify that a clear understanding had been achieved and to 
ensure that nothing that was either privileged or that the interviewee did not 
want included was in the interviewer's record. The same privileged access 
that allowed the interviews to occur also meant that Kvale's observation that 
interviews are not collected but 'co-authored' between the interviewer and 
interviewee has a particular resonance in this case, as both sides shared 
some common interests and understandings.781 The semi-structured and 
directed nature of the questions employed within each of these sections were 
thus designed to mitigate any impact from this association. This mitigation 
was then improved through the analysis methodology used. Once the 
interviews had been conducted the approach was reversed so that their 
analysis was managed through the prism of the institutional costs impact 
framework developed in Chapter 2. This included consideration of individual 
elements and their mutual interaction and both positive and negative 
influences were sought out and examined.  
The results from the interviews were then applied to and compared with the 
wider results found during the analysis of documental evidence. In this way 
each source of information was used to corroborate or challenge the others 
so that an appropriate level of confidence could be imputed.       
Ethical Considerations: 
This research was conducted in accordance with the Brunel University Code 
of Ethics.782 Ethical approval for the methodology described above was 
granted by Brunel University on 22nd September 2014 and is attached as 
Appendix 2 to this thesis.  
 All the information within the thesis is openly available and no classified data 
or intelligence has been used or referred to. The privileged access of the 
author and of those persons interviewed in the course of this research was 
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used only to direct enquiries towards open source information where it 
existed. Where it did not, no use of the information has been made and 
alternate, published, examples that could make the same point were found. 
As the issues under consideration were ones of governance and internal 
cooperation, rather than of sources or methods, and both the UK and US 
governments are committed to as transparent an approach to governance as 
possible this proved less problematic than might have been anticipated.783    
Because published accounts were often compared to the personal 
recollections and observations of interviewees the same process was 
undergone with each to insure that not only was this thesis conducted 
ethically, but also that none of the interviewees were presented with any 
ethical dilemmas from their own professional standpoint. None of those 
interviewed, or approached as potential interviewees, were vulnerable 
persons. However all were, or had been, in roles that were bound by the 
Official Secrets Act (in the UK) or by some equivalent US/NATO constraint so 
that particular care was needed in utilising this data source. Each of the 
individuals that accepted the invitation was approached and presented with a 
list of the subject areas that the author wished to address during the interview 
that they could then amend or adjust as they (and on occasion their 
managers) felt appropriate given the peculiarities of their role prior to 
commencement of the interviews. In addition it was made clear that they 
could stop a line of questioning at any time, and that in the event they had 
said anything they regretted or believed would be in violation of the codes 
and rules by which they were bound these remarks would of course be 
disregarded. In the event this proved a positive effect as it allowed some 
interviewees to discuss particular instances that provided valuable contextual 
information, knowing they would not be cited on this, so that it became a 
valuable source of background information from knowledgeable sources that 
could help steer open source research.  
The provision of the degree and type of anonymity preferred was discussed 
with each interviewee individually, with a spectrum of possibilities offered to 
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each of them. A further discussion was then had to discuss how those that 
agreed to be directly cited were to be referred to so that they (or in some 
cases their unit) could not be identified. The resultant agreements have of 
course been honoured. The twin drivers of interviewees not wanting to be 
identified as part of the intelligence or security communities and the culture of 
secrecy with which most live meant that all bar the high profile political level 
interviewees opted for anonymity despite the subject area of the thesis. 
However this seemed to allow interviewees a degree of criticality around 
management issues that might otherwise have been absent. In addition the 
authors own vetted status permitted a more probing style than might 
otherwise have been the case, and perhaps went some way to off-setting any 
assumptions by either him or his interviewees that might have resulted.784 As 
a result  and once the interviews began some surprisingly frank observations 
were made and subsequently allowed to stand.        
Section 10: Conclusion   
Chapter 3 demonstrated how the complexity and uncertainty prevalent in the 
security and intelligence domain meant that the communities needed to 
provide these functions must be constantly interacting and adapting if they 
are reach adequate levels of fitness. It also considered the usefulness of a 
number of theoretical approaches in explaining the cooperative outcomes 
that have resulted. This chapter has extended that analysis to show how 
conceiving these changing patterns of interactions as a series of contracting 
arrangements between relevant actors, and then considering the levels of 
friction that are likely to be experienced in the form of institutional costs, can 
permit a comprehensive analysis that nonetheless incorporates an 
appropriate level of detail.  
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Because security and intelligence provision crosses not only the foreign and 
domestic divide, but also the strategic and operational spheres, so that a 
variety of agencies and departments will necessarily be involved in its 
delivery. Any explanatory paradigm that can assess the nature of the 
cooperative interactions between them will consequently have merit. 
However this chapter  has demonstrated how many of the existing 
explanations, while providing a strong account in some instances seems 
weaker in slightly different circumstances, or can be contradicted by alternate 
empirical evidence. This chapter has demonstrated that the strength of  
institutional cost analysis in an area of governance like the security and 
intelligence functions is not that it supplants or corrects previous approaches 
but that it incorporates their insights, allowing different aspects to come to the 
fore or recede as individual circumstances dictate, while still generating an 
holistic analysis.  
The diverse observations on collaborative working by various intelligence and 
security scholars from both sides of the Atlantic was contextualised by 
considering the surrounding institutional cost environment in which 
cooperation was required. This allowed the rather bleak view of new 
institutionalist thinkers to be contrasted with the more optimistic outlook of 
scholars who have concentrated on collegiality. It has also demonstrated how 
the level of costs experienced in any set of circumstances could determine 
cooperative outcomes. In this way the failure of each group of scholars to 
adequately explain the outcomes observed by the other could be dealt with 
within the same theoretical architecture.    
In the same way the limited applicability of theoretical of narrowly focused 
approaches that concentrated on particular behaviours or features of the 
organisational processes in use were considered from an institutional costs 
perspective. This showed how their undoubted strengths in examining the 
areas with which they were principally concerned needed to be considered in 
conjunction with other issues if a comprehensive explanation of cooperative 
success and failure is to be achieved. Furthermore the range of issues are 
each 'factors' of that explanation; it is their mutual interaction that is 
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conclusive. For example the temporal nature of the environment, or its 
complexity, might each mean that when an agency or department wishes to 
modify itself to lessen either internal or external frictions (and so improve the 
efficiency of any particular function), further frictions are likely to be 
generated in another functional area. Because functions like intelligence and 
security exist in an extremely complex and uncertain environment this is 
likely be a recurring problem: Simply considering a particular behaviour or 
inefficient bureaucratic process will not provide the depth needed.   
Conversely approaches that emanated from a more external viewpoint 
suffered from the alternate limitation in that they did not provide sufficient 
granularity to wholly account for all of the empirical observations made. Even 
where some allowance was made for the internal situation in which decision 
makers found themselves (so that the range of an actor's viable options 
could be seen to be constrained), it did not fully account for the nature of the 
cooperation between actors. However the consideration of institutional costs 
between actors, and between actors and their environment, ensured that not 
only were these internal factors included, but that they could be given the 
appropriate weighting in the particular circumstances being considered. This 
was as true in top-down models of the international environment as it  was for 
bottom-up ideas of complexity and evolutionary pressures. 
Having established the applicability of institutional cost analysis to the 
intelligence and security spheres of governance, and how the theory can add 
to the explanatory power of earlier social theories within that context; 
particular cases from both sides of the Atlantic will now be considered using 
the institutional cost paradigm to demonstrate how these interactions play 
out.  
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PART 2 
 
The Counterterrorism 
Function as a Case 
Study of Cooperative 
Success and Failure in 
the Intelligence and 
Security Spheres 
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Chapter 5 - Counterterrorism Collaboration and the Particular 
Relevance of Institutional Costs 
Section 1: Introduction 
The counter terrorism sphere of intelligence and security provides a useful 
area of research into cooperative working because its provision boasts some 
of the most complex mixes of goals, actors and organisations. It requires that 
those normally required to operate at a strategic level need deal with tactical 
level quandaries, whilst the impact of the actions of operational personnel 
often subsequently generate strategic level outcomes. Interactions between 
different elements of the counterterrorism effort take place over both very 
short and very long time-scales, further complicating any individuals 
assessment of desired outcome. Most importantly terrorism, as has been 
established, crosses normally discrete policy areas to a far greater extent 
than most other policy problems; it involves horizontal cooperation between 
agencies and even departments that are usually independent, and vertical 
cooperation between local and national levels of governance and political 
input. Counterterrorism therefore boasts substantial and quite particular 
institutional cost issues and this chapter will provide an overview of these 
before the next two consider more specific examples of vertical and 
horizontal collaboration respectively.  
Despite the inherent institutional difficulties posed by the terrorism problem, 
the US and UK experiences are very different. In the US institutional costs 
have remained endemically high. The attempts to alter that discussed in 
Chapter 6 after this discussion, by creating first a Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) and then a Director of National Intelligence (DNI), have had 
very little impact on them. In the UK on the other hand the institutional costs 
have historically been endemically low, and the introduction of the CONTEST 
strategy and Office of Security and Counter Terrorism (OSCT) examined in 
Chapter 6 merely facilitated the continuation of these low friction 
relationships. It is worth noting that this is a very different experience to the 
defence intelligence case considered in Part 3, wherein very specific 
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threshold points of change in the institutional cost environment can be 
identified. 
The view that existing collaborative arrangements were inadequate to deal 
with a more sophisticated terrorist threat in the new millennium has forced 
significant developments in the intelligence machinery in both the United 
States and United Kingdom in recent years. Attempts to improve cooperation 
across the whole of both the intelligence and security communities, and thus 
actually realise the totality of their respective capabilities, have been at the 
heart of both approaches. They have been variously driven by the attacks of 
September 2001 in the US and July 2005 in the UK, and a continuing 
perception by both nations that they are centrally involved in what the US has 
termed a 'war on terror' domestically and as a result of economic interests 
and military engagements overseas.  
Both nations have also increased the importance they place on 
counterterrorism security as a policy responsibility. In the United States 
terrorism was regarded as a simple policing function like many others until 
September 2001, with only occasional shifts up to national level policy 
making or military action when nation-state support for particular attacks 
became apparent, as was the case in Libya in the 1980's and Sudan in the 
1990's. This perception of terrorism as an issue for law enforcement, 
occasionally supported by other government assets, rather than as a problem 
of governance more generally, influenced US counterterrorism activity 
throughout the 1990's as Al Qaeda increased its influence in Africa, Asia and 
the Middle East.785 The idea that law enforcement was simply one tool that 
could be used against it, as subsequently advocated by the former US 
Deputy Attorney General David Kris in 2011,786 was not a part of any policy 
response. Terrorism did not even feature as an issue in the 2000 election 
campaign of President George W. Bush, and his first National Security 
Advisor, Condoleezza Rice did not initially see it as an issue for the NSC at 
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all, ironically believing it to be too operational and too domestic an area for a 
body She regarded as for foreign policy coordination.787  
In the United Kingdom of course the experience of Northern Ireland meant 
that a 'whole of government' approach managed via an applicable Cabinet 
committee was more the norm,788 and the solution eventually arrived at 
(albeit not a complete solution) involved not only the police, the agencies and 
military, but also foreign policy and domestic political elements. There is also 
a recognition that its maintenance will also involve long term economic and 
educational initiatives. The usefulness of that experience is however limited: 
The use of terrorism by the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) was 
only part of a strategy designed within a hierarchical organisation to improve 
their negotiating position, for Al Qaeda violence "... is the end itself" that has 
only the most opaque form of leadership, so that no negotiations are 
feasible.789 Furthermore the PIRA problem was domestic, and only 
occasionally became international, whereas the various forms of Islamic 
extremist terrorism that threaten the UK and its interests is international with 
domestic repercussions. Despite the fact that the UK's gradual blurring of the 
domestic and international arenas had begun in the post Cold War 
vacuum,790 the threat from international terrorism however, was still regarded 
as existing 'over there' until as late as 2003; the UK seeing itself as a "... net 
exporter of terrorism".
791
  
The domestic problem seemed limited to dissident Republican activity 
(including some limited internecine violence and public order issues), and 
funding and propaganda activity that was tolerated up to the point laws were 
broken. Like the US the primary approach to counter terrorism was as a law 
enforcement problem, but in the UK this was often managed by the police 
services being cued by the agencies. The converse could often occur too, 
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with the agencies being fed potential leads from within the dissident 
communities that existed in London by Special Branch.792 What the UK had 
established, that the US had not, was a rapport and trust between actors in 
different agencies that were mutually reliant. Although the quantitative aspect 
of the rise in terrorism was new and took some time to adapt to,793 a 
collaborative infrastructure and matching habits existed. Existing probity and 
a shared maximand were thus linked by lower communication costs than in 
the US case, as systems of negotiation and the reciprocity that resulted were 
already in use. The established arrangements could become the genesis of 
the more formalised low institutional cost arrangements that were then 
developed. 
Despite this difference by the end of the first decade of the new millennium 
both nations had decided that terrorism, particularly international terrorism, 
was a key threat and that counteracting it was a central function of 
government. Both had conceived a definition of national security that was 
broad and outward looking, with threats best addressed at their source by 
holistic policies that leveraged the totality of government resources.794 The 
US and UK then both faced a similar problem, framed in within broadly 
similar world views and policy preferences, and were largely constrained by 
similar legal systems and societies. A degree of change was allowed; but any 
actions that did not fit with their views of themselves as liberal democracies 
operating within a generally accepted rule of law would be resisted. In the UK 
the failure of Prime Minister Tony Blair's government to persuade Parliament 
of the need for a raft of new measures that included much longer detention 
periods for terrorist subjects set the first limits on what changes to the law 
were to be deemed acceptable.795 In the US the much disputed technical 
legality of holding some terror suspects without trial in Guantanamo Bay 
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remains a running sore for the Obama administration.796 Given that what 
each nation wanted to achieve, and the position from which they were 
attempting to achieve it, were so similar, it is perhaps surprising that the 
methods each chose to deliver improved cooperative capability across their 
respective communities, and the outcomes of those efforts, were so very 
different.  
Section 2 of this chapter will therefore examine the external issues that 
impact on an intelligence and security communities ability to work 
cooperatively in the counterterrorism sphere from an institutional cost 
perspective. It will consider shifting environmental conditions like the need to 
focus on public protection rather than national security, then the peculiar 
effects of uncertainty and complexity in this area. Property rights and asset 
specificity within the communities will then be assessed, followed by the 
impact of globalisation. Section 3 will then look at behavioural problems in 
the counterterrorism field, such as the additional need for probity between 
actors and how the wide variety of specialisations involved can allow 
behaviours that affect institutional costs. Section 4 will continue looking at the 
variety of specialisations, but from the perspective of information holdings 
and the structural secrecy created through them. It will then briefly examine 
how the more modern issue of transparency in government more generally 
has impacted on the institutional costs incurred when addressing terrorism 
before the chapter is concluded in section 5.    
Section 2: External and Environmental Issues in Counterterrorism 
Provision 
a. Counterterrorism and the Shift in Function from ‘National Security’ to 
‘Public Protection’   
The last two decades have seen substantive shifts in the environment in 
which the intelligence and security organisations on both sides of the Atlantic 
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have to work, and the quantitative and qualitative changes in the terrorism 
threat have been one of the most significant pivot points of that shift. The 
terrorist attacks on the East coast of the United States in September 2001, 
and the London bombings of July 2005 (in conjunction with numerous other 
attempted terrorist attacks in the same period)797 demonstrated in the most 
tragic way that the preeminent threat to American and British security no 
longer came from hostile governments, but from terrorist organisations, and 
that these boasted not only foreign groups opposed to some elements of 
western policy, but also domestic extremists every bit as alienated from the 
societies from which they emerged.798 Yet the relative ability of the different 
parts of the two nations security and intelligence communities to act 
cooperatively, and the level of institutional costs each experience when doing 
so, have remained remarkably fixed.  
The dangers of the terrorist threat, and of the possible reactions to it, have 
meant that the intelligence agencies have had to make counter-terrorism 
rather than counterintelligence or even espionage their primary concern.799 
National security has therefore come to be much more closely aligned with 
public protection.800 The seriousness of the nuclear threat during the Cold 
War, from which little could be done to protect the public in the unlikely event 
of an attack,801 was replaced by an expectation that government would be 
able to protect its citizens from the less serious but more dispersed and more 
likely threat from terrorism.802 Their operating environment thus became far 
more uncertain as the threat from a hierarchical organisation with a generally 
understood strategic goal was replaced by hazards emanating from a raft of 
disparate actors whose motivations ranged from the global grand strategic to 
the personal. Even within an apparently single group like Al Qaeda motives,  
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links between the strategic and operational levels, and even what sort of 
organisation it believes itself to be, have become less clear.803 Uncertainty 
pervades both the threat and the perception of the threat. This in turn also 
meant that the complexity of both those who presented the threat, and the 
range of actors needed to counter it, rose concomitantly. Cooperation 
between them however is not necessarily assured, as Sir Stephen Lander 
observed, "Collaboration is not an end in itself. It is utility that drives 
collaboration".804 Therefore that utility needs to be apparent to those 
involved. 
The shift in challenge from a single dominant threat to a an environment 
“permeated by risk”805 had to be matched by an equally substantive increase 
in the principle purposes of the intelligence and security infrastructure on 
both sides of the Atlantic. Moreover it also demanded an end to their isolation 
if intelligence was to be useful in promulgating security across  a range of 
governmental responsibilities that now included, inter alia, things like civilian 
resilience to attacks806 and counter radicalisation initiatives.807 The result has 
been a considerable increase in the number and types of organisations that 
need to be involved, and the level and quantity of the interaction required 
between them.  
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At the same time intelligence agencies particularly had to change from being 
"... institutions that manage stocks of information..." to being "... managers of 
fused flows of relevant information where timeliness is essential".808 Similar 
increases in inter-connectedness had to be managed in other organisations, 
such as those responsible for policing or civilian contingency planning, that 
had not previously boasted information as any kind of prime commodity. The 
transition has had to be managed while many of those same agencies are 
busier than ever before, and when not just terrorism, but also an 'information 
revolution' is changing the world in which they work. In such circumstances 
frictions between new and old, or between winning and losing elements of 
the intelligence and security apparatus are inevitable. Given that context it is 
perhaps more surprising how quickly both the UK and US communities have 
adapted, than that each have struggled in some areas.809 Institutional costs 
are bound to be high when such frictions emerge. Separate organisations are 
contesting new property right allocations around the contemporary goal of 
'public protection' based on skills and procedures evolved for their roles the 
previous 'national security' environment.     
b. Counterterrorism and Increased Uncertainty & Complexity  
Countering terrorism in a liberal democratic state is a complex task. As soon 
as any task becomes even slightly complex it will of course need dividing into 
specialisms, which will in turn need to be successfully re-amalgamated once 
the individual tasks have been completed is to be addressed at the level 
which generated the tasks in the first place. Coordination is therefore 
mandatory in any complex task to off-set the limited spans of control at each 
level of authority because of  the limits on time, energy and knowledge that 
any individual can provide.810 In institutional cost terms this is the problem of 
bounded rationality in the actors involved. The number of levels of delegation 
will reflect the complexity of the task, and at the same time increase the 
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complexity of the re-integration needed to manage it. This is particularly true 
of the counter terrorism function as it has evolved over the last decade.   
The twin drivers of increasing uncertainty about the threat faced, and the 
evolution of an increasingly sophisticated and multi-faceted set of responses 
to it have generated a requirement for a far more complex and better 
integrated community. Not only were new vertical connections needed, but 
so too were horizontal interactions suddenly required so that tactical and 
operational level synergies could be achieved. The inevitable result is that 
the problems of having disparate functions within the intelligence and security 
communities cooperate, while not new,811 have also increased. As the 
degree of difficulty will be to some extent a factor of the number of 
interactions involved, then the number of nodes involved will become a 
critical factor in collaborative success or failure if institutional costs are not 
managed.  
Consider for example the simple shift depicted in Figure 5.1,812 wherein a 
centralised national security apparatus not dissimilar to those required during 
the Cold War is represented on the left, and on the right the increasingly 
decentralised organisational form more useful in providing public security 
against a much broader terrorist threat is symbolised, so that the dotted red 
lines represent new lines of communication that need to be established and 
run, assuming the need for increased information flow and cooperative 
working between the functions needed. In this very simple example only one 
additional function has been added, but each member is connected to one 
another.  
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Not only have the communication costs risen significantly, as Williamson 
demonstrated when contrasting pin-wheel and all-channel methods of 
organisation,813 but also by that simple shift, the addition of a single extra 
actor and with each now interconnected so that the appropriate level of 
transaction can be handled at the correct level, the potential for institutional 
cost problems has risen exponentially. Furthermore in this heuristic model, 
and Williamson’s original, only a single cycle is being considered. A more 
realistic model would need to factor in the inclusion of sub-groups and 
internal networks that will each incur further rounds of communication costs 
at the least, and might each need some degree of re-negotiation in many 
cases, as well the sequential nature of less than perfectly similar transactions 
over time. The true level of institutional costs that result is thus more akin to a 
factorial of a factorial, and will be non-trivial even in the least contentious 
cases.  
The net outcome is that the two factors; an increase in the number of 
relevant departments or agencies and an increase in the need for them to 
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engage horizontally, actually cause an exponential increase in the number of 
times different elements will need to contract with each other to either share 
information or agree which will provide particular aspects of any proposed 
solution to a perceived problem. There is thus an inevitable increase in the 
transaction costs involved in the whole enterprise, as represented in Figure 
5.2.814  
None of the alternative organisational forms can perfectly address this 
problem.815 If a centralised control either directly manages each negotiation 
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between any of its sub-units, then its own bounded rationality and the 
constraints on executive time will create asymmetric information holdings 
between levels and encourage the sort of opportunistic behaviours discussed 
elsewhere in this thesis. It is thus hardly surprising that the possibility of hold-
up tactics, and the sheer limits of capability that channel capacity produce, 
have encouraged the National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) to retreat 
away from the more time sensitive operational decision making and towards 
the strategic and policy making levels.816 
On the other hand an alternative approach whereby the centre initiates a 
series of sequential negotiations that are delegated down and then along the 
outer rim of the sort of complex community represented on the right hand 
side of figure 5.1 will be wholly reliant on a clear and shared understanding of 
what the centre wants to achieve. But will in any event it will be increasingly 
hostage to the particular agendas of lower levels as the distance from the 
centre increases and the number of principal-agent style interactions 
increases. Adam Smith’s consideration of pin-making as such a series of 
technologically distinct but mutually interdependent functions817 may be 
regarded as a useful parallel here. As Williamson points out, it is transaction 
costs “… that militate against such an organisation of tasks”. This is partly 
because explicitly contracting in advance for even the limited functional 
elements of pin-making involves a degree of complexity, but more importantly 
that even if drafted such explicit contracts cannot provide even the limited 
adaptability necessary for such a simple task.818 The likelihood of 
opportunistic behaviour by sub-levels with their own understanding of what 
the maximand is are significantly higher in a problem as complex as 
counterterrorism.  
Institutional cost problems are therefore magnified to a significant degree in 
an uncertain and complex environment like counter terrorism. This is 
especially true when time sensitive transactions must occur and any threat of 
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hold-up risks catastrophic failure. The particular nature of counter terrorism 
activity inevitably engenders considerably increased cooperative problems, 
and organisational forms will necessarily have to adapt to deal with them,819 
but the usefulness of these alternatives is a function of the interplay of the 
different institutional costs with which they must deal. 
Small differences in the institutional cost environment within a particular 
intelligence and security community will thus translate into much larger 
differences in cooperative outcomes than would otherwise be the case. This 
has been the relative experience of the respective counter terrorism 
communities in the United Kingdom’s and United States. 
The UK's history left it better place to deal with this shift. It was after all a 
relatively simple matter to have organisations that were well used to working 
with each other and to negotiating over which came to the fore to achieve 
any given objective at any given point, to simply shift their (already) joint 
sense of what the maximand was from national security to public safety. The 
property rights of each remained largely unchanged. The Security Service, 
who had no powers of arrest or even search of their own, were used to 
having to hand over lead position to Special Branch officers whenever a real 
possibility of an imminent risk to the public emerged, and Special Branch 
every bit as used to handing over leads that could more usefully be 
developed for intelligence purposes than as arrests.820  
Indeed some operations during the 1990s this 'lead' could be passed back 
and forth several times as assessments of the situation changed. In 1992 
primacy for Irish Republican intelligence on the UK mainland was passed to 
the Security Service, although RUC-SB retained it in Northern Ireland. The 
Metropolitan Police’s Special Branch (MPSB) and the Police more generally 
provided and still had decision making authority over the type and scale of 
deployment of any executive capability. This could realistically mean that if a 
PIRA active service unit (ASU) travelled to London for example, the 
intelligence lead on those directing their activities would be with the ‘Royal 
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Ulster Constabulary’s Special Branch’ (RUC-SB), while the lead on the ASU 
itself with the Security Service. Meanwhile ongoing surveillance of them, and 
of any ‘quartermaster’ or other actors that might be contacted by them, would 
very likely be within the bailiwick of MPSB, who also provided the local and 
community level intelligence,821 but could be managed by the Security 
Service, or even both simultaneously as an operation grew. Mainland 
interdiction could threaten RUC-SB sources in the province and vice-versa, 
and would usually need police assets. At various points in such an operation 
therefore primacy might pass back and forth between senior bureaucrats in 
each organisation, but at any such point the formal lead would be cognisant 
of the possibility of future shifts and other operations, and thus of the need to 
be mindful of the priorities of their sister organisations throughout. The 
temporal nature of primacy and these exchanges thus lowered institutional 
costs as reciprocity increased probity. 
Assessments were made at an operational level by actors who knew each 
other personally, were aware of the needs of the others organisation and 
could realistically expect an equal consideration of their own drivers. 
Meetings were regular, and during critical stages of operations the decision 
makers would be co-located adjacent to the same operations room. All that 
needed to change was the point at which the acceptable level of threat to 
public safety was passed; little more than a tactical recalculation given the 
absence of coded warnings and different objectives of the terrorists, coupled 
with a formalisation of ad hoc procedures already in existence so that the 
increase in the numbers of potential plots could be better managed.822 Clear 
property rights and the resultant mutual interdependence meant the shift was 
easier.  
That such easy cooperation was based on both clear property rights and 
established trust over time that facilitated negotiations was made clear during 
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the most turbulent years of the Northern Ireland crisis; when organisational 
relationships varied dependent on the following factors.  
After the establishment of direct rule in 1972 until 1984 the Security Service 
and Secret Intelligence Service cooperated through the machinery of the 
‘Irish Joint Section’ (IJS) based on their established property rights over the 
domestic and foreign spheres without any great friction. The relationship 
between the Security Service and RUC-SB was also largely harmonious, with 
agent running being divided along much the same lines as it was on the 
mainland. RUC-SB handled the majority as they originated within the 
communities they policed, and the Security Service focusing on more 
politically useful targets, so that the relationship could be described by one 
insider as “… fairly seamless”. Both organisations for example had a shared 
interest in having the Northern Ireland Office (NIO) and wider government 
clarify rules on agent handling so could bond over a common cause. The 
Army on the other hand did not regard themselves as bound by Home Office 
guidelines in any event. Where property rights overlapped however, and the 
temporal dimension needed to establish low friction relationships was absent, 
the situation was very different, so that the relationship between the Army 
and RUC-SB was more fractious as the former sought to run agents in the 
same pool as the latter, a situation made worse by their rationale, that the 
RUC-SB were perceived as biased against the Catholic community. Tellingly, 
despite the plethora of committees operating at various levels of policy and 
tactical decision making, as late as 1988 the Prime Minister’s Office observed 
that coordination (of the intelligence agencies in Northern Ireland) was “… 
not an organisational matter, but a question of trust between those 
concerned, which can only be gained by working together”.823 Overall 
however the British had an established low institutional cost means of 
integrating different elements informally, which only needed to be slightly re-
ordered and formalised to meet the new operating environment.   
On the other hand the different elements that contributed to the United States 
intelligence and security effort that could be applied to the terrorist threat had 
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not changed substantially since 1947, and were orchestrated on much the 
same premise as they had been when counteracting the threat of espionage 
and subversion during the Cold War. The number of types of policy response 
involved was limited, and it was not necessarily seen as a priority by many of 
them who had broader national security responsibilities, so that their utility 
was best served in other policy areas.  
The CIA who were responsible for developing intelligence on terrorist threats 
overseas were, for example, primarily focused on nation-state to nation-state 
level threats to the US. The FBI, who had domestic responsibility, were 
focused on crime fighting, of which there was a lot, and happened to include 
terrorism, of which there was very little. Each organisation was an asset that 
was specific to a different problem. In some cases, crucially, high institutional 
costs were tolerated because they appeared to protect ideas of personal 
liberty.824 The classic case of this is the creation, and subsequent 
development of, the ‘wall’ between domestic law enforcement and foreign 
intelligence gathering, where rulings from the ‘Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court’ (FISC) on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
1978 (FISA), and constant re-interpretations by risk averse bureaucrats in the 
intervening years lead to the situation described in the 9/11 Commission 
Report where CIA and FBI elements felt legally barred from sharing 
information, to tragic effect. The different parts of each organisation were 
arranged so that individuals were unlikely to see notable returns in terms of 
additional utility by concentrating on terror, and could suffer sanction if seen 
to be helping the other agency.825  
Even when engaging with the terrorism issue the end goals of each were so 
disparate, with one concerned to prosecute offenders and the other to 
produce intelligence, that no shared maximand was apparent even when 
both were nominally part of the same unit.826 The sort of existing informal 
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nodes for communication, and the social norms that encouraged it in the 
British system were thus absent in the United States.  
Rather than being an exclusively cultural issue however, the contrasting 
approaches can be seen to reflect the different  rationalities exhibited by 
players during sequential rounds of the 'Iterated Prisoners Dilemma Game': 
In the UK case the sequential nature of the contracting by the same players 
encourages the same sort of cooperation the Rapoport and Dale observed in 
players mid sequence, whereas the less routine nature of interaction across 
organisations in the US encourages the sort of brinkmanship they found at 
the end of a cycle of play,827 suggesting that as well as culture the respective 
clarity of the actors property rights in the counterterrorism field in each nation 
are a factor.  
The sort of horizontal interaction needed to counter terrorist activity was an 
historical and cultural anathema in the United States. Information tended to 
be passed up the chain for assessment, from Agent to Agent in Charge for 
example, and only if it reached a certain level, and presented very clear 
external dimensions, would it move across to another agency, as was 
demonstrated by the respective retention of information on the Malaysian 
conspirators and the Phoenix memorandum by the CIA and FBI.828 The 
number of nodes in such a situation are of course increased vertically before 
ever making the necessary horizontal leaps, and the institutional costs 
increase because of the numerical increase in relevant actors, and because 
of the additional behavioural factors that are introduced. This can exacerbate 
the potential for structural failings that can in any event occur according to 
different organisational forms that must edit specific intelligence in or out to 
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reporting as it progresses up a hierarchy, as so clearly described by Bendor 
and Hammond.829  
The net result is that the American communities have proven more rigid than 
their British counterparts, and were thus badly positioned to adapt to the 
increased terrorism threat. However the increased number of cooperative 
contracts that need to be managed is only part of the problem that the 
environmental shift towards a focus on terrorism generates. Where those 
nodes are actually situated is equally problematic if they are not aligned to 
the new policy requirements thrown up by the emerging threat. Uncertain 
intelligence or security environments and the resultant shifting types of task 
will always mean adapting existing organisational forms to meet them as no 
form will be perfect in every case.830 Clarity of property rights is therefore an 
issue of central importance in deciding success or failure during the 
collaborative endeavours needed to counter terrorism.   
c. Property Rights Problems and the Issue of Redundancy in 
Counterterrorism  
Property rights in the counter terrorism sphere are more problematic than in 
most areas of governance. Not only are there a large number of aspects to 
the problem that need to be addressed, as discussed above, but also they do 
not parallel the traditional departmental divides that have evolved in both the 
United Kingdom and United States. The flexibility of any complex 
bureaucracy cannot hope to match the rapid adaptive capability of an organic 
organisation such as Al Qaeda, who have managed to alter their targeting 
strategy, their methods of recruitment and radicalisation, and even their 
command and control methodology in response to western attempts to 
undermine them.831 Robert Mueller, the Director of the FBI between 4th 
September 2001 and 4th September 2013, observed that "Our enemies live 
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in the seams of our jurisdictions. No single agency or nation can find them 
and fight them alone. If we are to protect our citizens, working together is not 
just the best option, it is the only option.”832  
A particular issue is as likely to fall midway along the axis between the two 
hypothetical functional areas A and B described in the diagram above (Figure 
5.1) as within them, and will shift along it over time. Responsibility may thus 
be shared and will also shift. This fact has non-trivial institutional cost 
implications. Even within the intelligence sphere alone for example levels of 
organisation need to be divided according to different requirements. If the 
most senior working level is separated thematically,833 between for example 
issues like terrorism, proliferation and economic intelligence, then as 
Hammond concluded, the next level down will probably need to be divided 
according to another, such as geographical location. A third sub-unit is likely 
to need yet another separation, such as who the customer for that 
intelligence is, and so forth. No general rule is discernible, only that sub-units 
will necessarily have to utilise a different approach to that of superior 
levels.834 This of course presents property rights problems.  
Consider for example a hypothetical human intelligence source reporting 
from a nation that could subsequently present a terrorist threat. If function A 
in Figure 5.3835 is counterterrorism intelligence, then the senior official level 
(denoted 1), may have strategic responsibilities that are delineated 
thematically around a particular ideology prevalent in that Country, and wish 
to task the source accordingly. At the same time an operational level analyst 
in a division concerned with weapon proliferation might also have 
responsibilities that include the country in question, and wish to task the 
source against that requirement. Although theoretically junior the analyst at 
2a is not in the same line-management as the senior official in 1. His or her 
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interest will then be vested in pleasing the senior official at 2. Given that any 
targeting of such a source presents a risk to it, then both sides will be 
incentivised to limit the source's exposure to their own area of interest.  
 
If the strategic and operational level property rights are well defined (or a 
clear requirements and priorities regime can provide the same), and if 
negotiations between the two thematic divisions take place in an atmosphere 
of shared knowledge and trust, then the two elements could be mutually 
complimentary. If the source is well placed it may even be encouraged to 
generate its own sub-level sources that can address the extant issues. 
However if it is less clear who responsible for what, or indeed what the key 
problems are, or if incentives are skewed to promote sub-goal pursuits by 
actors, then opportunistic behaviour may occur, with one side using 
asymmetric information holdings about the source to obscure their capability 
in the others area for example. 
Nonetheless negotiating will likely be towards a shared sense of the same 
maximand when those involved are engaged in the same functional area. 
One of the particular problems of the counter terrorism sphere is however 
that actors from a variety of functional areas need to be engaged in any 
holistic response, some of whom are not traditional players in security issues. 
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If one then extends the example above by a single functional area, as 
depicted in Figure 5.4836 then even a simple case demonstrates how the 
potential for overlapping property rights and negotiating complexity increase 
exponentially. This happens at the same time as the likelihood of the 
participants feeling any sense of shared end-goal decreases, because of 
loyalties and incentives being orientated towards their own functional area 
and the responsibilities that go with it. There is a dichotomy between the 
need for hierarchical control to avoid 'dilatory and time consuming' 
negotiations in time sensitive areas and the necessity for coordinating 
devices that can link the disparate elements into a cohesive program.  
Coordination however, far more than a hierarchy, needs a 'dominant idea' as 
"... the foundation of action and self-coordination in the daily operation of all 
the parts of the enterprise".837 Combating terrorism therefore needs both a 
shared maximand, and the means through which it can be inculcated into the 
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more specific goals and ambitions of sub-units if the full capacity of a 
government is to be utilised. Counter terrorism is thus a field where the 
existence of interdepartmental committees are essential to manage these 
sorts of coordination issues, for which hierarchical structures are ill-suited. 
They are better able to manage 'abnormal' situations and 'matters of 
policy';838 both of which are repeated features within the terrorism sphere.  
It is for this reason that the UK's long history of an approach that combined a 
committee system at the senior level supporting more hierarchal 
arrangements at the operational level, where matters impacting at a tactical 
level could be dealt with in a timely manner, has so often proved more 
successful in collaborative working against terrorism than the US community 
(despite numerous edicts from authoritative figures in the latter case). It is 
also why the US military was suddenly able to demonstrate the same sort of 
cooperative efficiency once General Soyster reenergised the Military 
Intelligence Board as a cross cutting committee within it, as discussed in Part 
3 of this thesis.    
There is however another aspect to this issue. Any counter terrorism activity 
is likely to be very serious in nature, so that failure as a result of system 
malfunction is unlikely to be acceptable to any degree. In a complex and 
operationally integrated system there is a risk of minor errors becoming "... 
amplified along the chain", particularly if the environment is uncertain.839 
Contrary to conventional public sector pressures to avoid any duplication of 
effort (and thus any duplication of costs) there is therefore a strong case to 
be made for accepting the institutional costs involved so that there is 
adequate redundancy in the system to avoid surprise attacks. Tom Fingar, 
who was chosen840by DNI Negraponte to lead the development of a 
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genuinely integrated information environment in the US intelligence 
community as a Deputy Director (Intelligence Analysis) in the newly formed 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) came to the same 
conclusion, and determined to leave some degree of overlap in critical areas 
to provoke more rounded assessments than any single agency might 
produce, and as part of the systems of checks and balances.841  
As we have seen, Richard Betts acknowledges these trade-offs. He argues 
that redundancy prevents too simple a consensus taking root, then goes 
further and links these trade-offs with those for and against multiple advocacy 
at the executive level, echoing Luther Gulick's concerns about spans of 
control being limited by executive time and energy842 on the analytic front. 
Betts argues that this will lead to bounded rationality in the decision maker, 
however well intentioned he or she might be. In the end he does not reach a 
conclusion, reinforcing the idea that no organisational form will be perfect in 
every circumstance. He does however warn that in a community of finite 
resources there is a tension between a system with redundancy built into it, 
and one with adequate breadth to warn of emerging threats in non-priority 
areas.843 This tension is essentially an issue of the asset specificity of the 
organisational form selected, and it has a special resonance in the terrorism 
field. Property rights are allocated along existing departmental and functional 
responsibilities, but the terrorism problem crosses them in constantly shifting 
ways. As a result new negotiations, that may be subject to opportunistic 
behaviour and high institutional costs for all of the reasons described 
elsewhere in this chapter, are regularly required.          
d. Asset Specificity in Counterterrorism Organisation: 
In addition to the tension observed by Betts in the allocation of scarce 
resources against a plethora of potential threats, there is also a similarly 
difficult structural choice to be made. Any degree of specialisation has the 
effect of making the more specialised asset increasingly specific to the 
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problem with which it is designed to deal. However terrorism is a broad and 
adaptive phenomenon, particularly in the modern era. In the biological world 
too great a degree of specialisation is prevented through equipotentiality; the 
tendency of neural networks to avoid becoming too specialised so that they 
can take over each other's functions in the event of damage to the system, 
albeit less efficiently. A comparable amount of caution in public sector 
endeavours has been recommended by Landau.844 Put into institutional cost 
terms, too great a degree of asset specificity in an agency means that it will 
be less able to adapt smoothly to environmental shifts.  
Certainly in counterterrorism activity a balance must be struck: The military 
for example took over an increasing number of protective security functions 
from the police in Northern Ireland  as the level of violence intensified. There 
were problems certainly,845 but the system as a whole coped where it might 
not have done had the military been inflexible and capable only of using the 
levels of lethal force necessary in war.846 Conversely, as we saw in chapter 
3, too precise a remit for the USAF during the Cuban missile crisis limited the 
policy responses open to the President.847 The point of balance will however 
continually shift in the uncertain counterterrorism environment. Integration 
reliant on adaptive collegial systems with established patterns of trust are 
therefore more likely to succeed in cooperating over a period of time than a 
more rigid hierarchal one. Property rights clarity too can be more reliably 
inured against environmental shifts if they are based on internal 
responsibilities that can be re-targeted by the same organisation as 
circumstances dictate, as is the case with the British 'Agencies', rather than 
being delineated by the target, which may shift at any time.   
Shifting that point of balance is however no easy task, as other institutional 
costs conspire to hold to a status quo. Zegart has convincingly described a 
dual faceted problem where organisational form is victim to not only to the 
machinations of current actors (discussed elsewhere throughout this thesis), 
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but also of those involved in the initial shaping of that form. Zegart thus 
argues that the agencies are, at least in part, path dependent.848 To use her 
notable simile, agency birthmarks endure so that “Initial agency design 
makes possible certain paths and rules out others”.849  
The inter-play of rational self-interested Congressional and bureaucrat 
actors, at one point in time, thus dictates agency organisation and capability 
far beyond that point. Whatever the motivations of those involved they were 
designing a system to deal with a threat landscape very different to the one 
now faced, their appreciation of potential changes inevitably bounded by their 
own experiences and cognitive limitations; it is not reasonable to expect the 
seismic shifts in environment to have been foreseeable over so many 
decades. More immediately apparent would have been the threat to their 
work in the near future by other actors invested in alternative solutions. As 
Zegart continues: “...today’s winners may be tomorrows losers....” those 
‘birthmarks’ are designed to ensure that the agencies are beyond future 
political control by enveloping them in “...counterproductive detailed rules, 
regulations, and requirements”.850 The relative lack of importance of terrorism 
as a policy problem then therefore informs the ability of intelligence and 
security communities to deal with it now. They are asset specific to a different 
world.       
Zegart was of course describing (a lack of) developments in the United 
States, but Michael Herman has described a British community that adapts in 
an evolutionary rather than revolutionary style,851 despite his 
acknowledgement of the importance of environmental changes such as the 
information revolution to counterterrorism practises, and the 'Revolution in 
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Military Affairs' (RMA) that it also initiated.852 Sir Michael Quinlan, examining 
the community in 1993, also observed that if the UK community was starting 
from scratch it would create different sorts of agencies",853 suggesting at 
least a degree of the same 'stickiness'.  The different experiences of the two 
may thus be rooted in their different approaches to power more generally; the 
UK favouring a Cabinet based consensual system of government over the 
USA's belief in greater personal power and responsibility initiating a system 
headed by a committee, the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), rather than 
an individual, which came to be responsible for both national level 
assessments and community management "... almost by accident".854  
Ironically the US preference for individual authority is tempered by a political 
system based on a constitution framed in 1787 more to extol liberal ideals 
designed to limit power than to promote either efficiency or even 
democracy.855 Concepts like the separation of powers and limited tenures 
percolate down to agency structure and capability in parallel to the rigidity 
that hierarchical systems imbue. The British system was therefore historically 
organised to be less asset specific, to be able to adapt to the developing 
terrorism threat and to the evolving risks from it, and to leverage a 'whole of 
government' response to its many levels. Institutional costs between the 
different elements negotiating between themselves to see how each adaption 
could be managed were thus lower. 
e. Counterterrorism and Globalisation  
Globalisation was initially perceived as an overall 'good' from a security 
perspective, in anticipation of a world where an increasing number of liberal 
democracies would compete on an economic basis and become ever further 
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entwined and mutually reliant through trade.856 The evolution of terrorism in 
particular has always provided an alternative narrative, whether through links 
between predominantly nationalist groups like the Provisional Irish 
Republican Army (PIRA) and rogue states such as Libya even as they 
engaged with the Irish Diaspora in the US,857 or the links between 
ideologically driven left wing terrorists and the Soviet Union during the Cold 
War.858 The increase in both uncertainty and complexity that globalisation 
has produced over the last decade or so, as the threat from abroad and that 
at home have merged still further, has been described by the Chair of the 
Intelligence and Security Committee, Sir Malcolm Rifkind. He has argued that 
a greater degree of intrusion into private spaces might be required to counter 
it.859 This in turn requires the negotiation of a new mandate and new forms of 
oversight to match. What is clear is that domestic public safety in both the US 
and UK is now inseparable from their security posture and intelligence 
capabilities overseas.860  
Richard Aldrich has argued that the problems of a more globalised world 
have fundamentally changed the very purposes of the intelligence 
organisations in both the UK and US. He describes how the twin drivers of 
counter terrorism and support to military operations have meant that rather 
than simply being involved in information acquisition or analysis they have 
become increasingly engaged in the use of that information for 'fixing, 
enforcing and disrupting' activities.861 This has ramifications for both internal 
and external organisation, and as a result the institutional cost environment 
within and between them: Internally different capabilities and different types 
of management are required of course. But still more significant are the 
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external shifts required. Not only will new points of intersection be required 
horizontally with other agencies, departments and foreign partners, all of 
which will need to be coordinated and some of which will provoke new 
oversight issues;862 but also in becoming their own customers for information 
the relationship with central governmental machinery, especially through the 
requirements and priorities process, is fundamentally altered.  
The relationships between the security elements involved are also altered. 
These are now more routinely proximate to not only their own intelligence 
apparatus, but also to those within the intelligence community itself. Property 
rights around both the intelligence and security aspects must therefore be 
realigned and agreed as both sides have capacity in both areas, and chains 
of command must be re-examined. Consider for example the different 
authorisations needed for a drone strike by the USA. If it is to be performed 
by the CIA then they are authorised by the Executive under Title 50, and 
Congress must be informed of their use through the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), but US involvement is not admitted. If 
however the strike is by the military then it can be authorised internally within 
the DoD and need only be reported to Congress (the Armed Services 
Committees not the SSCI) if the strike is defined as counterterrorism - and 
that is only since March 2012.863 As both avenues might be open to the same 
decision maker, who might then use the level and type of supervision he or 
she wished to engage with as a deciding factor.  
Clearly the environmental shifts have left maladapted processes that were 
designed for different functional entities in place.  Organisational adaption is 
therefore required to deal with this sort of problem. Yet rather than managers 
adapting organisational forms to deal with these new issues, Aldrich 
suggests they 'side-stepped' the difficulties and acted opportunistically in 
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letting the 'urgent' imperatives of pursuing tactical threats drown out the 
'important' but far more complex requirement for reorganisation.864   
At the same time globalisation has added to the profusion of points of contact 
between different groups or organisations with which counterterrorism must 
deal. The impact of the additional points of contact needed to address the 
different policy aspects of terrorism were outlined above, and globalisation 
adds an another dimension to this problem. Not only did it increase 
exponentially the number of transactions that had to go through the ‘contact’, 
‘contract’ and ‘control’ process, it also increased the range of different and 
potentially difficult negotiations that might be required. Within a nations 
intelligence and security community it can act as a catalyst for improved 
cooperative working as ‘home’ and ‘foreign’ responsibilities merge.865  
But globalisation also necessitates more external negotiations, outside the 
nation state.866 These can then have repercussions for it in its wider external 
relations and for its domestic policy environment, but a government or 
agency may have only a finite control over their direction and outcome. 
Issues like the treatment of captives during interrogation by nations with 
different values, and the use or non-use of that information provoke 
negotiations with liaison partners and with a range of internal actors with a 
variety of perspectives that can be hard to align.  
The difficult balancing act that this requires from those at the point of 
intersection has been outlined by the Secret Intelligence Service Chief Sir 
John Sawers, in answer to questions put by the Intelligence and Security 
Committee in 2013. He drew attention to the importance of countries with 
very different legal and cultural frameworks to current intelligence priorities, 
the legal framework in which SIS operate, whilst at the same time 
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establishing that "... there are sometimes fine balances to be drawn".867 As if 
to demonstrate the point, in the US case the complex new dynamic between 
the overseas and domestic environments has resulted in an attempt to create 
a new space between them at the Guantanamo Camp in Cuba that avoids 
the difficult legal and moral questions the shift threw-up in its wake, but the 
on-going legal negotiations and political and reputational debates this has 
initiated have only brought the problem into sharper relief, and made 
tangentially linked agreements more fraught.868 A US attempt to address the 
problem through a provision of the Foreign Services Act that makes 
Ambassadors and Heads of Mission responsible has been only partly 
successful due to their asymmetric holdings of information when compared to 
the intelligence Head of Station.869   
Globalisation thus has significant institutional cost implications at a structural 
level that can be captured within the environmental variables of the 
institutional costs impact framework. These in turn can impact on the 
behaviours required from and provoked in different actors as they find 
themselves in new situations and the next section will consider the relevance 
of these in the terrorism context.  
Section 3: Behavioural Issues and Counterterrorism Provision 
The last section described how shifts in the extent and pattern of global and 
organisational interconnectivity have undermined earlier clean departmental 
divisions between types of work, and in particular around the intelligence and 
security spheres. Governance in the UK is no different to that of the US in 
this respect. Nonetheless matters that are entwined in terms of both cause 
and effect still have to be divided amongst particular departments to be 
manageable because of the bounded rationality of the officials involved. The 
divisions are however often false.870   
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Nowhere is this more true than in the counter terrorism context. Terrorism, as 
Paul Pillar noted "… is an epiphenomenon of broader political and social 
developments" and must be addressed as such.871 Not only does this mean 
that forecasting it requires a deep contextual knowledge of these areas that 
cannot be served by the short range policy support that emerged in the US in 
the wake of 9/11,872 but also that combating it is not solely a policing or 
security function, but a far a wider undertaking that needs to address it at 
these levels too. It must therefore cross normally discrete political 
departments and operational entities, different arms of governance that are 
not usually linked to the intelligence and security domains, and include wider 
policy questions about housing, education and cultural identity. Institutional 
frictions between diverse groups of actors with a number of different 
organisational ethos's will necessarily be involved.  
Some, like those in the secret world, will necessarily develop very close 
internal ties to deal with the unique pressures of their work that will foment 
tensions with those outside.873 Others will be employed in more conventional 
parts of the wider civil service such as in a department responsible for 
education, or even in the public sector, and more closely represent the public 
at large.874 Some of the tactics and objectives of the former group may even 
be anathema to actors in the latter. In countering terrorism, and particularly 
terrorism that spans the domestic and international environments, in an 
holistic way they will nonetheless all have a part to play and will need to work 
cooperatively to some degree. 
At the same time each part of a security and intelligence community must 
attend to its own responsibilities. The problems of sub-goal pursuit that this 
results in are not only linked to the specified purpose of any given 
organisation, they are an integral part of its DNA. From the outset recruiters 
will look for particular character traits in those they hire and train, and 
thereafter the character of the organisation will be ingrained into them. This 
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promulgates a vicious or virtuous circle, depending on the environmental 
conditions in which those actors must then operate. Authors such as Zegart 
and Posner have described in some detail the deleterious effects of any 
mismatch between the cultural identity of an organisation and that required 
for an emerging role in the counterterrorism sphere, as well as the difficulties 
of altering such an identity even when a great deal of effort is applied.875 All 
that needs to be added here is that the cultural and social norms of an 
organisation represent one of the preeminent examples of asset specificity 
and is one of the least adaptive but most important elements of any 
community member. As Omand has observed, to ignore these cultural 
holdings is to invite failure in any change program.876 
Even within the more limited intelligence and security communities different 
characteristics are in any event required because of the unique difficulties 
that terrorism throws up. Michael Herman has described the different 
behaviours required to deal with both longer term requirements through 
forward looking analysis and well considered future-orientated source 
recruitment on the one hand, and timely reaction to events on the other, the 
need for the patient disposition required for counterintelligence and detective 
work as well as the intense 'quick response' approach needed for military or 
law-enforcement action.877 There is therefore a temporal nature to the 
problem of sub-goal pursuit, with different parts of any intelligence and 
security community likely to prefer an outcome divided by type (for instance a 
disruption as against arrests to foil a terrorist plot) but also by time, with some 
taking a much longer term view than others. The problem thus goes beyond 
the merely practical one of the urgent drowning out the important, which can 
be solved by the judicious balancing of resource allocation.878 Different parts 
of an intelligence and security community, even at a quite senior level, will 
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realise different utility returns from solutions timed for the near or more 
distant futures. These preferences will be deeply ingrained into their 
organisational and personal psyche so that negotiations between different 
preferences may be heartfelt and difficult.   
At the operational level the constant mutating of terrorism itself can provoke 
similar problems. Herman for example argues that counterterrorism action is 
distinct to counterterrorism intelligence, however closely they are aligned 
operationally, and needs to remain so because of the distinct cultures each 
requires.879 Yet Omand has described a post 9/11 World where intelligence 
'gatherers' have had to become 'hunters',880 a shift replicated in many 
intelligence organisations around the world.881 Conversely within the law 
enforcement community the role of intelligence in directing operational 
decision-making has increased significantly.882 As well as the necessity for 
external integration of disparate organisations and intentions, terrorism thus 
provokes a need for internal cultural shifts that encourage collaborative 
working with new actors with different skill-sets. Given the 'structural secrecy' 
advantages that specialisations bestow the potential for actors to act 
opportunistically if they disapprove of such shifts are large, and behavioural 
factors may well determine how successful new collaborative arrangements 
are.  
How disposed actors are to use this power may however turn on other 
factors that can be every bit as intangible as the behaviour itself, but are 
significant in an uncertain and complex sphere like counterterrorism. These 
can be captured within the institutional costs impact framework: Firstly senior 
actors will need to generate a genuinely shared maximand that is applicable 
across all the relevant organisations and at all levels of them and develop 
what Sir David Omand describes as a 'convincing narrative' of its merits and 
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of the need to adapt to achieve it.883Secondly the 'atmosphere' within an 
organisation must be robust enough for it, and the individual actors within it, 
to be confident enough to take on new tasks. In this respect an organisations 
established ethos is as likely to be a disadvantage as an advantage in 
informing behaviours.884  
Whilst the specific institutional cost issues that occur at the intra and inter-
organisational level are beyond the scope of this chapter, it is worth noting 
that the fact that sub-organisations will, by definition, have sub-level goals 
has implications for vertical coordination. Whether the approach is 
authoritative or collegial if a 'principal' is to achieve cooperation amongst the 
range of 'agents' in an intelligence and security community despite their 
information disadvantage then these disparate goals must be as closely 
aligned as possible without losing property rights clarity over actual roles. 
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Consider the relatively simple counterterrorism situation represented in 
Figure 5.5,885 where it is assumed for the sake of clarity that the marginal 
costs of each of the three functional areas described are the same (although 
this will rarely be the case). The line X represents a hypothetical point at 
which a successful attack becomes inevitable, which is included as it has 
different implications for the benefits each function are receiving from 
cooperating. 
In this hypothetical case the benefits law enforcement receive start low as the 
intelligence function is likely to be the lead agency. Credit for an early 
intervention, when a plot is in its infancy and any charges likely to be less 
substantial, is limited and more likely to go to the intelligence organisation. 
However once the attack occurs and becomes a 'crime'886 the utility they 
receive from cooperation rises sharply as they become the lead organisation 
and receive much of the kudos for solving it. They nonetheless need 
intelligence from the intelligence bodies to assist them. The utility an 
intelligence organisation gains from cooperation might also start low because 
of both competition and other responsibilities other than terrorism that mean 
an opportunity cost limits their relative utility, but rise smoothly throughout 
because of the current political and media interest in counterterrorism, until 
some point where it drop sharply due as no further benefits are realised.887 
Protective security on the other hand begin by receiving a large amount of 
utility from cooperation as intelligence can allow them to function more 
efficiently and law enforcement help can provide 'free' assistance. However 
this will fall rapidly once an attack occurs as the relevance of this function 
diminishes.  
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The result however is that the point of equilibrium; the maximum degree to 
which each will be incentivised to cooperate, is different in each case. This in 
turn will limit the potential size of any shared maximand. Furthermore it will 
vary with the particular circumstances of any given case so that sequential 
negotiations between them will be necessary and have distinct features on 
each occasion. The tone of those negotiations is thus non-trivial, but more 
importantly to this argument the ability for any poorly sighted higher 
organisation or role-holder to harness the joint capabilities of all their sub-
level functional entities is potentially quite limited. The nature of their 
organisational and even personal relationships with lower echelons will 
therefore be of importance.   
There is accordingly a tension between the sorts of principal-agent problems 
an ingrained functionally related cultural identity has thrown up in parts of the 
US system, and the flexibility the same sort of professional ethos has 
permitted in the UK. How, for example, does one account for the different 
experiences of the FBI, who have excelled in some investigative areas of 
counterterrorism but whose compliance with other cooperative mandates has 
been perfunctory at best? This can be compared to the very different 
experience of the British Security Service, who have adapted to cooperative 
working almost painlessly, formalising new processes with existing partner 
agencies and supporting the creation of wholly new bodies like the Joint 
Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) and Centre for the Protection of National 
Infrastructure (CPNI), despite a resultant loss of 'turf', without any great 
contention?  
The external threat each was required to address was similar, but the internal 
change narrative much less convincing in the former, but this is not a 
problem of national characteristics. Consider for example the sort of gaming 
behaviour and lack of support that lead to the 2008 resignation of the 
reforming Sir Ian Blair as Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police following 
(inter alia) the De Menezes shooting in 2005.888 In that case the absence of 
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any shared maximand and poor working relationships (or 'atmosphere' in 
Williamson's transaction cost language889) encouraged some lower tiers to 
use information advantages to undermine Commissioner Blair. Expertise 
garnered in previous years needs to be utilised, but often in new ways so 
there are behavioural as well as organisational advantages to maintaining 
specialisation, but there are also imperatives for more integrated working. A 
difficult balance must be struck and Blair's running difficulties with his 
Specialist Operations leadership is indicative of how difficult that balance is to 
achieve.890 Different functional responsibilities will need to be kept distinct at 
one level but to be meshed together at another.891  
 
Nonetheless the UK’s different experience in managing this balance is 
founded on the fact that the organisational architecture encouraged probity 
between, as well as within, organisations. In the US however the emphasis 
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has historically between on probity along the chain of command. The probity 
considerations that apply to counterterrorism integration are particularly 
complex, and intimately related to the property rights clarity of each functional 
area, and the probity considerations described in chapter 2 need to be 
extended as depicted in Figure 5.6892 to include a much wider array of actors 
that now include those downstream (and outside) of the national intelligence 
function.   
As has been noted above, there are two parts to managing a complex task 
like counterterrorism; one is in organising the division of labour, but the other, 
which is no less important, is in re-integrating the results. This need not be 
any kind of mirror image of the division of labour, and may usefully be in a 
significantly different form, but how these two are interrelated can impact on 
the probity of the actors involved, and thus affect their cooperative behaviour. 
As Professor R.V. Jones noted back in 1989, the organisation of the 
Agencies in the United Kingdom is by their type of input but their output is by 
subject.893 At the same time analysis is done, for the most part,894 outside the 
collection agencies, so that a more ‘pull’ architecture pertains, and routine 
engagement with multiple departmental consumers must occur, not only at 
the higher policy making level but also with lower tiers of analysts and 
advisers.895 They have therefore been inherently more integrated than their 
US equivalents, whatever the policy problem, and have established trusting 
relationships like those illustrated in figure 5.6, that are both vertical and 
horizontal, and which already boast a temporal dimension. The required 
behavioural shift needed to address the terrorism problem is therefore less.  
In the United States the more hierarchical structural form means that the fact 
that direction comes down through regimented tiers of line-management 
within organisations designed to address a particular policy problem in total, 
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making it more usual for output to simply reverse that process, with direction 
and then results passing up and down the same chain. The CIA for example 
was designed to address the clandestine national security issues of the Cold 
War, from collection, through analysis to covert action without reference to 
others below the highest policy making level.896 This may be an effective 
organisational form if both the problem and organisation can be accurately 
delineated and paralleled,897 but a sixty plus year history of such self-
contained working will inevitably instil an appropriately self-reliant 
organisational ethos that is hard to undo. The more collegial form that the UK 
was thus better suited to the cross-cutting activity needed for 
counterterrorism purposes as the probity considerations were already met, 
making the rationale for cooperative working easier to include in a shared 
maximand and reducing the likelihood of opportunistic behaviour. 
The breadth of the terrorism problem also leads to an apparent dichotomy 
between Coase’s ideas on clear property right allocation, and Gulick’s 
contention that homogeneity of function is central to efficient organisation.898 
Furthermore it reflects the criticism of Gulick's principles of organisation by 
Simon, in that he too suggested that they were inherently contradictory so 
that behavioural explanations are required.899 In fact Hammond's extension 
of the debate more realistically parallels the counter terrorism community 
issue as it emphasises the pragmatic nature of the problem.
900
 What are 
treated as separate issues, specialisation and unity of command, are in fact 
different sides of the same coin. Certainly if work is homogenous across the 
criterion Gulick uses then those conducting it can be more simply jointly 
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specialisations exists, then, as Simon observed; 'decision premises' may be 
required from multiple expert sources not necessarily in a simple hierarchal 
relationship with each other.901  
The issue is thus actually one of property rights, and the organisational issue 
less one of supervision, but rather one of coordination. A different chain of 
command for the different function will be needed so that the different 
functions are managed separately, and then re-integrated. Gulick's own 
ideas on reconciling the impacts of bounded rationality problems ('spans of 
control' operating from the top down) and the potential for opportunistic 
behaviour if principles of homogeneity were ignored (coming from the bottom 
up) are themselves an implicit early recognition of property right constraints 
as they act across different levels of organisation.902  
The debate between the relative merits of unity of command as against 
specialisation is therefore a false one as the benefits of each can be realised 
if clear property rights are maintained between managerial sub-units, and the 
behavioural problems and gaming behaviour between them is thus 
minimised. The difficulty is rather that arranging those property rights in a 
manner ideal for one threat environment will mean they are less well adapted 
in another, and organising an intelligence or security community intended to 
deal with the full spectrum of risks and threats will be impossible without 
major overlaps.903 This will include, but not be limited to, the terrorism issue 
which covers a number of significantly different concerns. 
Consider for example the difficult recent history of the Special Branch (later 
the intelligence element of the Counter Terrorism Command (CTC-SO15)) 
within London's Metropolitan Police. It managed itself, largely without major 
problems, as an independent entity throughout the 1980's. At that time it 
boasted an informal rank structure that operated with only a nod to the more 
formal version, which it paralleled in its parent body. Engagement with that 
parent only really occurred horizontally, with very limited direction at the 
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highest level. Clear roles and responsibilities as the executive arm of the 
Security Service and the provider of intelligence on politically motivated 
issues to the police existed and relationships with both were largely 
straightforward. Property rights concerning both management and roles were 
clear despite being largely informal.  
However, during the late1990's there was an increasing executive capability 
within the newly legitimated Security Service, particularly against terrorism 
targets.904 At the same time there was a gradual integration of Special 
Branch into the wider police service through new collective processes  and 
senior officers, and an emergent enthusiasm for a shared 'corporate identity'. 
All of this confused the Special Branch's role and chain of command, so that 
as it entered the new millennium it exhibited the same sort of cultural frictions 
and organisational pathologies exhibited by their nearest US equivalent, the 
national security intelligence elements within the FBI.905 These problems 
have continued even after its eventual dismantling in 2006. Despite its 
reinvention as the new CTC-SO15, a body which in theory at least 
amalgamated London's Special Branch (SO12) and its prosecutions focused 
Anti-Terrorist Branch (SO13), it continues to struggle with the internal 
intelligence capability. Ironically the new command is finding it much less 
difficult to manage a successful collaborative relationship with the external 
Security Service.
906
       
The terrorism problem thus requires a difficult blending of clear roles and 
responsibilities that are nonetheless adaptive, a dichotomy that can only 
really be managed by constant negotiations among a shifting constellation of 
actors that are encouraged to display probity in their dealings with each 
other. Put in institutional cost terms, clear property rights must be matched 
with the ability to adapt smoothly towards a shared maximand by actors 
whose levels of asset specificity  allow them to negotiate with each other 
without  friction. Such levels of trust are more easily achieved if those actors 
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share a common understanding of the problem and their collective 
capabilities over which to manage those negotiations, and the next section 
will therefore consider the particular problems of the information environment 
in counterterrorism. 
Section 4: Information Issues and Counterterrorism Provision 
The information costs that affect counterterrorism are entirely consistent with 
the institutional cost impact framework as a whole as they include both and 
external and internal dimension, and these operate across asymmetric 
holdings of information by the unusually large range of actors described 
above. Because of this range the problems of information exchange can be 
increased through what Williamson referred to as 'language limitations'.907 
This is a sub-set of bounded rationality that in this case impedes 
communication between different parts of the counterterrorism community 
because of different understandings of specialist terms and the capabilities 
they imply.  
More significant to terrorism however are the three issues of information 
asymmetry across the wide variety of organisations that are engaged in 
some aspect of countering it. that is to say the sheer diversity of information 
that needs to be handled, its quantity, and the need for those both inside and 
outside the communities involved to share some sorts of information, whilst 
being excluded from others due to the need for secrecy. These three areas 
will therefore now be considered in turn from the institutional cost 
perspective. 
The exacerbation of environmental and behavioural institutional costs across 
uneven holdings of information, and the language and computational limits 
that make these hard to redress were described in some detail in Part 1 of 
this thesis. Due to its diffused nature terrorism presents very particular 
examples of this: The various aspects of the counterterrorism function boasts 
some very small pockets of expertise about what can be low impact issues 
that can suddenly become the centre of  media interest or of unexpected 
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strategic significance. This could be because of a single attack, a new 
alliance, or even an unconnected external development such as the 
development of an energy source in an otherwise strategically irrelevant 
area.  
For example in North Africa Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) would 
have been the subject of substantial analytic effort, whereas the al-
Mulathamun Battalion and Moktar Belmokhtar, who split from it in 2012, 
might have been the responsibility of very few analysts prior to their attack on 
the In Amenas gas plant in 2013 that had political and energy related 
strategic implications.908 In the same way low intensity counter-radicalisation 
programs were abruptly pushed into the limelight following the killing of Lee 
Rigby and suddenly attracted high profile political interest,909 and a 
commensurate degree of high profile contention.910 In any such case both 
structural and actual secrecy ensures that relevant detailed information is 
asymmetrically held by a limited number of specialist but sometimes low-level 
actors. Conversely managerial or 'bigger picture' type information will be in 
the hands of a different set of middle level actors. The fact that each have 
different but unique holdings incentivises each of them to behave 
opportunistically to preserve their position.  
A managers interests are therefore linked to their continuing relevance; to 
being in-the-loop in colloquial terms. To return to Figure 5.3 above, a 
manager of Thematic Division Issue 2, for example, would best serve his or 
her individual level utility by arranging institutional costs so that the lowest 
friction route between their own Geographic Division Zone 2a and the 
manager of Thematic Division Issue 1 is through themselves. However this 
can be achieved by introducing artificially high costs between them as easily 
as by lowering the horizontal frictions between the two managers and 
simultaneously, those between themselves and their own staff. There may 
even be sound operational as well as bureaucratic reasons for doing so: 
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Direct communication between the two might mean that issues of interest to 
both thematic divisions, but that are being dealt with Thematic Division 1, fail 
to register on Division 2's agenda, and Bendor and Hammond have 
demonstrated how such an oversight can impact on wider awareness and 
strategic decision making even when one part of a community is aware of an 
issue.911  
On the other hand too much sharing can lead to overload, and undermines 
the purpose of sub-dividing a function in the first place. A counterterrorism 
community as a whole would thus have to be arranged so that the rewards 
for successful, well-considered cooperative behaviour outweigh the utility 
gained through more localised prestige if it is to off-set this tendency and 
achieve a balance between these conflicting tendencies.   
At the same time the very significant powers that countering terrorism can 
require dictates that high institutional costs between separate elements, such 
as between the political and the official/operational parts, can be desirable. 
Independent holdings of information can be an easy way to manage the 
distinction between strategic direction by the former and operational 
independence by the latter for example. However, the sort of very high levels 
of trust between each exhibited by the then Home Secretary and his Security 
Service and Police chiefs during Operation Overt912 are then needed if this is 
to be managed successfully.  
In the UK this necessitates a difficult balance as the political level remains 
responsible for the operational actions of their staff and is duty bound to 
question them and represent the wider public interest, and can even request 
that a particular course be adopted. Processes exist for appeal to the Prime 
Minister in extremis, whose decision could theoretically still be ignored. A 
weak official might of course regard such a request as an order of course, but 
in practice however such procedures are rarely invoked, and the more likely 
course if a proposed course of action is potentially contentious is that the 
official level will argue the points and describe the risks of a particular case 
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as fully as possible using their specialist knowledge. This specific discussion 
will however be based on the broad subject area briefings that are routinely 
delivered so that the political level can fulfil their more general public interest 
role. If the matter is particularly contentious or has political implications at 
home or abroad an official can seek specific authorisation from the political 
level as required.913 The UK's system is thus more reliant on trusting 
negotiations across the different types of information holdings than on any 
rigid delineation of knowledge or responsibility. The British tendency to 
'muddle through' is thus actually well suited to the constantly adapting 
terrorist problem.  
The second information issue particularly pertinent to the terrorism problem is 
the amount and type of information it includes, and for the organisations 
involved there are both external and internal dimensions to this. Both impact 
on their ability to cooperate with each other.  
Externally, the shift in the information environment generally has 
exponentially increased the amount of potentially useful information and the 
places where it might be found.914 For counterterrorism cooperation this has 
brought some specific problems. During the Cold War the preeminent 
intelligence problem was in the collection of a small amount of well concealed 
information. The combination of the rise in the importance of terrorism as a 
national security problem with the information revolution has meant that that 
the difficulty has shifted to difficulties in aggregating, sifting and analysing a 
great deal of information so that the resultant product is both timely and 
accurate despite the increased amount of apparently contradictory data that 
might be available. Beyond that however, it must also be analysed in such a 
way as to supply the right conclusions to the right level and type of decision 
maker because it must also be actionable.915 This is an especial problem in 
counterterrorism where the same information can have strategic, operational 
and tactical relevance and which is evident might depend on the perspective 
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of the observer, which in turn will inform which interactions amongst 
community members occur in the first place.  
Perhaps as importantly, information in the terrorism sphere is an integral part 
of how each side combats the other. Information is transmitted to secure a 
propaganda advantage as well as to provide a decision making one. 
Terrorism has of course always been a means to shift political discourse in a 
particular direction, and support groups have always been needed to manage 
the messages received by engaging with the media and so on. The 
information revolution has  however permitted a step-change in the amount 
and nature of this activity. The Chair of the Intelligence and Security 
Committee has described a world in which terrorists disseminate propaganda 
and instructions globally, and can radicalise and organise followers in 
another country without ever even having to meet them.916 The additional 
utility of information for propaganda purposes by either side provides an 
additional complication to straightforward communication and the need for 
yet another ‘language’, which may well be anathema to some elements of an 
intelligence and security community. 
The increased availability and different type of information needed for 
counterterrorism has also shifted the nature of the information advantage 
enjoyed by those providing intelligence. It used to be that the acquisition of 
information was a resource intensive undertaking; thus the preserve of large 
bureaucracies or organisations that had a significant competitive advantage 
over less well resourced actors. With information now much more freely 
available to poorly resourced actors as well only either a significant 
qualitative increment through competent analysis, or access to secret 
information such as that achieved through modern signals intelligence 
operations can restore that advantage back to national agencies. The need 
to adjust to such shifts in the information environment can however also 
encourage the sort of gaming behaviour Williamson noticed with the near 
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equivalent 'inside contracting system'.917 Actors, for example, can be 
incentivised to hold onto information until its release is most opportune to 
their standing, such as shortly before contracts are re-negotiated.   
Internally the increase in information moving around the system in the 
counterterrorism arena also impacts on the nature of collaboration and the 
institutional costs it involves. Landau has described large scale organisation 
as "... a vast and complicated information system ... necessarily and 
continuously engaged in the transmission and reception of messages", but 
adds that any such system is noisy and ambiguous, and messages are not 
transmitted in any "... consistent or constant way" in terms of either content or 
routing.918 Under such conditions too rigid an architecture seems more likely 
to induce a failure than an adaptive one reliant on human agency, as new 
and different types of messages evolve and need transmission to whichever 
recipient is most able to deal with that functional area.  
Yet in the United States terrorism drove the establishment of a formally 
constituted 'Information Sharing Environment' (ISE) that mandated a freer 
flow of information. This included across the previous 'wall' between foreign 
and domestic issues. The removal of the distinction between the internal and 
external spaces became a central tenet of this drive, so that the National 
Foreign Intelligence Program became the National Intelligence Program 
(NIP) and the new Director of National Intelligence (DNI) was given 
responsibilities in both areas. The very definition of national intelligence 
became associated with "...information that pertains to more than one 
agency..." and almost all encompassing in that it included a catch-all "... any 
other matter bearing on national or homeland security..." element.919 
Inevitably this means an exponential increase in both the number and type of 
messages being transmitted between two or several actors. The plethora of 
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departments with an interest in counterterrorism described above means 
there is a parallel increase on the demands made on the intelligence 
community particularly, because it has historically been a provider of a 'free 
good', so that for most of those recipients 'more' will always be 'better'.920 
Moreover, because these relationships are new the established codes and 
language used by the much smaller circle of those previously engaged in 
national security will either be unknown to them or unsuitable for the new 
usage, increasing the bounded rationality problem as information flows 
increase. The British Foreign and commonwealth would be well used to 
providing their own analysis of product from the Secret Intelligence Service 
(SIS) for example, and understand its limitations, and the limitations of what 
could reasonably be requested during negotiations with them. The same 
need not be true of a Home Office organisation more used to the UK's 
operating conditions. Jervis quotes Dean Acheson as saying that a National 
Security Council document should be "clearer than truth" to indicate how the 
political level not only needs intelligence to assist with decision making, but 
also to help in the advocacy for a policy. The inherent uncertainties of much 
intelligence are thus unhelpful.921 The same is true of those on the security 
side of the communities trying to make tactical level decisions of the 'go' 
'don't go' sort. In both cases the disparity of type of information between what 
can realistically be provided and that preferred by the recipient means a 
disconnect between them that will inevitably increase negotiating costs.  
A similar disconnect can occur where different parts of the community are 
used to different sorts of information handling: Just as different countries 
might have different collection philosophies, as Sir Stephen Lander observed, 
so might different agencies within a country. To extend his metaphor; an 
agency used to dealing only with the occasional 'needle' of data will be 
swamped if suddenly provided with a 'haystack', and have little chance of 
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distinguishing (much less utilising) the 'needle' within it.922 The nature of the 
search costs are therefore changed. The fact that the provider of all that data 
has done so does not necessarily alleviate the problems of the recipient in 
such a case, who may have to put as much effort into searching through the 
larger quantities of data that they hold as they used to put into getting it in the 
first place. New (and potentially fractious) negotiations might be needed to 
have information supplied in a more usable form.  
Recent developments in the terrorism and information fields have thus jointly 
engendered significant and varied institutional costs that act on the 
intelligence and security communities from both the outside and the inside, 
and impacted on how cooperation can be managed. At the same time (in part 
because of those same shifts) social expectations of the communities have 
also shifted and these will now be considered. 
Since the turn of the century terrorism has driven what the second US 
Director of National Intelligence, Mike McConnell, described as a shift from 
the old Cold War ethos of the 'need to know' to a more cooperative 
requirement, a ‘responsibility to provide’.923 This is in keeping with the parallel 
shift from a national security focus to that of public safety.924 The cultural shift 
that has resulted is significant; since the attacks on New York, Madrid and 
London the emphasis on trying to keep secrets has mutated into an 
organisational level phobia of being the ‘one who knew’ in the event of a 
further successful attack, a concern that is often proved justified: The 
Security Service’s prior knowledge of Siddeque Khan and Shazad Tanweer 
has caused them significant public embarrassment notwithstanding that the 
subsequent (less newsworthy) inquiry has accepted that with the information 
available to them their decisions were entirely reasonable.925  
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As well as producing the sort of new challenges to managing operational 
security that the ongoing Snowden allegations have demonstrated so 
acutely,926 there are thus twin pressures on organisations. They must 
distinguish themselves against others in the counter terror sphere and thus 
win access to scarce resources despite being risk averse to not having 
disseminated leads (leads that represent their competitive advantage) to their 
competitors. This view has a certain resonance with the American 
experience. Confused and contradictory impulses lead to confused protocols 
being developed to service contradictory demands, and in turn promote 
opportunistic behaviour, as following chapters will demonstrate. Yet there is a 
clear understanding that this is at odds with what is required; the then 
Director of the FBI, Robert Mueller was clear that collaboration at every level 
was "... the future of counterterrorism".927  
In Britain the organisational arrangements are such that no one agency can 
realistically progress a counterterrorism operation without reference to the 
others, so that that competitive spirit is largely absent, and the shift to sharing 
consequently less dramatic. There could nonetheless still be a concern that 
an agency providing information might find themselves unacknowledged 
when any subsequent credit is awarded. In spite of this the temporal nature 
of relationships mean that to do so might provide utility at the time, but any 
longer term assessment would show the consequences are likely to be 
negative. Collaboration commitment is instead demonstrated externally, 
through devices like ensuring all relevant organisation's crests or logos are 
on reports,928 or by the police (often the public face of a counterterrorist 
operation) ensuring they routinely 'cite' agency assistance during press 
conferences. Existing property rights clarity, the ‘good fences make good 
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neighbours’ approach typified by the UK intelligence community,929 have thus 
counter intuitively assisted in maintaining low institutional costs between 
organisations despite the environmental shift that the 'duty to share' 
provoked.  
That same duty however has also extended beyond the intelligence and 
security communities and into the public domain, with pressures for open 
government and transparency impacting most on those areas of government 
most used to working in secret,930 who have to operate simultaneously with 
different sorts of information at the extreme ends of the spectrum. The fact 
that some is necessarily placed in the public domain and is often of 
substantive media interest, whilst most operational information must remain 
secret can lead to tensions and very different ideas of a maximand between 
actors. This is especially the case between those who collect secret 
information and those who would use it to progress arrests and prosecutions. 
A very close relationship and clear understanding of the motivations of the 
other is therefore necessary if the sequential negotiations this problem 
engenders are to be managed effectively.     
The fact that intelligence has been intimately associated with political 
advocacy (as discussed previously) produces a similar divide between the 
public and officials as well as politicians. For the latter the problem is one of 
confidence, but for the former, who need public trust to gather information, it 
has an impact on capability. The former Security and Intelligence Coordinator 
Sir David Omand has observed that "intelligence assessment and policy 
advocacy do not comfortably co-exist" but that all sorts of actors must 
routinely manage that co-existence.931 Specialised officials from the police or 
security agencies have always given advice to political decision makers as 
they try to formulate policies, but because transparency is now a much 
sought after commodity they must necessarily do so in a more public way. 
This can easily give rise to allegations of policy interference, and has the 
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potential to back-fire, as the Head of the Metropolitan police's Specialist 
Operations found when he supported ninety day detention in terror cases.932  
The problem can also extend beyond the immediate issue at hand. Davies 
has observed that intelligence agencies are likely to indulge in bureaucratic 
behaviour by overplaying the need for their services,933 in accordance of 
Niskanen's predictions of bureaucrats more generally.934 If they, or indeed a 
security or defence official, are associated with a particular policy preference 
then it, like the competition for resources, may be seen as motive for any 
public announcement. The relatively recent tendency for senior officials and 
ex-officials to detail current threats935 may thus be received with more 
scepticism than it warrants. 
In the same way open discourse on counterterrorism lays bare the contrary 
pressures from those who want effective measures and those who want a 
more liberal approach. This is of course an essentially political problem, and 
traditionally community members have been insulated from the debate, which 
occurs at the political level. However Richard Aldrich has vividly described 
how they are increasingly stretched between the two positions as they are 
increasingly monitored and examined.936 Ironically transparency itself can 
thus act as an institutional cost between the public and the intelligence and 
security communities with whom they must negotiate to maintain their 
support by increasing the number of actors that can impact on negotiations 
and amplify monitoring costs.   
Countering terrorism therefore boasts unique information related costs. The 
diversity and number of repositories of specialist information, coupled with 
the secret nature of much of the work, give the usual institutional cost 
problems of information impactedness through structural (and actual) secrecy 
a particular emphasis. Secondly the volume of information that is relevant or 
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potentially relevant is vast, provoking problems of overload and 'signal-noise' 
ratios, and  exacerbating the problems of complexity and uncertainty. At the 
same time cultural shifts around the internal sharing of information and for 
public engagement have varied from organisation to organisation and made 
the establishment of a shared maximand harder, and opportunistic behaviour 
more likely.   
Section 5: Conclusion  
This chapter has highlighted the particular difficulties of, and simultaneous 
necessity for, collaborative working to counter modern terrorism using the 
institutional cost framework developed in Part 1. It first demonstrated how the 
shift in governmental responsibility from providing national security to 
maximising public safety, coupled with an unprecedented degree of 
complexity in both the terrorism problem and the type of responses it 
required magnified some tensions  between different actors. The argument 
was then extended to examine how the property rights regimes and asset 
specificity of existing organisational structures could help or hinder efforts to 
address these different ambitions, before the impact of increasing 
globalisation across the range of issues was considered.  
The next section then analysed how that complexity could translate into 
behaviours that might heighten or lower institutional frictions between actors 
with different policy responsibilities depending on the degree to which a 
shared maximand was generated, and probity could be established between 
actors through the temporal nature of sequential negotiations and mutual 
need. The different natures of the US and UK communities in this regard was 
highlighted. Finally the heightened importance of institutional costs relating to 
shifts in the information environment both within and outside the communities 
was examined. Information issues as a pivotal factor in deciding success or 
failure in cooperative working across the counterterrorism sphere was 
described in the light of the environmental and behavioural issues 
discovered. The very specific applicability of the institutional cost impact 
framework in this area was thus outlined, and the core of the explanation for 
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the different experiences in the UK and US developed in preparation for more 
detailed analysis of specific examples. 
Chapter 6 will now consider the different arrangements that have been 
adopted to manage and indeed encourage collaborative working in the 
United States and Great Britain as a response to the issues described above 
from an institutional cost perspective to test what impact relatively high or low 
costs have on success rates in each.  
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Chapter 6 - Counterterrorism, Collaboration and Vertical Direction and 
Oversight 
Section 1: Introduction  
As has been noted elsewhere, the United Kingdom and United States are 
often regarded as broadly similar political systems, and yet they have elected 
to follow very different patterns of management to deal with the evolving 
threat from terrorism. As noted at the beginning of the last chapter, the US 
has demonstrated endemically high levels of institutional costs that the 
measures discussed in the following sections have largely failed to lower, 
whilst the UK has managed to maintain a relatively lower level throughout, 
and the substantive shifts in the institutional costs environment observable in 
the defence intelligence sphere (and examined in Part 3) do not occur in 
counterterrorism despite significant organisational changes in both the US 
and UK cases.  
Yet the nature of the terrorist threat they face, and their possible range of 
policy responses to it are nonetheless remarkably similar. In both cases 
policy options are constrained by the democratic underpinnings of their 
respective societies, their believe in the primacy of law, and their inherent 
distrust of any intelligence gathering or operational activity that is not tied to, 
or at least orientated towards, some form of criminal prosecution. This 
remains the case despite the various oversight mechanisms that are in place, 
and both Countries are prepared to put up with a degree of inefficiency and 
some institutional difficulties in order to be seen to honour these principles.937  
This is particularly true in the domestic arena despite the increased risk to the 
polity themselves when the threat arrives ‘over here’. Of course, whilst the 
UK has had long experience of dealing with an endogenous terrorist threat, 
the US has not had the same type of experience to fall back on. Some 
differences in evolution are thus to be expected. Nonetheless both have had 
to deal with a similar sea-change in the threat environment they face since 
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the turn of the millennium, and have had to re-cast the national level 
machinery to meet this new shared threat. Each has experienced the same 
sort of shifts in the acceptable balance between civil liberties and intelligence 
collection over time, and the 'policy pendulum' swinging back and forth over 
time.938 Yet each decided on a very different top-tier system for coordinating 
and directing that effort. This chapter will therefore focus on how institutional 
costs impacted differently on these two approaches by considering their core 
constituents. 
The levels of specialisation and expertise inherent in the security and 
intelligence functions of counterterrorism delivery limit control by principals of 
their agents. Labour is necessarily divided to overcome the scale of the task, 
and the complexity of the problem inevitably begets a complex organisational 
form to address it. Thus a condition of structural secrecy is inevitable if 
expertise is to be available, by virtue of the breadth of possible issues that a 
policy or senior decision maker would have to have expertise in if even the 
few most likely terrorism contingencies are to be covered.939 The bounded 
rationality of any individual actor would always limit their ability to hold a 
current and complete picture of all issues or regions, as well as the possible 
impact of its complex interactions with other issues at one or more remove. 
These are the twin environmental conditions of uncertainty and complexity. 
The nature of the contract between those who direct security or intelligence 
and activity and those who deliver it, as well as the extent to which it is 
honoured, will therefore effect counter-terror outcomes. However the sort of 
'resilient' trust needed for effective cooperation over time in a functional area 
like counterterrorism940 is most usually developed through patterns of 
horizontal, not vertical, cooperation. It is along this dimension that actors can 
produce the sort of norms of probity that in turn increase trust still further.941 
Achieving vertical cooperation is thus particularly problematic in this area. 
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Whilst there is obviously a general ‘distaste’ against any further attacks that 
all actors share, any lack of trust will translate into differences of opinion as to 
how that is best achieved, disaggregating any shared maximand developed. 
Vertical coordination and the sort of leadership that can engender 
cooperation942 is therefore more difficult to achieve, particularly as spending 
or investment of time moves into the medium or longer term, when actions by 
sub-levels become increasingly difficult to monitor.  
In the UK coordination was to be achieved through improved collaboration 
set within a single strategic architecture; the CONTEST strategy, coordinated 
through an executive directorate within the Home Office, the Office for 
Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT).943 The strategy was geared towards 
creating a shared goal that could encompass the long and the short term 
elements of the challenge, the strategic and the tactical; so that what the 
Director of the Security Service described as the ‘duality’ issue could be 
addressed. (Duality is the simultaneous responsibilities of "...keeping the 
country safe today, and ensuring we remain able to do so tomorrow... doing 
all we can to tackle the threats the country faces today, while also positioning 
ourselves and developing the capabilities we need to be able to protect the 
UK against future threats.").944 Beneath this overarching objective however 
the ‘means’ were tied to the strategic intelligence available from the Joint 
Intelligence Committee (JIC) in Cabinet Office, and the tactical intelligence 
produced by Joint Terrorism Analytic Centre (JTAC), both of which could 
provide analysed product specifically geared to the terrorism problem based 
on intelligence from the widest possible range of sources. These intelligence 
inputs are then aligned to four strands of work within OSCT – Pursue, 
Prevent, Protect and Prepare – that clarifies the responsibilities roles and 
thus the property rights of the various departments and agencies involved, 
but simultaneously sets these within the same single strategy. In this way a 
visible shared maximand that describes what type of security is preferred, 
and how it is to be achieved, is developed.  
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The USA on the other hand, pursued improved coordination by trying to 
create a genuinely authoritative, responsible and accountable head of the 
entire homeland security and later intelligence communities, through the 
creation of a Secretary level head of a new government department, the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2002, and the Director of 
National Intelligence (DNI) in 2005 respectively.945 In their view coordination 
of what had historically proven to be recalcitrant independent agencies 
needed enforcing through a clear hierarchy that would clarify the roles and 
responsibilities of each part of the community, towards both the terrorism 
threat and each other, by fiat. An equivalent to the UK's JTAC was 
established as the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) in 2004.  
Unlike JTAC however, the NCTC remained a stand-alone agency for only a 
few months, becoming part of the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence (ODNI) once this had been established to support the DNI in the 
following year.946 In a further departure from the JTAC model, the NCTC was 
burdened with a second reporting line direct to the President on "Executive 
Branch-wide counterterrorism planning", so that it can "assign roles and 
responsibilities to departments and agencies as part of its strategic planning 
duties" and can prepare "... more granular, targeted action plans to ensure 
integration and coordination..." and yet does not "direct the execution of any 
resulting operations".
947
 The NCTC therefore boasts some of the policy 
functions performed by the OSCT in the UK, as well as the counterterrorism 
intelligence  roles performed by the British JTAC. Although in keeping with 
the idea of a hierarchical authority over counterterrorism the property rights of 
the NCTC thus overlap many of those of other agencies and departments, 
and property rights over it by the ODNI are at odds with the claims of the 
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President, allowing the possibility that other interested actors might be 
motivated to contest them. There are therefore clear organisational 
distinctions between NCTC and the UK's stand-alone JTAC, which is limited 
to collating terrorism intelligence and producing then disseminating all-source 
assessments to the other agencies or departments that need it. The placing 
of the NCTC within the ODNI is therefore not necessarily advantageous to 
either organisation, despite the formers production of terrorism intelligence 
for a wide range of users.  
The results of both the DHS and DNI endeavours, although still evolving, are 
rather less well defined than in the UK case, and very far from genuinely 
authoritative across the community. Some degree of a shared maximand, 
originally under the auspices of a ‘war on terror’ was achieved but this was 
largely a cultural phenomena, oft stated but only distilled down into 
organisational reality on particular and specific occasions. Disparate ideas 
about how that 'war' was best prosecuted remained, and which part was the 
responsibility of whom continued to be contentious.  
Although the use of predictive intelligence is at the heart of both nations' 
security strategies948 the two approaches cannot of course be directly 
compared 'like-for-like'. CONTEST is a policy framework entirely devoted to 
the terrorism problem; including the use of tactical, operational and strategic 
intelligence to inform decision making in a range of policy areas. The 
Secretary of the DHS and the DNI lead specific organisations. The first is 
charged with coordinating the response to every type of security issue, and 
the second to coordinating the whole of the intelligence community. Both 
organisations include terrorism in their various responsibilities, but are not 
limited to it. Nor do either have responsibility for the full gamut of terrorism 
related issues. This distinguishes them from the Office for Security and 
Counter-Terrorism (OSCT) which is concerned solely with (every aspect of) 
the terrorism issue, as the body responsible for delivering the CONTEST 
strategy.  
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Nonetheless, one could reasonably expect them to share similar 
relationships with the agencies and departments that they rely on to deliver 
the counterterrorism function. In providing governance and direction they 
must all interact with a range of very different bodies with very distinct roles 
and ambitions. This should be equally problematic to them all. As Anderson 
has noted; "Organizations that perform well on the criterion preferred by one 
constituency tend to do poorly on a criterion favoured by another" so that "... 
conflicting expectations...create a payoff function too difficult to assess and 
optimize".949 The CONTEST strategy requires engagement with twenty-two 
different governmental bodies (one of which is actually comprised of forty-
eight police forces around the UK),950 the DHS comprises sixteen 
departmental components of substantial variety.951 Furthermore the DNI must 
coordinate the sixteen members of the intelligence community,952 so that 
each may be regarded as having a similar hurdle to surmount in this regard. 
The trajectory that has been followed in each case is however very different 
because each boasts very different approaches to organising coordination, 
and it is this divergence that are the focus of this chapter.  
In the UK case established linkages to consumers were already in place 
because the intelligence organisations historically had little ability to act on 
their own findings, but were instead simply an element of the larger 
governmental machine. All that was required was that these existing nodes 
be consolidated into a more coherent strategic vision and become better 
organised to serve that. No major new organisations were needed and the 
property rights to particular functional areas did not need any significant 
alteration. Instead the Home office simply re-arranged a part of itself to 
become terrorism specific, creating the OSCT in 2007. The OSCT then 
orchestrated a general  ‘scaling-up’ to deal with the sheer size of the new 
challenge, and allocated different aspects of newer tasks such as countering 
radicalisation to those bodies it regarded as best able to take them on. In the 
                                                                   
949
 Anderson, "Perspective: Complexity Theory and Organization Science." 225. 
950
 "Contest: The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism." Annex A. 
951
 "Official Website of the Department of Homeland Security," DHS, http://www.dhs.gov. 
952
 "Office of the Director of National Intelligence: Leading Intelligence Integration". As a matter of 
statute the DNI coordinates the 16 members of the Intelligence Community, although the ODNI 
coordinates some parts at the senior working level. 
319 
 
same way no new laws were required to initiate the strategy, it was no more 
than a government organising a primary function of governance in the way it 
saw fit given the prevailing environmental conditions. The re-negotiating 
across different agencies and departments that was required was thus 
relatively limited. 
In the US case both the establishment of the DHS in the immediate aftermath 
of 9/11, and the later creation of the DNI after the failure to properly assess 
Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capability re-focused attention on 
the intelligence community, followed recognition by different parts of the US 
leadership that a properly coordinated intelligence function had to be 
integrated into the whole of the nation’s security capability. The former, a 
direct consequence of the terrorist attacks of 2001, was a Presidential 
initiative and put the intelligence function within a security organisation, 
arguably in an attempt to prioritise its usage.953 The latter, which was driven 
by a congressional leadership concerned with not only terrorism but also the 
wider intelligence failure demonstrated by the Iraq WMD issue,954 remained 
focused on the information itself so that integration with the security 
community was for the most part a matter of ensuring intelligence was 
passed to the right people in a timely manner. There was nonetheless scope 
for significant overlap between them, and both have evolved to address 
these and other confused property rights. In both cases however this has 
been to the detriment of their original mandate.    
When President George W. Bush issued Executive order 13228 establishing 
both the Office of Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Council on 
8th October 2001 he prefaced his order with a mission statement that was a 
tacit acknowledgement that its position in the intelligence community would 
be central to its success in protecting the American public. He gave the new 
office strategic responsibility to ensure that the US intelligence machine as a 
whole was adequate to “detecting…, preventing, protecting against…. 
terrorist threats and attacks” and a responsibility to “prioritise and co-ordinate 
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efforts for collection and analysis” of information that related to both terrorist 
activity within the USA, and any activity outside the country that could lead to 
a threat of terrorism within it.955  
The DHS as originally envisaged was to be not only central to, but also to 
have a domestic lead function within the US intelligence community. It was 
thus intended to provide the intelligence link to its security responsibilities. 
These were similar to those that comprised the UK's CONTEST strategy; 
functions like protection, preparedness and incident management.  
However by October 2005 the Department had been relegated to little more 
than an intelligence customer, similar to law enforcement officers and other 
peripheral agencies, and was essentially dismissed even as a necessary 
conduit to its own security components by the then DNI, even though the 
DHS's 'Intelligence and Analysis Division' was legally still in the intelligence 
community over which he presided. As a result the DHS retreated from the 
intelligence domain and the role originally envisaged for it there, and instead 
turned to its security and operational coordination roles to provide its raison 
d'être.956  
The creation of the DNI on the other hand followed a very different track that 
impacted on its ability to counter terrorism in a distinct way. Whilst the 
maelstrom that followed the 9/11 terror attacks, and the failure of the 
elements of the intelligence and security communities to function holistically 
on that occasion, had renewed calls for a National Intelligence Director 
(equivalent to the eventual DNI role, albeit with slightly different 
authorities),957 it was the intelligence communities’ poor performance around 
estimating weapons of mass destruction in Iraq that eventually provided the 
impetus for its creation in 2004; a very different sort of issue.958 The result 
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was that the role of the DNI and supporting staff was to provide an 
organisational infrastructure devoted to the intelligence issue whose 
responsibilities include but are not limited to the terrorism issue. This problem 
was exacerbated by a similar lack of clarity over the policy as against the 
operational aspects of the new DNI role. The DNI's new NCTC for example 
overlapped the CIA's Counter Terrorism Center (CTC) as well as the FBI's 
Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC - whose functions it then 
subsumed959) whilst also having the policy advisory role described above. 
This introduced a tension between national level responsibilities and tactical 
capabilities that undermined the authority of the both the DNI and NCTC from 
the start.960   
Thus although each approach was designed to integrate different strands of 
work to counter the same terrorist threat, and turn a number of discrete 
capabilities into a cohesive whole they have had very different experiences. 
They can therefore usefully be considered together. Each provides a useful 
key in describing how the policy makers of each nation believed control over 
existing departments and policy tools could best be managed so that the 
principal-agent problem, and institutional frictions between the centre and 
them, are minimised.   
This chapter will therefore consider how the institutional costs inherent in the 
provision of counterterrorism that were discussed in the previous chapter 
impacted on first the DHS (in Section 2), then the DNI (in Section 3) as they 
attempted to ensure cooperative working across different parts of the 
intelligence and security communities. Section 4 will then consider the very 
different approach of the UK and its much lower institutional cost 
environment. The whole will then be concluded in Section 5 which will 
contrast the impact of the different institutional costs on cooperative 
behaviour between levels. 
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Section 2: Hierarchical Cooperation and The United States Department 
for Homeland Security 
As discussed in the introduction to this chapter, the Department for 
Homeland Security was originally intended (inter alia) to bridge the gap 
between the significant but foreign orientated intelligence capabilities of the 
United States and their domestic security organisations. In institutional cost 
terms the organisation was supposed to provide a low governance costs 
route between the two sides of the wall between foreign intelligence and 
domestic law enforcement discussed in Chapter 5, Section 2b above.  It is 
worth noting again however the wall created the single biggest negotiating 
cost problems, with genuine and perceived legal obstructions to cooperation 
being reinforced by institutional and jurisdictional precedent, a complex set of 
rulings that further obscured property rights (the domestic sphere can, for 
example, include an attack on a US citizen anywhere in the world961) and 
encouraged cautious interpretations by risk adverse bureaucrats, each 
addressed in a variety of ways by different actors and organisations.962 For 
the DHS to secure a low friction route between the two sides was therefore 
no small undertaking. However linking the two functional areas in so direct a 
manner meant a potentially dual identity for the new organisation as both a 
security and an intelligence entity, and required it to engage in substantive 
negotiations with existing organisations over which it was to be 
superimposed in both areas. This section will therefore focus on the 
institutional costs that prevented its access into the existing intelligence 
community.     
This duality provided the nascent organisation with divergent evolutionary 
pressures: According to the ideas developed by Powell and DiMaggio,963 
membership of either community could have seen it adjust its institutional 
form through processes of isomorphism so that it more closely represented 
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the organisational fields of intelligence and/or security. However one of the 
principle reasons the organisation was deemed necessary was that they are 
very distinct functions, with very distinct identities. In trying to  establish a 
new organisation that was 'of' both communities (rather than simply a link 
between them as in the UK case discussed below) the United States 
provoked a tension rooted in overlapping property rights with each. The utility 
of senior bureaucrats is the net value of the benefits successful integration 
into each brings, less the institutional costs involved in pursuing it, but in this 
case an additional dimension was added in that there was a choice. The 
degree they were incentivised to pursue acceptance into either the security 
or intelligence communities was thus a matter of the relative net utility each 
could offer. In the event the DHS became a security focused body with only a 
very minor acknowledgement of the intelligence function for which it had also 
been originally intended.  
To achieve that access over time Powell and DiMaggio predict that the new 
organisation would have had to demonstrate an institutional definition or 
structuration of its function in four ways: "An increase the extent of interaction 
among organisations in the field; the emergence of well defined inter-
organisational structures of domination and patterns of coalition; an increase 
in the information load with which organisations in a field must contend; and 
the development of a mutual awareness amongst participants in a set of 
organisations that they are involved in a common enterprise”.964 Each is 
intimately associated with aspects of the institutional costs impact framework. 
Improving levels of interaction is dependent on negotiating costs overall: 
Patterns of domination and coalition rely on property rights arrangements. 
The movement of a greater information load on bounded rationality, language 
costs, and structural as well as specific secrecy issues. The common 
enterprise requirement is synonymous with creating a shared maximand. 
The ability of the DHS to act with first the DCI, and then after 2004 with the 
DNI, to coordinate counter terrorism intelligence, and thus provide the link 
between the intelligence providers and the security providers is therefore 
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bound up with the reality of its membership of each. The complicated 
overlaps in property rights this duality provoke are be represented 
diagrammatically in figure 6.1.965 
 
Yet according to Dunleavy's categorisation, it can be conceived as a 
'regulatory' agency with respect to its intended intelligence function, but as a 
'delivery' agency for some of its security functions.966  Agencies are a product 
of the laws of supply and demand; they “…. Do not appear ex nihilo but are 
established to serve a particular purpose and provide a product or service 
that establishes them.”967 and certainly the need for an intelligence 
organisation that breached the US ‘wall’ between foreign intelligence and 
domestic law enforcement had been clearly demonstrated by the intelligence 
failures that contributed to the 9/11 attacks.968 This section argues that it was 
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the high institutional cost environment that existed between the DHS and 
each community that prevented them fulfilling that need to the extent 
originally intended.    
The DHS Intelligence and Analysis Centre would have been expected to be 
an additional asset to the existing domestic intelligence landscape given its 
links to the plethora of different types of state, local and tribal agencies. The 
development of should have provided a much needed 'requirements and 
priorities' template for collection capabilities within them.969 Its ability to 
collate large quantities of diverse intelligence and to analyse them from the 
homeland security perspective,970 as well as their broad access to (for 
example) passenger information, that complimented emerging data mining 
capabilities,971should have been able to satisfy the supply and demand 
requirement.  
However, the laws of supply and demand coexist with other economic 
imperatives: The DHS are in a monopsonic relationship with their 
paymasters, but share that status with the intelligence agencies and other 
bodies they were intended to coordinate, so there are ‘opportunity costs’ to 
the tasks undertaken. Any function ascribed to a new agency will reduce the 
resources available to its ‘competitor’ agencies.972 This is particularly relevant 
to the DHS case as the original Department was conceived to be “revenue-
neutral”973 so that financing it became a ‘zero sum’ competitive game 
between it and the various intelligence capabilities it had to manage. In 
addition to the inevitable biases and frictions this introduces when the 
disbursement of resources is being negotiated, it also incentives self-
interested senior bureaucrats in the wider intelligence community to act 
opportunistically to undermine their own coordinating machinery.  
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Richard Clarke observes that it takes years for any new Government 
bureaucracy to 'jell' and become effective, even when much smaller in scale 
than the (then) proposed DHS, pointing to the mergers that created the 
Energy and Transportation Department's. He therefore advocated the use of 
existing White House coordinating machinery rather than the creation of a 
new department because he did not believe that any new bureaucracy would 
have time to negotiate its place in the constellation of existing 
organisations.974 To do so would have necessitated establishing respective 
roles and responsibilities with each of the other agencies. However, existing 
'suppliers' could not be sure whether the DHS was a provider of 
complimentary or of substitute goods. Because the respective property rights 
of the new and established departments were not clear, it was not apparent 
to the established actors if this new entity was an ally or a threat to them. 
They were therefore dis-incentivised to initiate negotiations to establish them, 
creating a vicious circle of disengagement, until the DHS was so weakened 
as to no longer represent a potential threat.975  
Given that those other organisations were motivated to exclude the DHS, and 
had the means at hand because the complexity of the institutional 
architecture and the uncertainty of the terrorism threat environment, it is little 
wonder that the new joiner could not achieve any purchase within them and 
that Clarke's concerns were so prescient.    
Nonetheless the Homeland Security Act of 2002 unequivocally makes the 
DHS information analysis element a de facto member of the US ‘Intelligence 
Community’ on a legislative basis.976 This gives DHS representatives a 
formal role in discussions on intelligence priorities and on the disbursement 
of limited resources and their allocations amongst other agencies.977 As long 
ago as 1965 Sherman Kent had observed that “A very great many of the 
arbitrarily defined branches of intelligence are interdependent. Each may 
have its well defined primary target which it makes its primary concern but 
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both the pursuit of this target and the by-products of pursuing it bring most of 
the independent branches into some sort of relationship with the others.”978 
so that the DHS's dealings with terrorist related information should have 
provided an evolutionary pressure that gradually integrated the DHS into the 
intelligence community on a practical level as well.  
The very fact that the 2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security 
specifically describes its intelligence and information analysis effort “not as a 
stand-alone activity but rather an integral component of our Nation’s overall 
effort….”979 actually acts counter-intuitively to further cloud property rights. 
Even within this early document there are ominous signs of a lack of clear 
property right allocations that could in turn have produced the sharply defined 
patterns of domination and coalition required by Powell and DiMaggio980 if 
ingress to the intelligence community was to be achieved. Firstly rather than 
establishing the lead position of the DHS in providing either strategic or 
tactical threat analysis, or even supporting it on a 'primus inter pares' basis 
as the British might have done, the document shows the lead for both 
functions as being shared with the (then) DCI and FBI, and the lead for 
strategic response on the policy side still held by the White House.981 A 
manifestly unworkable proposition at either level, but particularly problematic 
at the tactical level, defined as the “immediate” and “near-term”. In attempting 
to define property rights too prescriptively in an uncertain and shifting 
environment the National Strategy actually made  them more debateable, 
increasing negotiating costs overall. 
Because of the way that the US intelligence community is organised, tactical 
level threats were dealt with within the CIA or FBI depending on whether they 
were regarded as foreign or domestic, no matter whether the particular case 
involved a threat warning or an active disruption. Each already had claims on 
the property rights over one or other sphere, and would be disinclined to pass 
them over to a new department. To do so would only introduce an additional 
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friction to their operational independence without any commensurate return. 
Any remaining tactical level property rights claims were further blurred by the 
lead for any preventative action quickly passing to the national 'Joint 
Terrorism Task Force' (JTTF) in 2002, a multi agency construct within the 
FBI that subsequently relocated to the National Counterterrorism Center 
(NCTC)982 to work alongside the ODNI's national centre there. This meant 
that both the counter terror intelligence function, and the policing response to 
is leads were located at a single site that was not the DHS. The DHS would 
therefore not be offering much more than a message switching service to the 
wider security communities, without allowing the originator the luxury of 
deciding who and how much should be transmitted to whom. This would 
undermine any information advantage the originator had within the 
community, as well as possibly risking external security.  
Then, in January 2003, the property rights over even this function were 
obscured when the DHS Intelligence and Analysis Division was put in direct 
competition with the then still new TTIC (which later became the NCTC as 
mentioned above). President Bush created the TTIC to “integrate terrorist-
related information collected domestically and abroad” and to provide 
“Terrorist threat assessments for our National Leadership”.983 There were 
thus clear overlaps in the roles and responsibilities of each, although the 
Homeland security Act was not amended. However when it came to 
competing over those property rights, the TTIC was given clear advantages 
in that it could provide a lower institutional cost negotiating framework within 
which some of the principle external organisations with an intelligence 
function could work.  
Where the DHS was initially headed by a political figure – the former 
Governor of Pennsylvania Tom Ridge, an acknowledged Intelligence 
professional John O. Brennan fronted the TTIC. The TTIC included 
intelligence professionals from the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center (CTC), FBI’s 
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Counterterrorism Division plus parts of DOD and even the DHS itself 
attached to it.984 Whilst the TTIC thus had a ready-made pool of (relatively) 
experienced counterterrorism intelligence analysts, the DHS, in its formative 
years, had to utilise computer analysts from General Services Administration 
and the Energy Department, as well as generalists from the DOD and FBI 
who did not have the skill set for counterterrorism.985 In this case the DHS 
lack of asset specificity to the terrorism problem contrasted poorly with a 
body that was better suited to it.  
This problem was exacerbated by the bounded rationality of those analysts 
being challenged by the sheer volume of data involved. The DHS Intelligence 
and Analysis Division employed less than 200 analysts, yet the department it 
served was vast. There were 22 different Agencies and some 180,000 
employees cobbled together into the DHS, along with ‘information sharing 
partners’ throughout law enforcement, State, local and even tribal bodies 
(amounting to some 1500 different organisations),986 as well as some 40 
State ‘fusion centres’ and countless private sector actors, all intruding into the 
time of these few analysts. Some of the product reaching them would have 
been sorted, validated and analysed but a great deal would not be, and with 
no general standard or system it would be impossible to judge the quality of 
that analysis. It would therefore need to be revisited anyway, and in the post 
9/11 climate very little terrorism related intelligence was discarded early. 
Because the suppliers had all developed independently there was no one 
system or method for feeding product, in any state, through to the DHS 
itself.987 Rather than overcoming the costs created by the wall, the DHS 
instead faced significant additional information related costs in searching for, 
filtering and evaluating information that might be useful to the 
counterterrorism effort. 
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It seems impossible therefore that the DHS can do justice to even this 
element of their intelligence role, or are that they likely to be taken seriously 
by the intelligence community members with whom they must negotiate.988 
Indeed the CIA flatly refused to provide them raw data, and George Tenet 
even testified to this effect to the House Senate Joint Enquiry into 9/11 when 
he must have been under enormous pressure to at least appear 
conciliatory.989 Although they were obliged to provide any sanitised product 
DHS requested, the CIA were fully aware that it could only be requested if it 
was known about. Without it DHS analysts could not even provide the 
“second opinion” the Bush Administration had sought.990 Conversely the 
TTIC's internal position allowed them ready access to both sensitive and 
highly classified intelligence and the established asset specificity of their 
officers to the terrorism problem validated their expertise. These provided the 
TTIC with the mainstays of credibility in any Intelligence Community and the 
pre-requisites to any complete analysis. 
The DHS claim to property rights over the authoritative role was eroded in the 
same way as their functional role: Two further Executive Orders, EO13355 
and EO13356 reiterated the DCI’s authority for managing the intelligence 
community and established an ‘Information Systems Council’ to develop and 
operate terrorism information sharing systems respectively.991 Then the 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
992
 established the 
DNI post and created the Joint Intelligence Community Council on which the 
Secretary of Homeland Security (with his equivalents) was required to sit 
under the chair of the DNI and provide advice.993 Certainly the fact that a 
Cabinet level council was legislatively mandated to provide advice to the DNI 
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would have been intended to increase the authority and legitimacy of that 
post to the intelligence community, but in doing so it further diminished the 
status of the DHS. The turf-war that surrounded these moves principally 
concerned the DCI and DOD, but it is telling that DHS authority was already 
so eroded that the establishment of a further tier of bureaucracy over it 
passed with barely a murmur.  
Internal structural issues also impact on the institutional cost environment 
from which the DHS must contract with its external intelligence functions. 
Even its own elements are organised so that they do not report directly 
through the Intelligence and Analysis Division but direct to the Secretary and 
Deputy Secretary.994 This has meant many of the constituent parts of DHS 
have maintained their own, independent intelligence capability, which in turn 
allows what are effectively intelligence competitors like the NCTC (see 
below) to bypass the DHS Intelligence and Analysis Division and go direct to 
the source organisation. For example the Secret Service have retained their 
links with the Treasury’s Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence. The 
Coastguard on the other hand have used their inclusion into the DHS to push 
ahead with a more serious intelligence infrastructure, with its own career 
path, that attempts to bridge the wall through a formalised taskings process 
that can come direct from CIA (rather than DHS). It is the Coastguard rather 
than its parent DHS that now boasts a counterintelligence division,
995
 and 
retains a separate “Intelligence Authorization”.996 Both effectively usurp their 
new parent organisation and ensure that the increased interaction required in 
Powell and DiMaggio’s model occurs beyond DHS purview. Institutional costs 
are lowered between the Coastguards and other intelligence bodies, but 
raised between them and the DHS, who do not have the visibility over either 
the actions of these sub-organisations by virtue of their (the DHS's) bounded 
rationality relative to the size of their responsibilities, or of the immediate 
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environments in which their sub-organisations are working, to be able to 
reduce moral hazard.997   
Furthermore although a Homeland Security Intelligence Community (HSIC) 
has been argued to exist in effect, it does not parallel the DHS internal 
structure as a management construct.998 A substantial percentage of 
intelligence relating to homeland security is actually from agencies outside 
the DHS, such as Law enforcement, DOD or Foreign Intelligence, which do 
not primarily report to the DHS but to their own line management.999 
Therefore any holistic view of an HSIC must include some established parts 
of the intelligence community that are outside the DHS, other organisations 
that are neither part of the intelligence community nor the DHS, Fusion 
Centres, as well as the DHS Intelligence and Analysis Division itself. When 
stacked against the much lower institutional costs involved in linkages with 
established bodies responsible for protection and crisis reaction, so confused 
a collection of associated organisations and property rights will inevitably 
incentivise bureaucrats to focus on the security side of the business, and 
internalise the intelligence function as far as possible, as Secretary Chertoff 
did in 2005.1000  
On the face of it the much-vaunted ‘war on terror’ should provide for the “... 
development of a mutual awareness among participants in a set of 
organisations that they are involved in a common enterprise” that Powell and 
DiMaggio give as the fourth element of structuration; the shared maximand of 
institutional costs analysis. However once again the way the established 
community is organised introduced frictions that worked to counter that 
impetus: 
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The different collection disciplines of, for example, SIGINT, MASINT, IMINT 
(now referred to as geospatial intelligence) or even HUMINT are still seen as 
discrete specialisations that require a purpose-trained and recruited group of 
practitioners. Those practitioners would perceive themselves as engaged in 
the collection of intelligence (including its analysis) to support national 
security decision making or as engaged in tactical military or law enforcement 
at a local level. However the environmental shift that meant domestic 
terrorism became a national security threat blurred those divisions even as it 
increased the sense of shared maximand.1001   The creation of a further 
discipline of Homeland Security Intelligence (HSINT) which would then be the 
province of the DHS Intelligence and Analysis Division, appears at first a 
natural and even quite an elegant solution to bridging that gap.1002 It could 
after all be expected to provide the DHS with their own intelligence discipline; 
the property rights to which might grant them an entree into the established 
community.  
In fact the addition of HSINT as a collection discipline has proved problematic 
precisely because it creates overlapping property rights and introduces 
language costs between the boundedly rational actors in different 
organisations. Rather than being a collection discipline HSINT is a 
substantive area of enquiry. The other collection disciplines are source-
specific and operate using an identifiable platform, managed within a given 
agency and producing intelligence to support the functions of that agency.1003 
HSINT however is more comfortably visualised as the purpose of collecting 
the Intelligence rather than as a unique collection method, so there is a 
language cost. This is exacerbated because HSINT is only nebulously 
defined, with some believing it to be a Federally led ‘Top-down’ model that 
provides information to the State and local actors, and other seeing it as a 
‘Bottom-up’ network that allows local product to be assimilated into the ‘big-
picture’.1004 This lack of definition confuses contracting between the DHS and 
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its consumers/suppliers, so that its implementation of the Homeland Security 
Information Network (HSIN) was piecemeal and unsuitable for most external 
users.1005   
Whether the DHS is focused on one or the other further obscures property 
rights that already overlap: Four statutory members of the US Intelligence 
Community are specifically engaged in the domestic security mission (The 
intelligence elements of the FBI, US Coast Guard, Treasury and the DHS 
itself)1006 although none is primarily an intelligence agency, with the others 
devoting some of their resources to it, and responsibilities in both the analytic 
and coordination functions have become more complex and confused at 
every level.1007  The tactical level threat of terrorism becoming a national 
security issue thus means that any DHS claims over HSINT will be contested 
because resources are finite.  
Another structural problem that produces negotiating frictions between the 
DHS intelligence effort and its potential partner agencies is that they are not 
configured in the same way. Negotiating costs are higher because 
appropriate points of contact are indistinct which produces barriers to peer to 
peer cooperation, and clear equivalents to practices and organisational forms 
are not apparent to DHS officers. The sub-level organisations that might offer 
an independent collection capability of HSINT to the DHS do not report to its 
‘Intelligence and Analysis’ element, but rather to the Deputy Secretary, who 
is also responsible for their wider security functions. Any coordination below 
that remains within the sub-level organisations gift.1008 In the established 
intelligence agencies intelligence-product travels up the same chain of 
command under which officers operate. The different types of organisational 
structure used in these different cases are an inevitable by-product of having 
different organisations, doing different things, and in different environments: It 
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follows that Different “species” of organisations are thus needed.1009 However 
this distinction produces institutional costs between actors who nonetheless 
need to cooperate closely.    
Thus the poor definition of property rights surrounding the new organisation 
and HSINT itself will lead boundedly rational senior bureaucrats in diverse 
agencies to feel individually responsible for overlapping elements of the 
function. They will be incentivised to act opportunistically in a Niskanen-like 
manner to secure a greater counterterrorism responsibility, as well as the 
kudos and resources that go with it. Because the provision of security is an 
"...n-person game dominated by strategic practices of information control and 
power as between various agencies...",1010 the weak property rights clarity 
provokes high institutional costs. Frictions occur during each separate 
negotiation in which the DHS engages, with any one of these other 
organisations. Moreover the shifting terrorism environment means these 
occur sequentially as well as simultaneously.  
Powell and DiMaggio describe a 'normative isomorphism' where established 
members of a community act to "... to define the conditions and methods of 
their work, to control ‘the production of producers’...".1011 The structural and 
operational secrecy inherent in intelligence work makes it especially 
vulnerable to these pressures. An outward looking organisation like the DHS, 
made up of individuals largely recruited from outside the intelligence 
community, and led by a politician, would be an anathema to those already 
inside the intelligence community. These insiders can use the high 
institutional costs that are inherent to counterterrorism provision, as well as 
those that result from both the cultural and organisational differences 
described above, to act opportunistically to regulate the patterns of dominion 
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and coalition to their individual advantage rather than that of their sponsor, 
the US government.1012  
Section 3: Hierarchical Cooperation and The United States Director of 
National Intelligence  
Although unable to leverage the political support to establish a community 
wide head of intelligence itself, the 9/11 Commission did identify a lack of 
cohesion across the US Government and intelligence community as one of 
four principal failures that had contributed to a failure to prevent the attacks, 
clearly signposting the importance of cooperation in the counterterrorism 
function. This shortfall in coordination was then divided into two areas: Firstly 
the Commission noted that “Action officers should have been able to draw on 
all available knowledge....”, and secondly that “Management should have 
ensured......duties were clearly assigned across agencies, and across the 
foreign-domestic divide.”.1013 This clearly signified that the lack of cohesion 
went beyond information sharing issues, but also included confused 
responsibilities and uncertainty over priorities. The 9/11 Commission 
therefore believed that systemic problems in both the structure and 
information sharing capabilities needed to be dealt with, both of which can be 
captured within the institutional costs impact framework. The subsequent 
creation of a Director of National Intelligence after the second shock over 
poor intelligence on Iraqi WMD capabilities was (inter alia) intended to 
address both of these problems, at least for the intelligence function, in future 
counterterrorism work. This section will therefore examine each issue in turn 
from an institutional cost perspective to assess the contribution the DNI (and 
ODNI, including the NCTC) has made to collaboration within the US 
intelligence and security spheres in the counterterrorism field.  
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a. Structural Issues 
The post of DNI, together with its supporting organisation, the ODNI and 
functional centres like the NCTC were finally created in 2004 through the 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) specifically to 
‘manage’ the intelligence community.1014 It boasts a significant architecture 
through which that aim could be achieved, with different committees, councils 
and centers designed to coordinate the whole community both vertically and 
horizontally.1015 Indeed despite some misgivings, Gregory Treverton 
suggests that the creation of a DNI was one of the foremost ‘successes’ of 
the 9/11 Commission.1016 Certainly the fact that IRTPA gave the DNI role 
responsibility for both foreign and domestic intelligence activity, and 
reconstituted the National Foreign Intelligence Program as the National 
Intelligence Program should have removed one of the most problematic bars 
to cross-community cooperation in the terrorism sphere.1017  
However even in that the DNI's actual ability to direct the program with any 
authority was "... acutely circumscribed", limiting the role of the office to 
'advise' and provide 'guidance'.1018 The creation of the office, in tandem with 
IRTPA measures and building on both the 2001 Patriot Act and its 2006 
enhancement Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization Act is regarded by 
some as positive, as wide-ranging as the threats with which it is required to 
deal, and timely.1019 Yet  some of the resultant detail indicates that horse 
trading over the minutiae actually allowed the reappearance of some of the 
structural problems that the legislation was designed to overcome, with the 
same institutional frictions still apparent (and in some cases made worse).  
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Any such assessment must take into account that the DNI as originally 
envisaged is a hierarchical construct intended to sit over the disparate parts 
of the US intelligence community and enforce cooperation between its 
recalcitrant members from on high. However when actually rolled out the DNI 
was neither a wholly authoritative body; equivalent to what the WMD 
Commission thought of as a 'Secretary of Intelligence' with powers to match, 
nor what they regarded as the other viable alternative; a simple coordinating 
entity.1020 Property rights over the use of intelligence community resources 
were thus further confused rather than clarified: An ODNI 'Office of the 
Inspector General' report in 2008 found that it had lead to elements of the 
intelligence community believing that the DNI's support for collaboration was 
indicative of how it was to be managed only with their consent, a position 
fundamentally at odds with the original DNI ethos and even IRTPA.1021 These 
opaque property rights introduced further search, information and negotiating 
costs, fundamentally changing the DNI role and the capabilities of its 
functional elements like the NCTC. The different institutional cost impacts on 
first hierarchical, then collegial structures will therefore be examined to 
assess their impact on the DNI's ability to genuinely ‘manage’ collaborative 
working against the terrorism threat.     
i) Structure, Authority, and Institutional Costs 
These structural difficulties were rooted in the negotiations that suffered from 
high institutional costs. Firstly there was a language cost as boundedly 
rational advocates variously argued over national and tactical level control of 
assets on the apparent assumption that they were the same thing. 
Congressional debates show a clear tension between strategic and tactical 
concerns without the distinction being made explicit. They reflect a well-
founded fear that if DNI has an holistic responsibility (including for DoD 
intelligence assets) they will be focused on the national level priorities of their 
new masters. The reasonable assumption being that a DNI, as the 
Presidents principal intelligence adviser, will direct his or her assets to fulfill 
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these needs to the detriment of tactical level intelligence, so that soldiers and 
others would be put at risk.1022.  
The very real but very different needs of both sides are reliant on many of the 
same tools. However because the agencies and departments involved were 
organised into self-contained functional silos, providing intelligence for their 
own purposes from the bottom all the way up, the utility of senior bureaucrats 
is best served by maintaining autonomy, as they can then judge how best to 
allocate scarce resources between each as particular circumstances dictate.     
In part because of this organisational form high negotiating costs between 
actors were not solely predicated on the different levels of responsibility that 
complicated the DNI case however, or even the peculiar difficulties of the 
terrorism problem. Rather they were the norm between the various members 
of the US intelligence community. Terrorism was simply another issue over 
which they were to be contested.1023  
Indeed the level of negotiating friction and repeated sub-optimal outcomes 
that have resulted are a strong argument against the sort of ‘realist’ world-
view described in Chapter 1. The WMD Commission’s overview, which was 
produced after the twin exogenous shocks of 9/11 and the flawed intelligence 
assessments on Iraqi WMD, pessimistically noted the ability of the 
intelligence community to resist any externally generated pressure to adapt, 
and how closed to outsiders it was.1024 The uncertainty of their external 
environment is therefore not matched internally; where private firms adapt at 
a population level, because if they fail to modify after exogenous shocks they 
perish, most government bodies survive for decades almost unchanged.1025 
Without that risk the relative utility of pursuing agency level sub-goals is 
enhanced over community level projects like the DNI.  
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Nor was the idea of an authoritative DNI universally accepted as a positive 
move across the board anyway; opposition coalesced around concerns that 
the DNI would be neutered,1026 particularly without an agency of their own, 
and the converse worry that they would be too strong relative to the DoD.1027 
The recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, whilst authoritative, were 
only recommendations, and its panel were from outside the community so 
lacked credibility to some. This was the case despite the fact unlike many 
earlier Commissions, the 9/11 Commission did not disappear having 
reported, but remained constituted to try and ensure implementation of their 
recommendations.1028 In any event the role of DNI was mutated through the 
same processes of deleterious horse-trading that have undermined almost 
every measure recommended in Presidential Commissions going back to the 
First Hoover Commission in 1948,1029 the original National Security Act of 
1947,1030 and even the US approach to foreign and domestic intelligence in 
the run-up to the Second World war.1031 
The results were a set of confused property rights that varied not only from 
issue to issue but even with respect to different agencies within each issue, 
and according to the level at which the issue was being addressed, 
increasing complexity rather than lowering it. These property rights problems 
are shown diagrammatically in Figure 6.2.1032 They mean that the DNI has to 
enter wholly different negotiations with each, even when dealing with the 
same issue. The likelihood of the same outcome, and the evolution of a 
genuinely cooperative ‘single’ community, is thus reduced. Consider for 
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example the agreements reached around the appointment of senior 
personnel around the community.  
 
The DNI chooses and is line manager to the Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency, but both of them are actually appointed by the 
President. Conversely the DNI's authority over the appointment of an 
intelligence head for any of the host Departments of other Intelligence 
Community members like the State Department or Treasury is limited to a 
veto because these are appointed by their host department. As if to enforce 
the importance of negotiating positions over practicality in this area, the same 
veto arrangement applies to the intelligence heads for the Army, Navy, 
Marine and Air Force elements of the military, who would be most engaged 
with their solely military single-service concerns. On the other hand the DNI 
only has a right to ‘be consulted’ around the appointment of the DIA head, 
who has very specific national responsibilities1033 which overlap those of the 
ODNI. Even where the DNI has theoretical authority, weak property rights 
and a poor negotiating position mean that enacting it is problematic. A 
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directive from DNI Blair in 2009 that his office would henceforward select the 
US heads of intelligence in any country, historically a CIA choice from 
amongst their own staff, was immediately countermanded by the then 
Director, Leon Panetta, who successfully ordered that it be ignored despite 
being ostensibly under the DNI's line management.1034 Given that the 
principle purpose of these organisations is not counterterrorism, or even 
intelligence collection in most cases, a condition of differing sub-goals will 
apply and the DNI's ability to align their goals with his (at the time of writing) 
own will be limited by these confused and restricted property rights.     
Internally property rights are similarly confused so that the DNI is barely even 
'master in his own house':1035 Because of his limited authority over the 
external parts of the intelligence community described above, a great deal of 
the counterterrorism effort is vested in the internal NCTC. Certainly the 
NCTC sits within the ODNI, but its Chief is appointed by the President (and 
ratified by the Senate). Thereafter the NCTC reports to the President on 
counterterrorism operations that are not 'intelligence' (despite its own lack of 
operational capacity), but to the DNI on counterterrorism intelligence.1036 
Again, confused and overlapping property rights linked to different goals 
mean that the intended hierarchal authority of the DNI over the 
counterterrorism piece is largely illusory. 
Other possible control methods were similarly limited. The UK's former 
Security and Intelligence Coordinator, Sir David Omand, has stated that for 
any reforming initiative to be successful there must be an alignment of the 
desired change and authority over the relevant budget.1037 However the 
diminution of the proposed authority of the DNI included a limitation on the 
budgetary control over agencies that the DNI could exercise, so that the role 
became a 'conduit' for the agencies financial bids to the President, a conduit 
that could be 'gone around' if the agency in question was unhappy with the 
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DNI's position.1038 The result is that for budgetary questions the DNI may 
represent an additional tier of institutional costs that can be avoided by some 
of the actors involved.  
The contest over budgetary control between the DNI and DoD was an 
extension of the strategic/tactical debate already referred to, but was rooted 
in the negotiation over new patterns of property rights. The DNI was never 
intended to be involved in the tactical military intelligence programs, known 
as 'Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities' (TIARA), because they were 
to serve military commands and field commands only. The property rights 
were apparently clear. However the shift in the external environment brought 
about by the information age,1039 coupled with the linkage between 
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism that the US's 'War on Terror' brought 
about, meant that the distinction between military operations and civilian 
counterterrorism, and between the tactical and strategic levels, was far less 
clear. It was therefore proposed that the DNI have some authority over the 
'Joint Military Intelligence Program' (JMIP), but that included elements of 
TIARA as well as DoD held, nationally responsible resources like the NSA 
and NGA (and precursors); a significant overlap that could seriously impact 
on the ability of each to function in their respective roles.1040  
The resultant arrangement directing that the DNI 'consult with' the Secretary 
of Defense to agree civilian and military needs (with the President as 
referee);1041 was in fact a settlement that is no settlement at all. Item by item 
and use by use negotiations that are hotly contested are inevitable. The 
military needs to integrate the same resources needed by the national level 
into operational units, for whom more will always be better and the need 
always more 'urgent' (if not more important) than any civilian requirement. 
The creation of an agreed strategic framework by the DNI and Defense 
Secretary as advocated by Treverton through which all such negotiations can 
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be mediated seems unlikely,1042 so that this element of budgetary control 
seems more likely to prevent cooperative behaviour than encourage it.     
The DNI's ability to use budgetary authority as a control mechanism post 
approval of the National Intelligence Program (NIP) are slightly better 
however. As well as controlling disbursement the DNI has a monitoring role 
and needs to approve any shift in what the money is to be used for by an 
agency.1043 Given the uncertainty of the environment such a constraint on an 
individual agencies flexibility is a significant tool to align them with other 
agencies, albeit a negative one. Possible sanctions in the event of a breach 
remained weak however, and the DNI's own ability to respond to emerging 
threats in any positive way, which might have gained the office credibility as 
an intelligence actor, more limited still. Shifting funds between programs 
requires the agreement not only of the agencies (at least some part of which 
will be a net loser) but also the Office of Management and Budget.1044  
This pattern of formal authority over intelligence community elements 
intended to enforce cooperative behaviour that is not matched by any real 
statutory authority is repeated elsewhere. The DNI's strategic responsibility 
for community requirements and priorities included the near impossible 
exhortation to resolve conflicts in collection priorities and tasking of national 
assets with no commensurate property rights over either the agencies or 
assets in dispute.1045    
However less obviously contentious hierarchical control measures have been 
gradually accumulated to offset these limitations, most often through 
Congressional activity, whereby the DNI's impact could be enhanced through 
relevance to enabling rather than core architecture: While the DNI's directive 
that the NCTC should be staffed by analysts from across the community 
might have been the victim of perfunctory compliance by self-interested 
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managers,1046 the Senate Select Committee could provide the DNI with some 
intra-agency personnel authority by giving the office some control over ceiling 
levels so that civilian expansion had to be approved by the external DNI, 
granting the office additional 'cards' in other negotiations.1047  
There are therefore indications that Congress and the ODNI are talking to 
each other, and that Congress is aware of the limitations to the DNI’s 
authority, and minded to enhance it, albeit by gradual evolution. Contrary to 
Zegart's findings of a disinterested Congress little incentivised to involve itself 
in foreign affairs,1048 an institutional cost approach suggests that Congress is 
instead motivated to improve their own negotiating position. Congressional 
utility from intelligence related matters has shifted with the closer links 
between them and the domestic security environment and terrorism. 
Empowering the DNI in any real way may not be a positive for the 
Executive's utility, given their direct working relationship with internally 
controlled departmental intelligence agencies (in the DoD and State for 
example).  
Enhancing the position of the DNI nonetheless lowers Congress's own 
institutional costs by providing a single executive point through which to 
oversee' the community at large. Although it is too much to claim any seismic 
shift in willingness by Congress to enter into the sort of bruising internal 
reforms and external negotiations with senior bureaucrats advocated by Lee 
Hamilton, the former Vice Chairman of the 9/11 Commission,1049 the 2010 
Intelligence Authorization Act is replete with minor measures that enhance 
and extend the DNI's authority.1050 Indeed Congress behaves in a Dunleavy 
'bureau shaping' manner in the report by accepting a diminution of its own 
authority by passing the power to order an 'accountability review' of an 
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intelligence community element to the DNI.1051 One of the most potentially 
potent of these measures is the granting to the DNI authority to control the 
vetting status of everyone within the community (except some political or 
judicial appointees which are specifically linked to the oversight function).1052 
There are thus indications that where head on assaults on the intelligence 
community have failed, Congress is minded to use the DNI as a lower 
institutional cost route to back-door control. This indicates that although the 
DNI was intended as a coordinator by fiat, when that failed, routes boasting 
less institutional frictions have been sought.  
Nonetheless the net divergence between the proposed authoritative DNI role 
and the actualité was so great that several potential candidates for the job 
declined it prior to Negroponte’s accession despite its apparent kudos,1053 
and there has been a high turnover thereafter.1054 The post cannot enforce 
cooperative behaviour across the intelligence aspects of the counterterrorism 
community because the detail of the legislative and organisational 
architecture in which it sits engenders high institutional costs.  
ii) Structure, Collegiality, and Institutional Costs 
The alternative possible path offered by the WMD Commission, that the 
ODNI be a small coordinating body only, would also have been subjected to 
institutional cost pressures that would still have impinged on its ability to 
encourage collaboration. Certainly the DNI could usefully have been a 
'primus inter pares' amongst agencies. Like the British system this could 
have offset the positions bounded rationality problem, whilst lowering 
'principal-agent' tensions, because although still unsighted the DNI would be 
a coordinator and not a principal anyway. Such a system would also provide 
redundancy against the bounded rationality within the agencies themselves, 
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a useful commodity in an uncertain security environment despite the potential 
problems of overlap.1055 
The scale of the undertaking dictates a number of committees sitting across 
purposes, geographical areas and consumer areas of relevance.1056 Efforts 
to achieve this have been negatively impacted by the resulting complexity. 
Executive coordination is for example ostensibly managed by a National 
Intelligence Board (NIB), which the DNI chairs over the various heads of 
agencies. Despite its larger membership than its forefather (the National 
Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB)), Davies suggested in 2012 that its remit 
for coordination across the community is weaker. However the more recent 
release of Intelligence Community Directive 2021057 suggests that it has 
actually inherited the NFIB remit, so that although not technically weaker, the 
NIB's lack of visibility across the community that Davies observed means that 
it is de facto less influential. Whilst it manages national estimates, 
coordination has been delegated down to a complex tapestry of managers 
with specific areas of concern1058 as predicted by Hammond.1059 The net 
result has been a series of 'duplicated taskings' and 'conflicting messages' 
out to the wider intelligence community which have undermined ODNI status 
and cooperation generally,1060 as actors individually select their own reporting 
lines (in the manner depicted in Diagrams 5.3 and 5.4) according to which 
offer the lowest institutional difficulties.   
At Cabinet level there are other institutional costs that reduce collaborative 
capability. The Joint Intelligence Coordinating Council (JICC), which the DNI 
also chairs (although the role is not of Cabinet rank), is intended as a 
committee type body for national level coordination. However the rigidity of 
the legislative architecture through which it must work, when coupled with the 
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informal channels open to participants, limits its ability to work collegially. The 
JICC system mandates that members may formally dissent from any advice 
or opinion the Council offers. It further states that any such dissent must be 
brought to the attention of the end-user (whether the President or NSC).1061 
Any dissenting party, which might include the Secretaries of State for 
Defence State or Treasury (who are more overtly politically aligned with the 
President than the DNI), will however have much lower institutional cost 
points of access to the President that are both routine and less formal. 
Through these they will  discuss the broader set of issues relevant to their 
role, of which any intelligence opinion is but a small part. The weight of the 
original opinion can therefore be diminished by a single dissenting voice, 
undermining the collaborative approach that produced it.  
Perhaps the greatest structural flaw in the DNI's ability to promote 
cooperation across the counterterrorism intelligence endeavour lies in the 
fact that although no longer formally double hatted in the way the old DCI 
was, the DNI nonetheless has two roles: As the manager of the community 
and as the Presidents principal intelligence adviser. Just as being double 
hatted provoked probity problems for the old DCI role, this arrangement 
creates significant institutional costs for the DNI. Each role is qualitatively 
different to the other, so that any holder of the DNI post is likely to 
themselves be asset specific to one or the other. The span of control of any 
executive is inevitably delineated by the time and energy available to 
them,1062 and bounded rationality will prevent full engagement with two such 
distinct areas. Any information disadvantage in either will be magnified by the 
attention needed by the other, as knowledge in each area will be highly 
idiosyncratic to it alone.1063 The fact that the DNI's intelligence responsibilities 
that transcend the full range of national security issues in an uncertain 
environment will inevitably provide a push for the intelligence adviser role as 
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crises emerge, and be deleterious to the terrorism issue generally, and its 
coordination particularly.  
Michael Hayden, the former Principal Deputy DNI (as well as former Director 
of  the CIA and NSA) observed: “Unfortunately the DNI has two jobs, either of 
which would overwhelm a person. One is senior intelligence adviser to the 
President; the other is smooth functioning of the Intelligence Community. It’s 
very hard for a DNI not to focus on the first, largely because the president 
insists that he does. If you do that, that means the smooth functioning of the 
community, by default, tends to drift to the DNI staff. That is not a formula for 
success. Staffs don’t run other staffs; staffs support principals”.1064 The 
problems Hayden refers to can be described in institutional cost terms by 
examining the two significant issues that result.  
Firstly appropriate points of contact are indistinct which produces barriers for 
to peer to peer cooperation. Clear equivalents to practices and organisational 
forms are not apparent. As Gareth describes it, different 'species' of 
organisation are required if systems are needed to do different things in 
distinct environments,1065 but the ODNI has two such roles and a Director 
who "... spends his days waiting outside the Oval Office ... trying to manage 
the community on his Blackberry"1066 so that the development of probity at a 
senior level is difficult. Hayden goes on to make this point, arguing for the 
importance of commanders talking to commanders, so that the "... CIA’s HR 
(human resources) is not being tasked by DNI’s HR … the CIA director may 
be tasked by the DNI, and the director may use his HR to respond to that 
tasking. When you’re able to establish that kind of relationship, then I think 
we’re more likely to succeed."1067 In an apparently hierarchical system the 
same will be true of a function like counterterrorism, increasing the 
negotiating costs experienced by a body like the NCTC. The dual role of the 
DNI thus increases the frictions in negotiating at both senior and working 
levels. At the same time communication costs increase with the necessity for 
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peer to peer nodes, and information costs rise as the DNI staff must 
coordinate itself before it can attempt to coordinate the external community.   
Establishing such a relationship is however rooted in the utility different 
actors find in each function. Clearly aware of the extent to which this 
distracted him from what he saw as his principal mission, DNI Mike 
McConnell did attempt to divest himself of the responsibility of delivering the 
President’s Daily Brief (PDB). The President was not inclined to permit 
this1068 as his utility was in receiving the best possible intelligence picture on 
a daily basis. At the same time whilst the coordination role may be the job 
that is least able to be delegated, the DNI's personal utility will probably be 
enhanced by satisfying the senior decision-maker: He or She will have been 
appointed by the President after all. The relationship will offer significant 
status and may even be personally fulfilling, or at least relatively low friction. 
There will only be a small number of nodes with which to connect, all of 
whom will be part of the same executive team and will largely share the same 
maximand. Atmosphere will therefore be superior when contrasted with the 
limited and variable lines of control the DNI can muster in delivering his or 
her coordination function. Often this will be a matter of cajoling and 
negotiating difficult 'contracts' between various actors that are frequently at 
least as powerful, boast the same access to the senior decision maker, and 
can routinely use the significant structural secrecy factors and limits on the 
DNI's time to engineer information advantages and then act opportunistically. 
Presidential direction will thus only reinforce how the DNI would rationally 
elect to allocate his scarce personal resources. 
Secondly because 'staffs don't run other staffs' the rationality limitations of 
the DNI will be reflected in their staff, rather than off-set by it. Left to its own 
devices, a staff will naturally pursue the status quo, focusing its energy on 
maintaining a point of balance as close to the point where a senior decision 
maker left it. They will be risk averse and have neither the authority nor the 
inclination to engage with any issue that might be contentious, or where the 
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wishes of their absent principal are not obvious at the outset.1069 The 
equation for the operational elements with whom they must contract is 
however very different as they are motivated to take risks if they believe other 
parts of the community are providing an 'insurance cover'.1070 They might use 
their discretionary latitude to deviate still further from the formers implicit 
wishes if they believe the ODNI are that insurance, and for example, reduce 
coverage of a counterterrorism target offering poor individual utility returns in 
favour of something else more in keeping with home agencies core mission 
as they perceive it.  
The DNI's staff will also be incentivised to maximise their personal utility by 
pursuing their principals preferences for obtaining good analytic product with 
which to serve the President (for much the same reasons), and thus inclined 
to liaise vertically with their contacts to help compile national level intelligence 
products like the Presidents Daily Brief (PDB), rather than horizontally to 
improve linkages across a discordant counterterrorism effort, as the 
emphasis within the Office of Deputy Director of National Intelligence for 
Intelligence Integration makes clear.1071 The organisational levels responsible 
for tactical delivery are capable of working bilaterally when it appears to them 
functionally useful, as various operations have demonstrated,1072 and so 
could after all actually end up removing the ODNI from that linkage at a sub-
strategic level, where many of the rewards for counterterrorism are to be 
found. The ODNI is therefore incentivised to maintain an asymmetric control 
over information if it is avoid the possibility of being neutered by the very 
organisations it is supposed to coordinate.  
There is therefore a tension between the costs associated with either 
management by fiat or by coordination. The bounded rationality of the DNI 
will make it impossible to actively manage information flows between different 
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organisations that themselves have a complex variety of information 
holdings, roles, and specialist knowledge advantages. The volume of data 
that may be potentially relevant is simply too great. What he or she could be 
reasonably expected to achieve is the establishment and management of a 
low institutional cost environment for the different agencies so that they can 
interact horizontally.1073  
However, any such moves from a DNI would undermine their own office, and 
violate the ‘command principle’ resulting in confusion and inefficiency.1074 
The ODNI have tried to manage this tension by focusing on high powered 
analysis in functionally based centre's like the NCTC, arguably another staff 
running staffs approach with all the problems that brings (as discussed 
above). However this sort or organisational form itself requires a trade off 
against the deeper cultural and contextual understanding often needed, 
which is better developed through a more traditional geographically based 
form of organisation that allows an analyst a longer period of familiarity with 
potential problem areas as they ebb and flow towards becoming a terrorist 
threat.1075 
Each has advantages in different circumstances, but the property rights 
overlap between the DNI's NCTC and CIA's CTC has meant that those 
advantages have become a means for each to behave opportunistically to 
define and then protect their 'turf' rather a point around which they coalesce. 
The ODNI have tried to improve their bargaining position with the rest of the 
community by becoming the loci at which all such information is aggregated 
then analysed,1076 but have evolved into a strategic level resource as without 
an 'agency' of their own they have struggled to establish low friction 
relationships at more operational levels. The CIA on the other hand have 
used their greater depth of knowledge to remain the operational and tactical 
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level intelligence providers for counterterrorism, behaving opportunistically by 
sending only very inexperienced analysts to the NCTC so that their own 
capability is retained, and the knowledge base of their rivals is not 
improved.1077  
Other structural problems are less intentional, but occur as a result of the 
uncertain environment shifting. The counterterrorism capability of the US is 
heavily invested in foreign liaison relationships and the DNI is in turn 
responsible for the coordination of liaison with foreign intelligence and 
security agencies,1078 a responsibility delegated down to the CIA Heads of 
Station in most instances. Observers like Michael Herman have long warned 
that the new need to share intelligence across national divides following the 
environmental shift at the end of the Cold War could only be managed if trust 
was developed, and that this might be incompatible with broader 
requirements and priorities.1079 Trust in the probity of one's fellow actor is 
likely to be fragile, and can be easily lost.1080  
There is an inherent risk in putting both counter terror liaison and 
responsibility for diplomatic and economic intelligence needs in the same 
hands.1081 Jennifer Sims has even argued that in some cases a liaison 
service will have to be penetrated so that the likely costs and benefits of the 
relationship can be assessed.1082 Whilst there is no great problem if one 
avoids discovery, if one does get caught one cannot hope to maintain a 
cordial, or even a 'business as usual' relationship with one's target. The US 
has had a mutually beneficial relationship with Germany1083 over shared 
terrorism concerns for some years, but this is likely to be seriously diminished 
following allegations of both SIGINT intercepts on Chancellor Merkel's 
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phone, and the presence of US agents within the German intelligence and 
security infrastructure. The fact that one of the sanctions imposed by the 
Germans was the requirement that the CIA Head of Station, the man 
responsible for that counter terror liaison, left the country, indicates how 
fraught having the two responsibilities in the same hands can be.1084 The 
breakdown of trust has made negotiating around the terrorism issue with any 
sense of a shared maximand more difficult, and the remaining (genuine) 
need for secrecy around some sources and methods mean that re-
establishing trust is particularly problematic in the intelligence sphere once it 
is lost.    
Like the DHS before it, the structural framework in which the DNI operates 
both internally and externally has significant implications for the level of 
institutional costs the post must overcome if it is to deliver truly cooperative 
working in the counterterrorism intelligence sphere.     
b. The Management of Information Sharing 
The centrality of information sharing to an effective intelligence community 
was noted when the US first created theirs: Reviewing the Joint Committee 
on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack Report,1085 Michael Warner 
has stated that the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 "... 
could have been blunted if the various commanders and departments had 
coordinated their actions and shared their intelligence.” They therefore 
enacted the National Security Act, 1947 precisely to “....implement the 
principles of unity of command and unity of intelligence”.1086 Yet in 2001 a 
comparable lack of cohesion contributed to the success of the 9/11 
attackers.1087 Improving cooperation around information sharing was thus 
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seen as a key reform, and the IRTPA was specific in making the DNI the 
official to discharge Presidential responsibility in this area, as well as 
mandating the appointment of both a program manger and council to advise 
them.1088  
Certainly the result was some significant improvements in the ability of 
analysts to access intelligence, and to collaborate with each other virtually. 
These successes rested on not only allowing collaboration, but also changing 
the utility that cooperation offers to those involved. This course was chosen 
in preference to trying to enforce cooperation, which was regarded as 
doomed to fail as compliance would only ever be perfunctory, and experience 
had shown this to be inadequate for intelligence engagement that needs the 
active value-addition from actors.1089  
The relative utility that both analysts and their managers achieved through 
sharing was heightened through positive measures and the introduction of 
potential sanctions. Although National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) had long 
been joint products, intelligence Involvement in creating the Presidents Daily 
Brief was now formally credited. This provided kudos so that by 2009 70% of 
products involved input from two or more agencies, and the products of the 
National Intelligence Council (NIC), which was by now part of the ODNI,1090 
became a community wide standard. At the same time programs that 
demonstrated what other members of the community did were delivered to 
managers. This ensured both an increased shared maximand and that they 
were aware of low institutional cost routes to where help could be found for 
their own issues, and even how overlap could be reduced and resources 
redirected. Concerns from within agencies that their core mission could be 
degraded if analysts were busy on someone else's problem were off-set in 
this way. Because interactions became more sequential probity could be 
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established and managers could be reassured that they would benefit when 
their turn came.1091  
Other negotiating costs were lowered too, albeit some accidentally. Probity 
amongst the senior bureaucrats was already established as eight of them 
had been China analysts together in the past, which acted as a lubricant to 
the inevitable frictions. Inter-organisational pathologies that had been useful 
to build esprit d' corps within agencies through the denigration of the 'others' 
were discouraged through integrated training, behaviours and standards of 
analysis (although certainly not eliminated altogether1092), and collaboration 
was made easier through shared vetting standards and levels as well as 
through innovative IT that reduced any 'opportunity costs' in pursuing a 
collaborative solution.1093    
However although better cooperation in forming analytical judgements within 
the intelligence community was achieved to some degree, the more 
problematic linkage between the intelligence and security capabilities so that 
the resultant product is properly actioned is a distinct issue sitting at the edge 
of the DNI's responsibility. Strategic warnings in the run-up to the 9/11 
attacks were after all numerous and widely disseminated,1094 it was the more 
operational collaboration that missed key linkages both within and between 
agencies,1095 and this problem would appear to have persisted, as the post-
incident investigation into Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab's attempt to blow up a 
Northwest Airlines flight on Christmas Day 2009 demonstrated. It concluded 
that information was shared, but not in the meaningful way that might have 
pre-empted his attempt.1096 
The difficulties of managing cooperation across this divide are still significant, 
and riven by contradictory pressures. The need for secrecy competes with 
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the need to share, with serious consequences for the inappropriate use of 
either, incentivising delay and risk aversion. The intelligence and security 
nexus thus demonstrates the same conflicting drivers of 'guardianship' and 
'trade' identified by Jane Jacobs.1097 The DNI’s current drive for analysts to 
engage in ‘outreach’ with security professionals, policy level consumers, and 
well informed outsiders while still remaining non-partisan and protecting 
secrets provokes such a tension and is exemplified in the mutually 
contradictory instructions emanating from the DNI in both ‘Vision 2015’ and 
the more specific ‘ICD-205’, as they try to incorporate both traits in the same 
activity.1098 Such tensions inevitably make negotiations between agencies 
more difficult as without a clear policy either might be preeminent on any 
given day. As no in-depth explanation for sharing or guarding will usually be 
possible, establishing probity will be harder, and the perception of the sort of 
opportunistic use of intelligence as a tool for self-advancement observed by 
Nolan within the NCTC and CTC1099 is always likely.  
The former DNI Dennis Blair also points out the inevitable dichotomy 
between sharing and securing information, without offering any particular 
solution. He does however link problems of information sharing with the new 
information costs that the information revolution has brought. He observes 
that the ideal is to “… leverage virtual teams of intelligence officers linked 
together throughout the world” but goes on to intimate that the problem for 
analysts has shifted from one of obtaining scant or secured information, (that 
is to say finding enough pieces of the jigsaw) to discerning which pieces of 
the myriad available are useful and relevant to the problem at hand.1100 
Oversupplying, or simply sharing everything will therefore not resolve the 
problem; the protective security intelligence element of the Secret Service, 
who were one of the organisations dropped into the DHS when it was created 
in 2002, and who are charged with the early identification of tactical level 
terrorist threats to the President and others, were receiving some 5000 
                                                                   
1097
 Jane Jacobs and Random House, Systems of Survival: A Dialogue on the Moral Foundations of 
Commerce and Politics(New York: Cambridge Univ Press. Vintage, 1994). 
1098
 Anthony C Olcott, "The Challenges of Clashing I.C. Interests," International Journal of 
Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 23, no. 4 (2010). 625-626. 
1099
 Nolan, "Information Sharing and Collaboration in the United States Intelligence Community: An 
Ethnographic Study of the National Counterterrorism Center." 
1100
 See for example Blair, "Road Rules for the Intelligence Community."  
358 
 
reports a day even in 2009, with very few staff members to read, much less 
properly assess them.1101 Whereas the new emphasis on sharing details of a 
sources access and credibility with the analyst responsible for the overall 
assessment can provide a qualitative improvement1102 and lower horizontal 
negotiating costs. Nonetheless search costs that occur before the negotiation 
between analyst and user can even begin have largely replaced the former 
costs of intelligence collection.     
Costs are then exacerbated through the cultural enthusiasm for hierarchy  
that exists within the US mindset. A belief that, in order to be useful, all 
intelligence needs to move upwards that was asset specific to the very 
different intelligence and security environment of the Cold War. Ironically it 
has been the US military, that most hierarchical of organisations, that have 
been first to bypass the additional frictions and costs that unnecessary 
vertical move creates, as the next part to this thesis will discuss. The 9/11 
Commission critically refers to much needed intelligence not reaching the 
President. This despite its own observations that throughout 2000 and early 
2001 the “…system was blinking red” and that President Bush had been 
specifically reminded of the imminent Bin Laden threat in a Daily Brief in 
August 2001.  
As the 9/11 Commissions Executive Summary puts it “These cases did not 
prompt urgent action. No one working on tactical and operational leads in 
individual agencies through the summer of 2001 connected them to the high 
level of threat reporting. In the words of one official, no analytic work foresaw 
the lightning that could connect the thundercloud to the ground”.1103 This 
describes a problem of poor vertical collaboration so that the leads on which 
tactical level officers were working, such as the 'phoenix memorandum', were 
not contextualised within the framework of the intelligence that was reaching 
the very senior levels. These frictions must then be considered in conjunction 
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with the policy makers preferences for “tactical level warning”1104 which 
satisfy their utility by providing easier decision-making 'wins'. Although in turn 
thy provoke tensions between levels as lower level specialists can be left 
having to execute operations in a manner they would not have chosen.1105   
The DNI's ability to either enforce or encourage cooperation is thus limited by 
high institutional costs between actors, although to a lesser extent than that 
of the DHS. The imposition of an authoritative super-structure over the entire 
intelligence community, as originally intended, was impossible due to high 
existing negotiating and information costs in the US system, exacerbated by 
weak property rights around the new DNI post which in turn increased 
negotiating costs again. These encouraged the opportunistic protection of the 
status quo by many of the actors involved, and the complex tapestry of 
overlapping property rights made more collegial management less effective. 
Information sharing within the community has improved, and the DNI's ability 
to focus elements of it on particular problems like terrorism through 'mission 
teams' has improved coordination more generally.1106 Despite this frictions 
between those 'inside' the community, and those who must use their product 
who are 'outside' persist. Overall structural fissures that permit high 
institutional costs between intelligence community agencies still pertain and 
prevent genuinely cooperative working.   
Section 4: Hierarchical Cooperation and The United Kingdom's 
CONTEST Strategy 
Unlike the case of the DHS examined in section 2, the establishment of the 
CONTEST strategy by the OSCT did not require the latter to become both a 
security and intelligence body, despite their similar objectives for integrating 
the two communities. Instead property rights were clearly delineated at the 
                                                                   
1104
 Stephen Marrin, "Homeland Security and the Analysis of Foreign Intelligence," Markle 
Foundation Task Force on National Security in the Information Age 15(2002).14 Mark V Kauppi, 
"Counterterrorism Analysis 101," Defense Intelligence Journal 11, no. 1 (2002). 
1105
 The advent of improved encrypted communications has for example allowed strategic level 
decision makers to direct operational and tactical levels from situation or control rooms, which has 
increasingly permitted a blurring of property rights over each level, even across the Atlantic, as US 
policy interference in the UK's Operation Overt demonstrated. See Chanan, "The Plot to Bring Down 
Britain's Planes."   
1106
 Blair, "Road Rules for the Intelligence Community."180 
360 
 
outset, so that OSCT were responsible only for coordinating existing 
functionality at the strategic level, according to the needs of CONTEST. 
Negotiations between the OSCT and the organisations that supplied the 
counterterrorism functions  were focused on that (shared) goal only. 
Institutional costs were thus much lower and vertical cooperation easier to 
achieve. Neither the OSCT or the CONTEST strategy were ever any sort of 
security or intelligence provider. Although its staff boasted some individual 
areas of expertise,1107 it did no more than provide a link between the wishes 
of government and its security and intelligence tools. Much in the same way 
as the agencies, departments and police were already used to through 
previous engagement with Cabinet Office or other departmental elements.1108 
Negotiations could run along established routes, using existing property 
rights and relationships that already demonstrated probity. Overall 
institutional costs were therefore much lower and cooperation much easier to 
achieve.  
A brief overview of how these different levels cue particular sorts of activity 
can clarify how low-friction negotiations aid effective delivery of the whole: A 
former senior UK practitioner has described how a the JIC might produce a 
strategic warning of an emerging potential threat that might prompt further 
‘Research and Development’ activity in several other government 
departments, and shift collection priorities for the agencies. They in turn 
might produce an operational alert if conditions seem to them to have made 
the threat more likely to become reality. Should the increased vigilance at (for 
example) border controls produce intelligence suggesting the threat is more 
immediate and domestic, the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC), which 
is responsible for analysing and assessing all intelligence relating to 
terrorism, whatever its source, without impinging on existing departmental 
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roles and responsibilities,1109 might issue an operational warning. It will then 
be for the police and Security Service to identify the individuals involved and 
to provide any executive action required. Each element is to a degree 
triggered by another but are nonetheless distinct functions managed 
separately.  
Nor are they mono-directional; the intelligence process requires that 
information gleaned at any stage and by any party should be assessed for 
utility not only at the level it is secured but also those above and below it. 
Coordinating that effort produces further distinct functions: The JIC and its 
machinery, the Joint Intelligence Organisation (JIO) will coordinate 
intelligence and information that is useful at a national strategic level1110 
whereas JTAC will do so if it has a more immediate or tactical level utility. 
There is however a further coordination need that is qualitatively different 
again; this involves the coordination of policy level decisions that cross the 
normal departmental or agency boundaries of responsibility, so that existing 
line management structures are inadequate. As the last chapter discussed 
countering terrorism in any holistic fashion produces a number of instances 
where this is required.1111 A closer examination of the policy machinery is 
therefore required. 
It should be stressed at the outset that this section is not concerned with the 
success or otherwise of any particular work stream within the CONTEST 
strategy. It is instead only concerned with the degree of success it (and by 
extension the OSCT) has achieved as a means of integrating different 
security and intelligence providers within a shared overall objective. However 
because it must integrate a range of departments and agencies in diverse 
functional areas, and is itself only a part of the wider National Security 
Strategy,1112 as operationalised in the Strategic Defence and Security Review 
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(SDSR),1113 CONTEST cannot exist much less function in isolation, whether 
vertically in either direction or horizontally.  
At the heart of the CONTEST strategy and the UK's counterterrorism effort is 
the understanding that predictive intelligence is its central tenet and provides 
what has been described 'strategic notice of possible futures'.1114 The fact 
that the different threats from terrorist activity are only possibilities, with 
varying degrees of likelihood, mean that any strategy to minimise their 
potential impact is a risk management tool. A government will have very 
different uses for intelligence that is strategic in nature, and intelligence that 
is more tactical, but will need to harness both in pursuit of national security in 
all its forms. The complexity of that undertaking means that different 
organisations will be responsible for different functional elements.  
Where the US compromises on the legislative form of their reforms, and 
negotiates each down to the minutest detail, then enforces the resultant 
agreement rigidly, prompting only reluctant and perfunctory compliance,1115 
the UK produce a definitive strategy that goes no further than being exactly 
that. Compromises then occur after the fact and the binding effect is more in 
the form of favours owed across those responsible for different aspects, 
much more in the manner of the way a core executive might operate. 
Compliance is thus more likely to be achieved because even if doing so is 
not in one elements best immediate interest, they can anticipate a return later 
and will be seen as cooperative and 'part of the team' in the interim.   
This section will therefore consider how the different aspects of the 
CONTEST strategy approach to cooperative working established a very 
different institutional cost environment to that experienced by either the DHS 
or the DNI. It will first consider how different parts of the community are 
directed towards very different objectives so that property rights between 
them are clear, then examine how the relatively un-ambitious functions of the 
OSCT have impacted on their working relationships with external agencies. 
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Finally the limits of the approach in terms of cooperative efficiency across the 
whole counterterrorism endeavour will be briefly assessed.    
Each iteration of the UK's CONTEST strategy has been premised on the 
same fundamental principle: Different parts of the nation's intelligence, 
security and wider government would retain responsibility for the delivery of 
the area in which they had expertise. The division of labour is managed not 
by the problem to be addressed but by the specialist skill set held. In the 
United States responsibilities are often broader, with comprehensive 
capabilities to deliver against a particular problem without outside help held 
within individual organisations. In the United Kingdom on the other hand 
primary organisational structure takes less note of the problem. Instead the 
existing structure is refocused and ad hoc committees are formed at various 
levels, and which can last for as long as they are required, to coordinate 
existing organisations that are relevant to the new problem. Essentially the 
CONTEST strategy adopted the same approach.  
Although reliant on predictive intelligence,1116 the CONTEST strategy does 
not regard terrorism as an intelligence problem, and therefore within the remit 
of the three UK agencies, anymore than it is exclusively a law enforcement, 
military or foreign problem. Rather it is a risk management tool that is as 
precautionary as it is responsive. Strategic and operational intelligence 
inform assessments around the capabilities and intentions of potential threats 
as discussed above, but only to direct resources and future planning as 
efficiently as possible. 'Risk' is taken to be a function of the likelihood of any 
particular attack, the vulnerability of the potential target, and a combination of 
the impact and duration of any harm felt. Each is mitigated using the different 
work-streams that make up CONTEST: Likelihood is diminished through 
'prevent' then 'pursue' activity, vulnerability by the 'protect' functions, and the 
impact and duration of harm are managed through 'prepare'.1117  
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Different organisations have different parts to play in delivering each but no 
absolute authority over any. The police for example have responsibilities in 
each of the four work-streams. They lead in some, some of the time, such as 
under 'pursue' when tactical primacy might shift between them and the 
Security Service as an operation evolves. Under 'protect' on the other hand 
they might have sole responsibility in some areas, such as for providing 
armed protection, whether for premises or at-risk individuals. It is noteworthy 
that the protection of individuals was a function of the Metropolitan Police 
Special Branch, an intelligence entity, albeit a policing one, until its demise in 
2006, an arrangement that recognised the central importance of intelligence 
in providing close protection and which obviated the sort of problems that the 
US Secret Service experienced with overload when using a small hub of 
analysts to serve their wider organisation (referred to above).1118 In some 
areas they may share that responsibility with others, including those in the 
private sector, such as when obviating the threat to 'crowded places'. In 
some functional areas they may merely assist, such as in the protection of 
the UK's critical national infrastructure, which is handled by the Centre for the 
Protection of Critical National Infrastructure (CPNI) by providing advisers 
through the National Counter Terrorism Security Office (NaCTSO) 
scheme.1119 The different points of access needed for 'prevent' activity meant 
the police could engage with more extreme but not necessarily criminal 
elements of Muslim communities while educationalists engaged with the 
young. Government could nonetheless preserve their political level 
control.1120 In each case property rights are delineated not by responsibility 
for the desired outcome but by the input each organisation can offer.     
This organisational form has allowed the UK to be more resistant to 
environmental shifts and the uncertainty that is a fundamental aspect of the 
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terror threat. In the US a shift in the threat environment lead to new and 
unanticipated overlaps between different aspects of the security and 
intelligence infrastructure, so that bureaucrats were obliged to compete for 
the emerging territory and the resources that went with it, and had to portray 
it as either a law enforcement, military or intelligence problem over the other 
options to do so.  
In the UK property rights are able to remain constant despite the same shift. 
Counter-intuitively the more rigid role definition actually provided greater 
flexibility. The law enforcement officer remained in control of law enforcement 
aspects to the problem, intelligence officers remained focused on providing 
intelligence on which others might act, and so on. The post 9/11 changes 
were thus primarily ones of scale for each agency, with an upsurge in the 
amount of effort demanded of them against international terrorism overall and 
as a percentage of their workload. New initiatives peculiar to the post 9/11 
environment were thus evolutionary and took place within existing 
organisations at the operational level, and outside them at the policy level. 
The CONTEST strategy was simply a governmental policy response to the 
particular issue of terrorism, nothing more.  
In the same way the OSCT was reorganised to develop and then coordinate 
delivery of that policy, and no more than that so that property rights 
allocations did not overlap. They are not responsible for operational delivery 
and property rights between the strategic and operational levels can remain 
unambiguous.1121 There can be no perception of OSCT having any vested 
interest in any particular organisations rise or fall, or any particular analytical 
outcome.1122 Where a potential conflict has been identified, as was the case 
with overlaps between the CONTEST strategy and the more specifically 
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targeted work of the Northern Ireland Assembly to counter terrorism in the 
province, then coordination passed to the officials working to the political 
level responsible for deciding on the policies that required coordination.1123 
This in turn has meant that the principal-agent problems that undermined the 
DHS's efforts to coordinate and direct both the intelligence and security 
communities was largely avoided. Where property rights are clear between 
distinct levels as well as distinct functions then the visibility required to off-set 
moral hazard can be effectively delegated. Because the property rights over 
strategic control of the counterterrorism effort clearly belong to the 
government, but the rights over operational control are retained by (variously) 
the police or agency in question,1124 competition between levels is limited. 
Thus operational plasticity can remain as high as the uncertain environment 
requires, while strategic plasticity is nonetheless limited. Consummate 
compliance is achieved by the higher level limiting the scope of their direction 
to the strategic sphere, and the sort of perfunctory compliance exhibited by 
sub-levels in the US cases above is avoided. 
This same principle of clear property rights vertically as well as horizontally 
operates 'upstream' of the OSCT where the CONTEST strategic objectives 
must be agreed and be integrated into governance beyond the 
counterterrorism sphere. The UK is advantaged over the US here because its 
very system of government through the collective responsibility of Cabinet 
means that negotiations occur early, after which the individual utility of actors 
is bound to the successful implementation of the collective decision.1125 This 
same approach is informally applied at levels several stages below Cabinet 
itself, and encourages the sort of whole-of-government approach the many 
facets of the terrorism problem need. It has therefore had a Cabinet 
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Committee responsible for coordinating a policy response to terrorism of one 
sort or another since 1969 and the early years of the Northern Ireland 
troubles.1126 Even the quantitative and qualitative shifts in terrorism related 
governance of the post 9/11 period did not equate to the requirements for 
Cold War committee machinery to achieve the same level of policy 
coordination,1127 so that the habits of negotiation and the history of probity 
were already in existence. 
Until the creation of the National Security Council (NSC)1128 in 2010 property 
rights were well established. The Defence and Overseas Policy (International 
Terrorism) [DOP(IT)], which was chaired by the Prime Minister, dealt with the 
global threat. The more detailed aspects were delegated down to DOP(IT) 
(Protection Security and Resilience[PSR]), under the Home Secretary, and 
there policy decisions were informed by and enacted by the Terrorism, 
International Defence and Overseas (TIDO) machinery, chaired by the 
Security and Intelligence Co-ordinator and staffed by civil servants (with 
seconded military and agency personnel). The Cabinet's TIDO system was 
arranged into the four CONTEST work-streams with additional cross cutting 
elements to deal with general issues like communications and research and 
development so that responsibilities were clear, and ran parallel to those of 
the OSCT in the Home Office.1129  
It has been argued that this arrangement produced too domestic a focus,1130 
and with detailed policy being decided on in a committee chaired by the 
Home Secretary, then being enacted through machinery there-under, while 
the whole is coordinated by the OSCT from within the Home Office, who in 
turn have responsibility for many of the key assets needed to deliver that 
strategy such as the Security Service and Police, the criticism may be valid. 
What is evident is that the property rights are clearer than in the US cases 
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above, and contracts are negotiated only at the level at which actors have 
responsibility. Decisions are then delegated down for interpretation and 
enactment by other actors with a more specific knowledge base, offsetting 
the bounded rationality problem and linking the personal utility of agents to 
that of their principals. The division between responsibilities necessitates 
negotiations and the resultant agreements create a shared maximand to 
which all the actors are bound. Despite the less formal authority imbued in 
each, the capacity for decision making and delivery at each level within one's 
area of responsibility is thus actually higher.   
A brief examination of how apparent overlaps in one area of CONTEST, the 
'prepare' work-stream, are actually managed demonstrates how the 
counterterrorism strategy is integrated into more general governance. In this 
case some of the functions already existed within the 'Civil Contingencies 
Secretariat' in Cabinet Office, a much wider pan-governmental body created 
in July 2001 in the wake of the 'Four F's' procession of crises, and before the 
threat from international terrorism was properly acknowledged.1131 It was the 
Secretariat, not the OSCT or even Home Office, that already had broader 
responsibilities for 'prepare' type functions that related to the panoply of non-
terrorism hazards likely to impact on the nation because they were always 
likely to involve more than one department,1132 where in the USA those 
duties were contained within the DHS.  
At first glance this suggests property rights clarity would be poor, with a 
functional overlap as depicted in Figure 6.3,1133 and one would anticipate 
clearer property rights in the single hierarchy of the DHS. However the 
existence of a shared management structure does not establish a shared 
maximand, and it is the latter that makes the difference between perfunctory 
and full compliance. The collegial nature of governmental relationships mean 
that although the Cabinet Office Secretariat is in some respects a 'higher' 
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body' than the OSCT, for terrorism related contingency coordination it 
becomes the delivery arm of the CONTEST strategy.1134 There is no 
necessity for the OSCT to contest 'ownership' with the Secretariat because 
neither own the overarching strategy, they each simply manage the 
coordination of different parts of it. 
 
The two organisations thus only need to share the same idea of utility with 
each other, and know that the necessary preparation is being done. They can 
therefore act more in the manner consistent with Dunleavy's 'bureau shaping' 
model, with senior bureaucrats incentivised to maximise their utility by 
focusing on core functions and having extraneous responsibilities passed to 
others.1135 Both exist as 'control' agencies'1136 and disperse funds to achieve 
their goals.  
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Where they overlap in Figure 6.1 above, so to do their objectives. Under such 
conditions, negotiations as to who is responsible for what become relatively 
frictionless: The Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS), who are part of the 
Cabinet Office and have coordinated the UK's response to national 
emergencies since July 2001, remain responsible for coordinating the work of 
individual operational and tactical level providers of response to national 
crises under the seventeen work streams that define types of emergency, no 
matter how they are caused.1137 The Home Office on the other hand are 
responsible for national level exercising of that response to terrorist incidents 
because of their established links to the police et al. Meanwhile they have 
jointly clarified the property rights of those providers through the Civil 
Contingencies Act 2004 and do not need line management downstream to 
implement their respective responsibilities.1138 No DHS style monolith that 
must struggle with the complexity of the problems is therefore required where 
property rights are clear and contracting costs low.  
The UK is not immune to the same sorts of opportunistic reorganisations 
observed in the US cases however, reinforcing the idea that it is clarity of 
property rights and institutional costs, not national culture, that decide levels 
of friction. For example in recent years substantive changes across central 
government1139 have included the national level strategic machinery. Gordon 
Brown's government established a short lived National Security Forum (NSF) 
to provide analytical advice from external1140 sources in competition with the 
established lines of reporting from the JIC  who, with the JIO, should have 
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been ensuring that such views were already inculcated into assessments via 
the various governmental departments and agencies.1141  
This was abandoned by the subsequent government. This move was 
questioned by the Joint Committee on National Security Strategy,1142 but the 
Intelligence and Security Committee had reported in 2009 that the Ministerial 
Committee on National Security, International Relations and Development 
(NSID) had been functioning adequately without any significant advice from 
the (National Security) Forum. It also observed that the interim National 
Security Forum had had a negligible impact on the other elements of the 
national security machinery; questioning the need for it at all. all this suggests 
that the established machine adopted a position of perfunctory compliance 
with the new initiative.1143  
In fact, despite this clean bill of health, NSID itself was abolished and the new 
National Security Council (NSC) created. The NSC was managed on a day-
to-day basis by a National Security Adviser (NSA) who ran a distinct 
supporting structure through the NSC 'Officials Committee', the NSC(O). This 
system however also provoked institutional costs that impacted on 
cooperative behaviour, and thus counterterrorism. Because it ran in parallel 
to the established JIC system, the NSC(O) obscured the property rights 
around both the provision of analysed intelligence to policy makers and of the 
requirements and priorities procedure. Both are vital to the CONTEST 
strategy, which is informed of strategic and emergent threats, and is directed 
towards them, based on the strategic analysis taking place in the JIO. Yet the 
creation of the NSC(O), and more specifically the role of Deputy National 
Security Adviser for Intelligence Security and Resilience, overlaps that 
function significantly.1144  
This means that heads of agency can sideline the requirements and priorities 
JIC lay-down. The confused property rights thus allow, and may even 
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incentivise, opportunistic behaviour. The head of SIS for example has 
variously stated that the National Security Strategy, the principal product of 
the NSC, had “....little direct impact on the focus or nature of their work”.1145 
Indeed in evidence to the ISC he particularly pointed out that he absolutely 
needed to retain an independent capability to focus SIS on targets that he 
perceived to be necessary, JIC priorities notwithstanding.1146 Curiously in a 
unique public address in October 2010 he then made it clear that SIS in fact 
did take direction from the NSC.1147 This variety of positions suggests at least 
the potential for principal-agent problems as the plasticity of agencies is 
increased, and is reminiscent of the way Treverton found managers of 
national level agencies in the US DoD developing their own autonomy by 
playing different consumers off against each other.1148  
Simultaneously the property rights over the intelligence advice role were also 
increasingly obscured because the heads of agency sit in on NSC meetings 
as required, although two of the three provide raw rather than all-source 
analysed product. This may allow a narrowing of the input to advice that has 
not gone through the rigour of the JIC process, and the avoidance of a 
cooperative approach in analysis altogether.1149 The property rights over the 
strategic and operational domains have also been blurred. The NSC itself 
was intended solely as a strategic entity that would act as a more responsive 
form of 'Cabinet' for security issues as the full Cabinet became too unwieldy 
and concerned with more immediate problems.1150 However the use of the 
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NSC structure during the Libyan crisis in 2011 permitted the intrusion of 
strategic level decision makers into operational matters.1151     
Nonetheless for the most part property rights around the counterterrorism 
endeavour have remained clear. The CONTEST strategy is much a 
horizontal construct as it is vertical, with the OSCT having to interpret, 
coordinate and disseminate the policy decisions emerging from Cabinet 
Office bodies. Despite the importance given to its re-invigoration by Dr. (now 
Lord) John Reid in 2003, and the appointment of an intelligence professional, 
Charles Farr,1152 to lead it (as well as a number of seconded and ex-security 
professionals on its staff), the OSCT functions exactly like any other branch 
of the civil service. It advises upstream and helps with drafting policies that 
are agreed, and then helps ensure their delivery. Its area of expertise 
happens to be the counter terrorism function, which requires it to have both 
Cabinet Office and Home Office responsibilities because of the inter-
departmental interests and domestic threat, but it is nonetheless limited to 
that standardised civil service function.1153   
This has meant that although the organisation was new its property rights 
were already clear to the delivery organisations, who were used to receiving 
policy direction from the centre anyway, and did not have to compete for their 
right to decide on operational matters, which was established. There exists 
the same delineation of role and inter-reliance between policy level and 
delivery level as is found between, for example the intelligence agencies who 
have only limited capability to act, and the security agencies who have only 
limited sight of the environmental conditions that prevail, and where to target 
their actions. Each organisation, by virtue of the limits within which it works, 
shares some of the informational asymmetry of its principal, and needs the 
other organisations to off-set this condition. Bounded rationality problems are 
nonetheless reduced because OSCT only needs to have full information on 
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strategic level activity. Each of the delivery organisations would need to take 
the others with it if it wanted to move contrary to the strategic direction, and 
would be less able to do so unobserved by the centre. To do so would be to 
risk the operational freedom they enjoy within their own functional area.   
Sub-levels are thus neither fully capable nor particularly incentivised to act 
contrary to the principals wishes. They are certainly concerned with 
immediate goals at their particular level, but these remain intermediate 
objectives along a route towards a maximand shared with the principal 
(policy setting) level. Responsibility for each level is nonetheless clear, and 
so any failure of delivery cannot be generalised. Policy level goals cannot be 
supplanted with operative goals and vice versa. If each part of the 
bureaucracy can be assessed independently then the problem of 
organisations being identified as efficient or not because of their performance 
around intermediate rather than primary goals is obviated. This in turn limits 
the tendency of bureaucrats to indulge in sub-optimisation or goal 
displacement.1154    
Internally, the layered nature of the strategy, with each layer of prevent, then 
pursue, protect and prepare geared to offset harm from terrorism at a 
different phase, mean that each of the four work-streams can be managed 
separately.1155 This has proven useful in clarifying property rights within both 
the TIDO and OSCT organisational infrastructures, and has assisted in 
establishing probity in relationships between the civil service side and the 
delivery mechanisms. There is a natural tension between the norms of those 
engaged in the aggressive tactics needed for 'pursue' and the more culturally 
sympathetic and engaged approach required of those doing 'prevent' work for 
example. By keeping the two separate patterns of trust can be created that 
are not negated by the less palatable actions or requests of 'others' in a 
different work stream.1156      
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In the US case examined above, the DHS could be categorised as a 
regulatory agency with respect to its intelligence community coordinating 
functions, and a delivery agency in respect of security coordination, while the 
ODNI resembles a regulatory agency.1157 The OSCT and relevant parts of 
Cabinet Office are however more akin to a control agency as it has 
responsibility for disbursing funds. Dunleavy has demonstrated how this has 
profound effects on the discounted marginal utility senior bureaucrats will 
enjoy from different increases in program budget as external resistance shifts 
there costs curve.1158 In institutional cost terms the maximand of each type of 
agency is different. Because that external resistance is linked to the 
institutional costs environment the same logic can be applied to the utility 
they receive in other areas that require bureaucratic labour to produce utility, 
particularly from cooperative working where the joint enterprise affect itself 
lowers external resistance so that both curves are shifted.   
In the United Kingdom intelligence and security are predominantly funded by 
different budgets in the same way as they are delivered by different 
organisational structures. The intelligence agencies are funded out of the 
'Single Intelligence Account' (SIA), managed through Cabinet Office, and the 
police and military through independent budget streams via the Home Office 
or local government structures and Ministry of Defence respectively. The 
Cabinet Office and OSCT/Home Office infrastructure therefore has 
considerable budgetary authority where programs that fall under the 
CONTEST strategy are concerned. The military are probably furthest 
removed from this, but counterinsurgency operations fall outside CONTEST 
concerns anyway.1159 The problem of MoD budgetary control over national 
intelligence assets and thus national rather than military priorities forms part 
of the cross-case to the CONTEST strategy examined in Part 3.1160  
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This has enabled them to encourage and finance initiatives that cross usual 
organisational boundaries, such as JTAC. The same is true of operational 
units that provide low institutional cost linkages such as the Counter 
Terrorism Unit (CTU) and Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Unit (CTIU) 
networks. Each of these links a number of police forces and security service 
representatives with specialist capabilities and knowledge,1161 whilst internal 
reorganisations such as the creation of the Counter Terrorism Command 
(CTC-SO15) within the Metropolitan Police remain within the gift of the 
organisation itself, and in this case was funded and driven by the new 
Metropolitan Police Authority when control for the forces budget passed from 
the Home Office.1162 
This is not to suggest that cooperative working under the OSCT system is 
always so well ordered. As soon as property rights are blurred, problems 
emerge and actors act opportunistically. For example following the 2008 
financial crash when funding was reduced the previously observed distinction 
between the strategic and policy roles of OSCT, and the operational delivery 
level was damaged. Funding from the OSCT to the Protection Command 
SO1, who provide close protection to at-risk political figures and are the 
successor organisation to the Metropolitan Police Special Branch protection 
officers discussed above, was based on a formula that included a payment 
based on the number of officers required. Property rights were occluded as 
which individual were to receive close protection was already decided on by 
the OSCT, albeit on JTAC advice. Where in almost every other sphere the 
OSCT has no operational control, and do not get 'reported back to' by the 
delivery level to ensure their independence,1163 in this case they had a vested 
interest in outcomes, as the Home Secretary and other senior political figures 
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are amongst those who receive such protection (and all the resources and 
assistance that go with it).  
By re-assessing the number of officers they believe were required to provide 
close protection so that overall costs could be reduced without lessening the 
number of protection operations itself the OSCT became directly involved in 
operational decision making, trying to enforce a new 'single vehicle package' 
model that removed the need for a back-up vehicle and its crew. Partly 
because this was regarded as tactically unsound, and partly to protect their 
decision making integrity, middle managers acted opportunistically to derail 
the initiative, replacing back-up vehicles with 'logistics vehicles that simply 
shifted the budgetary burden, ensuring the new model was not 'trained', and 
so forth.  
Tensions between the two sides rose, which negatively impacted on other 
areas of negotiation, and cooperation between them more generally.1164 The 
contradictory nature of this case indicates that is not simply a cultural 
predilection to cooperate in the UK as against a more competitive ethos in 
the US, and that although the absence of financial control was a problem for 
the DNI, having it does not in itself necessarily ensure cooperative success.  
Rather the role of CONTEST and the OSCT in coordinating counterterrorism 
in the UK demonstrates that it  is the importance of clear property rights and 
low institutional costs between actors that dictate cooperative success or 
failure.   
Section 6: Conclusion  
The two very distinct post 9/11 attempts to coordinate different areas of 
governance into a cohesive counterterrorism response, and the very different 
experiences in the US and UK that resulted can now be contrasted more 
holistically: 
The formal authority of both the DHS and DNI concepts, through which each 
was intended to deliver counterterrorism cooperation across the security and 
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intelligence communities, has in fact been circumscribed by the interaction of 
environmental and internal institutional costs. These have combined to 
ensure neither are ever more authoritative than the organisations they were 
intended to oversee. Terrorism intelligence product from other organisations 
can have utility without passing through either the DNI or the DHS 
intelligence capability. This fact must be added this to their starting position of 
asymmetric information holdings, so that they need not know what 
intelligence is available to ask for. It is clear that their position as apparent 
monopsonists is actually weaker even than if they were in a bilateral 
monopoly relationship with intelligence providers. They are therefore prey to 
the same sort of gaming behaviour observed in the 'inside contracting 
system' during any of their interaction between the centre and the contracting 
agency or department, but even less able to deal with it.1165  
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The US attempts at hierarchical control can thus be summarised 
diagrammatically as in Figure 6.4,1166 which is derived from Dunleavy’s 
analysis of the respective costs and benefits experienced by actors at 
different levels in a regulatory or delivery body.  
Using Dunleavy’s categorisations, the DNI can be conceived primarily as a 
regulatory agency, as its ability to act as a transfer agency as originally 
conceived was limited through the opportunistic behaviour of sub-groups.1167 
The DHS on the other hand can be categorised as both a regulatory (for its 
intended intelligence function) and a delivery (for some security functions) 
agency. Both however are liable to high levels of institutional frictions when 
trying to enforce cooperation on lower organisational tiers, as described 
above, and Dunleavy treats both agency types together in his analysis.1168 
The marginal advocacy costs (a particular sort of negotiating costs) for a 
policy maker trying to encourage a policy program rise steeply in this case as 
implementation is resisted by those with alternative or overlapping property 
rights. They can adopt the sort of behaviours described above and restrict 
compliance to a perfunctory level by utilising the uncertainties inherent in the 
counterterrorism sphere and the complexities of overlapping functions in 
other national security policy areas to obstruct full implementation, until it 
finally rises vertically at the point after which no further implementation will 
occur no matter how much effort is made because of environmental 
conditions beyond the principals control.  
Meanwhile the discounted marginal utility (a part of their maximand) they 
receive starts high as a new policy is introduced, but drops sharply once the 
initial appreciation for the program is received, as other policy concerns 
emerge and effort is required elsewhere in the manner described by 
Zegart.1169 At the operational level meanwhile the marginal utility likely to be 
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received by cooperating with the more senior level starts much lower as there 
are "...benefits in autonomy and costs in ceding it".1170 These are off-set by 
utility losses as independent capabilities are lost to the higher level. The 
lower powered incentive schemes enjoyed by operational level bureaucrats 
are only tangentially linked to any policy program or cooperative success, but 
much more tightly aligned with the local-level, more internalised success of 
core missions (as perceived by themselves). This provides for a less radical 
drop in marginal utility over time. The costs of cooperation also rise more 
slowly and are relatively inelastic. There is therefore a significant disparity 
between the points of equilibrium between the marginal costs and benefits 
the actors  at different levels, represented by the difference between 'Bi' and 
'Bii'. Dominant coalitions of actors working at a distance from their principal 
are thus both incentivised and able to pursue their own sub-goals.1171  
Poorly defined property rights across both the security and the intelligence 
communities encourage senior bureaucrats to use what is anyway a difficult 
institutional cost environment to seek contractual advantage over their 
colleagues. At the same time, because the asset specificity of intelligence 
resources is of a different type to those needed for security, attempts to blend 
them have been thwarted. Alignment of intelligence assets to earlier 
environmental conditions limits their flexibility to adapt anyway, or indeed to 
want to. Difficulties in monitoring have provided them with both an 
information advantage and a condition of moral hazard in which to use it. The 
negotiating advantages existing organisations enjoy over new joiners, 
whether formally senior or not, has allowed them to use property rights that 
are poorly allocated to new circumstances to act opportunistically to secure 
agency level goals in preference to those advocated from on high: Despite 
the creation of the two organisational super-structures, the DHS and DNI, 
established agencies have, in the words of the Office of the Inspector 
General, continued to go their own way.1172  
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In the UK case, Figure 6.51173 makes the same comparison between the 
relative utility (that is the net utility given that that there are costs involved in 
achieving it) of the policy making and coordination level embodied in the 
OSCT and Cabinet and that of the operational levels who must cooperate 
with them to deliver it. The different organisational structure, whereby the 
principal level is a control organisation according to the Dunleavy 
classifications1174 rather than a delivery or regulatory body as in the US case 
provokes a very different institutional cost environment in the manner 
described above.  
The clearer property rights across levels of responsibility allows the flexibility 
that the uncertain and complex environment requires, and reduces the need 
for lower levels to act opportunistically to secure autonomy. The result is that 
the principal's marginal advocacy costs rise in a shallower curve than in the 
US cases as less frictions to program implementation are experienced. Their 
discounted marginal utility still drops over time, but less sharply as utility is 
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uniquely associated with  policy implementation in the counterterrorism 
sphere. The operational level remains less elastic, but marginal utility gains 
from successful cooperation will not be off-set by utility loss associated with 
the loss of autonomy. The difference between Yi and Yii is thus significantly 
less than that between Bi and Bii in Figure 6.2 so that a viable shared 
maximand across levels can be inferred, and because within that shared 
understanding of a maximand each level has its own objectives that are 
distinct to their level, the strategic level is less inclined to adopt operative 
goals and dominant coalitions at the operational level, however powerful, can 
remain incentivised to cooperate with the strategic vision rather than to 
reform it. Goal displacement or sub-optimisation by them is thus much 
reduced in comparison to the US organisational architecture.1175    
The analysis of vertical collaboration in the counterterrorism sphere as 
pursued through very different organisational forms in the US and UK 
conducted in the sections above thus demonstrate how high institutional 
costs between actors at different levels are a bar to cooperation between 
them. The findings indicate that for functions like security or intelligence 
provision, which are neither routine nor repetitive and boast high levels of 
information asymmetry between boundedly rational levels, attempts to 
enforce cooperation will produce perfunctory rather than complete 
compliance with instructions. The US cases demonstrate how monitoring 
costs will preclude the use of sanctions to correct such behaviour, so that 
lower level actors will remain incentivised to pursue sub-level goals that are 
only tangential to those of the principal or policy making level. On the other 
hand in the UK case the same difference in information holdings between 
levels is offset by established probity between actors. The achievement of a 
low institutional cost inter-relationship between levels, based on clear 
property rights over specific roles and responsibilities that are nonetheless 
geared towards a strong shared maximand, can thus encourage higher levels 
of cooperative success.  
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Chapter 5 thus demonstrated how the provision of counterterrorism provokes 
inherently high institutional costs, while this Chapter has examined how 
different approaches can either exacerbate or reduce this naturally high level. 
It has examined the particular problems of two US approaches to 
coordinating the counterterrorism function and contrasted these with the very 
different approach in the UK. Part 3 will now examine cooperative success 
and failure in the provision of defence intelligence  to demonstrate how these 
positions can be reversed if the level of institutional costs is inverted.    
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PART 3 
 
The Paradoxical Case 
of Cooperative Success 
and Failure in the 
Provision of Defence 
Intelligence 
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Chapter 7 –Institutional Costs and the Contradictory Case of National 
Military Intelligence 
Section 1: introduction  
In the introduction to this thesis two possible conceptions of a security and 
intelligence community were suggested; firstly as a unitary entity with the 
lower level elements acting as tools in pursuit of an overarching goal (the 
utopian ideal) and secondly the perhaps more realistic idea of a community 
of disparate elements, each pursuing utility at the level at which they operate, 
and of the type they each perceive as most advantageous. Part 2 of this 
thesis argued that the United Kingdom's approach to counterterrorism 
boasted lower institutional costs than that of the United States and 
encouraged higher levels of co-operative behaviour and improved outcomes.  
The UK then would appear to be closer to representing a genuinely 
cooperative community, whereas the US seems emblematic of the more 
realistic model described in Section 4 of Chapter 1; findings which support 
the apparently contradictory conclusions of Patrick Dunleavy in the UK, and 
William Niskanen in the USA for governance in the two societies more 
generally, as discussed in chapter three. This is the distinction highlighted by 
Davies in the intelligence sphere, who has described significant differences in 
the cooperative capability of each community. More controversially however, 
Davies has also noted that in some specific instances where intelligence and 
military functions interact the opposite is the case, with poor cooperation in 
the UK and good cooperation in the US.1176   
This chapter will therefore seek to continue the argument that the causes of 
different cooperative outcomes between the two communities is caused by 
the interaction of the wide range of organisational, environmental and 
behavioural factors captured within the institutional cost impact framework by 
examining collaborative working in the military intelligence sphere.  
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It will examine the different experiences of the defence intelligence bodies of 
the two Countries, demonstrating that they have each developed against type 
with respect to their respective nations, and are thus cross-cases. In the 
counterterrorism sphere the United Kingdom demonstrated good cooperative 
working while the United States performed poorly in this area, whereas in the 
defence intelligence sphere this is reversed. Furthermore the endemic and 
constant nature of either high or low institutional costs observed in the 
counterterrorism sphere in Part 2 is not replicated in defence intelligence. 
Instead specific points of change that shift both levels and types of 
institutional costs can be observed. The UK's defence intelligence capability 
has historically had problems defining its place in the larger intelligence and 
security community, and has oscillated between contested organisational set-
ups that have then bedded in, only to be changed again. Recent reports have 
indicated a continuing inability to work co-operatively and effectively at all the 
levels required. The defence intelligence capability of the US, on the other 
hand, which has had a similarly difficult history, has recently demonstrated a 
number of initiatives and shifts that have lowered its institutional costs and 
improved its co-operative capability significantly, an effect which is beginning 
to transition beyond the immediate defence realm. 
This chapter will thus demonstrate that the exceptional nature of military 
intelligence and the resultant respective organisational structures in the US 
and UK has lead to a shifting and opaque sets of property rights. In the UK 
this has lead to high institutional costs as solutions have had to be negotiated 
on a case by case basis. Confusing requirements and priorities will be shown 
to have lead to the UK's military community to have pursued the sort of sub-
goal pursuit more usually associated with US intelligence community 
members. Conversely the Unites States defence intelligence capability will be 
shown to have shifted in entirely the opposite direction, having progressively 
sought and then enjoyed easier cooperation across several previously 
difficult boundaries, based on increasingly better delineated property rights in 
support of a shared maximand.  
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The next section will therefore examine how unique features of the defence 
intelligence architecture in both the US and UK provoke particular institutional 
cost issues that impact on its cooperative working on its interactions 
internally and with the wider security and intelligence effort. Section 3 will 
then consider the impact of the 1991 Persian Gulf War (Operations Desert 
Shield and Storm) as the precursors to a volte-face in the US military 
intelligence institutional cost environment and contextualise elements of the 
US defence intelligence and information revolution that followed. Section 4 
will then conclude. 
Section 2: The Uniqueness of Military Intelligence 
Military intelligence boasts very distinct differences to its civilian counterpart 
that significantly alter the institutional cost framework within which it must 
operate, and thus the organisational architecture best suited to collaboration 
with the wider security and intelligence communities. These will be briefly 
considered by firstly examining the property rights position, then considering 
how different understandings provoke language costs and an asymmetry of 
information between various actors. Next the importance of organisational 
positioning will be assessed for its impact on cooperation with either the 
military or national level communities. The different pragmatic needs and 
cultural preferences of the various actors for hierarchical rigidity or flexibility, 
and their institutional cost implications will then be appraised. Finally the 
nature of military intelligence as a product will be considered from the same 
perspective. 
Before that it is worth reflecting briefly on the impact of both uncertainty and 
complexity on the nature of organisational form that is likely to be best suited 
to any military endeavour. General Rupert Smith has written:   
“On every occasion that I have been sent to achieve some military 
objective in order to serve a political purpose, I, and those with me, have 
had to change our method and reorganise in order to succeed. Until this 
was done we could not use our force effectively. On the basis of my 
lengthy experience, I have come to consider this as normal—a necessary 
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part of every operation ...... The need to adapt is driven by the decisions 
of the opponent, the choice of objectives, the way or method force is 
applied, and the forces and recourses available, particularly when 
operating with allies. All of this demands an understanding of the political 
context of the operation, and the role of the military within it. Only when 
adaptation and context are complete can force be applied with utility. ”1177  
Smith thus suggests that the environmental conditions that surround any 
military endeavour will make it unique. Thus, in keeping with the ideas 
developed in Chapter 2, no perfect organisational form  for all instances can 
exist. The uncertainty that results from the decision-making of opponents, 
and the complexity inherent in working with varying patterns of allies require 
a flexibility that is at odds with conventional appreciations of a military 
bureaucracy's reliance on 'Standard Operating Procedures' (SOP's) and the 
like.1178 Rather Smith's experience seems to push him towards a Merton-like 
distrust of rigid doctrine1179 so that a tension between different hierarchal 
levels seems likely from the outset. 
a. Shifting Property Rights at the National Level in the US and UK: 
Despite the very many distinctions between the military and civilian 
intelligence worlds, they are nonetheless required to inter-relate at various 
levels so that the level of institutional cost will always impact on how well the 
one can serve the other, and perhaps as importantly, how useful the military 
part of intelligence is perceived to be by political decision makers (and 
budget setters). This part of the chapter will therefore examine how property 
rights are arranged between the two in both the US and UK, and briefly 
consider the history of shifting claims and counter claims as environmental 
conditions have changed to provide a context for the tensions apparent in the 
military intelligence arena. 
                                                                   
1177
 Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World.6 
1178
 The Chief of Defence Staff, quoting Basil Liddell-Hart, stated in 2010 that “...there is only one 
thing more difficult than getting a new idea into the military mind and that is getting an old idea out”. 
General Sir David Richards, "Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty," (2010), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/2010-11-22-securing-britain-in-an-age-of-uncertainty.  
1179
 Merton, "Bureaucratic Structure and Personality."562-565 
389 
 
Some parts of the UK's defence intelligence infrastructure, such as the 
Defence Intelligence Assessments Staff (DIAS), which is responsible for high 
level analysis, and the Defence Intelligence Fusion Centre (DIFC - formerly 
the Defence Geospatial Intelligence Fusion Centre (DGIFC, and before that 
JARIC), which performs the imagery intelligence function, have national 
responsibilities whist being part of the Ministry of Defence, and property 
rights over them have therefore been affected by changes in the 
organisational structures in each, particularly in recent years with the advent 
of substantive changes like the military Joint Forces Intelligence Group 
(JFIG) in 2012 or the civilian National Security Council (NSC) in 2010. In the 
US the National Security Agency (NSA), National Reconnaissance Office 
(NRO) and National Geospatial-intelligence Agency (NGA) in the US, are 
formally double-hatted, with the Defense Intelligence Agency being 
effectively triple-hatted (to the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(JCS) and lower level commanders) because they are national agencies that 
are nonetheless part of the Department of Defense. The DIA's defence 
intelligence role is then overlapped by the individual security agencies of 
each of the single services, any of which can contribute to the national piece 
without being a national agency under statute.  
In both countries then this mix of responsibilities to both national and military 
masters means that property rights are inevitably extremely complicated.
1180
 
The problem of double-hatting, which caused such problems for the former 
DCI and current DNI roles (as discussed in Part 2), is a structural necessity if 
the significant military intelligence capabilities are to serve civilian as well as 
defence needs. Finite capability means that not all demands can be met and 
some form of prioritisation must occur. In an uncertain environment priorities 
will of course vary, which will inevitably be to the detriment of both, as the 
requirement to shift quickly between the national strategic concerns of the 
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Cold War to the theatre level requirements of the first Gulf war in 1991 
demonstrated.1181  
Property rights around military intelligence assets at the national level are 
affected by interrelationships at the international level; particularly between 
the two communities under discussion: In the civilian sphere the United 
Kingdom, through its relationship with the United States, has the capability to 
be a significant actor on the world stage. This in turn enhances the policy 
making level's ability to project British policy overseas both through 
reputation and its status as influencer to the worlds remaining superpower 
(however remotely). 
During the Cold War and into the 1990's this was through intelligence sharing 
agreements and mutual need, with the United Kingdom's geographical 
position on the globe, and the spread of its former colonial possesions, an 
important initial consideration.1182 More recently, as budgets are restricted in 
the United States, previous areas of redundancy and overlap have been 
removed and the American civilian community has been less inclined to 
duplicate the UK's collection efforts or re-assess analysed product from it. In 
the military sphere this is not, and has never been the case.1183The relative 
sizes of the two make any aspirations of parity unrealistic, and the United 
Kingdom's current military strength make any significant unilateral 
undertaking a risky proposition.1184 Despite the 2010 Lancaster House treaty 
with the French, the only tried and tested basis for such coalition based 
action remains the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, in which the 
Americans are dominant. This means that the UK's military is dependent on 
civilian intelligence if it is to retain its position as the 'primus inter pares' ally 
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of the US. Where the military and civilian decision makers derive utility from a 
shared goal this is not problematic. However civilian resources can be 
diverted away from coalition military uses to national level concerns, so that 
differences in property rights allocations can provoke tensions that are 
exacerbated because the US and UK organisational architecture over some 
intelligence assets is different, even when they are engaged in a shared 
endeavour.  
These overlapping property rights can undermine cooperative capability at 
even the international level as actors try and ensure their ability to function 
effectively cannot be compromised by decisions over which they have no 
control. In the military arena intelligence at any level is more closely geared 
to specific missions and goals than that of its civilian counterpart so these 
tensions can play out very differently between the tactical and strategic 
levels: For example even while good collaborative working was being 
demonstrated around the Iraqi intelligence target after the first Gulf War at an 
operational level, different institutional costs were effecting strategic level 
pulls and providing the impetus for, and then shaping the detail of, the 
European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in the late 1990’s. At that time 
there existed a combination of bounded rationality on the part of European 
strategists (who struggled to manage the language costs in interpreting 
domestic political messages in the US in relation to European security), 
asymmetric information about actual US intentions, and an awareness that 
US assets committed to the protection of Europe were non-specific and could 
be easily redeployed. These institutional costs were all set in an atmosphere 
of uncertainty as to future environmental conditions and lead British and 
French policy makers to fear opportunistic behaviour by the US that could 
lead to strategies of abandonment, entrapment and exploitation.1185 
Ironically, the sub-goal pursuits of the various nations, each seeking to 
maximise their individual utility through  distinct organisational designs that 
placed autonomy in different areas, and their respective concerns around the 
property rights over any new force, were eventually managed through the 
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use of another institutional cost: Re-designing the EDSP so that its assets 
were less specific to intra-European problems, and more generally available 
to NATO, and therefore the US, were what made the new security institution 
palatable to all those concerned.1186  
The same institutional cost pressures can be seen to impact on cooperation 
between levels of command as one descends to the operational level. 
Improved connectivity mean that messages from different sites of authority 
are easier to transmit. But this is countered by the bounded rationality of 
actors concerning the situation of others, and the language costs generated 
mean that handling the resultant collection of policy level maximands is 
problematic. Commanders at different levels have to manage often 
unrealistic expectations from their political leadership.1187 This can be 
described in institutional cost terms. British military commanders in, for 
example, Afghanistan face significantly higher negotiating costs as a result of 
increased direction from the centre of Whitehall through the National Security 
Council, and the information asymmetry between them. What was barely 
manageable during the Libya crisis, a sharply defined engagement involving 
the British and French acting as independent nations, as property rights over 
the operational direction of the campaign were split between NSC(Libya) and 
operational commanders1188 can become a more intractable problem in a 
longer term and more complex campaign such as Afghanistan. This serves to 
heighten the negotiating costs of middle ranking officers as they attempt to 
disentangle the various property rights of those above them in NATO-ISAF, 
the Ministry of Defence, and the National Security Council and then negotiate 
over the expectations of each.  
The level of negotiating frictions can then impact on the relative property 
rights of the different actors, and the lack of clarity left operational decision 
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makers to work according to their own preferences. In fact so authoritative 
was the chain of command leading up to NATO-ISAF, with whom they were 
in constant touch, that direction from London was sometimes seen as 
irrelevant because it was simply not deliverable outside of the narrow 
confines of the British mission in Helmand, in which case it was usually at an 
operational rather than strategic level anyway. Alternatively, if it related to 
political engagement with senior Afghan figures, it was largely handled either 
by the United States Four Star element (with war fighting left to the three star 
level), or by civilians in the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT). At the 
same time civilian intelligence assets being directed through Whitehall would 
nonetheless be prioritised according to the objectives set there, to the 
detriment of those being pursued by NATO-ISAF.1189 Conflicting property 
rights emanating from organisational choices can thus be seen to have an 
impact on levels of collaboration between different bodies.   
Conflicting pressures over property rights and the negotiating costs they 
engender in this sphere can be demonstrated by considering the how they 
have been contested and shifted even when environmental uncertainly and 
complexity were less significant during the Cold War. The relevance of the 
nuclear dimension, and policy instruments such as the doctrine of 'mutually 
assured destruction' that it engendered meant that the Cold War was as 
much a political-civilian conflict as a military one, so that the distinction 
between the property rights of each level was harder to discern.  
In the US, these different property rights perceptions of the civil and military 
leaderships are apparent throughout the early years of the DIA: 
From its establishment in 1961 until 1991, and the sea-change wrought by 
Operation Desert Shield/Storm, the United States central capability suffered 
much the same organisational pushes and pulls as its British counterpart. 
Rather than follow the United Kingdom’s model of division into directorates 
based on the areas to be studied,1190 although concerned with linking the 
intelligence capabilities of the single services, the DIA was however 
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organised almost from quite early on in a manner that spoke to the problem 
of having both a national and operational role; by the 1970's its three sub-
divisions distinguished between headquarters support, management roles, 
and operational activities so that the property rights of each should have 
been clearer. Nonetheless the organisation struggled with the distinctly 
different pulls from its civilian and military overseers from the outset, and by 
1971 Dr. James Schlesinger's report for George Schultz’s Bureau of the 
Budget noted the ‘spectacular’ rise in expenditure on collection which was 
not linked to a commensurate rise in quality of product, and presciently 
foresaw the need for an overall Director of National Intelligence to cover both 
civilian and military agencies (an idea blocked by the pentagon1191).  
By 1963 re-organisation was sought by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) that 
would re-prioritise their needs in an asset they perceived as theirs. This 
resulted in the 1965 appointment of a ‘Special Assistant for JCS Matters’ 
which shifted the balance slightly by 1967. As a result, and in response to 
continuing criticism through to 1970 (both internal and external) the then 
Secretary of Defense attempted to clarify the property rights as he saw them 
by ordering that the Director DIA should report to him directly. The DIA would 
thus have its priorities set by the political level (and the United States 
Intelligence Board) rather than by the JCS, which the DIA was directed to 
‘support’ (and who were specifically told not to establish a competing J21192 
capability in response).1193 The response from the Chairman of the JCS was 
to re-interpret this fairly unequivocal direction into a rather different property 
rights allocation: The ‘domestic, investigative and counterintelligence’ (i.e. the 
non-core functions) roles performed by DIA were to be through the 
Secretary’s office, but operational or foreign intelligence (and counter 
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intelligence) would still be through the JCS. Furthermore by 1974 a J2 
‘support office’ had, despite this direction, evolved and enlarged to leverage 
control back again.  
Military functions were then highlighted once again, with the DIA itself being 
re-organised in 1976 and then 1979 to better serve combat operations and 
strategic support to the JCS respectively. The latter was designed, inter alia, 
to specifically address the property rights question over DIA’s J2 functions in 
JCS; still extant since a 1971 blue ribbon review that had explicitly identified it 
as a problem (despite Secretary of Defense Schlesinger having regarded the 
matter as resolved in 1974). The reviews that underpinned these changes 
had culminated by 1982 in two charter revisions and the incoming Director 
James Williams explicitly advocated DIA functions that supported both 
strategic and tactical military efforts in an open letter to his agency.1194 Then, 
in 1986, The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act formerly made 
the DIA a national intelligence agency, providing statutory support for the 
national claim whilst leaving the agency in the DoD.1195 Legislators thus tried 
to influence the property rights debate, which should have strengthened the 
DCI's hand as the formal lead of the national intelligence community, yet DIA 
officers continued to work for the Defense Secretary, and to prioritise defense 
needs. Even as late as the mid 1990’s such shifts continued, with peace time 
defence intelligence re-geared to more closely function as it would during war 
time.1196  
However by then the United States military, along with its intelligence 
apparatus, had had to deal with the twin strategic surprises of the end of the 
Cold War and being suddenly engaged in a ‘hot’ war in the Gulf. These were 
to fundamentally change their approach to military intelligence from fixed 
positions on what was right, to an acceptance that it would need to be as 
flexible and agile as the forces it supported. Much lower institutional costs 
were then sought between actors at all levels and in a myriad of roles and 
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organisations; the developments discussed below which were to evolve into 
a central tenet of the 'Defense Intelligence Enterprise'.1197  Despite the 
tensions described above between the civilian and military needs, the DIA 
suffered less than its UK counterpart in the contest between the single 
services. It had been fundamentally strengthened by being formally made 
part of the national machinery following the 1986 Goldwater Nichols Act,1198 
which became the enabler for the bottom-up changes described below: Joint 
capability in the intelligence function followed on from a wider move towards 
joint operations across the military and most of the major frictions were 
addressed within that wider contest. 
In the United Kingdom on the other hand, the situation was reversed. Huw 
Dylan argues that proponents of wider centralisation in the military saw the 
creation of the Joint Intelligence Bureau (JIB) as a platform on which a 
'centralised, military relevant' intelligence service could be built, whilst 
opponents viewed it as a stalking horse for wider amalgamations and central 
controls.1199 Because the joint intelligence function was in the vanguard of 
wider centralisation, the individual utility of each of the three services was 
best served by undermining it and instead securing their own autonomy and 
the sole property rights to their individual intelligence capabilities. Each used 
their individual information advantages to act opportunistically in attempt to 
retain responsibilities they regarded as theirs.
1200
 The JIB functioned well 
when limited to a coordination role, very much like the CONTEST case 
discussed in Chapter 2, but provoked divisive arguments and limited 
compliance where its role was seen to overlap any of those previously held 
by a single service.1201 Dylan for example notes the problem of analyses of 
Soviet fighter production, which arguably fell under the JIB as an economic 
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issue, and the RAF's intelligence wing as an 'air' matter, so that the JIC noted 
in 1947 that "... there was no clear indication where the work of JIB ended 
and where that of the service directorates began.", encouraging the services 
to try and negate JIB functionality to preserve their own, and the JIB to 
attempt to grow in order to survive.1202  
Davies finds similar problems over property rights in his examination of the 
JIB's successor, the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) from 1963 onwards. He 
observes problems that are both intra and inter-organisational as DIS 
struggled to both coordinate the services and their intelligence appreciations 
whilst simultaneously responding to national level requirements and 
priorities.1203 The result is the same ebb and flow of dominance of the military 
then civilian priorities that was observed in the US case until the Goldwater-
Nichols re-organisation and the exogenous shock of the first Iraq war, as 
external circumstances changed and internal patterns of dominance shifted. 
The evolution of defence intelligence on both sides of the Atlantic during the 
Cold War thus reflects the tensions inherent in serving more than one 
master: As each moved from the military pre-eminence and property rights 
clarity of a shooting war to the more opaque imperatives of the civilian 
dominated nuclear world, and the new requirements and priorities that 
entailed, each organisational form was pushed and pulled between the needs 
of each. 
There are thus very particular property rights issues at a number of levels 
that afflict the military arena and its relationship with other areas of 
governance, and intelligence assets sit astride these fissures. How 
negotiations between the two are managed will therefore be a non-trivial 
issue in deciding the levels of cooperation between them. The possible 
frictions that can undermine such negotiations will therefore be considered 
next.  
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b. Different Understandings of Military Intelligence and Negotiating 
Costs:  
The sub-section above described how the peculiarities of property rights over 
military intelligence assets increases institutional frictions between different 
areas of governance. The problem is however more deep-rooted than can be 
addressed through organisational wiring. Both property rights clarity and 
wider negotiations over the shape and use of military intelligence can be 
negatively impacted by very different understandings and cultural norms in 
use by military as opposed to civilian bodies. At the extreme, this can mean 
actors are negotiating across completely different world views, rooted in very 
distinct theoretical approaches. Rather than negotiating around the best way 
to achieve a genuine sense of shared maximand they can actually be 
pursuing objectives that are diametrically opposed, sometimes without even 
realising this is the case. The former Permanent Under Secretary at the 
Ministry of Defence Kevin Tebbit has noted that although the MoD were the 
first department to produce any substantial policy statement following the 
9/11 attacks1204 the post-conflict stabilisation in Iraq was fundamentally 
flawed by the absence of any agreed cross-departmental strategy.1205 
In the UK, for example, it has been argued by Robert Crowcroft and Owen 
Hartley that the Ministry of Defence (MoD) approach is defined by their 
'realist' view of the world. The civilian side on the other hand is represented 
by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (F&CO), who see the UK as 
setting the tone of the debate in a 'Global community', and the Department 
for International Development (DfID), who are explicitly removed from 
national interests.1206 The government has attempted to off-set these 
difficulties by the creation of a cross-departmental conflict pool of resources, 
at least in part funded independently through the 'Counter Terrorism Program 
Fund' (CTPF). This links the overseas projects in the F&CO, MoD and 
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DfID.1207 Both the conflict pool and CTPF are attempts to ease the 
negotiating frictions involved in such inter-departmental undertakings by 
having NSC priorities inculcated into their work. This effectively creates a 
new shared maximand at a sub departmental level within and across them so 
that the existence of competing pressures is recognised,1208 even if the 
institutional difficulties these create for intelligence assets required to serve 
both have still not yet been successfully addressed.1209 The maximand of 
each intelligence consumer is bounded by the divergent world views 
observed by Crowcroft and Hartley, which are in turn based on different 
policy responsibilities, and thus, preferences. Collaboration between them in 
any functional area must overcome this. In Crowcroft and Hartley's view, 
where the MoD is pragmatic and precise in its objectives, the FCO are more 
ambiguous, and see the UK’s best interests as analogous to those of the 
wider ‘human community’. This has implications for the maximand and 
international engagement of each. The former look to the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation (NATO), the latter to the European Union (EU) as 
representative of the international perspective.1210 Military intelligence 
organisations must however necessarily engage with all these preferences at 
every level.  
All of the organisations mentioned above are represented in Afghanistan for 
example, and have distinct impacts on strategic direction and tactical 
delivery.1211 Even the Foreign Secretary has acknowledged the different roles 
of the military, diplomats, intelligence personnel and police officers and  
identified it as one of the jobs of 'government' to "... marshal their resources 
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in a way that serves the country's overall objectives ...",1212 clearly signalling 
the relationship between a shared maximand and inter-agency collaboration 
across the security and intelligence communities and the need for 
government to orchestrate the whole in the same way coordination has been 
managed in the domestic CONTEST arena described in Chapter 6.    
Any such orchestration is however hampered by the attempted clarification of 
the defence intelligence function as strategic, and therefore suited to both 
governmental policy making and Ministry of Defence military planning 
needs.1213 This has in fact increased the language costs associated with the 
bounded rationality of bureaucrats in different parts of government, and so 
had entirely the opposite effect. The understanding of strategic itself is 
fundamentally different between Cabinet Office on one side of Whitehall, and 
senior military figures in the Ministry of Defence on the other. The former 
differentiate the strategic, operational and tactical spheres with reference to 
time, while the latter do so by considering spatial dimensions.1214 So basic a 
difference in language can provoke the same sort misunderstandings Davies 
considered when discussing different understandings of intelligence between 
the US and UK intelligence communities in 2002.1215 To quote Davies more 
recent work, "... in the United States ‘information’ is a component of 
‘intelligence’ while in the UK, ‘intelligence’ is a particular type of information. 
This is not merely a semantic difference: it has profound and pervasive 
institutional implications."1216 In fact the regularity of joint UK/US operations 
through NATO has meant that the UK military intelligence community is as 
likely to be exposed to the US definition as that of its own nations civilian 
community, so that an additional set of language costs are likely here too. 
These same implications create institutional costs that impact on military 
civilian negotiations, which have to be managed via this asymmetry of 
understanding. The respective bounds on the rationality of each side are 
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inevitably magnified across such a divide, heightening institutional costs 
overall as each seek to negotiate to the same solution over what are can be 
rather different questions. 
Moreover, whilst the military can face the same difficulty of negotiating 
between their own tactical level needs and the strategic political direction of 
their civilian masters that law enforcement agencies were seen to suffer in 
the previous chapter, law enforcement communities in democracies can at 
least usually fall back on the supremacy of the law itself. The military, who 
are overtly a tool of projected power and are deployed specifically to ensure 
that political strategic objectives are met, cannot. They are a more directly a 
tool of government, even where it is not clear which part of the government 
that might be.  
 
In the case of Iraq for example the ability of the US Executive and State 
Department to agree legislative changes with the Iraqi Republic was 
challenged by Congress.1217 Such opaque property rights limit the military's 
ability to negotiate (both formally and informally) with the centre.1218 An 
example of the sort of tension that can result can be found in the United 
States and Iraqi decision in 2008 that local courts were to have primacy, thus 
altering the military mission to a law enforcement one despite the continuing 
hostility of the environment.
1219
 This meant that hierarchies were further 
confused and tactical level options were significantly limited as officers were 
re-focused on evidence gathering against insurgents rather than simple kill or 
capture missions. The bounded rationality of soldiers operating in a new role 
(as foreign police officers), their instinctive aversion to doing so for cultural 
and competency based reasons, conjoined with the increased complexity of 
working within the very distinct legal framework of a wholly strange culture 
pushed up the institutional costs within the military significantly.1220 
Conversely at the strategic level the willingness of the United States as a 
                                                                   
1217
 Matthew Weed, "U.S.-Iraq Strategic Framework and Status of Forces Agreement: Congressional 
Response," in CRS Report for Congress(Washington: Congressional Research Service, 2008). 
1218
 See for example Elliott, "Not Ruling the Waves, Just All at Sea." 
1219
 "Strategic Framework Agreement for a Relationship of Friendship and Cooperation between the 
United States of America and the Republic of Iraq," ed. State Department(Baghdad2008). 
1220
 Shannon W Caudill, Anthony M Peckard, and Raymund M Tembraull, "Defending the Joint 
Force: Lessons Learned from Joint Base Balad," Air and Space Power Journal Spring(2011).92 
402 
 
nation to make the shift lowered the negotiating costs between the two 
governments themselves (although problems such as jurisdiction over 
soldiers who have opened fire etc have remained problematic1221) and even 
within Iraqi society more generally, as the regime appeared more 
independently credible. Good collaboration at one level had to be sacrificed 
to achieve it in the other.1222  
c. The Position of Defence Intelligence in the National System: 
Despite this duality of civilian and military understanding, and confused 
property rights around their possible priorities, the defence intelligence 
apparatus in both the UK and US sits outside the rest of the Intelligence 
Community. Michael Herman has stated that there are actually two UK 
intelligence communities; the (civilian) community based around the Cabinet 
Office, and the Chief of Defence Intelligence's (CDI's) community on the 
other side of Whitehall.1223  
Although the 'Defence Intelligence' part of military intelligence is regarded as 
another part of the national intelligence capability it has a very different 
modus operandi by virtue of its need to function in a very different manner. 
As Michael Herman puts it, unlike the civilian agencies, Defence Intelligence 
is "... "governments authority on subjects not sources".1224 The military 
apparatus actually resembles the US civilian one, and therefore more closely 
reflect the incumbent institutional costs of that community (as discussed in 
the previous chapter) than those of its UK counterpart. On can consider the 
intelligence and security linkage as made up of three parts; collection, 
information management, and execution. The UK civilian division then occurs 
between collection and information management (which is co-located with 
policy delivery). In contrast the military put collection and information 
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management together, with execution under a single commander, who 
decides on the latter, using the former, under more finite and usually clearly 
delineated, circumstances. The military therefore, rather than producing raw 
product that is analysed by the consumer department, sit within the 
organisation of their own customers. They are thus collector, analyst and 
end-user. Whilst this is normal in the United States, in the United Kingdom 
assessment is viewed, as Davies, summarising the work of Michael Herman, 
has put it “... as a government function and not specifically as an intelligence 
function”.1225 The property rights problems discussed in the US 
counterterrorism context of the last chapter are thus also found in UK 
defence intelligence. The very unusualness of this style of division provokes 
a number of additional institutional costs as actors on each side try to 
integrate with the other, but have to negotiate across this qualitative 
distinction if they are to find an appropriate part of the other organisation with 
which to deal. In the US, although they have had to deal with the same 
overlapping and contentious property rights, there is at least a parallel in the 
systems used by civilian and military intelligence and security organisations.     
It follows of course that as the anticipated roles and responsibilities of the 
national level body are misunderstood, then the organisation that should 
support it is also flawed. As earlier chapters made clear there is no perfect 
organisational form, but rather different variations that perform different 
functions for better or worse depending on what they are prioritised towards. 
In the case of military intelligence not only is that prioritisation fraught with 
difficulties, but the decision making around what form is preferred is also 
necessarily confused by virtue of the different claimants on the 'right to the 
use of resources' of military intelligence as discussed above.  
If one takes the UK case, the strategic ‘pull’ architecture that acts on Defence 
Intelligence (DI) in the United Kingdom are themselves a complex set of 
interactions that need to be negotiated by those charged with 
implementation. As the ‘Defence Intelligence’s own website makes clear 
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there are effectively three occasionally divergent groups that can (and do) 
provide strategic direction and thus have influence on the requirements and 
priorities 'pulls' that will have to be negotiated across:1226 Firstly the military 
itself, including both the MoD and the armed services themselves, secondly 
the national central intelligence machinery represented by Cabinet Office, 
and thirdly treaty and coalition bodies and partners such as NATO and the 
EU, together with individual member states on particular occasions (the 
working alliance with France during the Libyan conflict being an example).  
The same problem can be seen at an individual level in the duality of 
Defence Attaches as both diplomat and intelligence officer.1227 The USA case 
is similar; agencies like the National Security Agency (NSA) and Defense 
Intelligence Agency (DIA) sit within the Department of Defense (DoD) but 
have national civilian as well as tactical military responsibilities provoking the 
property rights problems described above. Even as early as 1951 the then 
DCI Walter Bedell-Smith argued that the Department of Defense's 
communications intelligence should be re-organised so that national priorities 
were better reflected. He described a near impossible position of "...divided 
authorities and multiple responsibilities..." that he believed compromised 
communications intelligence as a source, but that actors nonetheless have to 
manage.1228 The duality of its functions made this re-allocation of property 
rights a more difficult undertaking than might be imagined however: In 
response the DoD re-created the intelligence function as the NSA, and 
ordained that the NSA should be considered as "... within but not part of 
DoD"1229 in an attempt to retain the capability. But in doing so they further 
blurred the property rights and ensured that negotiations between military-
strategic, military-tactical, civilian-national and civilian-tactical needs for the 
use of these increasingly important assets, and the significant budgets that 
accompany them, would remain contentious and protracted.  
                                                                   
1226
 "Guidance- Defence Intelligence".  
1227
 Intelligence Services in the Information Age : Theory and Practice.43 
1228
 Walter Bedell-Smith, "'Proposed Survey of Communications Intelligence Activities' 
"(Washington: National Security Council Executive, 1951). Cited by Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence 
Community.31 
1229
 The U.S. Intelligence Community.31 
405 
 
More recently the increasing number of operations in the counterinsurgency 
field have meant that the lower levels actors have now to navigate more 
complex property rights and negotiate with actors outside their usual chain of 
command, or outside the military altogether. However the long established 
principle of joint operating established in the Goldwater Nicholls, did at least 
set precedents for negotiated agreements of responsibilities that developed 
over the years. This means that, even on the battlefield other parts of 
government can be usefully employed,1230 and provided the setting through 
which later initiatives to lower frictions between levels and uses such as 
General Soyster's Military Intelligence Board (MIB), and General Flynn's 
operations-intelligence linkage could take root.1231        
In the United Kingdom on the other hand the only two organisations involved 
in the central intelligence machinery that have to manage both collection and 
analysis are the Security Service and Defence Intelligence. However the 
former, as was discussed in the previous chapter, have clearly delineated 
responsibilities geared towards very specific subject areas so that the 
property rights remain clear. This is not the case with defence intelligence. 
More specifically this means that there are two bodies charged with national 
level intelligence assessments, the Defence Intelligence Assessments Staff 
(formerly the Defence Intelligence Staff) and the Joint Intelligence Committee 
(JIC). Defence intelligence can therefore provide a ‘challenge’ capability from 
the other side of Whitehall, a perfectly healthy position even (if occasionally 
uncomfortable) if the two systems are properly integrated, as the different 
positions of the two on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction indicate. Even in 
this case of poor cooperation however the ongoing tension between the two 
sides are apparent, as the Committee of Privy Councillors that investigated 
the misreading of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction found when trying to 
advise on an organisational 'fix'.1232 The further complications of a political 
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dynamic that involves the usage of assessments to further policy objectives 
will inevitably increase that divide.1233   
Despite this unique position of arriving with already assessed product, from a 
range of Defence Intelligence sources, Defence Intelligence is nonetheless 
only another (single) voice amongst the single-source representatives on the 
JIC, who are there at the beginning of their assessment process. A voice, 
what is more, that may not have the intelligence background to overcome the 
information advantages held by intelligence specialists if from a conventional 
military background. The Butler Report noted that both the Chief of Defence 
Intelligence (CDI) and his deputy were not intelligence specialists.1234 There 
are thus inevitably inherent institutional costs involved in getting the requisite 
relative weight put on Defence Intelligence products, as the experience of Dr. 
Brian Jones during the run up to the 2003 war in Iraq made clear.1235 The 
civilian national lead is already held by the committee so that there should be 
little surprise when Defence Intelligence default to their military role.  
There is a similar imbalance above them at the National Security Council 
(NSC) level, where defence intelligence is only represented by the wider 
military, in the person of Chief of Defence Staff, despite their having a 
significant analytic capability, whereas the civilian agencies represent 
themselves although they boast only very limited analytic capacity. This is 
perhaps more problematic given that the NSC is supported by the National 
Security Secretariat and its National Security Adviser, which is distinct from 
the Joint Intelligence Organisation (JIO) which contains the JIC.1236 This 
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seems to specifically add a tier of negotiating costs between assessment and 
decision-making.  
The US alternative during the Cold War however had the Central Intelligence 
Agency’s (CIA's) Directorate of Intelligence, and the Department of Defense’s 
Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) both producing assessed product. 
Although some of this product was more even-handed1237 the overlapping 
property rights, coupled with different organisational interests, lead to sub-
goal pursuits and the production of very different estimates of Soviet 
capabilities, as each approached their assessment from their own particular 
(civilian or military) perspective. A process that moved the institutional costs 
from within the assessment process to the policy maker, making informed 
decision making more rather than less difficult.1238   
There is a further tension within the military in that Defence Intelligence is 
one of the most immediate ways that the wider military can be seen to be 
constantly and consistently useful to the government of the day outside of the 
deployment of forces. Intelligence is not however their core function, but 
rather only an enabler that supports it. The source of its financing is thus of 
import, and on both sides of the Atlantic it comes from within the wider 
defence enterprise. Those allocating increasingly scarce resources then have 
to balance the expected return on a particular piece of expenditure in terms 
of the prospective utility gained towards a national versus an equivalent 
military requirement or priority. Yet that decision must also be tempered with 
an assessment of how that choice might impact on future resourcing 
decisions by different consumers that are left either disappointed or sated. 
This may come down to being influenced by (otherwise irrelevant) factors 
such as the position or possible future position of those involved, or the point-
in-time in relation to the spending round.  
The position of defence intelligence in the wider system therefore has 
behavioural implications for the actors involved. Institutional costs may well 
be heightened as they pursue different sub-optimal outcomes for internal 
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political reasons. Opportunistic behaviour can occur as actors pursuing these 
sub-goals can justify decisions with reference to the entirely genuine needs 
of one part of community or another, and pursue them using the information 
advantage they enjoy through structural secrecy. The uncertainty of the 
environment makes suspected behaviour of this sort difficult to challenge and 
adds to the principal-agent problems as the latter can make their own 
choices as to which master to serve.  
Efforts to secure clearer property rights so that one's own side can better 
guarantee access to these intelligence resources under such circumstances 
often involve some form of fiscal control. Sir David Omand has suggested 
that there are two models of budgetary approach: A decentralised one, where 
each agency says what it needs and this is squeezed as necessary centrally, 
or a centralised version, where the centre says how much there is overall, 
and then divides it up. In the UK the civilian agencies use the latter, through 
the Single Intelligence Account, which provides strong leverage towards 
collaborative approaches and mutual 'cueing' of potential intelligence leads. 
Defence intelligence on the other hand is external to this system. It is funded 
from the MoD, which means it faces a wholly distinct trade-off; intelligence 
capability with more conventional forms of military power. Yet despite this 
separation they may be reliant on a collection platform that is not owned 
within defence, confusing property rights and future investment decisions.
1239
 
The decentralised system in the US is at the other end of the spectrum, and 
as funding is on a program by program basis, there is little incentive to 
increase collaboration. Instead actors are encouraged to behave in an 
Niskanen like way to push for greater program budgets.1240  
It is little wonder then that the Pentagon have routinely fought against a 
Director of National Intelligence with any authority over budgets. Or indeed 
that the Ministry of Defence have historically taken the unusual step of 
resisting an additional income stream from the ‘Single Intelligence Account’ 
to support their national intelligence responsibilities, such as the imagery 
intelligence performed in DIFC, knowing that it would lessen their ability to 
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focus their intelligence assets on purely military problems as opposed to 
civilian national level needs as espoused through Cabinet Office.1241  
Despite the fact that successive defence reviews have questioned the cost 
effectiveness of intelligence provision, particularly the expensive technical 
collection efforts such as Royal Air Force Reconnaissance aircraft and the 
overseas bases needed to operate them, no ideal solution has become 
apparent; each system boasts different institutional costs. One idea 
considered, for example, has been whether external customers could be 
directly charged for intelligence provided to bolster scarce defence 
funding.1242 But this would shift the costs not alleviate them, and might even 
increase them disproportionately. Additional negotiations would be needed in 
very low frequency circumstances, thereby increasing the institutional costs 
negotiating usage would bring. It is anyway unlikely that boundedly rational 
consumers (themselves facing resource constrictions)  could factor in the 
asset specificity of most assets, and the very long run-in times of many 
intelligence streams, before they could be useful. The approach could thus 
have detrimental strategic level implications on both sides of Whitehall.  
Another way to approach the problem is to have oversight bodies act as 
referee. However  these too are split along the same lines: In the US there is 
a Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and a Senate Committee on 
Armed Services, and even the Senate Committee on Appropriations uses 
sub-committees that have defence in one area, and the various intelligence 
needs split amongst different subject areas like homeland security and 
foreign operations.1243 In the UK oversight of defence intelligence at the 
national level is increasingly being undertaken via the Intelligence and 
Security Committee (ISC).1244 However references to defence intelligence in 
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the ISC Annual Report for 2012-2013 for example are largely tangential, 
predominantly in the cyber and 'support to military operations' areas, and 
although the subsequent years annual report also refers to some degree of 
financial oversight no DI or even MoD witnesses are recorded.1245 The  
impact of such changes on the allocation of property rights over military 
intelligence assets has therefore yet to be assessed.  
d. Institutional Costs, Military Hierarchy and Civilian Collegiality 
There are also cultural frictions that arise from the unique double-positioning 
of defence intelligence. It sits at the heart of the dichotomy between the 
collegial, committee based methodology for national level assessments more 
usually found in the UK system, and more centrist approach favoured by the 
US. Its approach to lowering institutional costs is thus composed of 
contradictory drivers. The collegial approach favoured by the British civilian 
community is anathema to its military counterpart, or at least its 
management.1246 In the US however the distinction between the two is less 
marked, and the frictions experienced are more standard fare across the 
community.1247 
Herman has argued persuasively as to the merits of a committee system for 
top level assessment, and describes a formal UK process that is supported 
by more informal understandings that can utilise the advantages of both 
central and collegial control.1248 Yet defence intelligence per se struggle to 
find a place in that system and the interwoven committees Herman describes 
are a very civilian construct. A certain discomfort with a committee of equals 
is inevitable given the very hierarchical managerial systems necessarily used 
by a military. In 1945 Secretary of War Robert Patterson testified to the 
Senate that "I will concede that coordination by committees is better than no 
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coordination at all. But in military matters action by committee is not the 
equivalent of action by a single authority. ... Someone has said that one poor 
commander is better than two good commanders sharing a command"1249 
indicating how deep a division this can be. The organisational forms most 
suited to the wider military endeavour are naturally hierarchical, with clear 
and unquestioned chains of command, and with each level of the hierarchy 
able to comprehend and decide on their own area of responsibility 
unilaterally.1250  
Intelligence functions on the other hand are better suited to less formal 
environments with low institutional frictions either horizontally or vertically, 
that encourage collaborative working, and it has been argued that military 
hierarchical approaches can produce a form of self-censorship that civilian 
'free-thinking' can avoid.1251 There exists a different cultural ethos between 
civilian and military approaches that the intelligence function sits astride. It 
permeates the sense of maximum utility and preferred organisational forms 
of each. Their individual approach to hierarchy and discipline will therefore 
create higher negotiating costs as each misunderstand the motivations of the 
other, as Davies quotation of a senior DoD official decrying CIA's lack of 
discipline in the most forthright terms makes clear.1252  
The military intelligence function must nonetheless sit inside the militaries 
preferred organisational type, but still be able to work upwards to collegial 
bodies, and horizontally on an intra and inter-organisational basis to an 
increasing degree. In the United Kingdom serving officers are posted to 
civilian bodies like JTAC, and civilians are routinely present in 
counterinsurgency operations like Afghanistan.1253 There is an inevitable 
tension between the culture as well as the needs of one against the other in 
many military intelligence undertakings, and it will need to be negotiated 
across at a variety of levels if collaborative working is to succeed.   
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Any point of equilibrium found between them will however only be suited to 
the environmental conditions pertaining at the time. The environmental shifts 
that occurred as World War II became the Cold War, which then in turn 
abruptly mutated as its monolithic threat was replaced by the more ubiquitous 
risks that permeated society more generally thereafter,1254 each drew out 
these divisions in different  ways. Any settlements that had been reached 
were ill suited to the new conditions and had to be re-negotiated.  
The nature of the Cold War and nuclear policy in particular make it much 
more a political-strategic issue than a tactical military one. Decisions are far 
more civilian and political in nature than that had been required before. In the 
US this meant a fundamental renegotiation of the civil military relationship 
that naturally included the military intelligence assets on which civilian 
decision making would rest. Yet cooperation between the two rested on a low 
level of institutional costs between them that Laqueur suggests would be 
unlikely even given normal bureaucratic behaviour, much less when 
expecting civilian and military cultures to interact.1255 The National Security 
Council (NSC) in the United States was after all supposed to be the point at 
which US national security capabilities were re-integrated into a single entity 
under the President; including integrating the single services within the 
Department of Defense (DoD), and foreign policy with defence policy. This 
was in recognition that the complexities of foreign policy could not handled 
within single departments, and that greater flexibility was required.1256  Whilst 
successful to a degree, the NSC nonetheless suffered from the same 
institutional tensions between civilian and military cultures described above.  
In her discussion of its creation and evolution, Zegart describes how the 
newly formed DoD had the capacity to provide a wealth of information to the 
Executive, but used its information advantage to 'filter' it through a 'self-
interested prism'. However to Zegart, its motives were not necessarily 
sinister, it was simply that the DoD was incentivised in a way that was 
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different to that of their President.1257 The NSC was thus a way through 
which the Executive could reduce monitoring costs: Because the NSC staff 
was smaller and closer, their behaviours were more visible, and as they 
served at the pleasure of the President, their utility was more closely tied to 
his.1258 In institutional cost terms the likelihood of opportunistic behaviour was 
reduced as spans of control became more manageable and a shared 
maximand between the levels was created. It is not surprising therefore that 
defence interests were keen to gain control of the NSC, and even generously 
offered to house it in the Pentagon.1259   
The post Cold-War environmental shift produced similarly significant tensions 
in the existing civilian military understanding of property rights over DoD held 
intelligence assets, but along a different dimension. In this case the policy 
shift from national security to public safety that followed increased the 
importance of the operational and tactical levels at the expense of the broad 
strategic agreements in place. The existing system was designed so that 
there were low institutional costs obstructing the vertical passage of 
intelligence up the chain of command, but with very high costs permitted, and 
even encouraged, horizontally. For example national level estimates could 
flow up both CIA and DoD with little interaction between them.1260  
More problematically for the new environment, the drafting of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) in 1978 allowed limited domestic/foreign 
joint working for counterintelligence purposes, but ensured high institutional 
bars protected US citizens constitutional rights.1261 These institutional cost 
rigidities, although well suited to both that environment and the military 
culture, were ill-suited to the increased complexity and uncertainty of the 
asymmetric threats that followed. It was a subsequent shift to the low 
horizontal frictions discussed in the next chapter that allowed these to be 
addressed, meaning that many of the earlier agreements became redundant.  
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In the UK the same cultural distinction meant that settling defence 
intelligence into the national system was similarly problematic: It remained "... 
one of  the only... UK bureaucratic rather than collegial model(s) of 
interagency coordination..."1262. Even in its formative years as the Joint 
Intelligence Bureau (JIB) different cultural ideas of a maximand caused 
constant attempts at reform that oscillated between the military of civilian 
approaches: For example during the 1960 Templer Review, the author 
advocated the removal of JIB from the MoD to Cabinet Office to ensure its 
views were seen as independent, whereas JIB Director Sir Kenneth Strong 
argued that the services would lose confidence in what would be perceived 
as a 'civilian organisation'.1263 At the specific case level, even Templer had to 
agree that the civilian 'group' approach was essential for 'scientific and 
technical intelligence'. However he believed it to be a special case, based on 
the high negotiating frictions between the respective departments, with the 
net result that some joint working was agreed, but that the single service 
departments remained.1264   
At odds with their organisational rigidity is the militaries mission-type 
flexibility. Michael Herman has identified a recurrent pattern of Ministry of 
Defence inspired economies that have reduced capability, which is then 
followed by a crisis of some sort forcing them to take on new topics or areas 
for the simple reason that no one else was equipped to do so.
1265
 Certainly 
the Research & Analysis Department of the Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 
which suffered similar cuts going back as far as the 1970's has no such 
surge capacity. Furthermore there is a cultural imperative within the military 
to do whatever is required, whether or not one is mandated or equipped for 
such a role; as Herman puts it, defence intelligence "... has upheld in 
intelligence the military tradition of pulling governments' chestnuts out of the 
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fire". This in turn has lead to an ever increasing "... ambiguity about where 
the limits of the DIS's responsibility for defence intelligence actually lie."1266  
However laudable and indeed necessary this might be, it causes legacy 
problems around roles and responsibilities as actors in subsequent 
negotiations point to precedent or areas of apparent similarity. Put another 
way, the organisation most steeped in cultural and historic norms, and 
working most assiduously to the sort of standard operating procedural 
rigidities identified by Merton and others,1267 is also the organisation from 
which the highest degree of adaptability and flexibility is likely to be required, 
and from which it is often delivered: 1268 Under such circumstances the 
detrimental prevalence of especially high institutional costs can be no 
surprise. 
Such short term and variable requirements can however mean that 
institutional frictions can prevent too great an organisational shift towards a 
transitory problem.  The limited time frame of many such missions (which 
cease on surrender of the enemy or when security is adequate for a civilian 
take-over) mean that the high institutional costs, both between the single 
services and between the services and their political masters, can actually be 
constructive. Like the high institutional costs built in to the American political 
system, they can prevent short term perspectives causing lasting 
damage.1269 There is of course a very real imperative to resource current 
operations adequately, and this can be at the expense of future strategic 
needs, for the urgent to obscure the important just as it did in the 
counterterrorism case. This can shift the negotiating dynamic between the 
single services, and between the military and Whitehall as controversies over 
equipment levels in the early years of British involvement in Iraq 
demonstrated.1270  
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The longer term requirements that the single service chiefs have tended to 
protect still exist, but remain assets that are specific to a particular type of 
operation that is of uncertain frequency, whether it is a current or merely a 
potential issue. The tensions between the two nonetheless decrease the 
sense of a shared maximand. Osborne for example cites General Sir Richard 
Dannatts emotive castigation of the MoD, who continued to prioritise across 
the three services even as the Army were struggling in Basra.1271 However it 
was not long afterwards that the UK had to conduct a complete campaign in 
Libya using air assets alone, and with little more than intelligence support 
from the US. The uncertainty of the environment can consequently mean that 
the asset specificity of military and single service cultures can be both a 
positive and a negative influence on efficiency, even as it provokes problems 
in cooperation.  
This dichotomy is not however new to the post 9/11 world of multiple risks. It 
was arguably the same sort of opportunistic ‘protection of turf’ observed in 
the notoriously difficult Montgomery’s defence of the Army in 1948, against a 
more generally held view that saw the future of wars as nuclear, and 
therefore the primary concern of the Air Force rather than the Army or Navy, 
that ensured the latter were able to take on the rise in counter insurgency 
and policing style operations that were subsequently required of it.1272 
Nonetheless it was the less egotistical Mountbatten who managed to lower 
negotiating frictions;  achieving more through higher levels of cooperation. By 
presciently shifting the debate from the exclusively nuclear sphere, he 
lowered the asymmetry of information, pointing to the uncertainties and 
(perhaps most particularly) clarifying the property rights of each service, with 
respect to the different types of potential engagement each might be 
engaged in.1273 
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For the military generally adapting to environmental changes is thus no small 
undertaking, and that includes its intelligence apparatus despite its greater 
engagement with the external world; it means altering ‘the form of social 
power in which the military apparatus is embedded’. Resistance in the form 
of opportunistic behaviour by boundedly rational officers protective of their 
own units or service is inevitable. It is perhaps more surprising that the 
American military intelligence apparatus have managed the change to the 
extent that they have,1274 than that their British equivalent has not.  
e. Institutional Costs and the Temporal Nature of Defence Intelligence: 
Just as different understanding of the term 'strategic' can produce language 
costs across the civilian and military spheres as discussed above, so too can 
misunderstandings about even the nature of the intelligence product within 
that. The issue of timeliness is central to the usefulness of all intelligence,1275 
and particularly so in the military sphere. However the detail of that timeliness 
will vary according to the type of the intelligence in question, depending on 
whether it can be regarded as strategic, operational or tactical. The utility of 
each has a different life-span depending on what it is being used for.  
This can be represented by adapting John Ferris's diagram demonstrating 
the perishable nature of intelligence in war, as Figure 7.1 shows.1276 The 
usefulness of a particular piece of intelligence is increasingly divergent 
between each level as time passes. As Ferris describes it, each sort of 
intelligence has a distinct 'half-life' that varies significantly over the levels of 
usage to which it might be put: The more 'mobile' the situation, the shorter 
the half-life of the intelligence. He therefore argues persuasively that each 
requires a different organisational architecture to be best employed: 
Elaborate and in-depth assessments staff are needed for the careful planning 
of operations but are disastrous for fluid ongoing actions.1277  
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The utility of any piece of intelligence thus only exists within a finite period of 
time, so that it is in effect a perishable commodity. That period will however 
vary according to the nature and intended use of that intelligence. If these 
distinctions are not understood then language costs can create tensions 
between military intelligence providers and their immediate customers even 
within the defence sphere.  
The nature of the ultimate intended use may however be beyond the purview 
of the analyst providing the assessed product if the wrong organisational 
architecture for that use is in place, so that bounded rationality acts across 
information asymmetry between each of the three levels. Any system that 
prescribes a particular level for any given piece of intelligence is unlikely to 
be appropriate. The same piece of intelligence might need to be used at 
various levels. A hypothetical example would be intelligence suggesting that 
Iran was assisting in the supply of Explosively Formed Projectiles (EFP's) to 
be used by Iraqi insurgents against coalition troops and civilian armour in the 
post Iraq war period. This would be needed by the Executive – 
contextualised by both intelligence and State Department analysts - to deal 
with as a strategic issue in any bilateral discussions with Tehran. But it would 
also be relevant to operational planners who need to ensure the right armour 
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is in use in theatre, and to a trooper on the ground that needs to know his 
vulnerabilities at an exclusively tactical level. Although a range of actors may 
have a need for the same bit of intelligence, their roles require them to do 
very different things with it. Property rights to each area of responsibility need 
to be clear or a senior policy maker might be tempted to concern himself or 
herself with the usefulness of B7 grade armour because that provides the 
sort of operative goal that Jackson predicted would replace the more difficult 
and longer term strategic one1278 of dealing with a truculent Iranian 
leadership. 
Despite the distinct types of usage identified by Ferris, and the different 
organisational form each requires, there is nonetheless an overlapping area 
where the same assets will be required to serve each. Senator Chambliss, 
who has served on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the 
House Intelligence Sub-Committee on Terrorism and Homeland Security, 
regards reform as a means for “Engaging the Full Spectrum” across the 
national and tactical divide, so that the same capabilities can serve each 
level.1279 It is not simply a matter of dividing assets between one or the other 
therefore, but rather of each level having clear property rights to the use of 
them to satisfy their own requirements; a far more complex and fluid 
cooperative arrangement is thus required, but as Ferris has observed, the 
uncertainty of the environment mean any 'lesson learnt' in one context may 
be "... precisely the solution not to apply",1280 so that developing any 
organisational solution will be difficult, and flexible ongoing negotiated 
agreements between actors will remain necessary.  
There are therefore significant institutional cost implications : Firstly the same 
organisational entity may well be responsible for the collection, analysis and 
even usage of a piece of intelligence so external dissemination is beyond 
their remit. If no established and trusted nodes for contact exist transmission 
is less likely. This applies in the military sphere to a greater extent than in the 
counterterrorism case because, in the UK at least, there is greater separation 
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between functions in the civilian arena. When collection, analysis, and 
'action-on' might all take place in distinct organisational entities it is easier to 
pass intelligence product to different consumers to consider within the 
context of their own responsibilities. Police resources might even take over 
from many of those belonging to the intelligence agencies as the situation 
evolves. This is not the case within the armed forces. Instead while property 
rights can be still more pressing, but with qualitatively different requirements 
and priorities being contested.  
Secondly if the distinction between strategic, operational and tactical 
intelligence is not understood then it can have a critical impact on efficacy 
between intelligence provider and consumer, so that further frictions are 
introduced into their relationship and subsequent negotiations are made 
harder. Vertical cooperation is thus keenly affected by the distinct nature of 
each levels intelligence requirement and the institutional cost landscape 
between them that will either help or hinder working across them.  
Military intelligence is very closely tied to the requirements and priorities of a 
commander, whatever level it is employed at and whatever time-period is 
being considered. This applies to a much greater extent than in the civilian 
agencies where requirements and priorities are broader. In the UK for 
example they are currently based within the Strategic Defence and Security 
Review (SDSR).1281 Beyond even that they allow for a certain amount of 
horizon scanning1282 and a degree of flexibility in interpretation.1283 There is 
therefore an immediate dichotomy between how each sphere of intelligence 
needs to operate. Because of this, defence intelligence is more closely 
aligned to its military master; interactions with the civilian community, and in 
particular its leadership (the national level consumer) are very limited. There 
is thus limited opportunity for the low institutional costs developed through 
regular interactions to materialise at the strategic level outside of the MoD 
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itself. In fact no Minister has attended a joint exercise with the military since 
Margaret Thatcher's premiership (who insisted on it, on a Saturday, to the 
chagrin of many).1284 They therefore only come together in very specific 
circumstances, such as when COBR(A) is being instigated due to a hostage 
taking or terrorist attack, or at one remove through the Chief of Defence Staff 
(CDS) at the National Security Council (NSC) as and when required.1285     
This same proximity of intelligence to mission, at all levels of the defence 
sphere, increases institutional costs in more internal ways too. The motivated 
bias that Matthew Wahlert identified as a problem in both the war fighting and 
intelligence functions1286 results from the toxic combination of uncertainty and 
bounded rationality, but the very nature of an international crisis is also likely 
to engender problems of assets specific to a different scenario. This is likely 
to be coupled with information costs that result from decision makers seeking 
to give ‘more weight than it can bear’ (to quote Lord Butler)1287 to information 
that supports the existing (and sometimes the only) policy option already 
selected. Indeed it has been calculated that in most international crises, any 
rejected option was never properly reconsidered, no matter how the scenario 
subsequently played out.1288  
Given that the rationality of the decision makers (whether political, official or 
military) is assumed, then it becomes clear that policy reversal is prohibitively 
expensive in institutional cost terms as the factors laid out above are 
exacerbated by a lack of time1289 to conduct unique searches for adapted 
approaches or to undertake the sort of complex negotiations needed to 
execute them. This is nonetheless the very sphere in which military 
intelligence must operate. Furthermore they must do so by integrating with an 
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operational arm for whom the some degree of path dependency is a 
necessary prerequisite for executive action if the same factors of bounded 
rationality, complexity and uncertainty are not to cause paralysis in decision 
makers. For them motivated bias can be a method for managing high 
institutional costs within the time-frame available.   
Analysts in all intelligence fields can suffer from what is recognisable as the 
pathology of confirmation bias, but in the military the analyst works directly 
for the decision maker, their commanding officer, in a very disciplined 
hierarchy. They are often a part of the staff function, and can be sitting in the 
same working space. The pressure to conform to the accepted view of the 
world once decisions have been made, and troops committed and put in 
harm's way, will thus be far higher than that experienced by their civilian 
counterparts who are insulated within their own (probably more 
understanding) agency, particularly when no alternative plan is apparently 
available.1290 Despite this co-location, the nature of policy execution in the 
military sphere means that it is necessarily handled by a separate entity, so 
that negotiating costs for even minor shifts in decisions are correspondingly 
high as they have to be managed across asymmetric information one way 
and asymmetric authority the other. 
Conversely in the civilian sphere a professional civil service is managing both 
the information and the delivery of the resultant policy.1291 The institutional 
costs of adjusting delivery in the light of changes in the information known 
are therefore relatively low. The significance of this is perhaps best 
demonstrated by the fact that it has been the United States militaries recent 
lowering of these institutional costs, so that the tempo of constantly shifting 
plans and contingencies can more closely follow the intelligence available, 
that has not only increased their tactical level efficiency but also changed the 
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nature of the ‘battle-sphere’ itself. This in turn has allowed them to 
incorporate the ethos of ‘Effects Based Operations’ into their strategic 
capability.1292  
Military intelligence is also distinct in that it includes, but is not limited to, 
significant amounts of what is known as 'situational awareness' from the 
tactical level up. This tells you where your enemy is, and is supported by 
'order of battle' type intelligence. However it has previously been at odds with 
a deeper knowledge of the capabilities and intentions of an enemy. One of 
the significant lessons of the first Gulf war was that even where situational 
awareness was good, deeper understanding of the enemy could be lacking. 
Furthermore, the relationship between the two types of intelligence (which 
might be the difference between imagery intelligence and a human 
intelligence source) needs to be negotiated, and often in very quick time. As 
Michael Herman puts it a battlefield commander might be "... incredibly well 
sighted, but in some degree deaf and illiterate in his choice of evidence to 
assess the enemy". A situation that has been exacerbated by the 'Revolution 
in Military Affairs' and the resultant dominance of information that has not 
always distinguished information by type.1293   
This section has shown that the peculiar institutional cost environment in 
which defence intelligence is situated presents very particular problems for 
cooperative behaviour at several levels. It operates in an uncertain 
environment. Above it, property rights over the function are opaque across 
the military - civil divide, while its position in the national systems of both the 
UK and US increases complexity and produces contradictory pulls 
downstream. The allocation of finite resources has to be negotiated 
repeatedly as a result. Meanwhile, high languages costs and cultural asset 
specificity make any such negotiations more difficult.  
Apart from noting that the US defence intelligence infrastructure and the 
wider intelligence and security apparatus are more similar organisationally 
than those of the UK, this section has said little about why the US defence 
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intelligence endeavour was able to produce a volte face during the early 
1990's. The next section will therefore examine the defence intelligence 
performance around the First Gulf War, when high institutional costs were put 
into stark relief, and some low institutional cost structures came to the fore 
which were subsequently capitalised on through a number of the initiatives 
that will be examined in the next chapter.  
Section 2: US Defence Intelligence and Operation Desert Shield/Storm  
For the United States defence intelligence the 1991 Gulf War experience was 
seminal as it provided a threshold moment between the collegial model that 
had been advanced by General Soyster and his reconstituted Military 
Intelligence Board (MIB) discussed below, and the more antagonistic 
approach exemplified by General Schwarzkopf (the overall Commander in 
Chief, or CINC, of the central command known as CENTCOM).1294 
Furthermore the necessity for joint working was more apparent than ever in a 
such an obviously military setting.1295  A clear pattern of what worked and 
what didn’t emerged in a less volatile environment than that which usually 
forces major reviews, when the sobriquet of ‘intelligence failure’ often leads 
to actors being forced into defensive sub-goal pursuits. On this occasion the 
monitoring costs of being in the media glare were lessened, despite the 
surprise of Saddam Hussein’s initial adventure into Kuwait, because the 
intelligence community at large were only one of several agencies involved 
and could share some of the credit for the subsequent successful campaign 
to oust him. The frictions that had provoked sub-optimal performance in 
some areas could therefore be contrasted with improved collaboration in 
others in a more rounded way than usual.  
As has already been noted, in the military domain intelligence is often viewed 
as simply another support function. Apparently held at the most senior level 
of command, this view hobbled theatre level intelligence capability from the 
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outset. Ironically, because of a fear of further Iraqi incursions into Saudi 
Arabia, General Schwarzkopf prioritised the lifting of combat forces over 
intelligence assets into theatre so that the latter had to fight for what space 
they could on flights to Saudi Arabia.1296 The General thus undermined his 
own requirement for indicators and warnings of any such incursion, and for 
detailed tactical information if it had actually occurred. The cultural distinction 
between combat troops and 'support' meant that intelligence assets were 
unable to negotiate across the divide to ensure their place on transport. 
CENTCOM commanders were boundedly rational1297 in that they failed to 
realise the degree to which intelligence assets were specific to previous 
priorities, and that they would need time in a new, very uncertain 
environment ahead of combat troops if the latter were to be most usefully 
deployed.   
Secondly cold war priorities meant that in normal times the CENTCOM 
intelligence capability was simply a shell, minimally staffed. It had no 
collection assets under its own control so that the property rights needed to 
secure them were an issue in the crucial first days of the crisis.1298 Like the 
DoD’s Joint Intelligence Center (DoD JIC) it was reliant on each of the 
services and national agencies for staff. Externally this allowed for 
opportunistic behaviour as boundedly rational middle level managers 
perceived their maximand as achieved through retaining their best staff for 
their own core functions, so that less experienced staff without adequate 
knowledge of the basic skill sets were sent first: In the DoD JIC these missing 
skills included such basics as ‘order of battle maintenance’ and experience of 
the messaging systems in use. Internally neither CENTCOM nor the DoD JIC 
teams had worked together, so that every issue had to be negotiated at 
several levels, across asymmetric information holdings as to purpose and 
priority, until a standard approach had been implicitly agreed. In the face of a 
quickly shifting, uncertain, and complex environment, this proved too tall an 
order. In fact, because of these issues, the DoD JIC was overwhelmed with 
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too many roles so that property rights were left un-clarified as it was in any 
event unable to fulfil them.1299 The CENTCOM's own  JIC also withdrew from 
its intended role, so that as the Congressional report into Desert 
Shield/Storm notes, “... no theatre wide intelligence architecture was 
developed; J-2 mainly focused on meeting the day to day, minute by minute 
requests of the CINC...”.1300 Conversely, the clear property rights of the 
Command Structure as represented by the Commander in Chief in 
CENTCOM, over all 'non national level' intelligence assets (and a few 
logistical pieces), no matter where those units originated, worked well in 
almost every other area.1301 The property rights over these had been 
negotiated and established over years of previous military engagements 
where command had to be delegated out from the centre in total, and were 
unequivocal. The relative ease and thus efficiency with which could be used 
was thus a clear marker for future development.  
The Pentagon’s DoDJIC on the other hand, as a rapidly expanding body with 
no “... road map” of how do so, also experienced overly high frictions with 
external agencies. The CIA for example declined to join it at all, arguing that 
its assessments needed to be independent. Given the asymmetric 
information holdings of each however divergent assessments were likely and 
are not helpful to a decision maker.1302 Instead they lead to acrimony and 
even higher frictions between bodies as trust breaks down (see for example 
the problems around bomb damage assessment discussed below).1303 
Curiously, this distance between the DIA and CIA was exacerbated by an 
imposed switch in property rights over the co-ordination function of other 
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assets, firstly from CIA to the DIA (on behalf of CENTCOM) then eventually 
to CENTCOM itself. A move made despite the CIA’s long experience and 
established relationships and already negotiated contractual understandings 
in fulfilling that role, and the fact that CENTCOM requirements were in any 
event already prioritised.  
This suggests the cultural distrust between civilian and military personnel 
described above were still a factor at this time, and that the civilian asset 
specificity was regarded as unsuitable to a situation where an actual war was 
to be fought. A very different view to that found in more recent times when 
lower institutional costs between the two have been established.1304 Clearly if 
institutional costs between the two agencies had been lower a more efficient 
service could have been achieved by CIA simply adapting their priorities, in 
concert with DIA JIC CENTCOM officers, to reflect the requirements of the 
crisis (and in fact Congress noted the sudden and almost total lack of 
coverage of other threats that resulted).1305  
Observers post war were able to contrast the limited performance of the JIC’s 
during the crisis with the Military Intelligence Board or MIB. This had been 
reinvented shortly before the conflict by the then Director of DIA General 
Harry Soyster as a decision making, as well as an advisory body that 
included the four service intelligence chiefs and the Director NSA, under his 
Chairmanship.1306 It was thus already well placed, as an authoritative and 
representative body, to provide lower institutional costs within the intelligence 
community, and therefore between it and its combat focused customers 
when the crisis broke. Ever since its incorporation (alongside the DIA itself) in 
1961 the MIB had been a body implicitly intended to lower institutional costs; 
initially between the Director DIA, the J2 elements on the Joint Chief of Staff, 
and the various heads of intelligence. However, after an initial flurry of activity 
the MIB settled into being an irregular body without a particular mandate, a 
situation that pertained through until the 1990’s. The imperative of the 
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forthcoming war however ensured the leptokurtic point created by the 
frictions that had prevented it acting as originally intended were passed. This 
allowed Soyster to change it from a slow-time and rather vague management 
forum into a dynamic support structure with a decision making capability, that 
then also included external voices such as Joint Staff officers for Command, 
Control and Communications (J6), that was intimately linked with the 
operational functions of the coalition.1307 It thus had the credibility to quickly 
clarify property rights over intelligence assets whenever they were disputed, 
and could lower negotiating costs between those who needed to utilise them. 
Beyond the institutional costs impact framework of course note must be 
made of Soyster’s own collaborative style. This, in sharp contrast to General 
Schwarzkopf's more abrasive approach, helped lower frictions between 
intelligence and the wider military, allowing him to lower institutional costs in 
the first place. The Congressional report into intelligence performance for 
example particularly cite the way in which a disagreement between the 
Pentagon and CENTCOM over the use of some imagery processing 
hardware that the latter did not want shipped into theatre was managed by 
the MIB. Rather than simply join the fray, MIB directed a tour of the theatre 
that established trust between the two bodies, demonstrated an 
understanding of the operational problems and needs which resulted in some 
key personnel who could assist with the management of the various new 
systems being shipped into theatre as well as the piece of hardware at the 
centre of the dispute.1308 Soyster thus established a condition of probity 
between the MIB and established lower communication costs between the 
relevant actors, including civilians, so that negotiations over the use of 
resources could be more easily agreed.  
Nor was this approach limited to the conduct of the war itself as the reaction 
to poor performance in some technological intelligence areas demonstrates: 
Ever smarter bombs had of course been developed over the years, but often 
on an assumption that the requisite level of detailed intelligence would be 
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there to support and direct them.1309 At the same time the pace of the Gulf 
conflict exacerbated the difficulties caused by the need for increased 
accuracy around not only around targeting itself, but also about the exact 
position of both enemy and friendly units. This takes a collection and collation 
capability of a qualitatively and quantitatively different order.1310 In the case of 
signals intelligence for example the Gulf war showed that the seven-year 
procurement cycle typical of DoD purchases was inadequate to keep pace in 
an area reckoned to double in capability every 12 to 18 months. Nonetheless 
overcoming the institutional resistance so that equipment could be bought ‘off 
the shelf’ from the private sector was no mean feat.1311 It is however now the 
standard approach on both sides of the Atlantic.1312  
The use of advanced technology in the intelligence sphere tends to bring its 
own institutional cost problems as its possession, and the secrecy 
surrounding its capabilities, both provides a bargaining advantage over one’s 
peers and creates frictions as those that do not have the capability perceive 
their needs are being side-lined so that others can secure either the use of 
the asset in the short term, or the property rights over it in the longer term. 
One of the pervading problems of the Gulf war intelligence effort was the 
secrecy of many of the systems that had suddenly become available. At the 
same time one of the lessons that had already been learnt during the 
Panama and Grenada campaigns was that tactical level commanders 
needed a much lower friction point of access to national level intelligence 
assets if they were to be able to utilise what had always been a strategic 
product in a tactically useful way.  
The answer to both issues was found by creating horizontal linkages that 
boasted far lower institutional costs than those that required requests to 
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travel vertically before being debated by more senior personnel in the 
Pentagon whose own utility was likely to be satisfied by bureaucratic ‘wins’ 
over rivals. The deployment by the DIA of eleven adapted National Military 
Intelligence Support Teams (NMIST’s) into the Gulf to be directly available to 
support tactical level command without the need for the frictions that running 
up and down the chain-of-command had previously engendered. The NSA 
mirrored this approach by directly deploying their own liaison teams to 
forward command areas that could assist with both subject matter expertise 
and easy access to nationally collected materiel.1313  
This meant that those involved in negotiating access suddenly had a clear 
and shared maximand at the same (tactical) level. It also negated the 
problems of secrecy to a significant extent, and became a way through which 
the cultural shift needed to routinely pass on information could be managed. 
This was particularly important as information that had previously only been 
needed by only a few was suddenly vital to a plethora of military 
personnel.1314 The addition of these national level teams directly into tactical 
command levels was therefore able to improve cooperation between different 
functional entities on each side of the intelligence and operational divide. It 
alleviated many of the problems associated with actually bringing to bear 
America’s prodigious national intelligence capability in a tactically useful way, 
although further improvements remained to be made.
1315
  
The overall success of the concept in achieving collaborative working is best 
demonstrated by the fact that after the Persian Gulf War, when one would 
predict a retrenchment back to the single-service or specific skill-set as 
bureaucrats tried to reassert their autonomy,1316 the idea was adapted 
further: Both the NMIST and NSA liaison teams were reconfigured into a 
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single, quickly deployable and dynamic National Intelligence Support Team 
or NIST which also included CIA and National Imagery and Mapping Agency 
(NIMA) personnel.1317   
This diminution of frictions between the strategic and tactical levels was 
particularly important because the Persian Gulf War saw the two become far 
more relevant to each other. The information age meant that suddenly a 
militarily minor matter at the tactical level could derail an entire strategy 
because of the higher levels of monitoring costs that improved 
communications had brought. For example Scud missiles were of limited 
military significance at the tactical level, but the possibility that they could 
cause Israeli popular opinion to force its Government to enter the war, and 
thus destabilise the whole pan-Arab coalition strategy, made them a 
politically significant threat that required substantial intelligence and other 
assets to be seen to be re-directed to them.1318 The different intelligence 
needs of the strategic and tactical levels described in the section above were 
actually seen to blur and become interwoven. For the most part this new ‘two 
way street’ functioned well, with Battalion level product informing ‘Echelons 
Above Corps’ (EAC), and with them in turn being able to access and utilise, 
via their NMISTs’s and NSA liaison officers, a good deal of what had 
previously been regarded as material for the strategic level only.1319 
However, where institutional costs existed, whether vertically or horizontally, 
it was noticeable that good information still failed to get to the right user in the 
right form.  
The congressional review team for example noted the unacceptably high 
institutional costs involved with the information itself. The nature of 
information costs had changed, so that traditional problems persisted in new 
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guises. Usable information was still scarce, but often this was because it was 
lost in too much data. The principal costs had shifted from collection of 
intelligence that was obscured behind a sophisticated counterintelligence 
program, to what became called the Tasking/ Processing/ Exploitation/ 
Dissemination (TPED) costs.1320 A system designed to be specific to a slow-
tempo, high impact cold war threat simply became flooded. As Hughes-
Wilson describes it, the full intelligence cycle had still to be gone through, but 
suddenly that meant 20,000 images to be assessed even as aircraft were on 
the runway 'turning and burning' waiting to be despatched to a target.1321  
This shift in balance generated a parallel shift in frictions around the whole 
intelligence cycle. A new set of negotiations and fixes therefore had to be 
introduced even as the campaign was running. These negotiations were 
hampered by too rigid an attachment to existing procedures better suited to 
earlier environmental conditions however; the occupational psychosis 
described by Merton 1322 pertained. Intelligence processes were for example 
asset specific to the use of intelligence in Cold War conditions. The resultant 
agreements did eventually shift performance, according to the Air Force 
Commander in the Gulf, from a five out of ten to a nine out of ten, but it was 
not an easy road.1323 In addition the bounded rationality of battalion level 
commanders led to a massive spike on the demand side. They knew they 
ought to be able to access detailed imagery intelligence, but didn’t realise 
that their own demands were further overloading the system.  
In response post war observers noted that more imaginative elements 
generated low institutional cost systems that could help deal with the 
problem. Devices such as the Army’s central intelligence component, known 
as ARCENT G2, developed a ‘key-reads’ methodology. This was essentially 
a short circuited ‘requirements and priorities’ system that could pre-assign 
                                                                   
1320
 See inter alia ibid.13 
1321
 Hughes-Wilson, Military Intelligence Blunders and Cover-Ups.349 
1322
 Merton, "Bureaucratic Structure and Personality."565 
1323
  Lt. Gen Horner as quoted by Paul Richter and Tracy Wilkinson, "Turning Facts into Attacks," 
Los Angeles Times, 6th April 1991 1991. 
433 
 
assets as key points in the campaign were reached, without the need for 
further individual negotiations.1324  
Similarly, the sudden availability of imagery intelligence changed the 
institutional cost balance between it and other seams of information. 
Boundedly rational and hard pressed analysts and decision-makers struggled 
to differentiate what different types of asymmetrically held intelligence were 
telling them. Low cost access to imagery seemed to offer both an immediacy 
and relatively high level of certainty when compared to deeper and more 
predictive intelligence as the latter needed to be interpreted through 
conversations with analysts who used a more uncertain language. As a result 
situational awareness data drowned out useful clues as to intentions and 
broader capabilities. As General Horner (who ran the Air War) noted the war 
was "...replete with our failures to understand the enemy, to dissect him with 
the clarity needed to discover his capabilities and intentions". He further 
noted that this imbalance, which favoured technology acquired 
measurements, could actually lead to an injection of biases in subsequent 
assessment of capabilities and intentions.1325  
Furthermore this friction was made more apparent by the coalitions capability 
to translate their superiority in technological intelligence into a decisive kinetic 
superiority. Quite simply, their ability to annihilate any enemy found 
decreased the utility of information on enemy intentions, so that the 
negotiating strengths of each shifted from previous considerations of the 
Soviet threat. But subsequent engagement in counter insurgency and 
counterterrorism operations would necessarily shift it again, so that the need 
for a low friction way to compare the utility of each intelligence seam in any 
given circumstance became apparent.1326      
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The same type of language cost were also problematic across the 
intelligence and operational divide because the type of decision making 
required was qualitatively and quantitatively different to that needed from cold 
war strategists. The Cold War derived language that was used by analysts 
could therefore provoke frictions between themselves and decision makers in 
two ways: 
Firstly terminology could be in too technical a format. General Schwarzkopf 
gives a (possibly apocryphal) example of being told a bridge is 52% 
destroyed when what he needs to know is whether the Iraqis were still able to 
use it to move either tanks or trucks across it. If they could not then it is 
effectively 100% destroyed, and decisions can be made on that basis. If they 
can use the bridge then it is not destroyed at all. In the more serious case of 
bomb damage assessment such language differences had the capacity to 
delay the ground attack significantly: Its timing was premised on the 
degrading of Saddam’s forces by a given percentage through the use of 
coalition air power. Language differences around the use of 'words of 
estimative probability' thus allowed naturally cautious assessors to use their 
informational advantage to behave opportunistically. They could protect their 
own preferred modus operandi and reputations to the detriment of 
collaborative engagement with each other and the senior decision maker.1327 
Conversely at the tactical level intelligence was supplied in the broad 
language needed by higher levels, so that it then had to be re-assessed in 
conjunction with their own observations before it was useful, detracting from 
its efficacy and adding tiers of institutional costs between provider and 
user.1328           
Secondly they are dealing with bounded levels of information in what are 
invariably complex and uncertain environments. This means that there is a 
natural (and, as subsequent events in the region proved, very necessary) 
tendency by analysts to caveat their impressions with assessments of how 
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reliable they believe they can be. This can be difficult for a military decision 
maker who may be faced with a binary decision of ‘attack/don’t attack’. There 
is a cultural preference for at least the appearance of certainty in military 
decision makers mind, which is at odds with the cultural preferences of an 
intelligence specialist; each is asset specific to their own role as discussed in 
the previous section. The dichotomy of positions across an asymmetry of 
information holding is exacerbated by the parallel divergence between 
analysts, who work on a permanent and on-going cycle and whose focus is 
always on more and better data, and the decision maker, who simply needs 
to know when he or she has enough information to act.1329 This can decrease 
their sense of a shared maximand. Furthermore the practical need for some 
degree of caveat on any predictive intelligence can be difficult to separate 
from a natural tendency on the part of boundedly rational analysts to behave 
opportunistically by ensuring so great a spread of caveats that they never risk 
being proven wrong.1330  
New data streams also reproduced some of the older opportunistic behaviour 
problems associated with asymmetric information holdings. The new form of 
scarcity (of processed, usable information) gave it a value and thus created a 
potential moral hazard in the component command staffs that had the 
greatest access to the systems capable of processing it. Their greatest utility 
lay in ‘hoarding’ it for the use of their own hierarchy rather than passing it 
down to ground units and air wings. This was possible because property 
rights over secret intelligence were not clear-cut; users existed not only 
above but also below and across the various hierarchies.  
Negotiating costs between (for example) the air force intelligence component 
of CENTCOM, known as CENTAF/Intel and the operational element it was 
supposed to serve were excessively high. Like the CENTCOM J2 element, it 
had been a shell until the war, so boundedly rational actors on both sides had 
no experience of how best to interact, or indeed what the other could or could 
not do. This asymmetry was repeated in other areas so that in many cases 
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operators simply sought out unofficial lower friction routes to secure what 
they needed. The negative impact on cooperation is clear when one 
considers that for some army units this meant bypassing the substantial 
CENTCOM assets altogether, in favour of interacting with French tactical 
collectors who offered a lower institutional cost route to usable intelligence of 
the right sort.1331 This suggests that a shared maximand and tactical 
language was more important than a shared actual language, and clearly 
demonstrates the importance of institutional costs in influencing actors 
choices.    
Perhaps the most noteworthy property rights legacy that those in the Gulf 
had to deal was a ironically dissemination issue dating back into the 1980’s, 
that made cooperative working in the 1990’s more difficult. The single 
services had each recognised the usefulness of imagery intelligence and the 
need to disseminate it quickly to (their own) front line troops. However, 
typically for the pre-Gulf era, they had all pursued independent projects in 
order to achieve this that were not interoperable. Operator level efforts to 
address the problem during the eighties were simply unable to gain sufficient 
traction to overcome the institutional costs generated by sub-goal (i.e. service 
level) orientated and boundedly rational hierarchies above them. Instead 
each holder of part of the property rights to the systems behaved 
opportunistically because they were each unwilling to lose out on their initial 
investment to their rivals.  
Uniquely, the technology existed to get national level intelligence in near real 
time from Washington to CENTCOM J2, but thereafter it stalled. To quote 
one intelligence witness “...The Navy had their own systems, which could not 
interface with the Army’s systems, which could not interface with the 
Marines’, which could not always receive data from J-2”. The net result was 
that despite all the advantages of American technological supremacy, 
forward deployed troops were ill served with what should have been the most 
useful tactical intelligence source, often resorting to couriers and other old 
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world methods.1332 Many units elected to bypass the problem, finding it 
easier to task their own assets over which they had clear property rights. The 
Navy for example had some success using a Vietnam era drone to direct its 
guns,1333 while the Army’s 101st Airborne Division resorted to pushing 
Apache helicopters along their potential routes of advance. Both these tactics 
also compensated for the asset specificity of the overly narrowly focused 
optical capabilities that were by then available; described as “... like 
searching New York by looking through a soda straw”.1334  
This seemingly inexplicable situation had resulted from the simultaneous 
retirement of the SR-71 aircraft and its comparable satellite. This was done 
by different independent bodies, each pursuing their own utility without 
consultation because the institutional bars to joint decision making at the time 
were too high.1335 Of the twelve Secondary Imaging Dissemination Device’s 
(SID’s) used only four were interoperable.  CENTCOM and the USAF for 
example were proponents of their own systems (Digital Video Imagery 
Transmission System or DVITS and Tactical Digital Facsimile or TDF 
respectively). But whatever its technical strengths the former was too late into 
theatre, and the latter was simply inadequate. The opportunistic behaviour of 
its advocates is perhaps best demonstrated by the wholly different evidence 
given by the senior officers who were at least in part responsible for the 
$688,000 spent on it, who were vociferously supportive, and the junior 
officers at ‘the receiving end’ who denounced it.1336  
In fact the interaction of the uncertainty of the defence environment and the 
asset specificity of both equipment and personnel transcended all parts of the 
intelligence effort, not just its technical elements. The whole army was 
specific to Cold War scenarios focused on European terrain rather than the 
deserts of the Persian Gulf, and the intelligence system supporting it was no 
less so. For example human intelligence collection and analysis, which had 
been negligible in the area anyway prior to Saddam's invasion of Kuwait, was 
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hamstrung by both its own lack of linguists as it had previously focused on 
USSR languages (earlier non Cold War related conflicts in Panama and 
Grenada had been managed by the fortuitously readily available supply of 
Hispanics in the military). Not only were the languages specific to a different 
theatre, but so to was the system that relied on those languages. Quite 
simply it was unable to process the huge number of Iraqi prisoners (some 
64000 by US forces alone) so that both intelligence and counterintelligence 
capability suffered.1337  
Just as importantly in the subsequent analysis of what went right and wrong, 
observers also saw clear evidence that the fixes employed by the more 
imaginative units to make things work tended to bypass problem areas, often 
by liaising horizontally and so shortening the links between producer and 
user and lowering institutional frictions: For example when JSTAR aircraft 
patched radar imagery of enemy troops moving direct to fire-control cells at 
divisional level the transactional costs involved in getting it to the right people 
were lowered, and suddenly the system worked.1338 The increase in efficacy 
that such low friction collaborative systems engendered may have been the 
genesis of General Flynn’s integrated ‘Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze’ 
cycle discussed in the next chapter.1339 However it is worth noting that even 
this successful system was asset specific to the Gulf War. Limiting the 
analysis to this extent would for example be less viable in the more complex 
and uncertain environment of a counter insurgency operation where ‘Red’ 
enemies were hidden among a wider population.1340 
The very public dispute over Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) touched on 
above is worth examining from a wider institutional cost perspective as well 
as it amply demonstrates the negative interaction of behavioural and 
environmental issues.1341 It variously involved the Army, Air Force, 
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CENTCOM and Washington trying to answer the critical question of the 
levels of damage being done to Saddam’s forces by the coalition prior to the 
land offensive without any pre-negotiated methodology. This was not simply 
a matter of how successful individual pilots or operations might be. Rather 
the level of damage done from the air was the key decider as to when the 
land offensive could be launched. CINC commissioned Army intelligence, as 
objective observers, and they, for lack of any other approach, developed a 
rational (albeit boundedly so) system of allocating percentages of kills against 
claims depending on the type of source reporting the damage, presumably in 
the forlorn hope that this apparently ‘fair’ system would minimise frictions. 
The Air Force however regarded the system as far too negative and argued 
(correctly) that the Army had no relevant or specific experience of BDA work 
with new ‘smart’ munitions. National assets in Washington meanwhile also 
disagreed with the Army’s BDA, but declared the results too positive, to the 
chagrin of all and the increasing frustration of General Schwarzkopf.1342 This 
led to Washington based decision makers publicly “... distancing themselves” 
from the CINC in case (in his view) the ground offensive stalled because he 
had gone too early, which in turn lead to a breakdown of trust between them.  
Thus because BDA was a low frequency need, previously performed by 
those with a specific (lower technology) skill set, but was suddenly required 
to be used in both a complex and uncertain environment, boundedly rational 
actors pursued their own ideas of the best way to maximise utility. Each held 
different information that they thought superior to their colleagues, whilst 
none had any clear idea of the other's property rights. Their interpretations of 
how best to serve what sense of a common maximand existed were 
therefore at odds. This led to opportunistic behaviour as, having failed to 
negotiate an agreed position; actors positioned themselves so as to be most 
likely to be proved right rather than supporting the needs of the CINC. The 
intrusive media interest increased the negotiating frictions by increasing the 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
2002). The type of debate this issue can engender is discussed in Harold Wilensky's 1967 work. 
Wilensky, Organizational Intelligence: Knowledge and Policy in Government and Industry, 19.   
1342
In fact the most reliable estimate made post war suggested that even the most pessimistic of these 
assessments was overly optimistic to the order of up to 134%, although in the event it made little 
difference to the success of the ground offensive. "Intelligence Successes and Failures in Operations 
Desert Shield/Storm: Report of the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on 
Armed Services House of Representatives."3    
440 
 
costs associated with monitoring potential agreements, as actors felt obliged 
to support their positions by public statements. This deleteriously impacted 
on both the probity that had existed horizontally across different levels (for 
instance between Army and Air Force analysts and between CENTCOM and 
Washington decision makers), and any probity that had been established 
vertically between analytic and decision making levels. A situation which then 
permeated through into other aspects of the campaign.1343    
Section 4: Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed how the peculiar nature of defence intelligence in 
both the UK and US imbues it with a distinct institutional cost environment. 
This then impacts on its ability to work cooperatively both within the military 
and across the wider intelligence and policy making communities. Both 
nations have been similarly afflicted, despite the disparity between the well 
reported difficulties in intelligence collaboration throughout the history of the 
US intelligence community, and the accepted wisdom of collegial 
relationships across its UK equivalent. This demonstrates that cooperative 
success or failure are not predetermined because of any national cultural 
pre-dispositions.  
The first half of the chapter examined how the naturally uncertain and 
complex environmental conditions common to security and intelligence 
functions are exacerbated in this arena because organisational structures 
and competing sites of vertical control have lead to contested property rights. 
These in turn have lead to asset specificity problems, as defence intelligence 
endowments and even cultural capital are suited to particular uses in either 
the national or the military domain, and are therefore ill adapted to the other. 
Structural separation and asymmetric information holdings have encouraged 
opportunistic behaviour as the ability of external principals to monitor military 
agents is extremely limited. At the same time each may have a very different 
idea as to what sort of utility should be maximised based on the sort of 
environments in which they work. These problems were further exacerbated 
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by language costs between different levels and functional entities, making 
negotiating over these issues more difficult.  
The result is that the role of defence intelligence as far as it relates to the rest 
of the intelligence effort of both nations, although different in each, is opaque 
at best. Attempts to genuinely shift the Defense Intelligence Agency of the 
United States into the intelligence community in a more than merely legal or 
formal sense have never managed to achieve the necessary momentum to 
transcend the very high institutional costs that DoD have always thrown up. 
In the United Kingdom the position of defence intelligence as a part of the 
Ministry of Defence, with a military command structure, rather than as a free 
standing agency simply responsible to a Secretary of State (as is the case for 
the other national agencies). This defines how it is regarded in terms of the 
national machine, and indeed what it can be expected to deliver to the centre 
as a result. The different claims mean its usefulness to either can vary over 
time, as either its military or its national responsibilities are pre-eminent.1344 
Whilst the military element in both Countries boasts some sort of line-
management the rights to the use of the resources is nonetheless opaque so 
that cooperative working has been hindered.   
As a result of the 1991 Gulf War experience the usefulness of low friction 
collaborative working to meet the new operating conditions was recognised 
across the wider defence intelligence enterprise, and a number of initiatives 
were introduced. These were intended to address the specific problems 
experienced in delivering collaborative working vertically and horizontally 
(described in the first half of this chapter). They were also meant to adapt the 
defence intelligence function so that it could better address its growing role in 
countering terrorism through increased counterinsurgency work, and the new 
partnerships that this implied. A shift in role that has provoked many of the 
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same institutional costs issues experienced by civilian organisations as 
described in Chapter 5. The following chapter will therefore apply the 
institutional costs impact framework to contrast the different ways the UK and 
US each tried to improve their cooperative efficiency, and why they 
experienced very different levels of success that reversed the more usual 
outcomes for each nation.  
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Chapter 8 - The Relative Management of Institutional Costs in the Upper 
Levels of Defence Intelligence in the United Kingdom and United States 
Section 1: Introduction 
The last chapter described how the particular demands on defence 
intelligence that crossed military/civilian and strategic/tactical boundaries 
produces a difficult working environment with high institutional costs 
impacting on collaboration across these divides. Nonetheless since the 1991 
Gulf War the US defence intelligence sphere has significantly improved 
cooperative capability to the extent that it is the preeminent example of how 
the full spectrum of intelligence capabilities could be harnessed. The UK 
effort on the other hand has continued its pattern of contested property rights 
and an ebb and flow of authority between different actors, so that it is as 
negatively contradictory a case in the largely cooperative UK intelligence 
machinery as US defence intelligence is a positive contradiction in the 
predominantly non-cooperative US community.   
Why then this dichotomy? Asymmetric military operations have become the 
norm. Often taking place in the midst of interwoven social, political, religious 
and economic strife between sections of populations. The settings are thus 
increasingly complex, and the wider outcomes of any action (or inaction) 
increasingly uncertain, particularly within the intelligence field.
1345
 Complexity 
theory argues that interconnected enterprises in such environments organise 
best from the bottom up.1346 Military organisation is however traditionally a 
conventional pyramidal hierarchy:1347 As actors became more senior they 
moved ever larger numbers of their juniors over ever larger areas of 
responsibility, to ever greater strategic impact. The chain of command 
insures high institutional costs, but these prevent the inexperienced from 
                                                                   
1345
 These aspects of asymmetric conflict are detailed in "Future Character of Conflict,"  in Strategic 
Trends Programme(London: Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC), 2010). The 
interconnected nature of these problems is examined in Charlie Edwards, "The Case for a National 
Security Strategy," DEMOS Report (2007). 
1346
 For example, for a parallel analysis from the healthcare field, see James W Begun, Brenda 
Zimmerman, and Kevin Dooley, "Health Care Organizations as Complex Adaptive Systems," 
Advances in health care organization theory 253(2003). 
1347
 For an assessment of how complexity in modern military scenarios impacts on principal agent 
problems see Coletta, "Principal-Agent Theory in Complex Operations." 
444 
 
overstepping their authority, which is able to be clearly assigned. This 
position has largely persisted, and the fact that minor tactical skirmishes 
could have major strategic implications has made senior officers more 
inclined to this approach to command and control despite the increased 
fluidity of tactical situations, so that a complex system of Unified and 
Specified (as well as Subordinate Unified) Commands has been developed in 
the US case to manage 'broad continuing missions'.1348 The complexity 
inherent in modern military operations and their interaction with the wider 
world, together with all the frictions discussed in the previous chapter, has to 
be managed nonetheless.  
The US defence intelligence community appears to have managed this with a 
number of horizontal linkages at every level that have very specific functions, 
and thus much clearer property rights in those areas. These are then directed 
through the principal of 'management by command intent' so that each has 
decision making capabilities within their area of specialism geared towards 
what is effectively a shared maximand with the next level up. Although the 
UK has achieved better intelligence and operations integration at the tactical 
level through the use of the 'shared floor-plate' approach1349 they have not 
been able to achieve the same at any level outside of that despite a similar 
approach being incorporated into the move to the refurbished RAF Wyton 
under Project Pride (the MoD's Programme to Rationalise and Integrate the 
Defence Estate).1350  
This chapter will therefore firstly consider the UK case in Section 2, to 
establish why it has been unable to get tactical level improvements to filter up 
despite significant change efforts. Defence intelligence itself is inevitably itself 
made up of disparate organisations with distinct functions, and space 
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precludes an in depth examination of all of them. The focus of Section 2 will 
therefore be on top level management and how this impacts on two areas: 
The strategic analytic capability of Defence Intelligence (DI - formerly the 
Defence Intelligence Staff or DIS) provided by the Defence Intelligence 
Assessments Staff (DIAS) and the imagery intelligence capability now known 
as the Defence Intelligence Fusion Centre (DIFC - formerly the Defence 
Geospatial Intelligence Fusion Centre (DGIFC, and before that JARIC). 
Section 3 will move on to examine the US case, looking at particular 
initiatives that have lowered institutional costs and improved cooperative 
working before Section 4 briefly considers the extent to which this mutation is 
fixed and applicable beyond the immediate confines of 'defence'. Section 5 
will then conclude. 
Section 2: Institutional Costs and Cooperation at the Upper Levels of 
UK Defence Intelligence 
In the United Kingdom the post 2008 financial pressures to prevent 
duplication and redundancy across the whole defence enterprise, coupled 
with the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR)1351 lead to an in 
depth re-evaluation of how defence was organised. Although broader in 
scope, it paralleled many of the findings of the much earlier Cold War reports 
into defence intelligence cited in Chapter 7. Much as civilian intelligence 
reviews in the US invariably came to the same conclusions without ever 
being able to address them.1352. Known as the Levene Report,1353 the 
investigation found substantial bars to collaboration at a number of levels 
which can be better described in institutional costs terms. The report was 
concerned with overlapping and confused authorities at the highest level, 
notably between the civilian Permanent Under Secretary (PUS) and the 
military Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), as well as the service chiefs; a 
property rights issue. It noted that because of this change “tends to fail”; 
implicitly citing issues of both ‘contract’ and the subsequent ‘control’ of 
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transactions when support for them is not across the board. At the same time 
it observed that any change that affects the balance of power within the 
military (as distinct from the quantity of power they all share) will be resisted, 
particularly if it shifts power relations between the three services, joint 
organisations and the ‘head office’. Where agreement has been negotiated, 
the organisational dynamic tends to ensure the relevant actors have moved 
on to other posts before implementation. Re-negotiation will therefore be 
required, often across a slightly different asymmetry of information, and the 
cycle of institutional costs begins again.  
Levene argued that “Specific allegiances trump corporate ones”;1354 so 
opportunistic behaviour is exhibited by boundedly rational individuals or parts 
of the organisation engaged on sub-goal pursuits. A position made worse by 
the fact that this top-down run organisation is almost exclusively filled from 
the bottom, so decision makers are steeped in cultural biases that effect their 
negotiating flexibility and sense of maximand.1355 Ironically the net result is 
that any bottom-up permeation of new approaches that have worked at the 
tactical level into the upper levels, in the ways one would expect of a complex 
adaptive system in a dynamic environment are, as Tom Dyson observed, "... 
hampered by organisational politics at the higher levels of the service”1356 as 
senior actors who are overly asset specific to their own service behave 
opportunistically to protect their part of the defence endeavour. Institutional 
costs thus impede adaption to a more collaborative environment, and 
defence intelligence is both an actor in the resultant contest and a resource 
over which other actors compete. 
a. Strategic National Defence Intelligence and its Coordinating 
Architecture 
Defence intelligence activities now exist in the same complex and uncertain 
environment that civilian counterterrorism has inhabited for some time, with 
the requisite increase in the number of actors involved. The institutional costs 
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involved in its delivery have therefore both enlarged and become increasingly 
relevant as the number of nodes with which must interact have increased, in 
much the same way as in the counterterrorism world (as discussed in 
Chapter 5). As an enabling function it has however remained distinct from 
core military work, so that nodal connections with the wider military itself 
remain some of the most opaque. Lord Levene reported ‘a number of 
tensions’ in joint areas and that cross-cutting or enabling activities, including 
intelligence and the other aspects of ISTAR, that were not organised or 
managed “... as coherently or effectively as they could be”. Despite the 
tactical level improvements referred to earlier, joint level synergies could not 
be properly exploited because of organisational separations. These  were 
often made on an ad hoc basis because units were too small to exist alone, 
but did not comfortably sit anywhere else. Yet they introduced institutional 
costs that no particular element had a strong interest in overcoming, 
particularly as these enablers were not ‘core to any single service output’. 
Defence Intelligence assets for example sat within the central ‘Top Level 
Budget’ (TLB) - the budgets held by the Service Chiefs under the Permanent 
Under Secretary - simply because it had nowhere else to go, but functional 
linkage to the other parts of central TLB was limited.1357 
At the same time increasing institutional costs were also being introduced 
upstream of the defence intelligence apparatus, impeding it from properly 
assisting in the compilation of national level appreciations and assessments. 
The bodies on which it had historically relied for its point of access, the Joint 
Intelligence Committee (JIC), and the Joint Intelligence Organisation (JIO) 
that supported it, had themselves been marginalised. Since 2009, they had 
been struggling with new questions of property rights as some of their 
functions were shuffled around Cabinet Office on what seemed at times to be 
a fairly arbitrary fashion,1358 fulfilling a diminished role as much of the 
coordinating function shifted new ministerial and official committees.1359 Thus 
what low institutional cost relationships defence intelligence had developed 
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with their civilian counterparts through the collegiality and established 
understanding of property rights of that forum were having to be 
renegotiated. To complicate matters further the recent innovation of a 
National Security Council (that was still bedding-in) and supporting apparatus 
clouded just whom such negotiations should involve.  
In 2011 a committee established jointly by the Prime Minister and Cabinet 
Secretary recommended that defence intelligence assets should be put 
"...more directly at the disposal of the NSC where appropriate" even though it 
also recommended that the NSC become the primary source of JIC 
requirements and priorities, providing a route for the Defence Intelligence 
Assessments Staff (DIAS) or other defence intelligence product to bypass 
their usual point of access (but only on occasion). This introduced yet 
another master in the form of the Cabinet Office's Chief of Assessments who 
could then task them. Even beyond the property rights confusion that must 
result, this process is likely to reduce the trust that oils the collegial machine 
as DI might be seen to have gone behind the JIC's back.1360  The possibility 
of property rights clarity being provided from on high was however further 
reduced as the Permanent Secretary level coordinator post was removed 
and Cabinet Office capacity to manage policy for the wider intelligence 
community diminished.1361 The previous difficulties of both civilian and 
military consumers having property rights over parts of the defence 
intelligence apparatus as describe in Chapter 7 have thus been exacerbated, 
with another civilian national level claimants on their resources being added 
to the mix.   
It is worth noting here that the departmental type organisational structure that 
creates these institutional costs is reflected in the organisation of its oversight 
bodies as well. Thus the very bodies that might be able to leverage 
adaptability and better cooperation from an external perspective are 
obstructed from doing so because they are orchestrated on parallel lines: For 
example the Defence Committee are distinct from the Intelligence and 
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Security Committee. They have themselves noted that their ability to tie MoD 
organisation into the National Security Strategy is limited precisely because 
they are the defence committee and tend to 'collapse back in' to MoD internal 
organisation. In so doing losing sight of cross government issues and the 
'security' element because of the institutional costs between the discrete 
silos.1362 Such an arrangement is asset specific to earlier environmental 
conditions, and would have been well suited to a period when the civilian and 
military worlds were discrete entities but actually adds a further tier of 
contracts that have to be negotiated if any change is to occur, and will thus 
tend to perpetuate the status quo despite any external shift in conditions.  
The Intelligence and Security Committee (and the Intelligence Services 
Commissioner) have recently been granted increased authority through the 
Justice and Security Act 20131363 that include defence intelligence elements 
in an attempt to redress this problem. At the time of writing how this new 
responsibility will interact with the Defence Committee's remaining authority 
has not yet become apparent. The nature of the property rights arrangements 
between the two committees, and where they intersect, may yet help or 
hinder cooperation. What is clear however is that a focus on parts of the 
organisation or process rather than the whole system tends to ‘displace 
problems’ or miss their root causes so far as wider cooperation is concerned. 
Wider patterns of oversight should at least assist with this, and help address 
the very natural tendency of any organisation (but particularly a secret one) 
to be inward looking and inclined to ‘wash their dirty linen in private’ so that 
horizontal criticism is all the more difficult.1364  
b. The Defence Intelligence Assessments Staff 
The fault-line between these competing needs is DIAS. As the provider of 
fully assessed intelligence (including open source intelligence) to both 
military and civilian consumers, based on input from the civilian agencies as 
well as defence intelligence collection assets, it is at the nexus of both 
horizontal and vertical reporting lines so that low institutional costs are a pre-
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requisite for efficient working. Unfortunately an internal study in 2012 
(released publicly in Public Policy and Administration) found DIAS itself 
exhibited significant bars to frictionless operation both within and outside 
itself. Despite the need to be interconnected logistical and security concerns 
have however left much of DIAS isolated from the rest of the military. Its 
evolutionary history has thus resembled that of a sort of Galapagos Island 
within the MoD. In fact participants in the study thought DIAS 'more like the 
MoD of several decades ago' than a unit at the forefront of interdependent 
functionalism.1365 The twin institutional pressures of secrecy that is both 
structural and actual, and the asset specificity that is evident in both its 
culture and its national level product have left it isolated within its parent body 
both physically and culturally. A presence in the MoD ‘Main Building’ that 
should provide an interface with its military consumers has largely remained 
behind locked doors except for generalist managers that orchestrate 
taskings, and a large proportion of specialists have been relocated right 
outside of London under the auspices of the estate rationalisation 
programme Project Pride anyway.  
Internally the culture of the analysts themselves was found to be asset 
specific to their own work, in that it was inward looking and risk averse 
analysts. Researchers found that institutional bars between themselves and 
their customers where encouraged. They preferred to supply carefully crafted 
written reports, which have the advantage of being difficult to misinterpret, 
that were thoroughly researched and caveated. This despite the fact that this 
approach is at odds with the military ‘can do’ attitude, and their need for the 
sort actionable rather than exact intelligence General Schwarzkopf had 
sought during the 1991 Gulf War.1366 In part this stems from an 
understandable reluctance to be forced, by customers "... for whom the price 
- in time and attention - of additional accuracy is not worth paying" into an 
analysis that lacks appropriate depth, but may not be possible in a resource 
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constrained environment.1367 While each position seems reasonable they 
nonetheless distance analyst from military consumer, and prevent the sort of 
low institutional cost, sequential, and personal relationships that might more 
closely align the two. 
The same bars are reflected between analysts and their supervisors, who 
actually manage both consumer interfaces and the requirements and 
prioritisation process. Time constraints preventing the use of proper 
methodologies (despite the post-Butler introduction of proper training in 
them), and an imbalance between current production and strategic analysis 
are imposed by extrovert managers on introverted analysts, inevitably 
increasing tensions.1368 Subject matter experts will be less inclined to engage 
openly with consumers if they feel their product is poor, while their managers 
will do so, but lack the detailed knowledge to match the brief to the customer 
need. The information asymmetry thus acts at two different levels across the 
same transaction and exacerbates the other problems, which can include 
language costs and probity issues between the groups based on a 
misunderstanding of the maximand of the other. 
The institutional costs generated by the cultural isolation preferred by some 
analysts are ensured by both the nature and location of DIAS offices. The 
Old War Office building still in use by some DIAS staff (despite several 
attempts to sell the building) is comprised of small offices behind closed 
doors, with very little shared space. The open plan MoD space is necessarily 
behind locked doors as well but does at least boast areas where consumers 
and DIAS staff can meet. For that reason however the main building is 
primarily occupied by middle managers so that they can better manage their 
customer interactions, which has tended to merely shift the institutional 
frictions further back along the chain so that they now exist between analysts 
and managers, rather than between the manager and consumer. They have 
therefore been reduced less than might otherwise have been the case from 
an organisation that prides itself on its focus on consumer needs. DIAS has 
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however not only has to manage the civil/military split across Whitehall, and 
its own split across Horseguards Avenue, it also has to deal with much of its 
own current operations capability being further removed to the Permanent 
Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) in Northwood, and will be sending an increasing 
contingent (about 15%) to RAF Wyton as part of the MoD estate 
rationalisation project PRIDE.1369 
Unlike the JIO staff on the other side of Whitehall, with whom they must 
routinely engage, DIAS staff are permanent appointments not attached for a 
defined period from a parent body. This causes a number of conflicting 
cultural tensions that in turn provoke institutional costs at the national level. 
Hare and Collinson found DIAS staff were in any event an amalgamation of 
cultures because of the wide variety of civilian and military sources from 
which they were recruited. However they do not identify with the MoD 
particularly, but rather with DIAS itself, as a particular sub-group. This 
suggests the possibility of opportunistic behaviour as they capitalise on their 
information advantage (particularly given their apparent dislike of the ‘breadth 
over depth’ preference of their customers). Yet despite their perceived 
differentiation from the MoD at large because of their national role, DIAS 
struggled to see themselves as part of the national effort. The study found 
that DIAS staff thought their product did not impact policy adequately, and 
that they saw themselves as the poor relations of the better resourced 
agencies,  1370 even though, as a producer of a broad tranche of analysed 
product, one would expect them to be a ‘primus inter pares’.1371  
Structurally, the four Directorates within DIAS (counter proliferation, 
conventional weapons and their platforms, strategic level political and military 
developments, and current operations) should be reasonably aligned with the 
customer base each field might attract, which should lower institutional costs 
as far as possible: Current operations are naturally used most by military 
figures, whether in theatre or Whitehall, political developments are of 
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particular interest to other government departments, and so forth.1372 
However cuts and a still significant operational tempo that must be supported 
mean that such an architecture is itself an overly specific asset, suited to 
earlier conditions (and very possibly one's to follow), rather than current 
demands on them. This hinders their ability to work cooperatively with both 
national and operational military consumers as they ebb and flow between 
them. The shift towards operational support is inevitably detracting from their 
ability to fulfil existing contracts at the national level, and vice versa.1373 
The cultural distinction between DIAS and the wider military, including the 
tactical level intelligence personnel who are ever more operational rather 
than analytic, becomes increasingly germane to its efficacy when one then 
adds in the other institutional costs that surrounds it. The environmental shift 
of the 1990’s, from which defence intelligence as a whole had largely 
benefited, saw its top level analytic capability cut from 800 to 600 (400 by 
20121374) staff, because boundedly rational actors saw a diminution in the 
key threat it had previously addressed. They had failed to properly 
acknowledge the impact of uncertainty, and the complexity of the new 
environment. This was a quantitative error that left DIAS hard pressed to 
provide even desultory coverage on the plethora of emerging threats, but it 
was also a qualitative problem: Defence intelligence analysis had, since the 
1964 Mountbatten reforms been focused on national strategic support, and 
what remained of analytic capability within the single services had to manage 
immediate tactical issues. 
The confused property rights around the twin mandate of defence and 
national intelligence support have been contended throughout the history of 
both DIAS and its DIS forbear. The emerging threats however also existed 
individually, at the operational, localised Headquarters, level. In the absence 
of any alternative, that gap had to be part filled by DIAS. This included being 
part resourced by them through ‘efficiency savings’ (forced on them via the 
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imperative of urgent operations). As a result there was a re-emergence of 
single service capabilities,1375 and a strategic level intelligence gap resulted 
that has not yet been filled.1376  This despite the advocacy of Lord Butler after 
the 2003 Iraq debacle.1377  In fact the position worsened as the twin pushes 
of reduced public spending and the wider re-organisations of the Levene 
Report further reconfigured DIAS: The former inevitably encouraged sub-goal 
opportunistic behaviour across disciplines and at all levels as actors had to 
compete for increasingly scarce resources despite still being engaged in 
Afghanistan and other occasional operations like Libya. The latter, despite 
being focused on joint operations and reducing overlap, was a review that 
was internal to the MoD so it naturally focused on Military, rather than 
national needs. 
The institutional cost environment of DIAS, like that of the DIFC, is therefore 
shifting towards what operational support it can offer. It is having to manage 
a new trade off between increased customer proximity and the lower 
negotiating costs that come with improved external relationships as a result 
on the military operations side on the one hand, and the increased difficulties 
of providing a genuinely holistic, all source analytic capability that can play to 
wider departmental assessments and usefully inform national level policy 
making with assessments from across the DIAS skill set on the other. The 
reorganisations that followed the Levene Report included the April 2012 
creation of the Joint Forces Intelligence Group,1378 and the subsequent shift 
of Defence Intelligence into the ambit of the new Joint Forces Command in 
2013 (discussed further below).1379 These may have improved coordination 
across the single services and have shifted the defence intelligence piece 
from being a 'staff branch at the MoD' to a military intelligence organisation 
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integral to the JFC,1380 but there is inevitably a cost in the increased 
separation from the national piece as the JFC introduces another tier of 
authoritative and military focused bureaucracy between it and defence 
intelligence capability. The changes can therefore best be visualised not as a 
solution to the tension between the two requirements, but only as a 
temporary shift in dominance between them; a continuation of the pattern of 
oscillation between the National and the military need. The net result 
however may well be the more permanent loss of a genuine centre of 
excellence for all source analysis.1381    
c. Overlapping Rights Over Shared Resources Across the Civilian 
Military Divide  
The same conflicting pressures produce similar contracting difficulties in the 
use of Ministry of Defence owned assets that also have a role in national 
intelligence assessments. The preeminent example is the UK’s imagery 
intelligence capability, which has been if anything had an even more 
turbulent history than that of DIAS. It has all the same problems of having to 
negotiate between the requirements and priorities of both civilian/military and 
strategic/tactical level consumers, and like DIAS is funded not from the SIA 
but from within the MoD. Requirements are set not within the Requirements 
and Priorities for Secret Intelligence (RPSI) mechanism, but via the defence 
intelligence's own Collection, Coordination and Intelligence Requirements 
Management (CCIRM) system. This is despite what is now the DIFC (and its 
precursors) being the equivalent of one of the agencies in its own right, by 
virtue of its unique functional capability. It has been examined in detail by 
Davies, who describes what amounts to a continuous series of disputes 
around property rights, renegotiations and reorganisation as first one then the 
other side are ascendant. The cycle then begins again as the previous 
compromise is found to be flawed.1382 It is worth considering the following 
points of his analysis from an institutional cost perspective: 
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Like DIAS it is an important part of the national intelligence capability but as 
Davies notes it is marginalised as a result of that importance. Actors in the 
defence intelligence community act opportunistically; using it to retain their 
status at the national table. Yet even then DIFC is represented, along with 
DIAS and all the other defence intelligence assets, by the Chief of Defence 
Intelligence (CDI), who is technically of a lower rank than his JIC fellows. This 
is despite the size and importance of the DIFC and DIAS contributions, and 
overlooks that, unlike other inputs, they boast an analytic as well as collection 
capability.1383 Property rights are more difficult because analysis (often of US 
raw product) rather than collection are at the core of modern imagery 
intelligence in the UK, but its analysed  product does not sit comfortably with 
the way the JIC has been organised.1384 At the same time the authority 
vested in the CDI to direct intelligence programs in this area is opaque 
because the UK armed forces do not necessarily 'own' the resources 
involved. Although it is worth noting that now both GCHQ and the US are 
represented in the open-plan floor plate at RAF Wyton, to expedite the 
additional negotiations this provokes.1385 Internal tensions, as Army and Air 
force elements have been joined, and tactical and strategic responsibilities 
housed within a single organisation, have also been observed.1386  However 
opinion remains divided as to whether the creation of DGIFC in 2012 (and its 
2014 shift to RAF Wyton as the DIFC) will be a force for good, lowering 
institutional costs between them, or will instead provoke further confusion 
and at the same time lower analytic expertise as the ‘centre of excellence’ 
that JARIC represented in its old format is spread across different points of 
requirement in an open plan, operationally focused, workspace at RAF 
Brampton.1387    
As well as the national/military problem shared with DIAS, property rights for 
imagery intelligence are additionally complicated by the very intimate 
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relationship it shares with its US equivalent. This includes joint investment 
over substantial periods of time as well as the resultant shared access 
through agreements like TALENT-KEYHOLE, a security clearance 
agreement that operates on both sides of the Atlantic.1388 Property rights that 
are already strained at the national level are thus further complicated by a 
variety of both fixed agreements negotiated as treaties, memoranda of 
understanding that need occasional renegotiating as circumstances develop, 
and informal reciprocal undertakings at the working level that can constrain 
the strategic level even when they have not been party to the 
negotiations.1389  
d. The Asset Specificity of the Cultural Condition in the Military  
The competitive culture encouraged within the UK’s armed forces1390 is the 
antithesis of the collegial one found in its intelligence community as well as 
the civilian intelligence and policy making bodies. It is a significant point of 
friction in negotiations between them, impacting on the ability of less 
operational intelligence assets like DIAS and to integrate with them and for 
probity to be established on any longer term basis. However the wider 
military’s use of an inter-unit competitive ethos is as suited to their needs as 
the collegial preferences of intelligence analysts is suited to theirs. 
Historically the creation of an esprit de corps at each sub-level has always 
helped cement fighting units into self-contained and very intra-reliant 
structures; any joint working was the preserve of the upper echelons. The 
recent increase in combat operations has intensified the need for this 
characteristic and new generations of officers and men are all a product of 
on-going hostilities. It is however a cultural disposition that is asset specific to 
open conflict, and at odds with the intelligence function outside of that.  
Nonetheless combat remains the raison d'être of the armed forces so that 
promotion and incentives are increasingly based on how individuals have 
performed on operations, with combat still the pinnacle. Despite a good deal 
of rhetoric as to the value of both the joint approach and intelligence as a 
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lead, this has had the twin effect of denigrating the perceived career value of 
non-combat roles and of soft skills such as an ability to negotiate efficiently, 
particularly once the Colonel/Brigadier level has been reached.1391 Officers 
are promoted if they are perceived as ‘winning’, whether that is internally or 
externally. The urgent drivers of current operations as against the important 
needs of future circumstances increases these tensions and exacerbates the 
cultural predispositions that enforce them. The likelihood of the same sort of 
collegial negotiations found in the civilian intelligence sphere being 
successfully applied in the military one is thus remote.1392 There are however 
some indications that this trend might at least slow to some extent in the 
future as some junior officers (and only in some Brigades) have in very 
recent years begun to rebuild these skills within the Counterinsurgency 
(COIN) context as greater emphasis has been placed on EBO and the hand 
over to Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).1393 
High institutional bars can also have accidental longer-term benefits, 
whatever the reason for their existence. It has been argued that the British 
military cultural investment is in single services or other lower organisational 
entities.1394 An example of how more specific allegiances 'trump' wider 
corporate ones as observed by Levene and referred to above.1395 The Actors 
are therefore more strongly incentivised towards the utility of that level over 
any broader objective. This can be beneficial because it can off-set the 
pernicious impact of environmental uncertainty in the military sphere. It also 
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means that there is a pressure to perform in current operations, despite any 
opportunity costs this might present for any future (largely unknown) 
crises.1396 Osborne suggests that institutional costs and difficult contracting 
between senior actors can prevent the sort of strategic short sightedness and 
short term views alluded to by Dyson1397 becoming catastrophic in the longer 
term, and can even paper over gaps in the strategy making process itself for 
a limited period. 
Others however have countered that such moves tend to reinforce 
distinctions between departments and that although this can have benefits in 
the immediate crisis they are achieved at the expense of longer term 
strategic capability and the more flexible posture that uncertainty dictates is 
required.1398 Certainly the idea that lower levels of cultural asset specificity 
could increase adaptability, giving decision makers a better range of options 
and thereby improving military performance is not a new one. In 1925 the 
British General John F.C. Fuller had already noted the problems that US 
sociologist Robert Merton was to expound on decades later1399 noting that 
the "... danger of a doctrine is that it is apt to ossify into dogma...".1400 An 
early variety of the low institutional cost model of ‘management by command 
intent’ that the US military were to find so useful for information orientated 
operations, was first promulgated in the UK by General Nigel Bagnall in 
1987. In his model political goals were communicated down to ever lower 
levels, who are then given significant autonomy to pursue that goal as they 
see fit, an approach well suited to COIN and other effects based 
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operations.1401 A shared maximand is thus created and problems of bounded 
rationality and limited monitoring capability by senior levels are off-set as this 
reduces moral hazard. Whilst this approach has had some success in the 
operational sphere, in the higher reaches of the defence intelligence arena 
conflicting property rights and objectives by consumers prevent any such 
shared maximand being established. There is instead a constant tension 
amongst lower level actors who are unable to satisfy all the demands upon 
them, and are instead motivated to act opportunistically to avoid any 
controversy by instead creating and pursuing more 'operative' and realisable 
sub-level goals in the manner predicted by Jackson.1402  
The next sub-section will therefore consider how far changes to cooperative 
working within the military itself can be applied to defence intelligence 
provision. 
e. The Impact of New Approaches to Joint Working 
Many of the frictions described above result from the difficulties of serving a 
plethora of requirements, all of which have an apparently equal claim. The 
property rights over intelligence assets for such claims tend to be strong and 
difficult to compare reasonably in terms of utility. Furthermore the ability of 
intelligence functions to work more cooperatively across the whole 
intelligence piece is reliant on it having the right structural nodes in place with 
which to interact. Addressing either issue within the military context has 
however been made more difficult through organisational divides between 
different areas of responsibility and functions that can be perceived as either 
'joint' or 'single service'. Intelligence can reasonably be either or both.  
For example the contentious question of who has ownership of learning from 
operations and previous decisions can vary with circumstances. The single 
services remain responsible for their own learning if there are no cross-
cutting functions involved. However either the Permanent Joint Headquarters 
(PJHQ) or the Development Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) are 
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responsible for any learning that has implications for more than one service. 
This is dependent on the perceived operational relevance, and includes 
responsibility for implementation of any actions identified as a result. There is 
also an understanding that DCDC do ‘higher level doctrine’ whereas tactical 
matters are the preserve of the relevant service, although the division 
between the two is more than a little porous in counterinsurgency warfare. 
Services however naturally like to retain control of such ‘learning’, which may 
often be critical, and “... retain the capacity to erect a 'firewall' hindering the 
ability to determine the extent of follow-up”. Opportunistic behaviour in 
deciding which category a lesson might go is therefore likely, and monitoring 
costs high. Furthermore tactical level operators will inevitably prefer to go by 
their own services doctrine, on which their line managers will judge them, 
rather than anything produced from a far-removed centre.1403 Thus the 
property rights of 'joint' organisations are obscured, and even resisted by 
single services. The same applies to the joint intelligence apparatus, and a 
commander will generally be motivated to prefer to use their own, more 
directly controllable intra-service intelligence capability where possible.  
The new problems that come from the "anarchy of the information age" as it 
competes with traditional hierarchical interests1404 are not in fact new at all. 
Rather they are the latest round of high friction negotiations that inevitably 
need to be managed in an area of confused and shifting property rights, 
across asymmetric information, and with all the attendant issues of the 
institutional cost impact framework. When the then head of DIS pushed for a 
national level coordination capability for intelligence in 2007, a de facto 
admission that current arrangements were inadequate, at least from the 
military perspective, he implicitly cited both property rights issues over assets 
with a general utility and information costs as a result of data quantity.1405 
Nonetheless attempts to lower transacting costs between elements of 
defence, particularly those that have a cross-cutting existence like 
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intelligence, continue to be made. Like the US case discussed later, the most 
significant initiative has occurred within the military, linking its own functional 
areas across a lower institutional cost interface through the creation of the 
Joint Forces Command (JFC), as recommended by the Levene Report: 
Firstly, it is positioned to lessen the tension between current operations and 
future capabilities. Joint Operations, Special Forces and Defence Intelligence 
all share two alternate reporting lines that separate current operations and 
strategic intelligence product. The Commander of JFC must report to both 
the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and, as a Top Level Budget Holder at the 
same level as the Heads of the single services, to the MoD's Permanent 
Under Secretary (PUS). At the same time the key task of the JFC is to 
develop and coordinate 'contingent capabilities' that address both strategic 
direction and emerging threats.1406 This should at least clarify some of the 
property rights issues even if it fails to reduce the level of demands overall. 
Secondly, it is intended to increase the negotiating authority of "... key 
enablers in the battle space" like intelligence and surveillance (known by the 
acronym ISR, or Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance) so that they 
could engage with the appropriate weight given their increased significance 
to modern operating conditions, and do so as a "central node" to both the 
military/operational perspective and the longer term corporate governance 
needs of the MoD.1407  
The JFC is premised on an acceptance of uncertainty in its operating 
environment, and focused on capabilities to counter 'real world scenarios' in 
the near and midterm, and mid to long term planning assumptions. At the 
same time the organisational logic of JFC suggests it should be able to leave 
the distraction of current operations to its junior partner PJHQ.1408 It is 
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therefore at least possible that some of the operational and strategic level 
intelligence capability that has recently been lost as defence intelligence 
have tried to supply contextual intelligence at the tactical level will be 
regained.  Furthermore the new organisational structure boasts some of the 
same attributes as General Soyster's Military Intelligence Board1409 so it may 
well be as successful in leveraging the same increased cooperation by also 
providing a lower institutional cost interface. Nonetheless it should be noted 
that as late as June 2014 Rory Stewart, a new member of the Defence Select 
Committee, clearly believed these operational and tactical improvements had 
come at the expense of a strategic capability. He describes 'Defence 
Intelligence' as "... hollowed out" because it no longer asked the "... hard 
questions ... regularly asked in planning meetings throughout the 1970's. 
'80's and '90's.".1410 Clearly a tension between the strategic and 
operational/tactical requirement remains, and given that the JFC also adds a 
further military tier of authority between the civilian strategic capability (as 
described in Section 2.b above) this is only likely to increase under these 
new organisational arrangements. 
Perhaps more radically, the ethos of the new JFC is intended to be 
collaborative and geared towards low institutional costs, albeit out of 
necessity as the organisation will remain minimally resourced and reliant on 
the single services. Its first commander, Air Chief Marshall Stuart Peach, has 
been portrayed as preferring a diplomatic approach,1411 and his Chief of 
Staff, Major General Phil Jones, is explicit that the posture is "... supportive, 
collaborative and enabling" and is clear that lowering anticipated frictions by 
'developing interfaces' and clearing up property rights overlaps by 
'establishing boundaries' were at the top of his agenda although not yet 
achieved.1412 More concrete perhaps are the improvements to the 
institutional cost problems that having intelligence and other functions sitting 
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uncomfortably in the central TLB provoked. The JFC has not only subsumed 
many of the functional areas that Lord Levene suggested,1413 it has also 
established its own TLB, effective as of April 2012, from which to run them as 
a coherent whole. The board that then manage that budget include officers 
such as Chief of Joint Operations (CJO) and CDI which should ensure lower 
frictions as scarce resources are negotiated over through trade-offs between 
contingent capabilities, rather than between current operational needs and 
longer term wish lists.1414   
At the same time however the CDS and PUS are describing the 'fundamental 
changes' in relationship between the four services, the MoD, Defence 
Equipment and Support and Defence Infrastructure. They argue that the 
alteration in TLB arrangements is part of as a shift back to single service 
power bases.1415 Property rights between them may become clearer, but it is 
as likely that the overall effect is simply another round in the contest between 
the centre and the services. The JFC may represent the sort of shift towards 
lower frictions between parts of the military whole that will improve 
intelligence at the joint level. It is however a very recent construct and it will 
take several years before this can be established. Concerns remain that the 
JFC has simply created another HQ 'without dismantling some of the 
others'1416 with the inevitable property rights problems that this might 
engender. Certainly the detailed organisational structure is a work in 
progress and the sort of informal nodal connections that might make the 
construct a success in managing collaboration remain to be negotiated 
across. 
Furthermore, the US Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), a Unified combatant 
Command formed in 1999 to improve transformational efficiency, and on 
which the UK version was to be closely modelled, was itself closed down in 
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2010 as a result of their defence budget cuts.1417 This cannot have helped 
the UK's new JFC's credibility and may result in the emergence of NATO 
level connections that bypass the JFC altogether. Lord Levene's 
recommendation that the CDI post no longer requires Three Star 
leadership1418 may also have negative repercussions (although the idea 
seems to have been sidelined for the moment): The civilian Secret 
Intelligence Service's demotion of their post holder on the requirements side 
had significant and unfortunate ramifications for the function,1419 and the post 
has had to be re-established as the Director of Requirements and 
Compliance. It seems likely that if this was the case in a civilian organisation, 
it will be more of a problem in a steep hierarchy like the military. Sir Stuart 
Peach was however emphatic that the JFC would provide a voice for 
enabling functions like intelligence,1420 and is himself a former CDI. Beyond 
him however the role may become the voice of a generalist as staff rotate, 
with intelligence's own voice receding still further.  
Overall then the level of cooperation across the upper reaches of the United 
Kingdom's defence intelligence apparatus remains poor, although there are 
nascent signs of this being addressed. Property rights confusion over 
national and civilian requirements and between strategic and more 
operational needs still undermine collaboration between them, and no clear 
negotiating forum through which these can be clarified has emerged; instead 
further complexities in the national machinery are likely to increase frictions. 
Within the military itself the same tensions are still apparent, but attempts are 
at least being made to address them. Defence Intelligence nonetheless 
remains the exception to the rule of low friction relationships within the 
intelligence community in the United Kingdom.  
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Section 3: Decreasing Institutional Costs across the US Defence 
Intelligence Enterprise 
In their ‘2012-2017 Strategic Plan’ the United States ‘Defense Intelligence 
Enterprise’ (of which the DIA remains the foremost part) acknowledges that 
prioritising the grand strategic or the tactical level is no longer manageable. 
Instead it must address what it specifically identifies as a “... complex and 
uncertain..” future environment by lowering institutional costs across what 
has been the missing ground between them. In this way it seeks to be able to 
most easily re-direct assets between them as circumstances shift, and even 
organisational forms themselves can be quickly re-constituted to a more 
appropriate form through “... aggressive and adaptive restructuring...” to 
support them.1421 The plan thus accepts, in an echo of Rupert Smith's 
observation,1422 that the breadth of the potential modern military intelligence 
mission means that no ‘perfect form’ for the DIA will exists, so that low 
internal institutional costs are a prerequisite for easy adaption to any 
particular case. This section will therefore examine the structural architecture 
that supports cooperative behaviour between different sub-level 
organisations so that the adaptability sought by the plan might be achieved, 
and how recent shifts in the type and methodology of operations undertaken 
has impacted on them.  
a. Low Institutional Costs impact on Vertical Support and the Strategic 
Level  
The shift to a more uncertain and complex environment post Cold War meant 
that the US defence intelligence community had to deal with potentially much 
higher institutional costs. Thus a pre-negotiated, flexible, and low friction set 
of interwoven architectures was deemed essential if the full capabilities of the 
intelligence community were to be brought to bear against a threat. Within 
the Executive this meant the establishment of a number of cross-cutting 
security committees to coordinate security policy and provide advice. These 
crossed previously discrete departmental divides. Perhaps most notably, 
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1994 saw the creation of the Security Policy Board by both the Deputy 
Secretary of Defense and the DCI.1423 
Within the military the experience of high institutional costs at the strategic 
level that had occurred in trying to run a Department of Defence Joint 
Intelligence Centre (DoD JIC) during Operations Desert Shield/Storm 
(discussed previously) led to fundamental changes in Joint Intelligence 
Center management. These included pre-negotiation of staffing surges and 
joint exercising,1424 and a continuing evolution of DIA that paralleled 
developments in the wider military towards Joint Task Forces (JTF’s) which 
could be utilised in a peace time role, but in a form easily transmuted to a war 
footing.1425 The central idea being that they too could lower the frictions when 
shifting between various missions; from long term “...projecting future threat 
environments” to short term provision of “... insight to operating forces”.1426  
To achieve this shift the DoD’s JIC was re-constituted as the National Military 
joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC) immediately after the 1991 war. This was 
more than a merely semantic change. Those elements that had functioned 
effectively during the war were institutionalised, and the Joint Intelligence 
Centers became the primary nodes for intelligence support to any CINC.1427 
Future conflicts would thus not face the same uphill struggle to achieve them 
once the threat emerged. Beyond this however the NMJIC is an exercise in 
lowering all the institutional costs that so affect intelligence in the military 
sphere. It was organised along very similar lines to those used so 
successfully some years later by the UK's civilian JTAC. Analytical teams 
were arranged by both geographical area and thematic divisions, all of which 
worked to produce the same reporting rather than competing outputs. It was 
made into a genuinely joint body, first by the permanent inclusion of staff 
from all the four services, followed by permanent staff from both the NSA and 
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CIA agencies. Furthermore it could include not only State Department 
analysts, but also those of the FBI; no small achievement in the pre 9/11 era 
of the ‘wall’.  
Designed to manage longer term indicators and warning, the NMJIC was 
also intended to be crisis centric, so that it could be readily realigned towards 
an emerging problem. Any working group could be easily expanded into 
Intelligence Task Forces, and from there into a full Operational Intelligence 
Crisis Center. Analysts could be quickly re-located to the Bolling Air Force 
base Defense Intelligence Analysis Center (DIAC) to provide a NMJIC 
capability that has immediate access to all of the DIA’s analytic output and 
could immediately become the ‘clearing house’ for all requests of national 
assets. Property rights over national assets were thus clarified so that the 
unit could better co-ordinate support to operational units via their intelligence 
field units.1428  
At the same time at the next level down Joint Intelligence Centers within the 
combatant commands extended this policy of low institutional cost support to 
the tactical level through an architecture designed to interconnect collectors 
producers and customers directly.1429 The experiences of the Gulf war also 
led them into pursuing a system of lower institutional costs in their (then) core 
function to support combat operations. The Department of Defence pursued 
a number of initiatives that included ‘pushing’ more national level intelligence 
collection and analysis functions out from the centre by establishing Joint 
Intelligence Centers not only at a national level but within each combatant 
command. This approach was further adapted in 2006 when the merger of 
the Combatant Commands intelligence elements’ financial and administrative 
functions were merged into the DIA in Washington.1430 
Almost accidentally this started the process of easier horizontal collaboration 
in the missing mid-levels as each Joint Intelligence Center then included 
liaison officers not only from within the DIA itself, but also from the NSA and 
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CIA (whose input had been so absent during Desert Shield/Storm). Perhaps 
more importantly these combatant command Joint Intelligence Centers 
brought with them tools such as the Joint Deployable Intelligence Support 
System (JDISS) which provided less friction in disseminating intelligence 
horizontally. The same system was also a medium for multi-way 
communication. This helped the age old problem of whether a ‘push’ or a 
‘pull’ architecture encourages maximum utility in different intelligence 
functions,1431 as it encompassed a capacity for both, and so increased 
flexibility to shifting environmental conditions. As these were linked into the 
more sensitive compartmentalised information held on the ’Joint Worldwide 
Intelligence Communications System’ (JWICS) they thus provided a low 
institutional cost first-point of access, via their liaison officers, to external 
agencies and defence intelligence product. All of which assisted in building 
trust between previously delineated personnel, and thus lowering negotiating 
tensions across the wider community.1432  
b. A Revolution in Military Affairs and Information Management 
Just as the arrival of the information age caused an environmental shift in 
counterterrorism thinking, so too did it affect defence, and in particular 
defence intelligence, provision. It finally permitted the sort of joint working 
that had been intended ever since the 1986 Goldwater Nichols Act.1433 What 
became known as the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), and the 
subsequent advent of ‘Information Operations’ as a military concept in their 
own right, fundamentally changed the place of intelligence in defence. 
Thereby changing the collaborative architecture it required to function. 
Strategic, operational and tactical decision making were all suddenly linked 
through concepts like the ‘Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace’ (IPB). 
IPB became a formalised, pre-negotiated holistic fully joint intelligence 
undertaking, adapted to the specific needs of any given situation to the extent 
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that it did not even need to be DoD led.1434 Crucially intelligence was a key 
component of how a whole operation could be managed, rather than simply a 
mechanistic battle field support function.  
In turn this was eventually linked to the very different sort of operational goals 
asked of the military in counterinsurgency operations. Commanders and 
planners had to think beyond the kinetic outcomes of any action, to the much 
more wide ranging and unpredictable social and economic results might 
result from any actions they took. These more rounded, all-inclusive, ‘Effects 
Based Operations’ (EBO) require intelligence and operational collaboration of 
a very different order to that needed in conventional conflicts. Relatively 
simple information on the capabilities and intentions of an enemy must be 
augmented by more contextual understanding of the society amongst whom 
a campaign is being waged.1435 This requires a very different, far more 
interactive relationship between intelligence and other functional areas of 
defence provision.      
In fact US military intelligence deliberately reconfigured itself so that it could 
act as a low-friction nexus across several planes, becoming a central tenet of 
RMA and became still further integrated under Secretary of Defense 
Rumsfeld's ‘Defense Transformation’ plan. The high levels of synergy 
already established at the Combatant Command level was extrapolated 
down still further without additional negotiating frictions needing to be 
incurred: The National Military Intelligence Support Teams (NMIST) and 
National Intelligence Support Team (NIST) which had already become an 
integral part of any joint task force could be supported by an already agreed 
operational level ‘Joint Intelligence Support Element’ (JISE), whether based 
in theatre or at home, working to the JTF J-2. The JTF J-2 in turn coordinates 
all the single service and even coalition intelligence assets,1436 thereby 
simplifying the number of nodal connections required, and allowing 
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boundedly rational actors to focus on more limited and better delineated 
areas.  
At the highest level, property rights over what were effectively new types of 
operation were clarified between the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Command, Control, Communications and Information (ASD C3I) and the 
Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) [USD(P)], via a memorandum of 
understanding in 1999. A property rights architecture that survives despite 
other organisational shifts and various post holders: ASD-C3I dealt with 
information assurance issues, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD-SOLIC) generated policy 
unique to that area, as well as separate policy areas for psychological 
operations and public information:1437 A prescient move that left the United 
States well placed to capitalise on intelligence and Special Forces 
collaboration throughout the following decade. Collaboration achieved 
through the evolution of the Joint Special Operations Component 
Commander (JSOCC), and the wider tactical shifts embodied in the Flynn 
report (both of which are discussed later). Unlike in the United Kingdom, the 
United States had deduced that property rights affected by shifts in strategic 
level policies would also need to be addressed as early as 1999.1438  
In fact, within the upper echelons of the DoD, the already strengthened ASD 
C3I eventually split (in 2003) to manage the different authorisations for covert 
actions that had previously been a simple matter of being either military, and 
within the gift of the Secretary of Defense, or civilian and needing 
Congressional authority.1439 However the move was also designed to ensure, 
under a single ‘Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) [USD(I)]’, a closer 
correlation between the 'intelligence' and the 'information operation' 
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functions, which by then applied across conflict and peacetime defence 
activity, and which were already central to the United States outward looking 
security posture.1440 The distinction between the military and civilian spheres 
was blurring and safeguarding the low institutional cost relationship between 
the two thus of increasing importance.1441 
 As a result the position changed from one where the CIA had declined to join 
the original DoD JIC during the Gulf war to one where even the upper levels 
of the intelligence community have managed to achieve a largely 
collaborative relationship within the defence intelligence arena. This 
relationship was described by Admiral McRaven (Commander US Special 
Operations Command) and Michael Lumpkin (Acting Assistant Secretary of 
Defense – Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict) in their 2011 testimony 
to Congress: McRaven describes a routinely interagency way of working at 
the operational level. Lumpkin meanwhile actively declines to have control of 
special operations moved into his personal remit, and implicitly refers to the 
clear set of property rights that already exist. Both are clear that the 
interagency approach at the strategic level is the most affective course.1442 In 
this, one sees an American senior bureaucrat behaving less as Niskanen 
would predict, and more like Dunleavy’s model of British bureaucrats1443 
because institutional costs have been lowered and property rights made 
clearer. 
That is not to say that the advent of information based defence planning and 
the more collaborative approach it engendered solved the institutional cost 
problem altogether. Increasing availability of data mean that information 
costs can still be high between boundedly rational actors incapable of dealing 
with more than a fraction of it. Proponents of RMA and other information 
                                                                   
1440
 It should be noted however that the creation of the USD(I) position caused disagreements between 
the DoD and CIA over the roles and responsibilities of each that would result, essentially a property 
rights dispute. See for example Allen, Blinking Red : Crisis and Compromise in American Intelligence 
after 9/11.20  
1441
 Armistead, Information Operations: Warfare and the Hard Reality of Soft Power.31   
1442
 The Future of U.S. Special Operations Forces: Ten Years after 9/11 and Twenty-Five Years after 
R-Nichols: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities of the Committee 
on Armed Services House of Representatives, 1st, 22nd September 2011 2011.10, 13-14   
1443
 Discussed in Chapter 3 but see Dunleavy, Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice: Economic 
Explanations in Political Science. 
473 
 
centric initiatives that best provide a low institutional cost collaborative 
response to the current crop of more complex threats and high levels of 
uncertainty in the environment argue that the natural extension to these 
developments are fully decentralised all-source, and demand led 
organisations like Pentagon's then Director of Transformation Admiral Arthur 
Cebrowski's Information Dominance Center's (IDC's). These are focused at 
the operational level and based in theatre commands, constantly 'merging' 
incoming information into an adapting picture, so that the threat from 
terrorism and asymmetric war fighters can be best answered.1444 Certainly 
this helps address the problems of too much information simply swilling about 
the system unused, and would lower the institutional costs involved in getting 
it front of a decision maker.   
But, as the British found, such a focus is likely to be to the detriment of the 
broader strategic, national-civilian intelligence capability. A low institutional 
cost architecture right for one context need not be right in another. In the 
same way that Herman worried that intelligence based on measurement will 
limit deeper analytic ability,1445 such a move will provoke other institutional 
costs such as what Ferris and Handel called the 'Type B Information 
Problem' with too much fluid information preventing good decision making in 
boundedly rational commanders.1446 The property rights and architecture that 
has so recently been established would have to be contested once again, 
heightening frictions and negatively impacting on the low institutional cost 
interdependencies currently enjoyed as shifts between Washington and the 
Combatant Commands, and between the DoD and CIA at the operational 
and tactical levels (see below) were adjusted once again.1447 Furthermore the 
divergent needs of larger collaborative groupings on the one hand and the 
need for secrecy on the other would be increasingly problematic. Refusing to 
supply intelligence can after all provoke longer term probity difficulties. This is 
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even more the case when coalitions, often with non-traditional ‘Four-eyes’ 
countries are involved.1448  
More successful collaborative working in the complex and uncertain defence 
sphere is therefore not simply a matter of employing an IT solution. Rather 
the improved cooperative performance of the combat support agencies within 
DoD is based on structural shifts that have promoted clearer property rights, 
permitting easier cross functional collaboration rather than overlap, and low 
friction adaption to environmental changes that can be easily negotiated. The 
next sub-section will therefore look at three examples of post Gulf War 
initiatives that have applied this more collaborative ethos.   
c.  Examples of Low Institutional Cost Architecture at the Operational 
Level  
i) The DIA's Council of Deputies 
The DIA's Council of Deputies was created after the 2006 expansion of its 
mission in relation to the Combatant Commands, coupled to the need for an 
operational level infrastructure that could support the evolving low 
institutional cost strategic and tactical way of working. The effectiveness of 
the MIB is for example dependent on the advocacy and balance of the 
positions put to it from the mid-level officers below it.  
In 2006 the DIA's responsibilities' as an operational level 'host' were 
significantly extended when some of these functions for the intelligence 
components in nine of the Combatant Commands were folded back into the 
DIA (with only tactical level functions left within the command). This 
potentially provoked two institutional cost problems: Firstly it provided the 
potential for opportunistic behaviour by boundedly rational actors separated 
by significant distances, who could realistically have been expected to 
contest responsibilities over these new roles and use the move to improve 
resource allocations to the centre at the expense of the denuded combatant 
commands. New property rights would necessarily have to be negotiated to 
match the new structure and those in the DIA had a significant information 
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advantage, established relationships with decision makers, and were already 
better designed for the new structure. Secondly the change meant a 
significant increase in complexity so that the needs of individual commands 
could more easily be 'lost', particularly as in any traditionally hierarchical 
structure they would have then been in competition with the intelligence 
needs of both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the increasing authoritative 
Special Operations command, both of whom were physically proximate.1449 
Instead however the DIA created the Council of Deputies, eliminating five 
other boards with overlapping property right in the process. The Council, like 
the MIB above it, boasts both a consultative and decision making role, and 
was tested during the planning of the 2013 'program build'. This had 
previously been an excessively competitive process as different sub-units 
compete for the scarce resources on which they will operate into the future; a 
zero sum game whereby success is entirely relative so that the denigration of 
one's competitors is as much a victory as individual recognition. However the 
Council of Deputies managed to encourage a sense of shared maximand 
amongst actors, and decreased the asymmetry of information holdings 
between them, by increasing transparency. It thereby reduced the temptation 
to behave opportunistically. Having established an agreed set of priority 
areas, negotiations were managed through a series of trade-offs.1450 
Negotiations thus became more overtly sequential than in the past, and 
probity between actors could be established so that any trade-off would be 
more likely to see a return in a later round.   
The linkages established provoked actors to demonstrate "... increased 
advocacy by its members for each other's priorities" through improved 
awareness of what each could do for the overall capability, so that a shared 
maximand was established. The council membership includes 
representatives from all the Combatant commands but is basically flexible 
depending on an issues relevance to a given actor; importantly however it is 
not dominated by Headquarters staff so that even the impression of 
hierarchical dominance from the centre is avoided. Thus it provides genuine 
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access  to MIB level decision makers to even the furthest Combatant 
Command on any operational support matter that might affect it.1451 
 ii) JIVA and IADS as Contrasting Stories 
The importance of property rights in complex and uncertain situations is not 
only relevant at an organisational level like the Council of Deputies case, but 
to actors at all levels, and even on an individual basis, nor is the opportunistic 
behaviour described in the British military context above exclusive to the 
individuals involved, or even their cultural and social norms. The propensity 
of lower level managers to act opportunistically under bounded rationality, 
and pursue a sub-level utility for their own advancement or unit and is 
unlikely to have simply stopped with the advent of the ‘War on Terror’. 
Gregory Treverton suggests that the managers of stove piped national level 
agencies within the DoD had actually managed to develop significant 
autonomy for themselves even within the DoD itself by capitalising on the 
opaque property rights of both the (then) DCI and the equivalent military 
intelligence leadership; essentially by claiming to each that the other was 
restricting them.1452 Mid level managers will also pursue their own rational 
self interest to the detriment of a larger strategic ambition (of which they may 
know little) whenever a lack of clarity around the property rights to the 
resources they believe they control is conjoined with bounded rationality in a 
complex or uncertain environment. 
To demonstrate this consider the apparently wholly different outcomes of two 
different defence intelligence programs in the mid 1990’s: The first instance 
to be considered was initiated as a response to Congressional criticism that 
the American intelligence community members were overly competitive and 
unable to collaborate or share information adequately. The DIA, despite their 
reputation as one of the least collaborative members of the intelligence 
community, answered by beginning the development of the Joint Intelligence 
Virtual Architecture (JIVA).1453 This involved creating cross-agency virtual 
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teams of analysts in thematically bounded areas, working on ‘collaborative 
white boards’ that can provide “modular” “living” intelligence products. These 
are constantly being updated from around the community as new data arrives 
with minimal institutional blocks, an approach far better suited to any 
operational or tactical environment.1454 In order to achieve this they 
reallocated some forty million dollars from other defence intelligence projects 
rather than securing new funding, creating a ‘sunk-investment’ that acted as 
a credible commitment to other community members, an important step in 
any  circumstances where actors are both bounded rational and likely to act 
opportunistically.1455  
Nor were the creators of JIVA naive as to the cultural hurdles to the venture, 
attempting to circumvent them through joint training and concept 
development. They even went so far as to appoint retired (and therefore 
theoretically non-partisan) three or four star ranks to act as mentors and 
lower negotiating costs between agencies when required.1456 Furthermore 
the principles behind the project were fully supported by both the new DCI, 
James Woolsey and the Deputy Secretary of Defense, John Deutch.1457 
Nonetheless the project was only successful in so far as it created a common 
data platform, Intelink.1458 As an attempt to provide more deep rooted inter-
agency links, the initiative was not particularly rewarding to participants, with 
interest and involvement tailing off within three years. Despite the significant 
efforts made by some very authoritative actors the property rights over the 
resource needed for the initiative to succeed, the analysts involved, were left 
opaque at middle levels of management. Middle level bureaucrats in whose 
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hierarchy they at least partly sat were faced with a skewed set of incentives. 
They were excluded from, and even unaware of, tactical level intelligence 
gains that they could use, as well as from any strategic successes that might 
have produced reputational gains for them. Therefore no additional utility 
reached them at a personal level. Instead they experienced a reduction in 
their real control over the asset without any reduction in their managerial 
responsibility for them and their productivity within their own section. They 
were thus motivated to behave opportunistically; to hinder the initiative and 
their staff’s involvement in it.1459 A lack of clarity over property rights therefore 
derailed this attempt at low institutional cost collaboration. 
The importance of institutional costs in deciding collaborative success can be 
demonstrated by contrasting the limited cooperative success engendered in 
the early years of JIVA with the more complete compliance from all levels 
enjoyed by a similar program; the 1994 Defense Intelligence Agency's 
Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) project. In this case property rights, 
which included the roles and responsibilities of actors and also what they 
could expect in return, were made explicitly clear at the outset. The narrower 
focus of the undertaking, to integrate different functional areas of intelligence 
analysis (such as an enemy's radar capability with their surface-to-air missile 
capability) permitted an easier sense of a shared maximand by actors at all 
levels, set within clear property rights despite the tri-service nature of the 
input required, as each participant had a specific expertise to contribute. The 
two part structure of co-ordinators and analysts was explicitly designed to 
include middle managers in their normal directional roles, which also ensured 
a credible commitment from each sub-group towards the general level utility. 
Furthermore those involved in the early formation of the project seem to have 
been implicitly aware of the need to minimise institutional costs and ensure 
that ongoing negotiations and monitoring could be best managed via an 
informal and flexible organisational structure.1460  
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In fact the program and its architecture looks more similar to its UK civilian 
counterparts than to those more normally found in the US military 
organisation at that time in both its organisation and its aspirations: Property 
rights are clearly allocated amongst what are nonetheless mutually 
interdependent actors and sub-groups, granting each improved to genuinely 
all source intelligence on a particular theme.  
iii) Knowledge Labs as a Low Institutional Cost Route to Information Sharing 
The different cultural requirements for needed by intelligence officers and 
combat troops were similarly addressed at an operational level some years 
later. In 2004/5 the DIA, having acknowledged that most of their projects 
involved both inter and intra agency collaboration, designed and developed 
an agency wide initiative known as the  ‘knowledge lab’ specifically to lower 
institutional costs at the operational level and so improve collaboration.1461 
Central to this effort was the understanding that the military is necessarily a 
hierarchical organisation, with information traditionally passed vertically up a 
rigid command chain, but that a ‘knowledge based’ organisation such as the 
DIA needed to “... behave collaboratively, seamlessly move across 
organisational boundaries” and indeed to “... promote the use of personal 
networks”; anathema to a rigid bureaucracy.  
Rather than being an intelligence sharing, shared IT initiative the knowledge 
lab concept was to create collaborative networks not of finished product but 
of adaptive work groups linked from the moment the problem to be 
addressed was identified.1462 An Organizational Network Analysis (ONA), 
which amounted to a “... probe into a complex social system”, was conducted 
to shed light on the DIA’s patterns of behaviour (including those that needed 
‘disrupting’). The results of the ONA however were not used to seek out high 
impact or efficient programs or units, but rather to identify points of 
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“betweeness... the extent to which individuals lie on paths between 
others”.1463   
The knowledge lab entity itself was organisationally predicated to keep 
frictions low: It avoided being under the governance of any particular line of 
the organisation so that it would not be associated with one, and therefore 
was not perceived as a challenge to the others. It avoided appropriating 
either budgetary or personnel resources so that middle managers were not 
disaffected, but rather used ‘volunteers’ who continued to do the day job but 
now brought with them an extended capability against complex problems that 
extended beyond what managers had been previously able to call on. This 
meant that the new approach was gradually accepted as the ‘line of least 
resistance’, rather than being resisted because it had been imposed from 
above. A summary of successful pilot projects by the project leader indicates 
how key low institutional costs were: The ‘Crossing Boundaries’ project was 
designed to lower negotiating costs both vertically and horizontally and to 
reduce both bounded rationality and the incentive for opportunistic behaviour. 
‘Critical Discourse’ was aimed at increasing the sense of a shared 
maximand. This was supported by a mentoring project that engendered one 
in staff.1464 This increased the synchronicity between it and the sub-goals of 
lower units and individuals. The sort of cultural asset specificity that was 
shown to be so problematic in the British case was addressed through the 
‘Full Spectrum’ projects, which attempted to insulate both analysts and 
managers from the pressures of the sort of institutional norms that could 
impose higher costs in any new situation that might subsequently 
develop.1465    
Section 4: The Applicability and Implications of Lower Institutional 
Costs in US Defence Intelligence Beyond the DoD 
The wider implications of these shifts in institutional costs must now be 
considered. These include the degree to which the United States has 
managed to extrapolate out this experience to the wider intelligence and 
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security community and how durable a construct the lower institutional cost 
ethos is within it. Certainly over the two decades there has been a number of 
initiatives that have promised improved cooperation more generally:   
During the crisis in the Balkans the NIST/NMIST model was borrowed by an 
under pressure State Department to create what became known as a 
'Diplomatic Intelligence Support Center' (DISC). This was needed, ironically, 
because President Clinton's 1995 Presidential Decision Directive 35 (PDD-
35)1466 had prioritised support to military operations over support to 
diplomatic operations for intelligence agencies. This had made their assets in 
the Balkans specific to force protection rather than able to support the sort of 
shuttle diplomacy and monitoring required in the run up to the Dayton 
Accord. In the face of an urgent need the 'Bureau of Intelligence and 
Research' (INR) created an "...interagency, all-source, dedicated analytical 
unit" to provide tactical level support to the Embassy team. It was an 
innovation designed to by-pass the rigidities of PDD-35, which had been 
drawn up by boundedly rational actors at the NSC to deal with the complexity 
of too many competing 'demands' on intelligence in the post Cold War era, 
but which had failed to factor in uncertainty. It was cooperatively designed 
from the outset by the several agencies involved; an INR initiative strongly 
supported by the DoD and with a CIA officer as its lead. Thus each actor had 
the same sense of what the maximum utility looked like and shared 
information and physical space allowed quick and low friction negotiations to 
address unanticipated requirements or contingencies as they arose at the 
margins. The format acted as the securer of property rights for all concerned 
so that they could work collegially.  
Yet despite this success the DISC was dismantled as soon as the crisis 
diminished. The high institutional costs more traditional between the 
organisations involved reasserted themselves back in Washington as upper-
mid level managers acted opportunistically to support their own 
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organisations. The CIA lobbied to maintain the role of sole intelligence 
providers in such areas, despite their inability to deliver alone in the Balkans 
case and a cash starved State Department acquiesced.1467 High transaction 
costs were then deliberately reintroduced into the system to prevent easy 
repetition and the establishment of a DISC now needs the express approval 
of the Director National Intelligence, who must answer to Congress for the 
appropriations involved.1468   
The occasional encouraging signs of a less competitive intelligence 
community is thus by no means a general picture, and even within defence 
intelligence there are contradictory indicators. The move from a competitive 
regime of high institutional costs (despite a relatively stable threat 
environment) during the cold war, to a collaborative low institutional cost 
network operating in the face of much higher uncertainty and complexity is no 
small achievement. It has however been achieved from within the DoD's 
position of dominance in the US intelligence community, and while the 
military mission has been at the forefront of foreign policy, so that the trade-
offs involved have been largely internal or, if external, of a minor more 
tactical-level type. Despite some signs of a wider pursuit of low institutional 
cost collaboration across the community there are clear indications that the 
shifts described above are specific rather than general.  
A number of examples may be cited to support this view. While operational 
level coordination with the CIA may be near seamless in some areas, there 
are still clear distinctions between the DoD and other civilian organisations. 
Language costs between the two remain. As late as February 2015, while the 
DNI issued one directive defining national security information that must be 
passed to the NSC as 'critical information' or CRITIC,1469 the DoD published 
its dictionary of military terms  defining 'CRITIC' and critical information as 
that pertaining to friendly intentions and capabilities that would be needed by 
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an enemy.1470 In 2013 the United States was still running 15 different 
unmanned aircraft programs, at a cost of some thirty-seven billion dollars, to 
the detriment of both efficiency and shared research gains.1471  
Even between the services themselves the possibility of a resurgence of high 
institutional costs exists. General Cartwright, a former Vice Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, who has some experience of the single services working 
together, suggests that declining defence budgets will negatively impact on 
cooperation across the board despite the successes it has brought because 
in times of austerity cross-cutting organisations are viewed as 'bill payers' by 
single service management.1472   
In some areas of defence intelligence the same enthusiasm for 'turf' is still 
evident: The DIA's continuing efforts to expand their human intelligence or 
HUMINT role have been ongoing since the 1990's for example, and encroach 
very directly on a CIA core function. This also suggests that the CIA's 
collection priorities are too tied to their national responsibilities for DoD 
preferences, leaving a potential gap in more specifically defence spheres.1473 
Although current levels of tactical cooperation in Afghanistan and elsewhere 
are very high,1474 there is no guarantee that will persist as levels of overt 
conflict decrease. In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, and despite 
budgetary pressures to reduce DIA expenditure by 20%, the then Director 
James Clapper, himself one of the architects of the low institutional cost 
approach, attempted to significantly enlarge the DIA role in HUMINT 
provision. His own motivation may have been to merely reconfigure the four 
single service intelligence structures into one more efficient organisation as 
the more complex threat environment made it became increasingly 
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important.1475 However the move provoked a resurgence of both inter and 
intra agency conflict.  
Property rights concerns with the CIA's Directorate of Operations and worries 
over professionalism by the single service elements 1476 meant each pursued 
sub-goals to ensure they retained operational control and achieved a more 
direct return on their own investment. The Army for example owned 85% of 
DoD HUMINT resources.1477 Despite support at Deputy Secretary level, the 
net result was, as Davies puts it "...an unwieldy compromise...entirely 
consistent with the existing precedent in US intelligence management"; the 
four existing agencies became five, with the Defense HUMINT Agency (DHS) 
managing the DoD piece.1478 Similar proposed expansions, riding on the 
back of some very significant tactical successes in both 20041479 and again in 
2012 were also met with obstruction. In the latter case a much publicised 
DoD plan to create a Defense Clandestine Service that would have exactly 
paralleled the CIA's had to be blocked by the Senate. They cited current poor 
management practises and asked the DoD to produce any cross institutional 
agreements with CIA and NSA that would prescribe property rights between 
them and declined to fund the move.1480 The Defence HUMINT case thus 
demonstrates that despite the low institutional costs established at all levels 
and discussed across this chapter, where doubts over property rights exist, 
contested negotiations are likely to obstruct a genuinely shared maximand 
and limit cooperative behaviour.    
The sort of integration of defence and defence intelligence capability into a 
wider cross government security strategy in the way it has been managed in 
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the UK's counterterrorism effort is also still absent, so that the DoD remains a 
largely autonomous tool for projecting policy.  Its attempts to respond to the 
increased complexity of soft-power operations by a more inclusive approach 
to other agencies and departments have not met with the success of their 
purely military initiatives. As recently as November 2007 the then Secretary 
of Defense Robert Gates argued not for enhanced DoD resourcing, but 
rather increased capability in other agencies that should work alongside 
Defense in soft-power projection.1481   
Jeffrey McCausland argues that this problem exists because of a lack of 
formal and overarching architecture at the Federal level. He suggests that 
this should be supported by the sort of strategic leadership that can not only 
set objectives (and communicate them as a shared sense of the maximand) 
but also grasp the policy detail to enact them across a complex 
organisation1482 (the organisational shifts needed to lower behavioural blocks 
and issues like asset specificity). However the Executive attempts to 
establish an effective civil support to COIN operations referred to in the 
paragraph above suggest that sub-goal pursuit and bounded rationality in the 
face of uncertainty are also part of the problem. 
 A 2005 Center for Strategic and International Studies noted that, despite the 
long accepted fact that Effects Based Operations (EBO) required significant 
civilian expertise and input, American operational capacity resided almost 
exclusively within the Department of Defense.1483 Despite having an 
enthusiastic advocate of an holistic approach to foreign policy in the shape of 
the then Secretary of State Colin Powell (2001-2005), a former Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs  of Staff from the era of Desert Shield/Storm, broader inter-
departmental collaboration had proved elusive. Powell pursued joint State 
Department, United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 
and DoD interoperability through initiatives like the Development Readiness 
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Initiative.1484 At the same time formal compliance was sought through via the 
2004 Lugar-Biden initiative (more formally the Stabilization and 
Reconstruction Civilian Management Act, which was also promoted by the 
future Secretary of State for Defense Chuck Hagel)1485 and the supporting 
National Security Presidential Directive 44.1486 These lead to the quick 
establishment of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and 
Stabilization (S/CRS) in the Department of State.  
However the bounded rationality of lower levels of management, who were 
committed to their own core responsibilities over those they shared with 
Defense, meant they were disinclined to divert resources to it. Opportunistic 
behaviour over property rights by bodies such as the National Security 
Councils Deputies Committee, who argued over the management system 
through until 2007, was the result. The ambition to have four cadres capable 
of gathering and utilising the deep cultural type of intelligence that is still,  of 
necessity, only developed within DIA has yet to be realised. In fact by 2008 
only seventy experts were on the books, with a woeful eleven actually active 
and deployable.1487 Crisis response suffers from the same marginalisation as 
the FBI's intelligence element; it is not seen as a central tenet of State 
Department work and so incentives do not support it. Perfunctory compliance 
with formal edicts is the result. In 2011 the Department of State created a 
Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization operations into which the S/CRS was 
integrated.  It was however underfunded from the outset, and left to wither on 
the vine by the NSC Deputies Committee, despite being intended for a very 
pressing need.1488 This suggests that environmental uncertainty will continue 
to provoke opportunistic behaviour by resource starved sub-groups. 
By this time (2011), the DoD had effectively withdrawn back into itself, and 
accepted that it was going to have to take on what were primarily civilian 
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tasks if they were to be achieved. DIA activity would therefore necessarily 
include intelligence suited to policing and nation building, as well as 
supporting kinetic operations.1489 Curiously the DoD's need to decide whether 
to rely on unenthusiastic external suppliers like the State Department, or to 
bring such function's 'in-house' are an echo of Oliver Williamson's original 
question in 'Markets and Hierarchies' that led him to develop transaction cost 
theory. 1490  
Even within the military the tension between 'urgent' tactical and operational 
military intelligence needs and 'important' strategic concerns remain. As 
Afghanistan becomes less important the DIA are likely to be re-directed back 
towards the strategic warning function, suggesting it’s impressive 
performance in support of the US military (even across so broad a front and 
at several levels) has left a gap as far as the civilian policy making level is 
concerned. However in an interview in July 2012, the then Deputy Director 
DIA, David Shedd suggested this need had manifested itself because the 
‘Arab Spring’ had not been predicted,1491 which suggests an unrealistic 
expectation from his intelligence community to predict 'mysteries' as well as 
gather 'secrets'. This will inevitably skew any future negotiations over 
organisational change to deliver such a shift. In fact his recent removal, along 
with his superior Lt. Gen Flynn, from the DIA after pressure from both the 
Administration and the DNI James Clapper, despite their significant 
successes improving co-operative efficacy within the DoD in Iraq then 
Afghanistan, precisely because of their military and operational orientation, 
go some way to indicate the level of this tension.1492 Opaque property rights 
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over each will continue to provoke competition and advocacy between actors 
and negotiating costs will remain high as a result.1493  
Shifts in environment find the single services still competing for territory and 
strategic relevance, which will inevitably include their intelligence capabilities. 
Although low institutional costs have evolved in the COIN scenarios and 
linked multi-agency stabilisation or policing style operations, that does not 
mean that the organisational forms generated will be adequate to lower 
frictions in other circumstances: The re-focusing on the Asia-Pacific region by 
President Obama has lead to tensions between the currently dominant Army 
and a coalition of the Navy and Air Force, with the latter proposing that 
emergent or potential threats from China and Iran are dealt with through a 
concept called 'AirSea Battle' whilst Army strategists argue vociferously for 
the need for a larger role in the Anti Access/Area Denial strategy on which 
this is based. At the heart of the argument is the almost philosophical 
question of whether the operational theatre is large sea channels with islands 
in them, or tracts of land surrounded by water.1494 Such basic divisions 
suggest that new strategic arenas will still suffer large negotiating costs, at 
least until property rights are clarified.1495  
Section 5: Conclusion 
The distinction between the collaborative capabilities of the defence 
intelligence organisations of the United States and United Kingdom are 
substantive, despite the very similar external environments they need to 
address. In a direct contradiction of the patterns found in the counterterrorism 
sphere, the former has achieved a largely low friction set of working 
relationships with other security and intelligence providers and with the US 
‘defense enterprise’ at large whilst the latter has continued the fractious 
relationships of the Cold War era.   
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Levels of cooperation across the upper reaches of the United Kingdom's 
defence intelligence apparatus remains poor, and what nascent signs of this 
changing exist are still mired in high institutional costs. Property rights 
confusion over national and civilian held assets, and the requirements and 
priorities they are supposed to serve remain high. Operational needs still 
have to compete with strategic ones and no clear negotiating mechanism 
through which these can be assessed has emerged. Instead the addition of 
further tiers of ‘principals’ have increased the complexity of ownership 
patterns that are heightening frictions and making opportunistic behaviour by 
‘agents’ who are anyway asset specific to previous environmental and 
organisational conditions more likely. Any of the benefits of the ‘operational 
dynamism’ found by Dyson at lower levels has therefore not been translated 
into collaborative capability at higher levels.1496 Instead a repeated pattern of 
oscillating power bases that have to be constantly defended emerges. 
In the United States on the other hand the joint approach first inculcated in 
military doctrine in the Goldwater Nicholls initiative in 1986 has permeated 
through to defence intelligence in the post Gulf War era, and their change of 
role post 9/11 from a narrow area of policy delivery in limited circumstances 
(war) to the lead player in the rather wider (albeit contentiously labelled) 'war 
on terror' has increased the cooperative tendency. The creation of a plethora 
of cross-cutting horizontal platforms through which cooperation could be 
managed reduced institutional frictions by creating a shared maximand that 
the actors involved in any transaction could relate to, not only at a general 
‘policy’ level but also in terms of their own mission.  
Figure 8.11497 is a development of the diagram used in Part 2 to show the 
increases in negotiations that complexity causes. It demonstrates that by 
establishing a direct link between two functional entities, in this case C and 
D, the purpose of their engaging with each other becomes their shared 
objective. Less contracting is required in any event as the centre need only 
deal with the horizontal platform through a single conduit (1, shown in green) 
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Inertia." 
1497
 Source of diagram: Own design developed from Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies : Analysis 
and Antitrust Implications : A Study in the Economics of Internal Organization.46 
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rather than through the traditional hierarchical individual relationships with 
both C and D. This reduces the opportunity for either to play off other actors 
against each other in the way that Treverton suggests DoD owned national 
intelligence assets had done in the past.1498  
 
Bounded rationality problems are limited because the leadership only needs 
to pass on its strategic intent rather than direct the agencies individually, and 
so do not need the same detailed understanding of the capabilities and roles 
of each. Instead the objective can be interpreted by horizontal linkage and 
the roles of each function contracted between them. Probity can be 
developed at a more manageable level and atmosphere improves. In addition 
communicating costs are reduced as the high quantity of messages 
represented by the dotted red lines that result from modern operating 
conditions can be sorted by the linkages to sift ‘signals’ that are relevant to 
the shared objective from surrounding ‘noise’ that might only be relevant to 
other functional areas.     
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The overall result of these lower institutional costs for vertical collaboration 
can then be demonstrated using the same comparison of the relative utility of 
different levels under the new conditions that was used in Part 2. By 
changing their modus operandi and providing low institutional cost 
cooperative mechanisms for their consumers, the Department of Defense 
intelligence assets introduced what was effectively a 'control agency' with 
which lower levels of bureaucrats could contract, even while the whole 
remained the classic Weberian ‘delivery agency’.1499  
 
As Patrick Dunleavy demonstrated, such a shift will have the effect of shifting 
the utility of the actors involved. The 'Discounted Marginal Utility' (DMU) of 
those responsible for orchestrating cooperation amongst the functional 
entities will move clockwise as the new linkages take over the task, as 
represented in Figure 8.2,1500 and become more engaged with having the 
functional entities cooperate to complete the task.1501 In the interests of 
                                                                   
1499
 Described in Dunleavy, Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice: Economic Explanations in 
Political Science.183 
1500
 Source of diagram: Own design developed from ibid.199 
1501
 Ibid. p.207-8 
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clarity the utility curve of actors within the functional entities is shown as 
fixed, although in fact improved atmosphere and probity with their colleagues 
will in all likelihood improve this too. 
At the same time the marginal advocacy costs shift as the actors involved are 
now intimately involved in encouraging a cooperative solution and gain utility 
by improving their working experience through (inter alia) improved 
atmosphere and sense of efficacy, easer working relationships, and so forth. 
In fact although not part of the new position depicted here, Dunleavy’s 
analysis also suggests that the utility of the higher-level bureaucrats who 
have shed the coordination task will be improved as they free up resources to 
engage with more intellectually pleasing tasks.1502   
Thus although cooperative behaviour in the US defence intelligence 
community is no more a given than it is in the UK's the structural changes 
that have occurred since the Gulf War in 1991 have lowered institutional 
costs between contracting parties and thereby improved cooperation 
outcomes. As Cebrowski put it, "...initial concepts of jointness were... based 
on deconfliction" and although eventually successful the whole  "... became 
interoperable in the most painful way".1503 The very different experiences of 
cooperation in defence related intelligence in the United Kingdom and United 
States cannot however be attributed to any single cause or executive edict, 
and many of the environmental pushes are very similar to those that caused 
entirely the opposite sort of reaction in each nation in the civilian 
counterterrorism contest. A more micro level of analysis however 
demonstrates that where patterns of institutional costs are similar, so too will 
the level of collaborative success or failure. 
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 Ibid.207 
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 Arthur Cebrowski, "Planning a Revolution: Mapping the Pentagon’s Transformation,"  
Presentation to the Heritage Foundation: National Security and Defense(2003), 
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2003/06/planning-a-revolution-mapping-the-pentagons-
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Chapter 9 - Conclusion 
Section 1: The Utility of a political Economy for Security and 
Intelligence 
As the examination in this thesis makes clear, any consideration of the 
governmental functions of security and intelligence must necessarily 
contemplate the feasible levels of cooperation between the actors and 
organisations involved in its provision.1504 Central to that cooperation is the 
ease with which decision makers can negotiate and contract with each other 
over which of them provides which service, counters what problem, and with 
which resources, and the clarity of the property rights across which those 
negotiations must be managed. Yet despite the theoretical possibility that the 
very substantial resources available to provide security and intelligence in 
both the United Kingdom and United States could be brought to bear as a 
cohesive whole, this is rarely realised. Even instances that are regarded as 
demonstrating successful collaboration exhibit some degree of institutional 
friction along the way. Conversely examples of good cooperation are evident 
on occasion even between established rivals like the CIA and FBI. Existing 
accounts are characterised by an emphasis on success or failure, frequently 
divided between the US and the UK respectively, but a more complete 
explanation must acknowledge that they are each characterised by both.        
At the same time the strong interpenetration of the security and intelligence 
spheres with more conventional areas of governance means that the fields 
are far less unique than might be expected. More general theories of (inter 
alia) bureaucracy, organisational behaviours and the wider environment can 
therefore each add something to the understanding of why cooperation 
succeeds or fails in particular circumstances. None however are 
comprehensive. Like the intelligence and security literature itself, the 
approaches considered in Chapter 3 can each be argued to provide a good 
                                                                   
1504
 In his substantive comparison of the UK and US intelligence communities, Davies emphasises that 
effectiveness in any agency relies on successful interagency. See Davies, Intelligence and Government 
in Britain and the United States : A Comparative Perspective.Vol.1.1 
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account of some instances, only to be found to be silent or even incorrect in 
others. 
Institutional cost theory is the larger theory that can encapsulate these 
approaches and extend them so that they can be considered in relation to 
each other. It is the theory that can be more specifically aligned with the 
predominant features of individual cases.  
Not only can institutional cost analysis account more elegantly for ‘normal’ 
cases such as the predominance of poor cooperation across the US 
counterterrorism effort than existing theoretical paradigms, it can also explain 
deviant cases like the high levels of cooperation that have emerged in the US 
defence intelligence enterprise with equal conviction. Furthermore this can be 
achieved without violating any of the central tenets of previous theoretical 
explanations. Talcott Parsons found that although existing literature in his 
chosen area of study was inadequate to explain the range of phenomena he 
was concerned with, it was nonetheless essential in providing the bedrock of 
his theory of social institutions. In the same way this work too has not been 
"... manufactured ad hoc out of whole cloth" but rather it is the product of the 
"interpretation and further construction" of those approaches.1505 
To support that contention a clear correlation between high institutional costs 
and poor collaborative outcomes, and low institutional costs and good 
collaborative outcomes can be discerned within the cases analysed. The 
detail of the results specific to each of the counterterrorism and defence 
intelligence cases has already been discussed and summarised in the 
conclusions to Parts 2 and 3. The next section will therefore concentrate on 
what the two pieces of analysis can say about the usefulness of institutional 
cost analysis for examining cooperation in security and intelligence when 
considered in conjunction with each other.  
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 See Parsons, "Prolegomena to a Theory of Social Institutions."319 (italics in original). 
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Section 2: Key Findings Across Counterterrorism and Defence 
Intelligence Cases 
The combination of the twin examinations of how vertical cooperation or 
closer integration between various functional areas and levels of authority is 
managed in the counterterrorism and defence intelligence spheres conducted 
in Parts Two and Three of this thesis provides very different results for the 
United Kingdom and United States. However whilst the consideration of 
counterterrorism supports the orthodox view that the UK is good at 
coordination whilst the US is poor, cooperation in the defence intelligence 
sphere demonstrates that the converse can also be true. When the 
granularity of the analysis shifts it is apparent that even within each discipline 
examples of good and poor cooperation are to be found and that there is a 
temporal dimension to both. Therefore each has the potential to demonstrate 
the same cooperative features as the other if circumstances alter. 
The analysis clearly indicates that those circumstances can be encapsulated 
within the institutional costs impact framework for security and intelligence 
provision that was developed in Chapter 2 of this thesis. However it is also 
apparent that its individual elements are of less importance than the result of 
their interaction with each other, as predicted by Oliver Williamson when he 
developed his ideas of transaction cost analysis for the very different cases 
of negotiating contracts in the private sector.1506  
The net result is that different institutional costs take on more or less relative 
importance depending on their interrelationship with the others, most 
noticeably across the behavioural/environmental divide. Just as flaws in, for 
example property rights allocations can exacerbate the tendency of actors to 
act opportunistically, so too can established probity in relationships or an 
accepted shared maximand between them diminish it.  
Although, as described above, it is still very much their interaction that 
counts, when institutional costs analysis is applied to the security and 
intelligence spheres then a new observation can be made. Particular 
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elements of the institutional costs impact framework can be seen to act on 
the whole in different ways so that they can be distinguished not only by the 
category to which they belong (be it behavioural, environmental or shared) 
but also by the type of impact they have.  
Although treated the various transaction costs described by Oliver Williamson 
are only discussed by him in terms of the levels of costs each create, the 
examination of the counterterrorism and defence cases above suggests that 
institutional costs can actually be separated very broadly into three 
categories: Firstly those that can be described as catalytic; these may be 
defined as precipitating institutional cost issues through their effect on other 
elements of the institutional costs impact framework, although they are not 
immediately affected by these frictions themselves. Property rights, asset 
specificity and uncertainty are all catalytic elements. Secondly there are 
those elements that act as a point of leverage about which the others react 
with each other. These may be described as pivotal as they provide a fulcrum 
across which institutional costs can be magnified or simply oscillate as 
negotiations and interactions proceed. Both information impactedness and 
complexity may be so defined. Finally there are those institutional costs 
elements that can be most easily conceived as a product of their fellows. 
Even where the condition might exist it only becomes problematic once acted 
on by one of the others, although each can then exacerbate the other. These 
may be described as derivative elements and include the behavioural factors 
of probity, opportunism and bounded rationality, the environmental condition 
of frequency, and the shared surrounding conditions of the degree of 
atmosphere and of a shared maximand. These will now be considered in turn 
as the combined findings of Parts 2 and 3 are considered in relation to the 
elements of the institutional costs impact framework.   
a. Catalytic Institutional Costs 
A number of common factors nonetheless emerge across both areas that are 
routinely catalytic in provoking frictions between actors and agencies 
required to interact. Principal amongst these are the surrounding issue of 
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property rights clarity, and the environmental variables of asset specificity 
and uncertainty. 
The examinations of counterterrorism and defence intelligence cooperation 
demonstrate how property rights clarity is of central importance in defining 
levels of institutional costs and thus levels of cooperation in both spheres and 
in both countries. Where and how that impact is felt varies across the cases 
however. Shifts in the environment produce concomitant tensions in 
established patterns of property rights ownership in the cases studied, but 
the nature of the existing organisational architecture has a substantive impact 
on how these play out. In the defence intelligence case both the United 
Kingdom and United States have historically struggled with overlapping 
property rights to military intelligence assets between national and military 
and between strategic and operational requirements. The upsurge in 
counterinsurgency operations in the new millennium with its requirement for 
increased interaction with civilian agencies and departments only 
exacerbates this tension. However while the US has developed a number of 
organisational linkages following the acknowledged usefulness of the Military 
Intelligence Board during and after the first Gulf War, the UK has instead 
continued the pattern of oscillation between the different demands, only 
adding an additional tier of authority on the military side in the form of Joint 
forces Command (JFC) following the Levene Report,
1507
 a review that itself 
was victim to the same division as was wholly centred on the Ministry of 
Defence and had no broader national responsibility. It is therefore likely that 
the JFC simply represents the latest shift towards the military side rather than 
any balancing, further complicating property rights without providing any 
means for the different sides to contract with each other over them, although 
it is too soon to be certain of this. The result is that while the US has 
developed a number of low friction links1508 that can more easily 
accommodate new partners and ways of operating, the British have not.  
                                                                   
1507
 "The Levene Report." 
1508
 There is a caveat to the linkage of this finding too directly to institutional cost issues, as the 
discussion of US military dominance as a potentially limiting factor below makes clear.  
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In the counterterrorism case the approaches (and the outcomes) are 
reversed, with the US opting to rely on additional levels of hierarchical control 
while the UK prefers coordinating existing capabilities through more collegial 
bodies. Again, the pre-existing organisational architecture helped define how 
these strategies played out. In the United States organisation was historically 
managed by functional responsibility, but terrorism crossed the fault lines 
between these, with a single case often having foreign and domestic, 
intelligence and law enforcement aspects. Organisations like the FBI, CIA 
and indeed the DoD have both an intelligence collection and analysis 
capability. They are therefore well placed to become their own customers, 
and need to interact with external agencies less than British counterparts. 
The different organisations are thus able and incentivised to act 
opportunistically and undermine new hierarchical controls over them. In this 
way they can secure contested property rights over the counterterrorism role 
and preserve their own autonomy.  
In the United Kingdom on the other hand, the existing organisational 
architecture was inter-dependent. Collection agencies needed other 
government departments to provide any analysis above the immediately 
operational level,1509 and any executive action was the province of the police 
or military. The tendency of terrorism to cross the jurisdictions of different 
agencies and departments is thus less problematic, as property rights are 
already allocated in such a way as to give each one well defined 
responsibilities at different points in any counterterrorism case. The OSCT's 
management of the CONTEST strategy, or even the roles of the Senior 
National Co-ordinator or the Executive Liaison Group are no more than 
formalisations of established practices and relationships. Even if they are 
motivated to do so, no one agency has the capability to contest further 
property rights as they are each reliant on the others. Indeed the most 
problematic unit in the UK's array of counterterrorism agencies, the 
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 DIAS being the exception, and boasting many of the institutional cost problems more normally 
observed in the US system, as discussed in Part 3. 
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Metropolitan Police's Special Branch, was the one closest to having a more 
complete capability.1510  
The analysis thus confirms that the clarity with which property rights are 
allocated between different actors and agencies is of primary importance in 
setting the level of institutional frictions, as the original model predicted. 
However it also demonstrates the importance of the type of supporting 
organisational architecture in determining how those allocations respond to 
changes in environmental conditions.    
The asset specificity of the different elements of both the security and 
intelligence arenas is also catalytic in stimulating other institutional cost 
activity, and is broadly divisible into two types that provoke different sorts of 
institutional cost issues: Technological asset specificity is observable in both 
the counterterrorism and defence intelligence cases. As functions of 
governance, intelligence and security each boast assets that are specific to 
the target or theatre in which they are to be used, and both pursuits require a 
long run-in time if new assets are to be developed, whether they are 
intelligence sources or security tools. It is therefore unsurprising that a 
tension between these assets and the uncertainty of their environment is 
observable, or that actors whose roles and relevance are directly linked to 
their continued use should act opportunistically to extend their life-span.       
The significance of the asset specificity of human sources on the other hand 
was less expected,1511 yet it is the more relevant in provoking frictions 
between actors and their organisations. The analysis exposes a key tension 
between the individual organisation's need to inspire and encourage its own 
culture and norms, the fidelity to self defining principles of Selznick,1512 and 
                                                                   
1510
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those of the wider endeavour. The professional and social norms of any 
organisation, as well as the coded means of communicating amongst its 
members that ensures effective delivery of whatever functions it is 
responsible for, are asset specific to that role as it has previously existed. 
This does not mean they are necessarily suited to new conditions. These 
new conditions in turn also require asset specificity if they are to be suitably 
addressed, just of a different type. This phenomenon is observable in both 
the defence intelligence and counterterrorism cases and prompts a 
substantial amount of institutional friction when cooperation between 
divergent cultures was required and was particularly prevalent in the face of 
external adaptive pushes. Like the property rights case above however the 
nature of the extant organisational architecture has a notable impact on how 
any resistance plays out.              
Uncertainty is often treated together with complexity during the examinations 
of defence intelligence and counterterrorism, however the two need to be de-
coupled at this stage. Although they both act as the same sort of 
environmental variable, and cause the same sort of difficulties for decision 
makers, the manner in which each does so is more subtle than that similarity 
would suggest. Whilst complexity provides leverage for the interaction of 
other institutional cost elements (and is therefore considered as a pivotal 
factor in sub-section b. below) uncertainty is observed to act as a catalyst for 
wider institutional cost issues, in particular behavioural activity, and therefore 
belongs in this category. Its impact is nonetheless intimately linked to the 
problem of bounded rationality and the manner by which information 
asymmetry issues and principal-agent relationships are enacted. Like many 
of the institutional costs elements, uncertainty is found to be a more nuanced 
concept than a simple quantitative appreciation would allow, although the 
levels of uncertainty are high in both the spheres examined. Because 
uncertainty provokes a number of possible futures whose costs or benefits 
cannot be compared like for like, its impact on institutional frictions is similarly 
varied, subtle and pervasive.  Actors must struggle to decide on their own 
priorities and then align them to those of their colleagues.  
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b. Pivotal Institutional Costs 
Other elements of the institutional cost impact framework are found to act as 
pivots around which frictions between contracting parties might be 
exacerbated or diminished. 
Foremost amongst these are information advantages, which function as an 
enabler for the behavioural elements of the model once any of the catalytic 
features have initiated friction between contracting actors. It is invariably at 
the epicentre of any principal-agent problems observed, justifying its position 
as a central point of leverage in the impact framework diagram produced in 
Chapter 2 (see Figure 2.3). Like the shared maximand issue, information 
asymmetry demonstrates relevance across both the horizontal and vertical 
planes. The secrecy inherent in intelligence and security provision is often 
cited as a reason for a lack of cooperation within the existing literature. 
Curiously however, although actual secrecy certainly adds to the perception 
of information asymmetry between actors and organisations, and can 
certainly be a logistical as well as an institutional cost problem in particular 
cases, the more ubiquitous problem of structural secrecy causing information 
impactedness between specialisms is the more significant variety. As 
secrecy is one of the elements of the institutional costs model that appears 
most specific to the intelligence and security functions of governance this 
suggests that a wider application of the model may be feasible. 
Another result of the analysis is that the exponential increase in information 
availability, particularly in the counterterrorism case, has not necessarily 
diminished the problem of asymmetric holding of information, but rather has 
simply changed its dynamic. Whereas during the Cold War an agency might 
enjoy such an advantage because it had collected what small amount of 
information there was, since the information revolution that advantage goes 
to those organisations capable of dealing with the huge quantities of data and 
discerning the ‘signal’ amongst its ‘noise’. The ‘ring of secrecy’ is no less an 
institutional fact and producers and consumers still exist either in a bilateral 
502 
 
monopoly or in a monopsonic relationship that offers only very limited or even 
false choices to decision makers while aggravating property rights problems. 
Information asymmetry remains key to the capability of agents to behave 
opportunistically with their principals and with each other. 
In the cases where cooperation between actors in a vertical relationship is 
examined, information advantages are found to be such that incumbent 
actors and organisations can still control the 'production of producers', as 
Powell and DiMaggio predicted,1513 by acting opportunistically to ensure that 
the authority of new joiners is restricted. In such instances the tension 
between secrecy and sharing that exists as an operational construct can also 
become a bureaucratic one. Once again this is particularly the case in the 
counterterrorism sphere, where major initiatives such as the DHS and DNI 
and NCTC are affected, but is also observable in the defence intelligence 
case, albeit at a much lower level, where initiatives like the 'Joint Intelligence 
Virtual Architecture' can be derailed by middle level managers working under 
poorly aligned incentive schemes.1514  
What the examination finds has changed however, is the inter-relationship 
between different functional levels in both the terrorism and defence spheres 
as they interact across unequal information holdings. Tactical level terrorist 
attacks have of course always had the potential to have a strategic impact 
and this has been exacerbated by more ready access to various media 
forms. The same impact can now be achieved during certain types of military 
engagement so that, for example, instances of ‘green on blue’ attacks or 
even an upsurge in 'improvised explosive device' usage can have major 
strategic implications. This in turn means that those with a more detailed 
knowledge of the tactical level can use the potential strategic value of such 
information as a bargaining chip in both vertical and horizontal negotiations 
with other actors.1515   
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 DiMaggio and Powell, "The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective 
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Closely related to the upsurge in information availability is the increasing 
diversity of the sources and types of information from which it is formed. This 
has implications for the ability of boundedly rational actors to deal with it. As 
the model predicts, this is equally true in both spheres examined, although 
the detail varies from case to case, and this is dealt with in more detail in 
Parts 2 and 3. However the sub-issue of the costs different usage of 
language provokes amongst those boundedly rational actors proves to be 
more prevalent and of more importance than was anticipated. That different 
social norms and terminology might create frictions between very different 
bodies such as those contracting across the military/civilian divide in the 
defence intelligence case, or across the law enforcement/intelligence divide 
in that of counterterrorism, was always likely. However the extension of the 
issue from the macro to the micro level is more surprising. There is 
substantial evidence of language costs resulting from different 
understandings of the world at large, as well as actors' understanding of 
specific terms such as the meaning of strategic or the definition of 
intelligence proving problematic at one end of the scale. At the other, 
divergent character types can produce internal language costs that magnify 
frictions at the intra-organisational level.        
The other institutional cost element that leverages increased frictions 
amongst the others is complexity. This is the case despite the fact that it is 
not located in the same sort of pivotal position as information impactedness 
in the impact framework developed in Chapter 2 (or indeed in Williamson's 
original diagrammatic representation of the 'Organisational Failure 
Framework',1516) but is instead an environmental variable. Yet it acts as such, 
and in very significant ways:   
The use of institutional costs modelling for cooperative working in the 
intelligence and security functions is based on the ease with which relevant 
actors can negotiate and contract with each other. It is therefore no surprise 
that the analysis finds that all of the institutional costs summarised above 
increase as the number of nodes required in delivering the whole becomes 
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greater. Just as important is the exponential increase that the increased need 
for horizontal interaction provokes. The augmentation of disparate 
organisations is visible in both the counterterrorism and defence intelligence 
spheres, although to a greater extent in the former, but it is their increasing 
need to interact at more and lower levels which impacts most on complexity 
and resultant cooperative capability.  
The significance of complexity is also found to be more than a simple 
numerical issue. Certainly the increasingly complicated problems of both 
counterterrorism and the provision of defence intelligence to ever more 
consumers provoke the need for more complex organisational forms. There 
are thus problems of quantity and quality to be addressed. Organisational 
forms have to deal with both the division of labour into manageable sub-
functions and the re-integration of their outputs back into a usable security or 
intelligence product. In addition to this however an increased complexity in 
terms of the types of work involved is observable in both fields. These are 
also divided into sub-functional fields, but that are not necessarily in any kind 
of hierarchical relationship with each other.  
In such circumstances re-integration is a more important issue.1517 The 
problem becomes one of not only having actors access the system at an 
appropriate level, but also in a manner that accords with their particular 
specialism. This might intersect with several other specialisations, so that 
further complexity is induced. In some instances this produces some 
surprising outcomes. For example despite their reputation as one of the most 
independent of the US bureaucracies, particularly where intelligence 
capability is concerned,1518 there is contrary evidence of the Department of 
Defense trying to off-load complicated (usually civilian) tasks in a very un-
Niskanen like manner, and also generating frictions in that direction as a 
result.1519 Complexity in both spheres is thus found to increase property 
rights problems and the difficulties of establishing a shared maximand, as 
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 A point strongly emphasised by Philip Davies in Davies, Intelligence and Government in Britain 
and the United States : A Comparative Perspective.Vol.1.1  
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 See inter alia Betts, Enemies of Intelligence : Knowledge and Power in American National 
Security.151-153  
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  Discussed in Chapter 8 Section 4. 
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well as providing the space for bounded rationality and for opportunistic 
behaviour to occur as the model predicts, but in a greater variety of ways.     
Tensions are also evident because these varied types of complexity are at 
odds with many of the organisational forms that are used to counter them. 
The nature of the asset specific hierarchical culture of the military has already 
been alluded to, but the complex and varied nature of counterinsurgency 
deployments, like counterterrorism, are found to create particular problems 
for organisation. In both cases the fact that the threat emanate from a 
plethora of ‘ground level’ sources means that traditional ‘top-down’ structures 
struggle to deal with it. In the case of the UK’s counterterrorism effort a 
collegial and often semi-informal structure is found to provide a lubricant, so 
that actors can quickly and flexibly contract with each other as circumstances 
dictate. 
Successful cooperation across the complex range of organisations in the 
cross-case of US defence intelligence is managed through a variety of new 
horizontal structures and, at the operational end, by creating a ‘complex 
adaptive system’ with intelligence and other enabling functions embedded 
with command structures in a single entity that can react rapidly and with little 
additional contracting required. The contrast between these cases and the 
poor cooperation found in US counterterrorism and, to a lesser extent, in UK 
defence intelligence, demonstrates how the organisational approach to 
complexity can magnify or diminish the institutional problems it instigates, 
and in the former case the two proposed solutions to managing the issue 
each in fact are found to add to the complexity of the organisational 
environment.1520 The cases examined are thus a testament to the importance 
of complexity as a qualitative as well as a quantitative issue.   
c. Derivative Institutional Costs 
The environmental variable of probity, together with the other surrounding 
factors of atmosphere and actors having a strong sense of a shared 
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 See Chapter 6 Sections 2 and 3. It should also be noted that the confused inter-relationship of the 
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maximand also proves important, but each of them is in turn a product of the 
interaction of the other institutional costs elements, flowing from them in a 
linear relationship, and as much a product of them as a producer. 
Williamson's problems of actors either 'free-riding' or demonstrating 'self-
interest-seeking with guile’ that are described in Chapter 21521 are less of a 
problem if actors are striving towards the same collective objectives, and vice 
versa. 
The elements of atmosphere and a sense of a shared maximand are 
however intimately related to each other. However just as clear is the degree 
to which existing conditions of good atmosphere and shared goals can 
lubricate processes of adjustment between actors as they have to respond to 
changes in their external environment or organisational arrangements. This 
applies in both functional areas and in both Countries examined. Collegial 
approaches coexist with good atmosphere more readily than does 
hierarchical organisation, although this is not nation specific. Indeed there are 
several examples of (often informal) collaborative arrangements being 
superimposed on formal hierarchies in the US, such as the utilisation of 
established bonds between analysts who had worked on cold war problems 
when trying to encourage information sharing after the creation of the 
ODNI.1522 Issues of atmosphere are therefore also closely bound up with the 
development of probity between actors and how they set about allocating 
new tasks. 
The analysis also demonstrates the usefulness of incorporating ideas of a 
shared maximand into the model. It reveals that a collective goal can be both 
an enabler for low friction negotiations and yet still a product of them. More 
surprisingly perhaps, not only is it important between organisations, and even 
between actors within the same organisation,1523 along the horizontal plane 
as predicted, but also along a vertical plane.  However the usefulness of any 
such shared maximand was found to be dependent on it being amenable to 
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 See for example Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies : Analysis and Antitrust Implications : A 
Study in the Economics of Internal Organization.96  
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 Discussed in Chapter 6 section a. See CH5. 
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 See for example the CIA/FBI relationship discussed in Chapter 5 section 2, and the relationships 
between DIAS analysts and managers and the larger MoD in Chapter 8 section 2. 
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being broken down into sub-goals that still serve it. In the military context for 
example it is relatively easy to translate a strategy for victory over a Nation 
State into sub-goals, so that lower units might for example have responsibility 
for taking designated parcels of land. It is much harder to translate a 
counterinsurgency strategy into vaguer, often more ephemeral, sub-goals 
involving what are more usually civilian functions. In the latter case the 
emergence of a new dominant narrative such as that found in 'Effects Based 
Operations' that can act as a bridge between the overall maximand and sub 
goals is required.1524 Certainly the analysis demonstrates that despite the 
depth of feeling that supported the United States' 'Global War on Terror', it 
did not act as a shared maximand in the same functional way as the less 
emotive ideas embodied in the UK's CONTEST strategy. Although beyond 
the purview of this thesis, further research into when and how a particular 
shared maximand becomes operationally useful would therefore be of 
interest.   
Like the shared maximand discussed above, levels of probity are evident as 
both a product of, and the supporting plank for, high or low institutional costs 
in both of the functional areas examined. Opaque property rights can for 
example be negotiated across more easily if parties have already established 
patterns of trust amongst themselves. This is evident in both functional areas 
examined and on both sides of the Atlantic. Equally, the level of significance 
that can be attached to the probity developed across working groups is 
clearly a factor in determining what other institutional points of friction 
between negotiating parties exist and how they are interacting. Within the 
context of the cases of managing cooperation amongst the different vertical 
levels examined, probity provides particular problems: The trust that results is 
at the same time both a construct of social norms that operate horizontally1525 
and a fundamental requirement of leadership.1526 The high resolution of a 
microeconomic approach like institutional costs analysis is therefore 
beneficial in exposing its impact.  
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One of the most significant aspects of the probity issue is the temporal nature 
of its relevance, so that the trust between actors which it engenders has both 
an "...intrinsic and instrumental value". It is both the means by which 
negotiations can be undertaken and the foundation on which membership of 
the community (of actors engaged in intelligence and security provision in 
this case) is based.1527 It is however hard to establish and easy to lose. That 
this should be so is of course predicted in the original model and in fact the 
analysis demonstrates how the sequential nature of contracting in each of the 
fields means that probity acts as something of a binding agent along the 
temporal dimension, so that its relative importance increases. Where 
successful cooperation is observed, probity, unlike many other institutional 
cost elements, is a repetitive aspect of contracting. This means that it is 
possible to offset the uniqueness of particular circumstances, that can cause 
problems of (inter alia) uncertainty, asset specificity and bound rationality. 
The predicted downside to this - that actors will be inclined to agree to sub-
standard courses of action to satisfy extant obligations to their fellow actors - 
is not evident in either functional area. However given that the emphasis of 
this work is the levels of cooperation rather than operational success, and 
that no counterfactual outcomes are available to contradict contributors, the 
weight that can be attached to this finding is limited.  
The analysis of the impact of hierarchical patterns of probity suggest, as 
Williamson argues for public sector pursuits more generally,1528 that low 
powered incentive schemes are more likely to encourage probity between 
actors, and thus cooperative behaviour. However the evidence supporting 
this conclusion is mostly of the negative sort, for example the lack of probity 
between FBI agents who are encouraged to compete very directly for 
advancement,1529 so that a stronger assertion is not possible without further 
research. The probity levels across relationships that result from the 
increasing relevance of private contractors across the security and 
intelligence fields might provide a fruitful line of enquiry  to prove or disprove 
this assertion.  
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1529
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The two behavioural factors of opportunism and bounded rationality are also 
seen to be a result of the existence of the more catalytic elements described 
above. In the case of the former this has implications for understanding how 
ideas of 'self interest seeking with guile' is actually operationalised. In the 
cases examined opportunistic behaviour is observed less as the positive 
pursuit of advantage by actors who simply had the opportunity to behave in 
this way, and more as a reaction to perceived threats to their interests 
(normally vested in the 'status quo'). The distinction has, in turn, implications 
for how the assumption of rationality in actors is conceived in such 
circumstances. In keeping with this finding, examples of extensive 
opportunistic behaviour follow the pattern of high institutional costs more 
generally, supporting the idea that it is as much a by-product of them as it is 
a creator of them.    
This slightly contradictory finding is, for example, evident where the 
opportunistic behaviour of hold-up is encountered. In the United States' case 
there is ample evidence that actors in both the functional areas considered 
are concerned to pre-empt the possible threat of hold-up by establishing an 
in-house capability for whatever service they might require from another 
organisation. However the evidence suggests this is more about internal 
concerns that an external providing organisation would prioritise their own 
needs to the detriment of those of the original agency needing to contract for 
their services, and a natural reluctance to be hostage to that sort of capability 
gap.1530 Given the serious nature of the subject matter of the cases 
examined, no admission that on the one hand the service provider was 
withholding support, or that on the other the service consumer was 
developing a parallel capability, simply because they wished to establish a 
position of strength for subsequent negotiations, was of course likely. Real 
motivations should therefore be regarded as remaining opaque. Nonetheless 
the perception of possible hold-up behaviour is present and sufficient to 
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 Consider for example the DoD’s pursuit of a HUMINT capability discussed in Chapter 8 Section 
4, or the NYPD’s attempts to secure national and international counterterrorism intelligence because 
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Chapter 4 Section 3).  
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cause uncertainty, property rights frictions, and further opportunistic 
behaviour in turn.1531  
Conversely in the United Kingdom the overarching organisational form, 
whereby each organisation is in an established relationship of mutual 
reliance with the others, again seems to dampen institutional cost pressures. 
Although this interdependency might have meant that hold up was more of a 
problem, as different organisations were hostage to the service provision of 
the others, the opposite is in fact demonstrated to be the case. The reciprocal 
nature of the relationships means that probity is improved. As importantly, the 
nature of the relationship is such that without the input of other organisations, 
none can function to the extent that any useful outcome can be realised. This 
is very evident in the counterterrorism case and to a lesser extent in the 
defence intelligence case, so that the risk of this sort of opportunistic 
behaviour would seem to be minimal at each end of the spectrum of 
interdependence, and greatest in the median range.  
The intimate association of opportunistic behaviour and the 'small numbers 
conditions' occasioned by the uncertain and unique aspects of individual 
counterterrorism and military operations suggests that it is worth considering 
the environmental variable of frequency together with that of opportunism 
here.   
Initial assumptions of uniqueness from case to case in both functional areas 
examined are found to hold. Once the degree of resolution used is such that 
the problem actors have to address and the negotiations themselves are 
equally enhanced it is evident that there is little homogeneity in either. This 
exposes a distinction between the US and UK counterterrorism cases 
because in the former this fact is not built in to their organisational responses. 
Contracts between collaborating actors are formal, often to the extent of 
being statutory instruments, and narrowly focused. These correspond poorly 
to the uncertainty inherent in dealing with terrorism and the high degree of 
plasticity held by lower level actors. Nonetheless their formality means that in 
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subsequent negotiations over issues that might be only slightly similar, extant 
solutions are likely to be adopted in the same way that Williamson predicts 
contract holders in the private sector will wield a substantial ‘first-mover’ 
advantage when contract renewal is required,1532 whether or not they are 
best placed to deliver the best solution.1533 This is a substantially different 
position to that found in the US defence intelligence case which more closely 
resembles the British counterterrorism approach. Both acknowledge the 
frequency problem, and leave agreements as overarching and quite open 
contracts, within which lower level actors can (and are encouraged to) 
negotiate with each other in a less formal and even organic way.   
The significance of bounded rationality, the final behavioural factor in the 
institutional cost impact framework for security and intelligence provision, 
parallels the division made by Williamson in that it can be observed as both a 
language cost and, distinctly, as a computational issue. In both forms its 
impact is greatest in the counterterrorism sphere. Environmental complexity 
and uncertainty are both extremely high, so that actors can only assimilate 
parts of the picture in adequate detail at any particular time, and spans of 
control are difficult to manage. This increases the property rights problems 
that boundedly rational managers create and the opportunity and incentive 
they have to take advantage of the structural secrecy that results. The wider 
range of types of organisations involved means that a larger number of 
widely divergent cultures need to interact, causing both information and 
language costs. In the defence intelligence case both problems still exist, but 
their nature is distinct: Because missions are geographically delineated 
complexity can be better managed. In the UK case particularly, it is 
uncertainty around not only the possible actions of the enemy but also the 
strategic goals that cause the greater bounded rationality problem. This in 
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turn creates some slight degree of friction both within the military element 
and between them and their civilian partners.1534         
These findings are commensurate with the model developed in Chapter 2. 
The more oblique problem stemming from bounded rationality in senior 
actors, that of satisficing, is however as important. Here there is a distinction 
between the nature of the bounded rationality of actors at different levels: 
Decision makers in both functional areas are inclined to favour previous 
solutions, or to adopt adequate solutions, in preference to incurring 
substantive search costs, particularly when time pressures are high. Lower 
levels on the other hand, whose knowledge is greater at a more detailed 
level, but less broad, prefer more specifically tailored solutions. This 
discrepancy negatively impacts on vertical cooperation; it echoes the 
frequency issues described immediately above and is closely aligned with 
information asymmetry issues more generally, as well as with the principal-
agent problems generated by the usually high plasticity of agents.  
Overall, analysis of vertical patterns of cooperation or of closer integration in 
the defence intelligence and counterterrorism spheres are found to match 
those that would be predicted by the presence of either high or low 
institutional frictions between actors. The next section will therefore 
summarise the implications of the findings as a whole on the development of 
a political economy for intelligence and security provision based on this form 
of microeconomic analysis. 
Section 3: The Overall Impact of Findings on the Theory 
The empirical findings discussed in Parts 2 and 3 to this thesis support the 
hypothesis that microeconomic analysis can explain levels of cooperative 
behaviour through the application of an adapted transactional cost paradigm 
more holistically than existing approaches. Both the subject matter and the 
approach to it permit a high level of confidence that the sort of 
microeconomic analysis developed in Part 1 of the thesis is well suited to the 
intelligence and security spheres examined. The two functional areas 
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considered have proven amenable to analysis, despite the secrecy required 
in some instances. Although heavily engaged with theoretical concerns, the 
analysis is fundamentally empirical in nature and deals with largely 
contemporary issues so that both primary and secondary sources are not 
only readily available but also often part of an ongoing 'conversation' across 
a spread of opinions that is especially conducive to the examination of 
cooperation. However the contemporary and temporal nature of the issues 
also means that there can be more variables of relevance than fixed points 
about which they react. Despite the drafting problems that so many 
interdependent variables can cause, this reinforces the place of interaction as 
a central concept of the institutional costs impact framework, and the need 
for an holistic model more generally.     
The cross-cases in the United Kingdom and United States strongly indicate 
that the orthodoxies of good cooperation being the norm in the former, and 
poor cooperation the usual experience in the latter, cannot provide any kind 
of generally applicable paradigm, despite the evidence for such a contention 
in the counterterrorism sphere. Equally significantly, the more detailed level 
of analysis required in assessing levels of institutional costs also 
demonstrates that even within each functional area, in each country, poor 
cooperation can occur if the institutional frictions are high and good 
cooperation can be engendered if the institutional costs are low. No particular 
organisation or interaction is wholly immune to their impact. Again, this 
supports the notion that the combination of elements that comprise the 
institutional costs impact framework is adequate to capture the sorts of 
issues that affect cooperative outcomes.     
However the increased granularity of the analysis also demonstrates that, 
even within the individual elements of the impact framework as currently 
constituted, there are significant and separate qualitative characteristics that 
can impact on the level and type of institutional costs created. These sub-
fields then interact with the wider framework in distinct ways. For example 
whilst both are subsumed within bounded rationality, computational limits are 
most closely associated with complexity and uncertainty, whereas language 
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costs are more particularly aligned to cultural asset specificity. Although 
highly nuanced, these qualitative distinctions suggest that the accuracy of the 
theory can be improved if it is further developed to incorporate sub-fields 
within particular elements. Such an extension might even shed further light 
on why some elements acts in a catalytic manner, others as a means of 
leverage, while a third category flows from the existence of the others, as 
observed in the section above.  
When the findings are re-applied to the theoretical considerations made in 
Chapters 3 and 4, two key features are observable: Firstly the observed 
dichotomy in the subject centric literature on the intelligence and security 
functions, whereby either cooperative success or failure is explained, but not 
both, is symptomatic of a larger problem of too narrow a focus. In fact the 
findings are at odds with the authors own biases,1535 which had anticipated 
that many of the cooperative problems were predominantly behavioural, with 
inappropriate incentive schemes and controls merely supporting self-serving 
behaviour, much as argued by Zegart and Posner.1536 The reality is more 
involved and more nuanced, with particular types of behaviour more evident 
as the inevitable result of the environmental difficulties of the field, especially 
uncertainty, coupled with stresses in the organisational architecture used to 
address them. Indeed the analysis shows that the sort of collegial behaviour 
described by British commentators like Herman and Omand
1537
 is also 
observable on the American side when surrounding conditions permit; it is 
just that the organisational architecture of the US system prevents such an 
approach more often than that of the UK.  
In each of the cases studied it is the interaction of several institutional cost 
issues that impacts on cooperative outcomes, and the relevance of each in 
that interaction varies widely from one instance to another. As Derthick 
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observed of American federalism, the intelligence and security functions are 
"...a very large elephant indeed" and "always in flux". Nonetheless the "... 
properties of the whole beast" must be grasped if any holistic explanation is 
to be produced.1538 It is in this area that existing explanations fall short; often 
working back from specific outcomes, they can use a linear explanation that 
excludes factors not relevant to the case in point, so that the applicability of 
their explanation is limited. The use of the range of institutional costs for 
analysis with variable amounts of emphasis on each gives the model as a 
whole a much broader utility.    
Secondly, the analysis suggests that ideas found in much of the existing 
literature arguing that organisational structure can be reformed to improve 
cooperative performance across the board are flawed.1539 Although 
examination of possible reforms is only incidental to this thesis, the ebb and 
flow in importance of particular problems nonetheless suggests that no 
perfect organisational form is likely to suit all circumstances. Whilst the British 
counterterrorism case demonstrates how one method of organisation might 
be better suited to cooperation in the face of uncertainty than another, that of 
the US, this is because it is more free to adapt and evolve, not because of 
any greater inherent suitability to the problems faced. No perfect 
organisational form per se, that would be well suited to all circumstances, is 
apparent. Instead rigid reforms induce problem displacement, and adaption 
to one environment leads to mal-adaption in another. Interestingly, this meant 
a closer alignment between this work and the more general literature, 
particularly that of Robert Merton,1540 than with much of the subject centred 
literature cited.  
Finally it must be emphasised that throughout the cases studied the twin 
assumptions of rationality and of actors pursuing their own self interest above 
all else are both far more nuanced constructs than the simple classical 
economic varieties. Indeed this is one of the powers of institutional cost 
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analysis. The divergence within them can therefore have non-trivial 
consequences for the larger institutional costs picture. 
In both the defence intelligence and counterterrorism cases, and on both 
sides of the Atlantic, the rationality of actors at every level is closely aligned 
with their plasticity as autonomous entities. Decision-making is adaptive and 
reactive, varying even in individuals when faced with largely similar 
circumstances. Rationality is thus evident to the extent that best outcomes 
are always preferred, but how that 'best' is defined can shift and is a matter of 
personal taste, often closely linked to the goals of the particular organisation 
to which actors belong but not necessarily any more apparent for that.1541 
Too great a reliance on any assumed preference as a fixed point is therefore 
problematic.       
Similarly, the nature of 'self-interest' as pursued by actors can be seen to be 
variable. More contradictorily, this is most significant when operating at a 
group level.1542 Individual actors at all levels naturally equate their own self-
interest with that of the group with which they most identify. The institutional 
cost problem this induces is not based on personally selfish activity, but 
rather on the fact that the level of identification is invariably at a sub-group 
level. This has implications for establishing vertical integration or even  
cooperation along any kind of hierarchical chain, as shared maximands are 
opaque and principal-agent problems more likely.    
Perhaps most importantly for the development of the approach used here, it 
is the interaction of particular institutional costs that decides the feasible set 
of cooperative outcomes, as suggested by the work of previous transaction 
cost scholars,1543 but this is still not a complete explanation. These findings 
also support a new argument, that different elements of the institutional costs 
impact framework each act on the others in very different ways, depending 
on the peculiarities of the case in question: Some are clearly catalytic in 
instigating other institutional cost issues, others may be conceived as pivots 
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across which the interactions of other elements occur (and are often 
magnified), whilst a third group are a product of other interactions, which 
might then exacerbate any frictions. Yet these categories do not necessarily 
parallel the divisions originally used by Williamson when he first framed his 
organisational failures framework.1544    
Section 4: Concluding Remarks  
The utility of the institutional costs approach as a means of considering 
cooperation between actors and organisations in the intelligence and security 
spheres lies in its ability to account for both 'normal' and 'deviant' cases with 
equal confidence. Because it is overall levels of institutional costs that define 
the boundaries of cooperative behaviour, and different issues can be more or 
less relevant, or act in distinct ways in different circumstances, the 
institutional costs approach offers an holistic explanation that is built on a 
range of existing theories, rather than in opposition to them.  
Taken in the round, the empirical findings of Parts 2 and 3 demonstrate that 
contrary to the orthodox view, British intelligence and security actors are no 
more predisposed to behave cooperatively than those of the United States, 
and vice versa. Rather, each will act and react to their fellow actors in similar 
ways to further the efficacy of their own particular responsibilities as they 
perceive them given similar constraints under which they must operate. 
These constraints are captured within the institutional costs impact 
framework and are constant on both sides of the Atlantic. It is matters of 
degree, and the way in which they interact, that varies from case to case. 
The principal distinction between the two nations is set, not in any general 
cultural antipathy towards, or enthusiasm for, cooperation, but in their 
overarching organisational architecture. It is this community level supra-
structure that defines the clarity of property rights allocations between 
different organisations and thereby the initial level of institutional frictions 
between them.  
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However advantages in those systems that do favour cooperative behaviour 
are not rooted in any specific structural design that is inherently superior in all 
cases. Instead it is a product of a lack of structural rigidity. The absence of 
too demarcated an inter-organisational structure allows actors to negotiate 
solutions in the face of environmental shifts and uncertainty more easily than 
would otherwise be the case. The apparent contradiction between the need 
for clear holdings of property rights and the need for adaptability in both 
counterterrorism and defence issues is not in fact a contradiction at all: 
Property rights were clearest when divided according to function, and most 
opaque when divided by responsibility. In the former cases those functions 
could be simply re-focused on any emerging problem by decision makers, 
whereas in the latter new threats mean new responsibilities and priorities that 
might provoke bureaucratic losers as well as winners.              
It is also worth reflecting on how fixed the various elements of the institutional 
costs paradigm might be? For example the emergence of a disposition 
towards ‘transparency’ in government amongst the public at large, set in an 
environment of increasing and ever more immediate access to information 
sources, was seen to create a new sort of monitoring cost. This could reduce 
flexibility and increase friction as actors had to negotiate in public, making 
any retreat from published positions and compromise harder. This shift 
suggests that other elements could also adapt over time, or potentially that 
wholly new elements might emerge, as the external environment changes.      
Overall then these findings have implications for both the practice and 
academic explanation of cooperation within the security and intelligence 
spheres. First, the idea that there can be any 'perfect organisational form' 
that is well suited to all possible environmental conditions, as advocated by 
many commentators advocating reform, is called into question. Certainly the 
manner in which the division of labour is managed can be altered so that 
property rights are clearer, but thereafter less not more rigidity is best in the 
face of high levels of uncertainty and complexity. But if the idea that there is 
any perfect organisational form that only needs to be introduced is a chimera, 
so too is the notion that any single issue can provide explanatory power for 
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the differing levels and types of cooperation observed across the two spheres 
of governance, whether it is socially or environmentally based.      
The question then arises, how far can these findings be extrapolated into 
firstly cooperation in the wider intelligence and security context, and 
thereafter across into more general questions of governance?   
The breadth of the areas of potential relevance to this study means that it 
cannot, of course, be exhaustive. Instead cases that could be expected to 
also test the boundary conditions of the institutional costs approach are used. 
This means that even within the functional spheres of counterterrorism and 
defence intelligence, issues of vertical cooperation and closer integration are 
the principal focus. At the same time it can be argued that both spheres, in 
both nations, could be regarded as having been in a state of crisis throughout 
the period under review, so that 'normal' environmental conditions remain 
untested.1545  
In order to support a wider claim of general applicability across the security 
and intelligence functions, there is therefore a requirement for a more 
extensive analysis to increase the reliability of the model. For a higher degree 
of certainty, the other dimensions of security and intelligence provision (as 
represented by the conception of probity considerations in Figure 5.6) should 
be examined in further detail. These would necessarily include horizontal 
relationships between and within different agencies, downstream interactions 
with local police and community level bodies, and an appreciation of how 
oversight is managed. To some extent each of these has been considered in 
at least a tangential way during this work: Firstly material published by 
oversight bodies is used extensively throughout the preceding Chapters so 
that at least some insight into the relationships on both sides of the Atlantic 
can be induced. Secondly the vertical integration and cooperation examined 
involved senior levels managing horizontal interaction amongst their sub-
level organisations across the broad front of functions needed in both 
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disciplines. This is an integral part of how managers achieve and deal with 
the complexity of the subject and their own bounded rationality. Both areas, 
like downstream relationships, would however benefit from further research. 
Some degree of commensurability across these levels can nonetheless be 
inferred, but with less confidence once specific cases are considered: The 
very poor relationships between operational level analysts within the CIA's 
Counterterrorism Center and the ODNI's National Counterterrorism Center 
(NCTC) for example seem to be aligned to the equally poor property rights 
allocations between them. However without further examination around, for 
example, what type of organisation the latter primarily aspires to be this is 
only conjecture; are the same tensions evident in the interrelationships 
between those involved in the NCTC's coordinating and policy elements and 
the CIA for instance? Similarly the local nature of the Joint Terrorism Task 
Force's across the US would appear to provide a lubricant between the local 
Federal capability and downstream 'State, local and tribal' actors. But there is 
also evidence that improving downstream interactions are at the expense of 
those back upstream to Washington, as the investigation into the Fort Hood 
shootings by Major Nidal Hasan suggests,1546 They may thus be becoming 
the same sort of fiefdoms that FBI field offices were found to be after the 9/11 
attacks.1547 If specific instances of poor cooperation within these areas are to 
be considered with a higher level of confidence more research is therefore 
required. In addition other areas of security and intelligence provision such as 
the provision of national estimates and their like, or counter intelligence, that 
were selected out of this thesis could also usefully be examined to support 
the wider aspirations of the theoretical architecture it espouses. 
The various theoretical approaches that are used in the development of the 
institutionalist costs impact framework for intelligence and security provision 
developed here, including the property rights and transaction costs 
considerations that are at its heart, were not themselves specific to the 
                                                                   
1546
 William H. Webster, "Final Report of the William H. Webster Commission on the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation, Counterterrorism Intelligence, and the Events at Fort Hood, Texas, on November 5th 
2009,"(Washington D.C.2012). 
1547
 "9/11 Commission: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the 
United States."74-78,425 
521 
 
intelligence or security spheres. Rather, they were designed to consider more 
general issues of social interaction that includes issues as diverse as private 
sector economic transactions through to wider matters of public sector 
governance. It is therefore likely that their amalgamation into the institutional 
costs approach may have a wider utility than that evidenced here. 
The narrow findings of this study validate the use of the institutional costs 
approach when considering cooperation between actors and organisations 
that exist along a vertical axis relative to each other. In the same way, it is 
likely to be pertinent to the other intelligence and security questions 
discussed above, despite the caveats already discussed. Beyond even these 
questions, the extensive breadth of theoretical views that have informed the 
development of the institutional costs approach argue for a potentially much 
wider applicability to questions of cooperation in governance more generally. 
Certainly the exact nature of much of the evidence discussed might be 
peculiar to the cases examined here; the asset specificity of military norms 
are of a unique type for example, but a less pronounced form might well be 
found in a Treasury department. The degree and exact nature of its impact 
will thus vary, but not the fact of its relevance. Similarly the problems of 
complexity and uncertainty might be particularly significant in the areas 
examined here, but they are never wholly absent from other areas of 
governance. While the institutional costs approach may have little to say 
about functions that are routine and repetitive and where contracting is 
predominantly fixed, in any more complex circumstances where actors must 
negotiate with each other to agree objectives, resources or roles it could, if 
appropriately developed, provide a more holistic explanatory paradigm of 
cooperation between them.          
The integration of the conclusions of a range of social scientists, including 
those outside the ‘economics’ realm, into the original Coasian and Williamson 
ideas of property rights and transaction costs has also refined understanding 
of their key elements, particularly as they are applied to non-financial 
agreements, and made them more broadly applicable. At the same time the 
more nuanced understanding of many of the terms asks further questions 
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about not only the degree of impact they might engender (be it positive or 
negative), but also the type of impact they might have as they interact with 
each other. The discovery that some can be catalytic, others act as pivots, 
and some are derived from the interactions of the other elements, suggests 
that the order in which each condition occurs might itself have an impact on 
how overall levels of institutional costs develop for example.  
There is therefore further work to be done, but as Graham Allison stated in 
his conclusion to ‘Essence of Decision’: 
“The burden of this study’s argument, however, is that larger payoffs 
in the future will come from an intellectual shift of gears. We should 
ask not what goals account for a nation’s choice of action, but rather 
what factors determine an outcome... We must move to a conception 
of happenings as events whose determinants are to be investigated 
according to the canons that have been developed by modern 
science.”1548  
This investigation into cooperation between different actors and organisations 
involved in the provision of security and intelligence is an examination of 
those factors, and the development of the transaction cost analysis for 
economic transactions into a framework of institutional costs provides a 
utilitarian and comprehensive means through which they can be more clearly 
analysed. It is therefore a further step along the road advocated by Allison in 
1971.   
                                                                   
1548
 Graham T. Allison (1971) ‘Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis’ p.255 Lillie 
Brown & Company. Boston MA. 
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Appendix 1 - Acronyms 
 
ASD-C3I Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control,  
  Communications and Information 
ASD-SOLIC Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low 
  Intensity Conflict 
BDA  Battle Damage Assessment 
CCIRM Collection, Coordination and Intelligence Requirements  
  Management 
CDS   Chief of the Defence Staff 
CENTCOM Central Command 
CIA  Central Intelligence Agency 
CINC  Commander in Chief  
CPNI  Centre for the Protection of Critical National Infrastructure 
CTIU  Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Unit 
CTU  Counter Terrorism Unit 
CTC  Counter Terrorism Command (aka. SO15) 
DARO  Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office 
DCDC  Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre 
DCI  Director of Central Intelligence 
DGIFC Defence Geospatial Intelligence Fusion Centre (Formerly 
JARIC) 
DHS  Department for Homeland Security 
DIA  Defense Intelligence Agency 
DIAC  Defense Intelligence Analysis Center 
DIFC  Defence Intelligence Fusion Centre 
DNI  Director of National Intelligence 
DoD  Department of Defense 
DoDJIC Department of Defense Joint Intelligence Center 
DOP(IT) Defence and Overseas Policy (International Terrorism) 
DOP(IT)(PSR)Sub-Committee of above for 'Protection Security and  
  Resilience' 
DVITS Digital Video Imagery Transmission System 
EAC  Echelons Above Corps 
EBO  Effects Based Operations 
EFP  Explosively Formed Projectile 
ESDP  European Security and Defence Policy 
ExCom Executive Committee of the National Security Council 
FBI  Federal Bureau of Investigation 
GC&CS Government Code and Cypher School 
GCHQ Government Security Head-Quarters 
GPO  General Post Office 
HSIC  Homeland Security Intelligence Community 
HSEC SINs Homeland Security Standing Information Needs 
HSIN  Homeland Security Information Network 
HSINT Homeland Security Intelligence 
HUMINT Human Intelligence 
INR  Bureau of Intelligence and Research 
IPB  Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace 
IRTPA Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 
524 
 
JARIC  Joint Air Reconnaissance Intelligence Centre, now the DGIFC 
JDISS  Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System 
JISE  Joint Intelligence Support Element 
JSOCC Joint Special Operations Component Commander 
JTAC  Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre 
JIC  Joint Intelligence Committee 
JICC  Joint Intelligence Coordinating Council 
JISE  Joint Intelligence Support Element 
JIVA  Joint Intelligence Virtual Architecture 
JMIP  Joint Military Intelligence Program 
JTF  Joint Task Force 
JTTF  Joint terrorism Task Force 
JWICS Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System 
MoD  Ministry of Defence 
NaCTSO National Counter Terrorism Security Office 
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NFIB  National Foreign Intelligence Board 
NGA  National Geospatial Intelligence Agency 
NIB  National Intelligence Board 
NIC  National Intelligence Council 
NIE  National Intelligence Estimate 
NCTC  National Counterterrorism Center 
NFIP  National Foreign Intelligence Program 
NIMA  National Imagery and Mapping Agency 
NIP  National Intelligence Program 
NIST  National Intelligence Support Team 
NMIST National Military Intelligence Support Teams 
NMJIC National Military joint Intelligence Center 
NRO  National Reconnaissance Office 
NSA  National Security Agency 
NSID  Ministerial Committee on National Security, International  
  Relations and Development  
NSC  National Security Council 
NSC(O) National Security Council Officials Committee 
ODNI  Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
ONA  Organizational Network Analysis 
OSCT   Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism  
PJHQ  Permanent Joint Headquarters 
PPD   Presidential Policy Directive 
PRT  Provincial Reconstruction Team 
PSIS  Permanent Secretaries Committee on the Intelligence Services 
PUS  Permanent Under Secretary 
RMA   Revolution in Military Affairs 
RPSI  Requirements and Priorities for Secret Intelligence 
TDF  Tactical Digital Facsimile 
SAP  Special Access Programs 
SCI  Special Compartmented Information 
SIA  Single Intelligence Account 
SID  Secondary Imaging Dissemination Device 
SIS  Secret Intelligence Service (also known as MI6) 
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SIGINT Signals Intelligence 
SCS  Special Collection Service 
SDSR  Strategic Defence and Security Review 
SOP  Standard Operating Procedure 
SyS  Security Service (also known as MI5) 
TIARA Tactical Intelligence Related Activities  
TIDO  Terrorism, International Defence and Overseas 
TK  Talent-Keyhole 
TPED  Tasking/ Processing/ Exploitation/ Dissemination 
TTIC  Terrorist Threat Integration Centre (later the NCTC) 
UK  United Kingdom 
US or USA United States of America 
USAF  United States Air Force 
USD(P) Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) 
USSS  United States Secret Service 
WMD  Weapons of Mass Destruction 
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